Introduction
The 20th century began with the First World War, which caused widespread destruction in Europe and other parts of the world. The Second World War was even more disastrous, as it led to the disillusionment of a generation and the loss of millions of human lives. The cold war, championed by the Soviet Union (USSR) and America, could have been the other big conflict to affect the world, had it not been resolved in a timely manner. Through these events, history has demonstrated that there is a pattern where powerful nations hop from one war to another to assert their power and dominance in global politics. The Cuban missile crisis was one such event during the cold war era that two global powers (the Soviet Union and America) tried to assert their dominance and power on the global stage.
The Cuban missile crisis was characterized by a 13-day escalation of tensions between the USSR and America where each party threatened each other with nuclear warfare (Appiah-Marfo 2014). The tensions escalated when the USSR deployed ballistic nuclear missiles in Cuba. Historians term this event as the closest the world ever came to a nuclear war (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). Many world leaders did not see a solution to the conflict, which did not involve the use of military arms. Furthermore, there were different hardliners who advised both American and USSR presidents that the best strategy to take to solve the crisis was a military one (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013).
Most of them were not open to negotiation, or compromise, because they believed it was a sign of weakness (compromise was often seen as an unacceptable solution to conflict during the cold war era) (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). As war seemed inevitable for many people in the USSR and America, other people in the world watched the conflict escalate from the comfort of their living rooms. Thus, humankind faced another possibility of total annihilation because the potential use of nuclear power could cause serious damage to people and the planet. Indeed, with both the USSR and America stocking huge stockpiles of nuclear arsenal, the world feared that the possibility of a large-scale nuclear war was inevitable. However, this did not happen.
This research study focuses on explaining why there was no war during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main research question for this paper is representative of this study focus because it strives to understand why there was no war during the Cuban missile crisis. Here, it is important to note that there was no one hegemonic power in global politics at the time; instead, there were two centres of power, fronted by the former USSR and America. This dissertation will explore the reasons for the lack of war during the crisis and investigate how both parties reached a compromise without resorting to destroying each other. The research design for this dissertation is a case study. It is centred on the Cuban missile crisis, which started in 14th October, 1962, and ended on 28th October, 1962. The research focus would mostly be limited to the two competing global powers of the time – America and the USSR. In this paper, I will explore the frustrations encountered by both centres of power during the crisis period, their decision-making modalities during the intensified relations, the role of diplomacy in quelling tensions between both sides, and the part played by the nuclear theory in preventing the outbreak of war.
It is important to understand the events that characterized this period because it was a significant event in international diplomacy and the wider field of international relations. Indeed, as Scott (2012) points out, the Cuban missile crisis was a significant event in international politics, which would have had significant repercussions for all concerned parties and the international community at large, depending on the decisions both sides made. The findings of this paper underscore the role played by timely diplomatic efforts, prudent decision-making skills and nuclear fear in diffusing the tensions in the conflict because, as observed by different researchers who investigated the conflict; the three factors were significant forces in the crisis. The main argument in this dissertation follows this school of thought. Concisely, in this paper, I argue that diplomacy allowed the competing parties to find a compromise that helped them to avoid a full-blown nuclear conflict, nuclear fear prevented both parties from making the first move, and effective decision-making skills helped the American and Soviet leaders to avoid military conflict, as advised by their officers. Before delving into these arguments, the following section outlined a brief overview of the conflict.
Brief Overview of the Event
The Cuban missile crisis is regarded as one of the most significant global events in international politics because it was the closest the world ever came to a full-blown nuclear war (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). The origin of the conflict started when the US invaded Cuba to overthrow the Castro regime in the Bay Pigs Invasion (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). It failed in this objective. However, Castro and the Cuban government were paranoid that the US could attempt another invasion. Therefore, they sought the help of the USSR to keep American at bay (Blight 1995). In July 1962, the USSR reached a secret deal with Cuba, where the soviet regime would place nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter further invasions by the USA (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). The missile program started in late summer of that year, but the US only knew about it after they sent a spy aircraft to survey the region, which provided them with photographic evidence of the nuclear activities in Cuba (Absher 2009). From the evidence collected, the USA was convinced there was a Soviet arms build-up in Cuba.
