Discuss how these factors contributed to the rise of communist totalitarianism in modern China:
- the political implications of the Chinese political tradition of “oriental despotism;”
- Confucian culture;
- a century of foreign invasion and historical trauma,
- the influence of the Russian communist revolution,
- the May 4th Movement.
The Influence of the Communist Russian Revolution
It is obvious that the first communist state in the world was Russia and that is why it is worth noting that this political regime appeared after the Communist Russian Revolution which took place in 1917. This revolution had a great influence on China. Communist roots in China can be traced back to the 1920s, a time when the Soviet Union engaged in financing the nationalist and Communist parties in this country to assist them in their effort to overthrow the warlords who ruled the land after the Qing Dynasty had been ousted from power in 1911. Under the Qing Dynasty, there was using the law to govern and those who did not obey the law were punished.
The Emperor’s word was law and there was the creation of a centralized state (Class notes). Eventually, there was a merging of the Nationalists and Communists but in turn, the first gained power after becoming the Communists, so they were recognized Chinese Government. However, at the time of the Japanese invasion, the Communists and the Nationalists came together again to fight against the Japanese. But after the Japanese had been expelled in 1945, civil war continued between them and finally came to an end in 1949. The end of this war allowed the Communists to gain power, hence the Nationalists had to escape to Taiwan (“What areas did communism spread to?”, par. 5).
Taking into account all the above-mentioned facts, it can be concluded that the Communist Russian Revolution contributed to the communist totalitarianism in modern China. It turns out that the assistance which the Soviet Union offered to the country resulted in the overthrow of the warlords, thus the idea of gaining power was instilled in both the Communists and the Nationalists in China. This eventually led to the Communists winning over the Nationalists.
A Century of Foreign Invasion and Historical Trauma
China had been considered as a “Great Empire” for almost a thousand years, that is why it was a great blow to the country to be deprived of such a status. However, its nation was to endure this humiliation to gain such an experience. China was very powerful and dominated its people as well as the nations around it. This country wanted recognition from the other countries to be appreciated as the most significant authority in the region.
Chinese pre-existing perception of prominence heightened the feeling of shame at the time the country suffered defeat, that is why losing the position of power was a big blow to the esteem of the nation and served to reveal the Chinese system’s weaknesses. The humiliation suffered contributed to the reviving of nationalism and the aspiration to get back to fame in the global arena. As pointed out by Varin, the humiliation experienced, which came out of the “loss of self-assurance regarding other nations, had a significant influence on the strategies adopted by decision-makers in the country’s foreign policy” (Varin 1).
The century of foreign invasion and historical trauma in China include “the Opium Wars, the Japanese occupation, the Jiawu War, and the Boxer rebellion” (Varin 1). In modern China, attention has been paid to the perceptions and expectations derived from the experience of humiliation the people were suffering during a century of foreign invasion and historical trauma. The Century of humiliation in China has triggered a craving for “revenge in form of a blistering rhetoric against the humiliators which is frequently endorsed through foreign policy” (Varin 1).
Submissive position in the global community is not accepted by the masses any longer. It can be concluded that a Century of Foreign Invasion and Historical Trauma contributed to the rise of communist totalitarianism in modern China.
The May Fourth Movement
As on one hand, the student protests are common in the present day, on another hand, the May Fourth Movement was directed by intellectuals who brought in fresh cultural ideas which included the calls for anti-imperialism, patriotism, science, and democracy to the masses. At the time of this movement, in 1919, there was no advanced communication technology as it is in the current day, and, therefore, the attempts to engage in mobilizing of the masses put the focus on literature, such as pamphlets as well as magazine articles, written by intellectuals. A large number of these intellectuals had carried out their studies in Japan and came back to China.
The literature they presented encouraged a social revolution and posed a challenge to the traditional Confucian values of family bonds as well as authority. These writers also engaged in encouraging sexual freedom and self-expression. Collectively, the objective of the intellectuals was to free the Chinese culture of those limitations according to which its people had a belief that contributed to China’s weakness and stagnation and to generate fresh values for a modern country (Mack 1).
