Introduction
Proliferation of nuclear weapons poses many threats to the international security. In response to such threats, nations look for ways of protecting their territorial integrity. The most effective mechanism of protecting individual national sovereignty entails adopting proactive response to security threats as opposed to reactive strategies (Nau 2008; Ross & Feng 2008).
Deterrence is one of the proactive mechanisms of shielding a nation from violations of territorial integrity through acts such as terrorism in an international arena. This paper declares deterrence an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and international terrorists.
First, it presents the theory of deterrence before discussing the challenges of proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. Lastly, it justifies why deterrence constitutes an effective strategy of overcoming the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism.
Deterrence
The deterrence theory acquired immense recognitions in the cold war era. Its focus was on nuclear weapons. The strategy aims at dissuading enemies from taking destructive actions (Vasquez 2009, p.14). It also involves requesting other nations to stop doing things that are against other nations’ desires. Hence, it entails using threats as a means of convincing other nations why it is not in order to follow some paths.
As a military strategist and a proponent of deterrence, Bernard Brodie claims that nations need to have credible and reliable nuclear deterrence to ensure that they are ready at all times, but not using the nuclear weaponry (Vasquez 2009). As quoted by Freedman (2004, p.43), Thomas Schelling presented the concept, ‘military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory’.
Rather, as a successful military strategy, he claims that deterrence encompasses coercion and/or acts of intimidation. In this extent, deterrence implies the capacity to harm other states that interact in the international arena in the effort to influence certain states to comply with the need to protect territorial integrity.
The success of deterrence to curb any act of terrorism rests on the ability of a nation to deploy the power to hurt or harm other nations as a motivating factor for the target nation not to engage in any act that may harm the targeting nation (Waltz 2010). Proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran evidences this assertion (Litvintsev 2014). The programme was initiated in the 1950s, with European governments and the US taking central roles.
It was part of the programme of atoms for peace. The involvement of these two parties did not proceed for long since it was terminated during the close of 1970s when the Iranian Shah was overthrown by the country’s insurgency. In the mid 1980s, Khomeini regime brought up the idea of a nuclear programme in secret.
The plan also encompassed preparing for acquiring the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that were initiated during the Shah’s reign. This move was initiated by the Iran’s devastation that had been caused by Iraq due to the moves of Iraq to deploy chemicals weapons in the war between the two nations.
Consequently, if Iran can successfully implement its nuclear weapon project, which the administration says is meant for nuclear energy purposes, the implication is that it can develop the capacity to coerce other nations in the international arena to behave in certain ways.
While deterring or coercing other nations, violence is often inevitable. However, it can be mitigated through the accommodation strategy. Hence, hurting other nations as a mechanism of exercising a bargaining power forms the basis of the deterrence theory. Such deterrence is most effective when reserved (Morgan 2003).
Indeed, Iran has attempted to present itself as a good international relations party by attempting to hold its ability to engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a reserve for its future ability to coerce other nations. In 1990, Iran endeavoured to develop its own nuclear power for the mining and processing of uranium.
Part of this energy was also scheduled to be utilised in the production of large amounts of water that is needed in the manufacture of plutonium. Still in the same year, Iran also began its secret mission of buying uranium centrifuges that were made by A.Q khan. Testing of the centrifuges began in 2000.
Although this process was done secretly, in 2002, the fuel activities cycle was publicised, thus prompting the intervention of France, Britain, IAEA, and Germany. These players in the international peace accord believed that Iran had engaged in a hidden mission of developing nuclear weapons for use against its adversaries such as the US and Iraq.
Power constitutes an important aspect that enables a nation to pursue its own individual interests over other nations. Indeed, deployment of military threats to deter any possibility of wars and/or crisis constitutes important issues in the discussion of international security (Morgenthau 2011).
For instance, the US, with cooperation from other militarily powerful nations, threatened to attack Iran if it did not abandon its nuclear weaponry project (Litvintsev 2014). The US has also predicted possible military confrontation consequences in Syria if the UN reports indicates that it has been using chemical weapons against is citizens.