In September 1962, the USA issued a warning to Cuba and the USSR, stating that the build up of arms in Cuba would come with disastrous consequences for both countries (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). In October of the same year, the US government discovered that the missile program was still ongoing because US spy planes provided further evidence that there was ongoing construction of medium-range and intermediate range ballistic missile weapons launch sites in Cuba (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). The gathering of evidence and its presentation to the Whitehouse marked the start of the Cuban missile crisis because it was at this point that John F. Kennedy thought about different courses of action to mitigate the problem, including destroying the missile sites and invading Cuba, as some possible solutions to the crisis (Absher 2009).
On one hand of the conflict was the USA, which had a ballistic missile deployment program in Turkey and Italy. On the other hand was the USSR, which had a nuclear deployment program in Cuba. Both antagonists could launch missiles into each other’s territory from these missile bases. Tensions started simmering in America where observers argued that Kennedy’s administration was ignoring USSR’s advances, which had culminated in a nuclear deployment program in Cuba (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). This program meant that the Soviet Union had the capability of launching nuclear missiles, 90 miles from Florida (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). After 13 days of negotiations, both countries reached an agreement that they should stop the tense relations and aggressions towards each other.
Brokered by the leaders of both countries, aggression by both parties stopped when the USSR decided to dismantle its nuclear program in Cuba and the US declared that it would not attack Cuba again, unless there was a direct provocation by the communist state. Some historical excerpts also point out that the USA also resolved to dismantle its nuclear launch program in Italy and Turkey (Blight 1995). This information was not openly available to the public. This crisis highlighted the need to establish a direct connection between the USA (Washington) and the USSR (Moscow). This happened. A series of other negotiated agreements between Washington and Moscow led to a further de-escalation of tensions between both countries, thereby leading to the end of the cold war. There are many reasons cited for the lack of war during the Cuban missile crisis. We explain these reasons below.
Diplomacy
Most scholarly works that have explored the reasons for the de-escalation of conflict between the USSR and America during the cold war period say that the decision-making systems employed in the Whitehouse greatly contributed to the lack of war during the conflict (Blight 1995; Appiah-Marfo 2014). While we will explore the role of decision-making systems, in later sections of this paper, it is equally important to understand the role that diplomacy played in the conflict. Indeed, as Allison (1969) points out, personal diplomacy between Khrushchev and Kennedy is one reason for the avoidance of war during the Cuban missile crisis.
Confidentiality and Secrecy
Personal diplomacy was shrouded in a mist of confidentiality agreements between Khrushchev and Kennedy that led many observers, and the world, to speculate how the two countries they represented did not go to war. This view is partly explored by Zegart (2012) and Anderson (1983) who explored different reasons why Kennedy chose to keep his communications with Khrushchev a secret. The consensus is that Kennedy believed in the power of old-fashioned personal diplomacy (Zegart 2012; Anderson 1983). An examination of different Whitehouse memoranda and transcripts from the executive communication (ExComm.) point out that President Kennedy limited the role of State Department diplomats throughout the negotiations. Instead, he chose to use the views of Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson as his main advisors (Mullins 2013). Both men had served as ambassadors to the USSR.
The US State Department cables show that the US embassy in Moscow was closely monitoring communist propaganda advanced by the Moscow regime and refuted it by trying to create a positive perception of US actions through demonstrations and public campaigns (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). However, the secretive nature of the Cuban crisis undermined their efforts. According to Mullins (2013), since the US president wanted to keep the negotiations between the USSR private, he limited the involvement of government officials who were not directly involved in the crisis. Interestingly, this strategy limited the access of diplomatic officers stationed in Moscow and who had the easiest access to the Kremlin leadership from the negotiations that ended the conflict. A memo from Charles Bohen who was an executive committee member of the ExComm and a leading presidential advisor at the time explained the importance of pursuing this diplomacy strategy by saying,
“No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic action – but it seems to me essential that this channel should be tested out before military action is employed. If our decision is firm (and it must be) I can see no danger in communicating with Khrushchev privately worded in such a way that he realized that we mean business. This I consider an essential first step no matter what military course we determine on if the reply is unsatisfactory” (Mullins 2013, p. 2).
