Introduction
Reelection is a significant part of the work for Congress, and it can be examined with the help of corresponding theories. Since the conduct of the members of Congress is the key to their success, it serves as the basis of their overall activity. In this case, the decision to reelect them is connected to the feasibility of their initiatives, and their practical implementation depends on the application of theoretical approaches.
Reelection
Reelection is an essential part of one’s term in Congress, and its members pay particular attention to this procedure. Its importance is conditional upon the long-term nature of changes as per policies designed for implementation and the deriving necessity of representation of corresponding issues on the federal level (Hagel, 2018). From this point of view, the members of Congress are mainly guided by the considerations of the timings of their initiatives as well as their feasibility for gaining the support of the citizens (Hagel, 2018). Even though the idea of prestige might also take place when striving for reelection, the presence of clear objectives and the proper response of the population to the representation of specific needs are crucial. This stance is supported by Matthew 22:14 as “for many are called, but few are chosen” which means the need for a solid basis for reelection (Bible Gateway, n.d.). It allows us to suggest that, in the absence of one’s desire to be reelected, individuals’ behavior might be oriented towards short-term initiatives and personal agenda. In other words, they focus on completing the initiated projects and ensuring a positive reputation for further employment outside of Congress.
Theories
The actions of the members of Congress can also be viewed through the lens of theoretical approaches to their conduct. The main framework, addressing the goal of describing their behavior, includes the theory of congressional behavior, the politics or problem-solving, and the legislative cartel theory, which seem to complement one another. Thus, the first approach implies the presence of numerous factors influencing the activity of these people, and suggests that their work is quite flexible as they are focused on negotiating conditions with others (Jewitt & Treul, 2019). From this perspective, the basis of their success in Congress is the ability to come to terms with others on the issues which they attempt to resolve.
In addition to this idea, the politics of problem-solving provide the structure of interactions within the theory of congressional behavior. This model guarantees the clarity of procedures at all levels of operation and thereby decreases the uncertainty concerning the outcomes of one or another initiative (Thomann et al., 2019). Even though it does not directly address the challenges, the fact that they are being resolved within specific agencies increases the productivity of work while combining these frameworks. In turn, the legislative cartel theory, implying the difference between the activity during elections and in the process of solving problems, helps exercise control over opposing parties (Fortunato & Monroe, 2020). In this way, it accompanies the previously discussed theories in the task of guaranteeing the lack of conflicts. Since the described approaches are responsible for varying aspects, which are somehow linked in reality, it can be stated that they work together, and no contradiction emerges in the end.
Conclusion
To summarize, the decision to reelection is supported by the members of Congress, whose initiatives are critical for the population and of long-term nature. Even though personal agenda and prestige are also important to them, these provisions are insufficient for productive work. In turn, their behavior is thoroughly described by the examined theories, and their combination means that projects and the structure of cooperation are equally significant for a positive outcome.
References
Bible Gateway. (n.d.). Matthew 22:14. Web.
Fortunato, D., & Monroe, N. W. (2020). Agenda control and electoral success in the US House. British Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 1583-1592.
Hager, L. (2018). Are members of Congress simply ‘single-minded seekers of reelection’? An examination of legislative behavior in the 114th Congress. PS: Political Science & Politics, 51(1), 115-118.
Jewitt, C. E., & Treul, S. A. (2019). Ideological primary competition and congressional behavior. Congress & the Presidency, 46(3), 471-494.
Thomann, E., Trein, P., & Maggetti, M. (2019). What’s the problem? Multilevel governance and problem‐solving. European Policy Analysis, 5(1), 37-57.