In such situations, the US and other powerful nations declare the step a potential threat to international security. They persuade other nations not to engage in any act that interferes with international peace because of losses and other costs that such a move might attract (Adsera & Boix 2002).
In the international security discourses, deterrence policies have implications of pushing for certain policy goals. In this context, deterrence covers all ‘threats of military retaliation as directed from leaders of one state to those of another in an attempt to prevent the latter from resorting to the threat of using military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals’ (Waltz 2010, p. 734).
Deterrence guidelines can be grouped into two major classes, namely the preclusion of any equipped assault against a nation’s field or an unswerving preclusion and avoidance of any prepared assault against another country. Directed deterrence occurs in case of direct confrontation between neighbouring nations without any intervention of a superpower nation (Waltz 2010).
Extended deterrence occurs where great nations are involved in international confrontation such as the case of fighting against terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now in Somalia.
As opposed to direct deterrence, extended deterrence attracts scholarly interest. Indeed, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or measures to avert acts of terrorism lies within the category of extended deterrence.
Morgan (2003) asserts that deterrence may aim at resolving short-term pressing threats to international security (immediate deterrence) or curtailing short-term threats from arising (general deterrence). The case of the conflict between Iran and the US in the exploration of the nuclear weaponry capability exemplifies the concept of direct deterrence.
The Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
International community has had an objective of preventing the probable use of nuclear weapons. The overall goal is to ensure the abolition of weapons reserves. This interest has given rise to various international institutions and governmental agencies such as IAEA that seek to ensure that no more nuclear weapons are developed.
Developing nuclear weapons threatens the territorial integrity of nations, especially those that constitute an adversary to a given state. For instance, the west views Iran’s nuclear programme as a means of developing the capacity to mass-destroy people and/or seeking the power to control the world. Since the Second World War, peace has been the main superiority of many nations all over the world.
Therefore, superpower nations have a noble responsibility of ensuring that all nations hold and follow the peace accord, as enumerated in the UN charter.
Indeed, the west pushes the world to view Iran’s missions to establish nuclear power capability as an attempt to threaten the life of the nationalities of the west and that of all people across the globe. With one nation having a superior weaponry capability, the deterrence capability of a likely target becomes incredibly impossible.
Although seeking deterrence against any potential nuclear weaponry attack is important, it has its negative ramifications. For instance, the overall consequences of spreading the negativity that Iran is a threat to the international peace, especially on the gulf region, is making the international community see Iran as a country that is dominated by a population that is strategically prepared to mass-destroy lives.
Consequently, the objective of the west is to make people perceive Iranians as a threat to the international peace without necessarily considering that they took part in the creation of the programme. Nevertheless, negative portrayal cannot suffice as a grounded reason for Iran’s alleged participation in the development of nuclear weapons in secret.
The Problem of Terrorism
Terrorism seeks to disrupt or destroy targets through cowardly acts. Terrorists deploy acts such as assassinations, hijacking, and kidnapping to advance their political discourses (Miller 2013). Indeed, terrorism has risen to become a major global problem. Cases of suicidal bombing have been registered in Afghanistan, Iraq, African nations, and the US among other places. Terrorism takes different forms.
However, their main purpose entails forcing regime changes in different nations. Terrorism is also acerbated against people who are opposed to some religious, cultural, political, and even racial ideologies.
For instance, in 1972, Palestinian liberation organisation held Munich Olympics under siege in an attempt to compel the Israeli government to free some captured terrorists. However, the government failed to comply with their demand. They resorted to blowing up helicopters that were ferrying Israeli athletes to the extent of killing the entire team (Miller 2013).
Overcoming Terrorism and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons through Deterrence
In September 2001, terrorists hijacked a plane, which hit the twin towers. It killed about 3,000 Americans. Following the attacks, the US showed a greater interest in instilling democracy by using force. This concern is evidenced by the 2003 inversion of Iraq in which the US deployed massive force in certain regions in Iraq in an attempt to bring forth democracy, even though some of the areas posed no security threats to the US.