Although President Kennedy was aware that the development of the Cuban missile sites were nearing completion and were almost at an advanced state for supporting a strike on US soil, he prevented himself from using a military option to destroy the facilities and instead chose to pursue a diplomatic route. The importance of this decision stems from the fact that the president was not left with many options to solve the crisis, but to pursue a military solution to the conflict because the Soviet Union did not heed to its naval blockade warning (at first) and construction of the nuclear sites were in advanced stages (Grattan 2004). In other words, there was no reason not to strike Cuba. However, he held out. Based on this assertion, Kennedy preferred to use a secretive diplomatic course of action to resolve the conflict because he deemed it a better approach to ending the conflict as opposed to using a military strategy.
Avoidance of Political Repercussions in America
From a post cold-war vantage point, and through a review of excerpts of communications by ExComm, we could easily deduce that Kennedy believed in diplomacy, but wanted to minimize his vulnerability to political persecution at home for caving into the demands of the Soviet Union to withdraw American nuclear missiles from Italy and Turkey (Chace 2015). The general perception was that he was the leader of the world’s most powerful state and that if he wanted; he could make the Soviet Union cave in to his demands (Mullins 2013). However, this perception did not augur well with the spirit of diplomacy, which is hinged on a “give-and-take” approach to solving conflicts. Kennedy kept the compromises he made with the USSR a secret because he knew he would suffer political persecution at home, if people knew what he did. However, he believed in the power of diplomacy, which partly helped to ease tensions with the Soviet Union.
According to Cimbala (1999), Kennedy wanted to formulate a political solution to a political crisis, as opposed to seeking a military solution to a political problem. Indeed, when ExComm seemed unsympathetic to the Soviet Union, and his inner circle advisors came off as unsupportive of his vision of diplomacy, he resorted to using secretive diplomatic channels to find an amicable solution with Khrushchev (Dodge 2012). Although Kennedy was praised for finding a diplomatic solution to the Cuban crisis, critics say that his undoing was the failure to disclose to the American public how diplomacy works because as Graham (2012) observes, many Americans failed to learn important lessons that negotiation is not appeasement, and being reasonable is not a sign of weakness. Thus, by failing to disclose what he had to do to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, critics argue that Kennedy failed to set a good precedence for other leaders to use in resolving conflicts, diplomatically. In fact, according to Cimbala (1999), Kennedy left the Whitehouse with Americans having the illusion that, with proper military arsenal and a big ego, it could force other countries to bend to their wishes.
The problem with this assumption is the lack of understanding of the compromises that parties in powerful positions have to make with “smaller players” to have a speedy and non-confrontational solution to a nuclear crisis. Broadly, from the success of the diplomatic channel pursued by Kennedy, we could deduce that it is the art and science of political manoeuvring and not competitiveness, or effective crisis management, which would help countries to solve conflicts that tinker on the brink of nuclear confrontation.
Coercive Diplomacy
Broadly, diplomacy played a significant role in minimizing tensions between Moscow and Washington because it helped America to manage USSR’s leader, Nikita Khrushchev. As such, the diplomatic approach practiced by Kennedy has become the model of excellence for coercive diplomacy (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). It hinges on the controlled and limited use of force to achieve political objectives without necessarily provoking the other party to take up arms and go to war. Clearly, Kennedy and Khrushchev skilfully used psychology and intuition to come up with proposals that each party would find satisfactory (D’Amore-McKim 2015). For example, Kennedy’s strategy was a mixture of threats and promises that convinced the Soviet leader to back down and remove the USSR missiles from Cuba.
