Introduction
Dwight D. Eisenhower was the U.S Republican president who served his country from 1953-1961. During his reign, he managed to form a very formidable and cordial relationship with John D. Diefenbaker who was the then Canadian Prime minister under the Conservative party. Their warm friendship extended beyond personal affairs to influencing important national decisions between U.S and Canada. In retrospect, the two countries have hardly enjoyed such a level of understanding as was experienced when the two leaders were at the helm of power. One surprising element of their relationship was quite often, it lacked the formality and official mood expected when national leaders meet. For a fact, most of their come-together meetings had no records; they merely interacted as simple friends. This essay explores in detail how the Diefenbaker-Eisenhower friendship affected matters of both national and international interest. In particular, the paper investigates the Mandatory Oil Import Program and the exemption of Canada from this initiative as well as the historical treaty that was officially appended by the two leaders in regard to the River Basin of Columbia.
The Post War Oil Crisis
The main American objective in its oil policy in the cold war period was.
The United States of America had been attempting to seek viable alternatives to the countries main energy source, the oil, for a long period of time. Its main concern was to “have quick and secure access to oil in an emergency” (Nemeth “continental drift” 1). The main concern had been the chronic dependency syndrome on oil importation from overseas (Ambrose 96). Almost at the same time, both the U.S and Canadian citizens were under extreme pressure due to the escalating oil prices. Nevertheless, both governments worked tirelessly hard to undo the prevailing crisis but this reversal gave birth to yet another challenge in which the U.S and Canadian oil resources would suffer low market prices as a result of oversupply.
The main goal which the U.S had during the era of the cold war was to amass as much oil reserve as possible to cater for unplanned eventualities. However, this dream was quite cumbersome to achieve even after the Cold War. There were rigorous appeals by private oil handlers in the U.S for the government to impose some limitations as far as the importation of oil was concerned. This took place during the 1950s. Consequently, the U.S Republican government under President Eisenhower began to seek ways of striking equilibrium between the intrigues of oil importation and national bargain.
There were a myriad of factors to be put into mind. For instance, the concern about friendly countries like Canada as well as government unconditional support for local oil producers was the main headache at that time. A more official and binding agreement called Voluntary Oil Import Program was signed (Nemeth “consolidating”134). This marked the beginning of Canada’s persuasion to the U.S to be given some form of special treatment in the importation program. The U.S government had to think and act smart of this request because the pact was equally binding to all members who signed it. Moreover, Canada had not been granted any exception when the Mandatory Oil Importation Program was incepted. Surprisingly, the act was amended barely in less than one month after it was enacted, to permit Canada to import oil through overland transportation pathways. More questions than answers arose as to why the United States of America breached the Mandatory Oil Importation Program contract and made a unilateral decision to exempt Canada from the treaty. This elicited intense debate. There were those who argued that there were documentary proofs indicating that the cordial friendship between Diefenbaker and U.S president Eisenhower was the “key factor which instigated Eisenhower’s decisions” (Ambrose 143). At this point in time, Canada was very strategically to the U.S both in terms of oil importation resources as well as a close U.S partner in trade and industry. The main target here was widely thought to be prior arrangements of continental trading between the U.S and Canada.
Regardless of these analytical beliefs, President Eisenhower was very much ready to cooperate with Canada at whatever cost at the time when Prime Minister Diefenbaker was in office. In fact, Canadian American history still has it that the friendship between the two leaders paved way for a peaceful aura of international collaboration between the two countries. It is also remarkable in the sense that both leaders happened to be in powerful offices at the same time with a slight overlap. For this reason, it would be possible for them to affect vital decisions with a lot of ease. Of notable interest is that the two officials frequently conversed with each other through telephone. In some cases, President Eisenhower consulted Prime Minister Diefenbaker on matters of both national and international importance.
To confirm that the leaders were indeed very close to each other, Robinson Basil who was the prime minister’s internal personal assistant observed that there existed close ties between Diefenbaker and Eisenhower. He further notes their discussions used to be more relaxed, smooth, engaging, and often laced with humor as they deliberated on important matters affecting both nations. Moreover, they used to share confidential information with each other and valued their relationship greatly. Rarely did they act too formal in their meetings and private conservations. In fact, they let off their leadership status and behaved normally like good neighbors. The personal secretary to the president equally noted with a lot of concern that the latter used to be very friendly with his Diefenbaker when having a dialogue through a phone call. In spite of their good and loving friendship, much of the dialogue they had was highly confidential since not even secretaries were present to jot down any proceedings. One incidence that left many amazed was when President Eisenhower visited Canada and the duo went for a fishing expedition and later a free and relaxed motor drive. In his personal submission, Eisenhower reinstated the significance of his friendship with the prime minister by saying that it was an awesome encounter for them to maintain face-to-face and cordial friendship. This, according to the former, was highly imperative not only to them as individuals but also to both countries as well. The big question still remains to be how the closeness between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker affected the oil importation program initiative.