Through the instillation of democratic regimes in countries that are led by terrorist groups, the US aims at enhancing deterrence. In fact, many nations in which the US has intervened to topple terrorist administration such as Afghanistan have relied on it (the US) and NATO forces to sustain their territorial integrity (Hautecouverture 2014).
With this reliance, the global population rests assured that any potential security threat is well deterred. Currently, terrorism is becoming almost an imminent threat to any nation that is opposed to social, cultural, and political ideologies of intolerance or extremism.
Hence, it is appropriate for nations to look for ways of ensuing they possess the capability to stop terrorist threats before such acts have been executed in their own soils. This claim suggests that the concept of deterrence remains important in the current and future policies of averting terrorism.
One of the ways of reducing the possibility of terrorism rests on proper identification of potential sources of threats. Hence, while deterring terrorism, nations need to identify people who pose the threat together with their origin. However, in the identification process, possibilities of stereotyping other people are inevitable.
Conception of differences among people in a negative way based on nationality, gender, and race among other social and demographic differences attracts oversimplification of perceptions of the involved people. In fact, association of one group with some certain characteristics that are inferior or negative is not based on facts, but rather on misconceptions and prejudices.
These misconceptions and prejudices about a particular group of people lead to their stereotyping. More interactively, from the perspective of socio-psychology, stereotyping involves, ‘the pictures that people have in their minds about other groups’ (Major et al. 1998, p.34).
For instance, when persons encounter an individual of a certain nationality who successfully or unsuccessfully executes a terrorist attack, they may spread the news that all people who belong to such a country are all terrorists.
The problem of stereotyping people of certain nationalities constitutes one of the biggest challenges of overcoming terrorism through deterrence. Generalisation hinders diversity integration as a major concern for international relations discourses. It leads to stigmatisation and discrimination (Gomez 2002).
Positive stereotypes may also be harmful since they translate into limitation of people’s attitudes towards a group of others.
This claim implies that people who are stereotyped presume that the beliefs that are held against their intergroup are justifiable from the basis of impressions of other people as opposed to out-group stereotypes. Indeed, there have been major problems in overcoming the belief that terrorists are of Arabic origin. There are also assumptions that terrorists are extreme Muslims (Vorauer, Main & O’Connell 1998).
However, the current wave of terrorism, especially in Africa nullifies this negative perception since people from across the racial divide have been identified as terrorists. Without a clear understanding of how terrorists appear, behave, or reason, deterrence becomes an ineffective strategy for reducing economic and human life losses that are associated with it.
Unlike terrorism, physical facilities are required in the production of nuclear weapons (Heuser 2007). This claim suggests that international community can track the location of the facilities. Consequently, any deterrence measure or policy can be developed targeting a specific nation or region.
For instance, although Iran inspection that was conducted by France, Britain, IAEA, and Germany revealed that Iran had brought to a halt its nuclear weapon programme, the presence of the US military in its borders between 2003 and 2004 prompted reconsideration of the development of Iran’s nuclear capability (Riet 2013).
Upon the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the EU3 agreement with the government of Iran to stop the exploration of nuclear weapons collapsed. Indeed, in 2009, Iran disclosed that it had a facility for uranium enrichment that was located at Fordow.
This facility is protected such that it is less prone to missile destruction. IAEA immensely believes that the facility had been undergoing tremendous expansion and that uranium enrichment had already begun as from December 2011.
With the ready but unused nuclear weapon capability, Iran might have confidence that it will have the ability to sustain its direct deterrence if the great nations attack it. For nations that seek to compel others not to engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they regard Iran as having a specific location for nuclear plants. Hence, a deterrence policy that focuses only on the nation can be implemented.
Conclusion
Nuclear weapons and terrorism can lead to mass suffering of people across all nations. While deterrence can be an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states, it fails to curtail international terrorism.
Since the last decade, terrorism has become an act of violation of territorial integrity of nations by people from across the racial spectrum within and outside the American borders. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through deterrence is possible since the source of the threat can be identified to a given nation such as the case of Iran.
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