Animal Rights and Ethics of Duty Essay

Introduction

In the article “The Edge of Animal Rights” of Sun Yajun, the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics argues that the moral culture is made up of all things worthy of moral concern. The main emphasis is on analyzing the edge of true conviction within the context of animal rights philosophy. It also looks at the similarities and discrepancies in the moral issue boundary between different environmental ethics schools. The comparison shows a subtle relationship between science and moral philosophy and a standard philosophical premise shared by all environmental ethics (Sun, 2018). This study contributes to clarifying ecological ethics’ moral concern, which is a necessary precondition for establishing a new ethic and consolidating ecological ethics’ link to environmental sustainability.

Animal Rights

“Rights,” in the ethic framework, refer to “moral rights,” rather than legal rights, which refer to individuals’ legitimate claims. In other words, a person’s noble rights are linked to any ethical concern that the person needs. Meanwhile, whether or not a person has virtuous rights is unrelated to whether they can comprehend and protect those rights. Sun (2018) believes that all people with intrinsic meaning, whether they are moral agents or righteous victims, humans or nonhumans, have the same ethical right to be treated with dignity. According to this logic, the principle that “the individual has intrinsic worth” is reasonable because “the person has noble rights” still, it may not be a requirement (Sun, 2018). “Animal rights,” in particular, are virtuous rights, and human people, as moral agents, should protect animals that have ethical rights.

Not all animals, in specific, have moral rights, but all aspects of life have the same intrinsic worth. According to Sun (2018), the subject-of-a-life criterion is an acceptable criterion; it does not seem difficult to attribute intrinsic importance to individuals who do not meet the subject-of-a-life criterion. However, as per Sun (2018), assigning inherent value to individuals (particularly an entity as a group, such as a species or an ecosystem, rather than an individual) is extremely difficult to make “intelligible and non-arbitrary.” As a result, the subject-of-a-life parameter can be considered a sufficient factor for the constructed ethical context’s inherent-value criterion (Sun, 2018). In my view, the beneficiary of moral rights that contribute to noble interests, the possessor of inherent integrity, and the subject-of-life all fall into the same group.

Subjects-of-a-Life

Subjects-of-a-life should be “mentally normal creatures of a year or more,” but they do not have to be mammals. As a result, this delineation of the boundary between subjects-of-a-life and non-subjects-of-a-life is a “conservative” demarcation: “mentally normal mammals of a year or more” are appropriate, but not mandatory, condition for subjects-of-a-life. Given the concept of the “subject-of-a-life” and moral concern in practice in the rights view, I believe that the term “mentally normal” should be interpreted as having an essential awareness and psychological functions. Individuals with mild mental retardation, for example, have low intellect than the general population but still have a fundamental understanding and psychological activities, making them subjects-of-life.

Based on the above analysis of the rights view’s “explicit” logic, I can draw the following finding that the denotation of the psychologically normal mammal is tighter than that of the subject-of-a-life. Another result is that the latter is closer than the denotation of the proprietor of inherent value. The last is faster than the denotation of the possessor of legal obligations (Sun, 2018). As an outcome, whether on a cognitive or functional level, defining the boundary of “moral interest” (i.e., “mentally normal mammals of a year or more”) appears to be an expedient that serves only to achieve short-term objectives but has no long-term implications for the rights view. Although a definite distinction is currently impossible, it does not rule out the possibility of doing so in the future. By applying the “implicit” rationale of “animal rights,” I attempt to investigate the content of moral concern that those who do not meet the subject-of-a-life criterion may deserve.

Two Categories of Individuals

People who have only perception and sentience but no other mental capacities and those who have both consciousness and sentience and different intellectual and volitional capacities should be treated with more significant moral concern. The philosophy of “animal rights” is primarily concerned with higher honest artifacts (Sun, 2018). Furthermore, the conservative stance on practice includes matters of social consequences; namely, it promotes activities that value all subjects-of-a-life and contributes to creating a moral society in which all ethical rights are vigorously defended. The rights perspective should also involve noble agents not to hurt innocent people to maximize beneficial impacts in a community.

About Lower Organism

According to the rights viewpoint, a person who may logically be injured needs to suffer, which refers to severe enough pain and lasts long enough, rather than some pain. Given the nature of their nervous system and stress response, it seems inappropriate to suggest that lower animals with simple sentience may only undergo pain (Sun, 2018). It is ludicrous to tell that lower animals and plants, which lack sentience, may feel pain, let alone suffer. As a result, Sun (2018) means that lower species cannot handle extreme pain or suffering and, therefore, cannot be harmed. In the context of “animal rights,” I may argue that “do not hurt lower animals” and “do not harm plants” are fictitious propositions. Meanwhile, since the essence of moral practice is “no harming,” it is illogical to suggest that an entity that can never be affected could become a direct object of ethical responsibilities. As a result, plants and lower animals do not adhere to the moral class in the rights perspective.

Conclusion

Finally, I could like to point out that the line between morally significant objects remains ambiguous. This is not due to the difficulties of correctly identifying subjects-of-a-life, but rather to the need to enhance the elaboration of “the meaning of a life.” The value of life rises in proportion to the number of possible sources of happiness for a person, so it varies between life subjects. To put it another way, different life topics have the same intrinsic value, but they may have varying degrees of life value. The total sum of one’s incentives for satisfaction often determines the worth of a life, and damage is measured by the lost amount of opportunities for happiness. If an individual’s physiological needs are usually their opportunities for fulfillment, this presumption is rational. If people accept that plants and lower animals have moral concerns as well, then this type of “generalized” ethical culture would be very similar to biocentrism. The compatibility of the rights view, which is the most traditional environmental ethic, and biocentrism, which is the most radical ecological ethic, is an essential step toward coordinating various environmental ethics.

Reference

Sun, Y. (2018). The edge of “Animal rights.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 31(5), 543-557.