Political Implications of the Chinese Political Tradition of “Oriental Despotism”
According to John Fairbank, a despotic state involves “the control of the land, the manpower, and the water supply” by a “hydraulic society” (Class notes). Looking at the hydraulic society, this refers to an oriental society that depended upon massive irrigation which demanded the central control of manpower and resources to construct a “hydraulic” system to bring the floods and droughts under control.
A “hydraulic society” breeds a “total state” or “oriental despotism” that can mobilize all its manpower and resources to construct “hydraulic systems” (massive public work) to bring the floods and draughts under control and enable the land to be cultivated for food production to feed its growing population. As a result, the despotic state overrides individual self-interest. People look for a strong government that can control the water work to ensure that even the villages which are located far from the river systems are supplied with the water required. Collective interest overrides individual interest. This, in the case of China, called for having absolute power of the state by the emperor to ensure that everything was carried out in the right way.
Confucian culture
Unlike monarchy which is powered by the church, Confucianism was adopted by the state. According to this culture, individuals belong to the collective (state). The reason for Confucianism being dominant is that it went in line with the ruling class’s needs. It could create a utopian world for the common people as well as for the ruling class. According to the Confucian culture, the ruler is like the father to those he rules taking care of their needs. This encouraged the officials to maintain loyalty to their rulers and supported the absolute power of an Emperor (Class notes).
Confucianism is totalitarian and it stresses the paramount need for accepting and having obedience for established social order as well as for centralized power of the emperor established based on the doctrine of ‘the Mandate of Heaven’. Under the Confucian model of government, the responsibility and rule can only be bestowed to people who have intelligence and are educated, because it is believed that ‘government by goodness’ can only be boosted through studying and learning by the people who possess superior moral and intellect standards.
Chinese political development has demonstrated a pattern dominated by power, ideology, and organization. What are the nature and characteristics of power, ideology, and organization in traditional China and contemporary China? In this essay, you are asked to explain similarities and differences in power, ideology, and organization between traditional China and contemporary China.
Similarities and differences in power, ideology, and organization between traditional China and contemporary China do exist. Some of the patterns in power, ideology, and organization in contemporary China were inherited from traditional China. For instance, the leaders who were at the forefront to bring change to Chinese society after the People’s Republic of China had been established in 1949 returned to the values of the old society.
Even if these people were “conscious revolutionaries”, they did not intend to change China by imitating a foreign nation. They possessed an undecided attitude towards their nation’s history and its traditional society, reproving some characteristics and embracing the others. Moreover, the leaders of China who came after 1949 paid their attention and commitment to ensuring that some of the aspects of the traditional society were changed.
Some of these aspects encompassed education content and rural area land tenure. However, some other points were not mostly touched, such as the family structure. Therefore, the change that has been implemented in Chinese society is less than total and also less steady. To understand contemporary Chinese society, one needs to familiarize him or her with the legacies of the earlier period, especially in the sphere of values in the social life field, like family organization, in which there has been no consideration of transformation as being a “high-priority political goal” (“Traditional Society and Culture” 1).
It is pointed out that “China’s traditional values were contained in the orthodox version of Confucianism, which was taught in the academies and tested in the imperial civil service examination” (“Traditional Society and Culture” 1). The concern of Confucianism is basically about social order. The achievement of the ‘social harmony’ is to be realized within the state, whose administrators consciously select the proper policies and act to educate both the rulers and the subject masses (Worden n.pag.). Confucianism came up and “developed as the ideology of professional administrators and continued to bear the impress of its origins” (“Traditional Society and Culture” 1).