Based on these facts, we could easily understand why the Cuban Missile crisis failed to evolve into a war. Both parties applied just enough force to let the other know that they were serious, but did not literally engage in actions that would provoke each the other into conflict. Both parties also persuaded each other to take certain courses of action without necessarily bludgeoning them to do so. Such was the case when Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy suggesting that a withdrawal of weapons from Cuba could only occur if the US withdrew its missiles from Turkey and Italy (Scott 2015).
The success of this diplomacy was reliant on the establishment of a direct and effective communication between Washington and Moscow. It also relied on the leaders’ discretion to use a balanced dose of threats and inducements to make the other party “see the problem through their eyes.” The balance of threats and inducements was critical to the success of the diplomatic strategy because they were all backed by the use of force by either party. Since both countries used force in a low profile and restrained fashion, it did not emerge as the most prominent feature to consider in the negotiations. This way, the parties were able to focus on what mattered most – a give and take approach (compromise). Force and accommodation in world politics (2012) supports this view by saying that “the use of force was so circumspect and secondary to the main conciliatory thrust that the force itself becomes a means of communicating a desire for accommodation” (pp. 253-254).
Carrot and Stick Approach
Some researchers have referred to the diplomacy that underscored negotiations between the USSR and the US as a carrot and stick approach. Brands, Pierson and Kiefer (2003) are such researchers who claim that the carrot and stick approach was practiced by Kennedy to avert the possibility of a nuclear disaster for both countries. They caution that, it is impossible to realize lasting peace by threatening an adversary without providing a way out of the conflict (Pierson & Kiefer 2003). Scott (2015) terms this approach as part of coercive diplomacy and argues that it can only be achieved if both parties practice a flexible strategy of diplomacy. Therefore, what cannot be easily achieved by bringing out a “stick” can easily be achieved by providing a “carrot.” Such was the case that defined the diplomatic process, which led to the end of the Cuban missile crisis. Thus, as highlighted in this paper, instead of only relying on military force to achieve the objectives of the USSR and the US, both countries practiced coercive diplomacy through the employment of skilful and tactful negotiation skills. Although personal diplomacy contributed significantly to the diffusion of tensions between the Soviet Union and the US, it had huge implications for presidential decision-making systems globally (Mullins 2013). This is because Kennedy and Khrushchev showed the world that, regardless of the gravity of political disagreements, opposing parties, with opposite views, could sit together and come up with a compromise that would safeguard the interests of their people.
Nuclear Theories
In the context of this paper, the nuclear theory is voiced as a possible deterrent to the outbreak of war during the Cuban missile crisis. In other words, this theory presupposes that the graveness associated with the use of nuclear weapons could have limited the ability of both the US and the USSR to make hasty decisions of carrying out their threats. Several nuclear theories support this reasoning. One of them is the doctrine of military strategy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD).
MAD
Scholars and international law experts say that the MAD concept became one of Kennedy’s defence policies during the Cuban missile crisis (D’Amore-McKim 2015). It also featured prominently in the rhetoric of America’s secretary of defence during the Kennedy regime, as seen through several of his speeches to the American Bar Foundation (Cullity 2013). This doctrine meant that the US would accumulate a stockpile of nuclear arsenal to retaliate against the USSR, if there would be an attack on American soil (Gioe, Scott & Andrew 2014). It would use this arsenal to cause massive and assured destruction to its enemies, if this happened. From this premise of understanding, the philosophy of nuclear deterrence was established. This logic meant that if the USSR were assured that its attack on the US would also mean an attack on itself; it would be hesitant to provoke America. The MAD doctrine was a departure from conventional warfare logic where the victor wins a war by having superior weapons, or better battlefield strategies. Instead, it dictated that there would be no victory for either side because the aggressors were matched in power (D’Amore-McKim 2015).
