Introduction
Nuclear weapons create the main threat for modern civilizations. The cultivation and proliferation of nuclear weapons have led not only Americans but all of humankind into a fearsome trap. The proposition, therefore, that law has an enduring relevance to the problem of nuclear weapons should be obvious. Sooner or later, in some form or another, the law must be brought to bear upon the ultimate peril, or that peril will surely be realized. That is the reason for the publication of this volume. Iran is one of the countries developing nuclear weapons in spite of strict international laws and legislation. The book Reading Lolita in Tehran by Azar Nafisi vividly portrays that the international community cannot control the domestic policies of this country and believes in its peaceful intentions. Abuse of human rights and laws is typical for Iran provided aggressive militarization of the country.
Main body
The main problem with Iran’s policies (domestic and international) is that it is difficult to predict them and foreshadow the next step in its activities. Reciprocal terror characterized Western culture long before nuclear weapons were even thought of, the existence of these weapons has created an entirely new situation, an entirely new level of reciprocal terror. The meaning is—at least, should be—clear: time-honored principles of governmental behavior must be re-examined. Political leaders no longer can ensure the survival of the state, or of the populace, should nuclear war break out. Accordingly, nuclear weapons must be eliminated (Schake 67). Just as Western liberal democracies have limited the state as the ultimate repository of police power, the state must be limited in its behavior as the ultimate repository of nuclear war-making power. Iran adopts aggressive policies against the US and the western world aimed to prove the military and political strengths of the region. Terrorist attacks and Jihad are the main principles adopted by the country’s leadership. “Iran threatens to resume production and testing of centrifuges in retaliation for IAEA complaints; Iran resumes uranium conversion in September 2005; President Ahmadinejad claims Iran is prepared to transfer nuclear knowledge to other Muslim nations” (Schake 3). Those who argue that nuclear weapons are now illegal base their case on a variety of widely accepted treaties and principles of customary international law dealing primarily with the humanitarian laws of war and the protection of human rights. These rules, for example, require combatants to protect civilians and avoid attacking non-military targets, bar the use of weapons likely to inflict indiscriminate and disproportionate damage or cause needless suffering, prohibit genocide, and require governments to respect human life and dignity. The proponents argue that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably involve massive violations of these fundamental rules of war and of human rights. As further evidence of an international consensus barring such weapons, they point to a number of recent U.N. General Assembly resolutions expressly declaring nuclear weapons illegal and their use criminal (Afrasiabi 23).
The USA should fear Iran’s venture because the state and its President Ahmadinejad do not want to cooperate with the international community and obey the international laws and doctrines. “The pattern of Iranian behavior during the negotiations does not support the hopeful proposition that the Iranian government is foremost seeking a way back into the mainstream of international activity. To the contrary, President Ahmadinejad gives every indication of reveling in the crisis and pressing for tactical advantage” (Schake 3). More broadly, international observers suggest that nuclear weapons should be viewed as inherently illegal since nuclear war is inconsistent with the fundamental values of human dignity and organized society upon which international law itself rests; a rational civilized society cannot accept as legitimate weapons which are likely to destroy it. Those who disagree with this position argue that, while nations may ultimately agree to prohibit nuclear weapons totally, they have not yet done so. In their view, international law rests solely on state consent; there is no “natural” international law. Customary international law that their possession or use of nuclear weapons—at least for defensive or deterrent purposes—is in itself illegal. On the contrary, existing treaties placing certain restrictions on nuclear weapons explicitly or implicitly recognize that, except as so limited by treaty, the possession and use of nuclear weapons are permitted. Attempts to stretch older treaties dealing with conventional weapons to cover the very different situations created by the recent development of nuclear weapons are not realistic and go beyond what nations agreed to or intended in these treaties. Indeed, if nuclear weapons are clearly illegal, it is not easy to explain to people why we need to continue working so hard, and with only limited success, to achieve other less far-reaching legal agreements (Krieger 3). Certainly, it raises the crucial moral issue of nuclear weapons—the deep and pervasive inconsistency between these weapons and all that civilized society has long struggled for in terms of humanitarian ideals, individual human dignity, a rational world order, and indeed human survival.
The book Reading Lolita in Tehran vividly portrays the abuse of human rights and domestic laws dominated in the country. Thus, so long as the illegality argument supplements rather than divert our efforts to develop new agreements and approaches, it can certainly help to develop broader public awareness of the issue of the legitimacy of such weapons and help to shape a moral consensus against them. In any event, however one comes out on the present illegality issue, it is clear that many additional measures will be needed if we are to make progress in stopping the arms race, stabilizing deterrence, and reducing proliferation. Azar Nafisi writes: “Any and all methods were used to achieve their purposes, including what became known as “human wave” attacks, where thousands of Iranian soldiers, mainly very young boys ranging in age from ten to sixteen and middle-aged” (208). Iran authorities do not value human lives driven by domestic security and global control issues. It forcefully demonstrates the relevance of the traditional humanitarian laws of war to nuclear weapons and shows that there are existing norms at least limiting the ways in which such weapons can legitimately be used (Sagan et al 135).
And if effective arms control isn’t achieved—and yet we somehow avoid a holocaust—we may face a future in which international lawyers may be dealing with some strange questions. Or, as the dangers of nuclear war continue to mount, nations may be prepared to try even more far-out ways of maintaining deterrence and providing assurance against a first strike—hostage arrangements, doomsday devices, prohibitions on civil defense or on shelters or safe-havens for high military and government officials, or an independent deterrent force under international or perhaps even nongovernmental authority. Azar Nafisi writes that “Think that our culture was not compatible with modern democracy, that there were Western and Islamic versions of democracy and human rights. We all wanted opportunities and freedom. That is why we supported revolutionary change-we were demanding more rights, not fewer” (261). If nuclear war becomes thinkable, even the most bizarre schemes for trying to avoid it may also become thinkable. A world in which nuclear arms control has failed and arms races and proliferation continue indefinitely will be a grim and dangerous world at best. We must somehow bring nations to their senses and make sure that our children never have to live in such an absurd world. If enough governments and peoples say that these weapons are wrong, it will be increasingly difficult for the governments of nuclear states to continue to defend their legitimacy. As international lawyers, we know that there are many reasons why nations are likely to keep their agreements, and that fear of being caught cheating is not necessarily the most important. If nuclear weapons are available, nations will be tempted to use them to deter or repel conventional as well as a nuclear attack; NATO’s nuclear deterrent policy against a Soviet conventional attack in Europe is an example (Sagan et al 135). So concern with nuclear war must not divert us from continuing urgently to search for ways to control all types of conflict. In particular, we have to give much more serious and urgent attention, and commit more of every kind of resource, to dealing with pervasive global problems that give rise to war—nationalism, ideological differences, economic inequality, injustice, and the denial of human rights (Schake 67).
Conclusion
In sum, the US should fear Iran’s capabilities because its impossible to predict and control the actions and policies of the country. In contrast to other Asian and European countries, Iran does not follow and accept international laws and regulations, does not value human rights and democratic freedoms. But much that needs to be done transcends issues of law. The non-nuclear states, in the U.N. and other international forums, should continue to condemn these weapons and demand their prohibition. Professional, religious, and other groups must keep hammering at the point that these weapons are wrong.
Works Cited
Afrasiabi, K. L. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction. 2006.
Krieger, D. Iran, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament. International Journal of Humanities and Peace, 22 (2007), 3.
Nafisi, A. Reading Lolita in Tehran. Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003.
Sagan, S. Waltz, K., Betts, R. K. A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster. Journal of International Affairs, 60 (2006), 135.
Schake, K. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran. Policy Review, 142 (2007), 67.