Claims for power by the Confucianists were presented based on their knowledge, coming from direct mastery of the Confucian Classics. It was believed that these books contained pure wisdom of the past that applied to the entire human race across the world (Worden n.pag.). The analysis of these books was the uppermost form of acquiring education and the maximum qualification that could enable one to hold a public office. To create a perfect nation, the country had to educate its citizens according to the classical teachings. An assumption was that every person was “educable” and each individual needed to be given appropriate education. The social order that was there might have come naturally, but an assumption was not made that it was intuitive.
Confucianism emphasized very much learning all the socialization aspects. The Confucianists “preferred internalized moral guidance to the external force of law, which they regarded as a punitive force applied to those unable to learn morality” (“Traditional Society and Culture”1). They viewed the perfect society as a hierarchy in which every person had full knowledge about his or her place and responsibilities in the society. Thus, it was necessary to take the existence of a state and a ruler for granted, but it was held by the Confucianists that leaders were supposed to show their readiness to fit their merit (“China – Physical Environment and Population” n.pag.).
The most important point was that heredity was not a sufficient condition for having legitimate power. Therefore, traditional Chinese thought brought together a perfectively firm and hierarchical social order having a positive reception of individual accomplishment, education as well as mobility within the fixed structure.
The traditional values have led to creating the greatest part of the Chinese modern lifestyle. The idea of being ruled by the elite which is learned and not specialized functionally, the importance attached to learning and spreading an accepted ideology that focuses on the government as well as on society, and the emphasis on hierarchy and the state’s greatest responsibility were all brought in from the Chinese traditional culture. Among the more severe and intense policies that were set up in the 1950s as well as in the 1960s, some can only be comprehended as responses to the conventional attitudes which are deep-seated.
The role played by the soldiers and the model workers and the formal concern in the structure of the arts and popular culture reflect the Chinese themes in a characteristic manner (“China – Physical Environment and Population” n.pag.). In the middle of the 1980s, several Chinese authors as well as the political leaders identified the persistent hold of “feudal attitudes even within the Chinese Communist Party, as a major obstacle to modernization” (“Traditional Society and Culture” 1).
Discuss what factors and how these factors contributed to the rise of military fascism in pre-WWII Japan.
The coming up of the Japanese military in politics commenced in the course of the late 1920s after Emperor Showa, who was the grandson of Meiji, took over power in the year 1926 (Class notes). In the year 1932, there was a coup attempt by some military officers, when Prime Minister Tsuyoshi was assassinated. Later, in the year 1936, there was a massive assassination that was undertaken by the youthful military officers in which they were targeting the cabinet officials.
This brought the Control Faction of the high-ranking officers into power, which had the responsibility of operating the government as well as the economy. Cabinet minister appointment required military approval. It did not take much time for the cabinet, which was controlled by the military, to carry out the implementation of the “national political innovation programs” for preparing for war, control of education, and supporting the military adventure in Manchuria of China and areas of Japan domination in Southern Asia (Class notes).
Pre-war Japan showed a large number of the traits which the modern scholars attribute to military fascism. During the early Showa period, Japan was greatly militaristic, nationalistic, imperialistic, and racialist. What tends to be missing is a “totalitarian organization of government by a single party dictatorship” (Willensky 64). If, however, it is accepted that in 1940, IRAA was the only political party that existed, as well as the Meiji Constitution, accorded wide flexible powers to the Emperor giving him an actual commander-in-chief status of the Imperial Japanese navy and military, then the fundamental framework for fascism tended to be in place in “Imperial Japan in the immediate pre-war period” (Willensky 64).
Imperial Japanese military and bureaucracy put immense emphasis on the collective belonging and a shared history. Beginning from Meiji, Taisho and, more evidently, during the early Showa period, there was no lack of propaganda sponsored by the government to offer assistance to the average Japanese people to see their place in “nation”, “household” and “family” and how they related with the Emperor in “unbroken line through history” (Willensky 64). Such a process emphasized the sacred significance of the Japanese language, history as well as culture. A portion of this indoctrination set stress on the significance of the kokutai, in that it must subsume under the concept of the individual. This is a very important element of fascism.