Towards the end of the 1950s, oil importation remained to be the most significant headache between the two countries. This crucial concern was further echoed by the then Canadian Prime minister (Diefenbaker) at an international summit in France. Furthermore, the Canadian administration sounded a similar alarm in 1958. These were enough calls by both Canada and U.S for the need to enter a bilateral agreement that would decisively address this problem. Consequently, a series of consultations between President Eisenhower and the Canadian Prime minister followed and went through a period of twelve months. During these formal and informal consultations, both of these arrived at a mutual understanding in which they saw the dire need of effecting substantial amendments to the oil importation act with key reference to Canada. Even after striking this compromise for Canada, President Eisenhower wanted the latter to be “exempted from oil import regulations” (Part 157). However, this brought further complications when part of the U.S administration blatantly rejected any extra changes to the original oil importation policy. They felt that it was needless to accord any country some exemption from the policy.
In the course of bilateral negotiations between Canada and the U.S and the latent resistance from some quota within the U.S administration, the top Canadian officials threatened the discussions by putting a condition that if no exception was given to it in regard to the Mandatory Oil Importation Program, it would construct an oil carriageway to its capital. By so doing, any marketing prospects of Venezuela to Canada would be null and void (Parmet 172). If this would eventually happen, an accusing finger would be pointed towards the United States of America. This stand-off generated mixed reactions and ripples within the U.S state Department. While there were those officials who supported Canada, some vehemently gave their vote to Venezuela. In a sharp turn of events though, President Eisenhower eventually assented to the amendments in 1958 which had a total inclination towards Canada. This inferred that Canada and the western block would be wholly exempted from the Mandatory Oil Import Program agreed upon earlier.
Another area of importance as far as the relationship between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker was concerned can be traced in the details of conversion which was held between President Eisenhower and Arnold Heeney who was by that time the official foreign representative to Canada (Frye, O’Grady & Staines 64). When the diplomat met with Eisenhower, he emphasized how critical the oil importation issue was to Canadians. In their deliberations, the U.S president equally reinstated the oil issue and confirmed that despite the evident split within the U.S State Department, he was personally committed to sealing the deal which would enable free trade between U.S and Canada. Moreover, President Eisenhower stressed the kind and contenting dialogue he previously had with Diefenbaker. Even Canadian citizens applauded the president’s personal effort and initiative in the oil situation. Eisenhower later reaffirmed his commitment to unify the continent and that acting towards exempting Canada on the oil importation issue was indeed in the right direction.
At this point, it was explicit that President Eisenhower decided to favor Canada. As a result, a serious ideological split marred the State Department. There were those who felt that Canada did not deserve sole preferential treatment on oil import policy. However, other administrative officials rallied behind the president in favor of the Canadian wish. In the long run, Canadian policy on oil greatly marveled at the fruitful engagement between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker (Nemeth “continental” 69). These relentless efforts by the two leaders were evident when plans to construct an oil pipeline to the capital were ignored. Another side element of their friendship led to the launching of the Ottawa Valley Line. However, drastic turns of events were witnessed after the expiry of Eisenhower’s term. The cordial nature which hitherto existed between Canada and U.S started to diminish gradually when President J.F Kennedy assumed office. In fact, the U.S-Canada oil deal which was enacted when Eisenhower was in power was incessantly amended culminating in the souring relationship between the two countries. This was inevitable and indeed expected once Eisenhower left office because all the terms of the agreement in the Mandatory Oil Importation Program besides the preferential treatment of Canada were greatly inclined and favored by the fact that Eisenhower and Diefenbaker enjoyed a warm and cordial relationship between them.
