The anti-Japanese propaganda was used during WWII in order to create fear and antipathy towards Japanese people and their values. The content of propaganda was much the same as that of broadcast propaganda: emphasis on the Allies’ growing war potential, ridicule of the more preposterous assertions of the National Socialists, evidence of self-contradictions in the various speeches of Hitler and his allies, messages of hope and encouragement (or advice to exercise caution) to the inhabitants of the enemy-occupied territory. Anti-Japanese propaganda created an image of an enemy and rival based on unconscious perceptions and images of the Japanese as an underdeveloped nation.
Following Dewer, Anti-Japanese propaganda was based on the image of the enemy reflected in images and pictures. Printed material introduced into territory which took the form not of leaflets but of forged currency or ration books belongs by any definition to economic warfare rather than to propaganda. But what has been said is sufficient to show that propaganda too can be and in the last war was a tactical weapon of war. ‘Black’ stations and printed matter have advantages over their ‘white’ opposite numbers. As they are presumably under military control they are not subject to the ordinary rules of war-time censorship; not being presented as coming from the enemy their targets can listen to them (Dewer 43).
Such slogans as Know Your Enemy persuaded American citizens that the Japanese were a low developed nation and a direct threat to the security and freedoms of the American people (Dewer 15). Most of the campaigns were based on the constant repetition of simple slogans, the organization of mass meetings and ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations, and the ‘identification of the enemy”. But behind all this, there lies the fundamental difference that whereas Anti-Japanese propaganda was calculatedly false and lying. It may indeed contain factual inaccuracies, known as well as unknown, but only if these will help to strengthen the appeal of the message offered a message in which the Americans and Europeans sincerely believe. Following Jund, the state created the Shadow based on the idea that: “it is everything in us that is unconscious, repressed, undeveloped and denied. These are dark rejected aspects of our being as well as light, so there is positive undeveloped potential in the Shadow that we don’t know about because anything that is unconscious, we don’t know about” (Jung 2000). The authorities expected that the picture of the world that would come into existence after victory was achieved, however vaguely outlined was yet calculated to appeal to genuine idealism–to a sense of justice, to the longing for peace and comradeship, to the hatred of oppression and cruelty.
The wastage was certainly great; thus a batch of leaflets intended for a particular city might be dropped into open country owing to a miscalculation by the navigator of the aircraft carrying it, or if balloon-borne might by a shift in the prevailing wind be deposited in the wrong country or on the high seas; or again, if the leaflets were dropped at night (as for obvious reasons they usually were) the enemy had a chance of picking them up and destroying them before most ordinary citizens were up and about. And beyond all this, the preparation, printing, and despatch of the material took time and it was therefore in danger of being out of date and even silly by the time it reached its target if it ever did. The overriding objective of this front-line propaganda was to depress the enemy soldiers and if possible to persuade them to desert or surrender (Dewer 76). To this end, various arguments were used. First, that the war was bound to end with a victory for the Allies ultimately and the sooner the soldier realized this the quicker he would be able to return in peace to his family; secondly that the campaign then and there being fought was bound to end in success for the Allies. It was essential as counter-propaganda since the enemy had tried to frighten would-be deserters by horror stories of how the British and Americans treated their prisoners. Dewer states: “photographic negative, devoid of individuality, would appear at first glance to be the crassest sort of Western ethnocentricity and racism, for example; but it was, in fact, not very different from the patriotic slogans promoted by Japan’s own ruling groups” (30).
The effect was even greater when to the printed word was added the support of public address systems and loud-speakers over which messages could be shouted giving precise instructions as to how to surrender with least risk and could be complemented by former comrades who had taken the crucial step and could say why they did not regret it. It thus breaks one of the cardinal rules of counter-propaganda do not give publicity to enemy propaganda unless it is unavoidable; whenever possible dispose of its arguments or appeals by oblique reference only; do not quote the enemy by name unless you are sure that you can make him look so ridiculous, or so wicked, that the free advertisement you give him will do less harm from your own point of view than the impact of what you say upon the target will do good. The majority of posters depicted cruelties and immoral behavior of Japanese soldiers, murder, and rap scenes. The task of these images was to create fear and disgust towards the Japanese nation and soldiers. Also, some posters were based on racist messages heated national differences, and racial envy (Dewer 92).
In sum, anti-Japanese propaganda was based on emotional responses and appeals aimed to create an image of enemy and killer. So populations on which propaganda was target could concentrate their hate and fear. Anti-Japanese propaganda portrayed enemies at all levels and in all campaigns. Concentrate the passions of targets on one enemy did not let them become dispersed and thereby weakened. Once a propagandist has declared that final victory was just around the corner his position became stronger.
Works Cited
Dewer, J. W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. Pantheon, 1987.
Jung, K. 2002. The Shadow Dance—Understanding Repetitive Patterns in Relationships. Web.