Imperial Japanese bureaucracy leaders viewed the relationship of the Japanese people with kokutai in the same terms, and an argument can be presented that Konoye Fumimaro, the Prime Minister, was making attempts at the commencement of the Imperial Japanese military “with the passage of National General Mobilization Law, Kokka Sodoin Ho” (Willensky 65). This law did not just target at creating an all-inclusive war economy but to unite the Japanese citizens according to submissive and awe-inspired state’s subjects.
The Emperor was not just an absolute but a divine ruler and “in his will was found the raison d’être of the Japanese nation” (Willensky 65). This is fascism as it was seen by Mussolini:
Individuals form classes according to the similarity of their interests, they form syndicates according to differentiated economic activities within these interests; but they form first, and above all, the State…Not a race, nor geographically determined region, but a community historically perpetuating itself, a multitude unified by a single idea, which is the will to existence and power (Cohen 331).
In the situation of Imperial Japan, the will to power was taken to be the Emperor’s will and the kokutai which the Emperor embodied.
It is pointed out that Fascism may not have been there in 1868, but the ideals which made up to “form the core of Mussolini’s vision are concepts and values that the nation-building Meiji oligarchs shared” (Willensky 66). They viewed Imperial Japan as a nation of a single heart and mind and in the light of the nation of individuals or the democratic European nations. It was outlined by Hiranuma Kiichiro in his 1932 speech that:
Our nation is constituted of one ruler, in an unbroken line of Imperial descent, and his subjects. It is a nation based upon the centralization of the Imperial Family, with the entire people assisting the ruler in the realization of national ideals. In other words, it is the duty of the people, under the Emperor, to exert their best efforts towards the accomplishment of the tasks allotted to them (Willensky 66).
It was not an issue that the Meiji oligarchs let the emperor know what his vision should have been. However, the issue, as well as the thing that mattered, was that they engaged in the creation of a certain cornucopia of modern values and myths that with time, led to the creation of the basis of a fascist state. The Imperial nation of Japan was fascist not for the reason that it succeeded in establishing good relationships with such countries as Germany and Italy but rather, it was for the reason that it was what the intention of the Meiji oligarchs meant it to be.
Compare China and Japan in terms of the nature of their political regimes and the key characteristics of their political institutions.
In both China and Japan, Confucianism as a moral code is observed. But the Japanese transform Confucianism in their way and to a particular level, there is applying of the Confucian concepts to relationships carrying a meaning that is not similar to that of China. Harmony, and not rivalry, is among the core Confucian notions and the concept which assists in shaping the Japanese as well as Chinese political cultures. Both of these nations are highly “collectivistic” societies under the Confucian influence (Wang 18). However, taking the case of Japan, there is putting of much emphasis on group orientation and loyalty to the group because it is the group that offers one a social identity, offers a security feeling and obtains the service rewards (Wang 22).
Looking at China, this nation has been experiencing a vibrant economic reform process as well as social modernization in the course of over the past two and a half decades. The economic path of China from the beginning of the reform era in the 1970s has been intensely different from other regions, such as Central Europe and Central Asia. The Chinese market transformation is characterized by three specific features.
One of these features is that the Communist party was able to survive the crucial period after 1989 and has undergone revitalization from that time rather than tumbling into destruction. In ways that are not similar to a lot of post-communist regimes, the Chinese elite has not been removed from power forcefully. But instead, it seems that the elite was in a position to engage in consolidating its power over the past several years.
Moreover, the market reforms in China have been implemented in even a better way as compared to those carried out in Russia as well as Central Europe regarding absolute economic growth the country has succeeded to achieve. The sudden collapse of the political institutions and the abrupt downfall of the whole system of economic regulation and property rights “were marketers of the development in former Soviet bloc, causing economic damage from which these countries would suffer for years to come” (Heberer and Schubert 10). On the contrary, China got involved in carrying out economic reforms in a much more gradual way, holding on to its Communist ‘one-party rule” political framework at the same time.