The Columbia River Basin Treaty
The warm bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States of America was witnessed when a binding agreement on Columbia River Basin was signed during the reign of President Eisenhower and Canadian Progressive Party Prime Minister Diefenbaker. This treaty, appended upon on 17th January 1961, was a water shade in the historical friendship between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker. In essence, it took a whopping sixteen years before a common ground could be reached in enacting the agreement (Frye, O’Grady & Staines 121). The President in his speech observed that the treaty would create a development platform between U.S and Canada. It is important to note that a process that had stalled for close to two decades eventually became possible courtesy of the two loving friends. In his inauguration speech during the signing of the Columbian River Basin Treaty, Eisenhower publicly confirmed that they were “such great friends”. He described their friendship as a good example that was worth to be emulated by other nations. He added that their friendship had reached a momentous point whereby it required to be solidified for the benefit of the entire world. He emphasized that he was personally honored and contented with the formal exercise thanking Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his officials for dedicating their time and other resources to make the agreement a success. This, he clarified, would not only benefit Canada and the United States of America but the whole world as well. His speech demonstrated a lot of commitment that existed in their friendship.
In his response, Prime Minister Diefenbaker remarked that the signing of the Columbia River Basin Treaty was indeed a historical landmark between Canada and the U.S. In retrospect; he commented that the opening up of Upper Columbia for development was among the most significant bilateral engagements of the time. The agreement also implied that Canada and U.S would share power as well as have a side-by-side contribution to the development of an important natural resource (Ambrose 154). He echoed President Eisenhower by observing that their warm friendship was to serve as a living example to other nations of the world and especially those who had failed to co-exist harmoniously. He added that even as President Eisenhower was trooping towards the end of his presidential term, their close ties had left an indelible mark in his mind and life. He further extended his sincere wish of long life to the President. Confirming that he was expressing his sentiments on behalf of all Canadians, Diefenbaker stressed that Eisenhower was indeed a role model of excellent leadership which has deviated from the old forms of unpopular leadership which were characterized by war and other forms of primitivism. Their cooperation, he said, was aimed at shaping the kind of future which both countries would love to live in.
This landmark agreement which had its goals and objectives geared towards the welfare and peaceful co-existence between Canada and U.S would not have been possible without this unique friendship between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker (Woolley par.5). As a matter of fact, a treaty to share a remarkable natural resource like Columbia River Basin would not have been any easy to strike putting into consideration the sixteen years which had elapsed before a compromise could be reached. Besides, the two countries, according to political analysts, enjoyed the peak of bilateral cooperation when Eisenhower and Diefenbaker were simultaneously in power.
Conclusion
In summing up this essay, it is important to reiterate some of the most significant elements in the relationship between U.S Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Canadian Conservative Party Prime Minister John D. Diefenbaker. To begin with, the warm friendship which existed between the two leaders did not only affect their well-being but also the manner in which Canada and U.S related as countries. In retrospect, the Mandatory Oil Importation program which was a policy enacted by the U.S and its allies remarkably depicted how the friendship between the two personalities affected bilateral decisions. Initially, the policy aimed at restricting the importation of oil from overseas reserves because it would lead to oversupply in the local U.S market which would on the other hand harm the local oil producers. Canada relentlessly sought to be exempted from the MOIP policy, a request which was not wholly supported by the U.S State Department. However, the close ties between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker saw the exemption of Canada from the oil import program.
In addition to the Canadian oil situation, the Columbian River Basin Treaty between Canada and the U.S during the reign of the two friends was considered a major breakthrough in history which was only possible due to the warm and loving friendship between Eisenhower and Diefenbaker.
Works Cited
Ambrose E Stephen., Immerman H. Richard. Ike’s spies: Eisenhower and the espionage establishment, Mississippi: Doubleday Publishers, 1981. Print
Frye Northrop, O’Grady Jean and Staines David. Northrop Frye on Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto press, 2003. Print
Nemeth Tammy. Consolidating the Continental Drift: American Influence on Diefenbaker’s National Oil Policy. Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 13 (2002): 191-215.
Nemeth Tammy. Continental Drift: Canada-U.S. Oil and Gas Relations 1958 to 1988 Vancouver, B.C., University of British Columbia, 2004. Print
Parmet S Herbert. Eisenhower and the American crusades, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009. Print
Parmet David. Eisenhower and golf: a president at play, North Carolina: McFarland & company Inc., 2007. Print
Woolley T John and Gerhard Peters. The American Presidency Project. Santa Barbara, CA. 2010. Web.
Bibliography
Barber J. William Eisenhower Energy Policy: Reluctant Intervention in Energy Policy in Perspective, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981.Print Robinson H. Basil. Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. Print Thompson John Herd and Randall J. Stephen. Canada and the United
States: Ambivalent Allies, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994.Print Wilkinson W. Bruce. Trade Liberalization, the Market Ideology, and
Morality: Have We a Sustainable System. Political Economy of North American Free Trade, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. Print