The third feature is that the state assets of privatization have been undertaken at a slower rate, and this has also been done more cautiously than anywhere else within the post-communist world, in which a large number of the state assets to private markets in the initial period of the transition were transferring. It is important to note that the private sector of China has not been raised via the state assets transfer to the private owners, but mostly through private entrepreneurship beginning outside the state sector via foreign investment. As a result, even being very large and contributing about 55 percent of the GDP, the private sector of China lags behind a large number of the post-communist economies.
It is observed that the Communist Party may also have attained success in engaging in the perpetuation of its exclusive authority, but with each coming day, it, however, draws closer to the inevitable intersection of the “full-scale privatization” as well as democratization (Heberer and Schubert 10). Some people observe that three scenarios are likely to come about shortly. According to Heberer and Schubert, ‘the apocalyptic” variant predicts that the present levels of political as well as social power instability will bring about “intra-party friction” and the eventual collapse of the regime.
Moreover, speculation is made by the “optimistic variant” on a progressive transition towards the democratic system “along the model set out by South Korea and Taiwan” (Heberer and Schubert 10). The third scenario is where there would be some obstacles to solve the problems that are reactive and restricted to the goal of ensuring the preservation of the Communist “one-party rule” (Heberer and Schubert 10). But according to the third scenario, the end of the Communist rule is only decelerated; it can not be saved from the ultimate collapse.
However, in whatever situation, change of system is considered unavoidable in China even if this change is either reformist or revolutionary. Although the current regime may not be regarded as unstable, in a condition of “stable unrest that may continue for some time, in the West, it certainly counts as deeply delegitimized in the eyes of most people it claims to represent” (Heberer and Schubert 10). Having stability being uncertain, an assumption is made that the Communist regime is facing a “deep-going crisis of legitimacy that will eventually lead to democratization” (Heberer and Schubert 10).
Considering the case of Japan, just like China, it has experienced economic development. A great economic development was witnessed in the post-WW II period. The political system was under the domination of the liberal Democratic Party up to the year 1993. In 2009, the Democratic party of Japan obtained the majority in the lower house which was more powerful, to move with the leading coalition to the upper house. Japan as a nation is “a constitutional monarch with the parliamentary government” (U.S Department of State 1). In this country, the election is conducted through a secrete ballot for all the elective positions.
National sovereignty is vested in the Japanese citizens and was formally embodied in the emperor. The Emperor is defined as being the state’s symbol. Unlike China which embraces one part rule, Japan embraces multiparty politics. Japan has developed economically to a level that it is the third-largest economic developed country in the world. This country’s economy is greatly efficient and very much competitive in those areas that are connected to international trade. However, productivity is lower in those areas that are protected, such as services, agriculture, and distribution (U.S Department of State 1).
Has post-Mao China moved toward “market capitalism” or “market socialism?” You are asked to
- clearly define the two concepts with a clear distinction between them;
- develop your logical argument about this issue based on your defined concepts and empirical observation;
- use substantial empirical evidence to support your argument based upon the reading materials as given in the class.
Whereas socialism refers to an economic system whereby the means of production and exchange have public ownership and the performance of the main economic activities is carried out by the public, societal well as governmental agencies, on the other hand; capitalism refers to an economic system where the exchange and production means have private ownership, and the performance of the main economic activities is carried out by the private organizations.
However, as pointed out by Guo, “socialism does not presuppose public ownership of all means of production and exchange but is compatible with the existence of private ownership in some economic fields like agriculture, handicrafts, retail trade, and small and middle-sized industries” (Guo 554).
Basing on all the evidence after carrying out a keen examination and evaluation of theoretical models, it is indicated that post-Mao China has in the actual sense moved away from a command economy that is planned centrally towards some sort of market socialism that is controlled by a state where corporatized public ownership dominates a free-market economy of capitalism. The real ownership level is in line with the official documentary goals of China and the SOE’s corporatization has not made a substantial contribution towards privatization.
The Post-Mao economic reforms have not facilitated the elimination of the public ownership system, about which a declaration has been made by all the communists of it being one core element of the basic principles and the communist ideology norms and a socialist economic system. There must be the sustenance of the public ownership of the main production and exchange means in the communist economic system to ensure maintaining the regime identity, although it is not essentially exhibited to a similar level at all times.
It has been indicated by hard evidence that all SOEs and other enterprises within the public sector have gone on to have domination in the economy; large as well as medium SOEs have been concerted into “joint-stock and shareholding companies with a rearranged pattern of public ownership, decollectivization has not led to privatization of land” (Guo.572); SOEs have gone on having domination and influence over all the resources, key aspects, industries, factors of production, and “commanding heights of the national economy, although its share in China’s overall GDP has largely shrunk; the same control system has remained effective and powerful, and state intervention has been extensive and commonplace in the post-Mao policy and performance” (Guo 572).
The aim of the post-Mao leadership is not to undertake the transformation of the whole economic system to change it into a capitalist system but to bring improvement in the socialist system and to set up the Chinese economy as quickly as possible in the fundamental framework of state socialism as well as its structure of political governance. A distinctive aspect of the Chinese reforms is the endeavor by the leadership to carry out the preservation of the socialist nature of the economy.
In this regard, the authorities have not engaged in pursuing a strategy of “mass privatization” like it was in the case of the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe. One of the examples that can be given is the ‘household responsibility system’; “even if they use land and its management are contracted out to individual households, land continues to be publicly owned” (Guo 572). Other examples can also be seen in the following. Even if the system of ownership turns out to be diversified, the public ownership encompassing “state and collective-owned” enterprises goes on to have domination in the economy.
Moreover, even if the forms of having the realization of public ownership appear to be diversified, the state sector still has much influence on the main aspects of what is referred to as “commanding heights” of the economy, and there is continually overseeing of the operation of enterprises by the party organizations. The third aspect shows that even though the market plays a more significant part, the ‘dual-track’ system goes on to be there and there has been no reducing of all the forms of the administrative interventions, but they have instead been made stronger.
A more remarkable change has been made by post-Mao China than Mao’s China, regarding the non-public sector, economic market as well as enterprise autonomy. However, the far it will go remains to be observed. Making a comparison of China with the economic transition of the Eastern European nations regarding the six main progress indicators, the progress of China remains to lag in respect of these six key progress indicators, even if economic reforms in this country commenced more than a decade earlier than in those states.
The six key progress indicators include “output share of the private sector, privatization law, internal convertibility, progress in privatization, price liberalization, and quantitative restrictions on trade” (Guo 573). Therefore, the transition of China has to be examined to have less advancement as compared to its counterparts in Eastern Europe.
Works Cited
China – Physical Environment and Population. n.d. Web.
Cohen, Carl. Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations. New York: Random House, Inc., 1972. Print.
Guo, Sujian. “The ownership reform in China: what direction and how far?” Journal of Contemporary China, 12.36(2003): 553 – 573. Print.
Heberer, Thomas, and Gunter Schubert. “Political reform regime legitimacy in contemporary China”. ASIEN, 99.1(2006): 9 – 28. Print.
Mack, Lauren. May Fourth Movement. n.d. Web.
“Traditional Society and Culture”. Countrystudies.us., n.d. Web.
U.S Department of State. Background Note: Japan. 2012. Web.
Varin, Caroline. Humiliation, National Identity and Foreign Policy: A Study of France and China. 2009. Web.
Willensky, Marcus. “Japanese Fascism Revisited”. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 5.1(2005): 58 – 77. Print.
Wang, James C. F. Comparative Asian Politics: Power policy, and change. New York: Prentice Hall, 1994. Print.
Worden, Robert L., Savada, Andrea Matles and Ronald E. Dolan. (Eds.). China: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. Countrystudies.us. Web.