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
The nuclear deterrence theory is another sub-brand of nuclear theories that prevented the outbreak of war during the Cuban missile crisis. Scholars who have examined the role of nuclear weapons in the prevention of war during the Cuban missile crisis say the role of nuclear weapons in the crisis can be answered in three ways: nuclear weapons are valuable, nuclear weapons have no value, and nuclear weapons are moderately valuable (Cullity 2013). Those who support the argument that nuclear weapons are valuable also align their views with those of the rational deterrence theory, which presupposes that the severity of nuclear weapons could deter parties from using it (Scott & Hughes 2015). Researchers who support the argument that nuclear weapons have no value argue that they could not deter countries from using them. Lastly, scholars who believe that nuclear weapons are moderately valuable argue that if leaders have adequate knowledge about the capability of these weapons, they are bound to use them wisely (Cullity 2013). Those who hold this view refer to its effect as the “crystal ball” effect (Scott & Hughes 2015).
In my analysis, I find that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons during the Cuban missile crisis was strong because the actions of the participants did not portray a situation where they were not cognizant of the effects of the nuclear weapons. This analogy exists in our understanding of the rational deterrence theory, which says, “that in order to deter attacks, a state must persuade its attacker that it has the capability to, and will, impose unacceptable costs on it, if an attack occurs, or a challenge to the status quo is evident” (Cullity 2013, p. 3). The principle of this school of thought is that a country cannot willingly engage in war unless it is guaranteed that it will be successful. On the flipside of this argument, a nation would hesitate from attacking another one if it believes that the enemy would retaliate in an equal or more powerful way. When we examine this argument in the context of the Cuban missile crisis, we find that it is prima facie because both parties restrained themselves from using nuclear weapons. The role of the rational deterrence theory in explaining some of the actions of the warring parties in the conflict have been asserted by several cold war scholars, such as Roberts (2012) and Cullity (2013). However, those that have critically evaluated their arguments find issue with some of them. One area where they find fault with this reasoning is the problematic logic that nuclear warfare is the worst outcome for parties involved in conflict.
Those who hold this opinion believe that deterrence, by itself, can never be successful (Pierson & Kiefer 2003). The same reasoning dictates that any state that suffers an attack will always capitulate, as opposed to engaging in actions that would yield the worst outcome for itself (Pierson & Kiefer 2003). Knowing this, proponents of the argument say that their adversaries will always attack. Another weakness of the rational deterrence theory is its failure to explain why the USSR decided to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, knowing that the US would retaliate with an equal or powerful force if it were provoked. The actions of the USSR draw our attention to the fact that some states would consider the effect of doing nothing to be worse than the effect of going to war in the first place. This reasoning could have explained why the USSR decided to place nuclear ballistic weapons in Cuba. It could also outline the rationality of starting a war. Nonetheless, the possible adverse effects of nuclear weapons in conflicts do not undermine the credibility of this argument.
Although it is important to understand the role of nuclear theories on the prevention of war during the Cuban missile crisis, the absence of war did not necessarily mean that a peaceful end to the conflict was inevitable. According to Blight, Nyey, and Welch (1987), it is important to understand the role of contingency and luck in the prevention of war during the Cuban missile crisis, as opposed to the role of effective crisis management in the same. They also claim that it is important to appreciate the deterrent value of nuclear weapons in averting disasters during such kinds of confrontations (Blight, Nyey & Welch 1987). This fact is underscored by the fact that there are different periods when there was a serious escalation of conflict between the USSR and the US, which eventually ended without any major provocation by either party (most of these instances have been highlighted in our overview of the conflict).
Comprehensively, in this section of the report, we find that although nuclear theories did not perfectly fit in the context of the rational deterrence theory, there is evidence that they partly contributed to the lack of an outbreak of war during the Cuban missile crisis. This argument stems from the understanding that the two leaders chose to pursue other means of solving the crisis because the failure to do so could easily lead to the use of the deadly weapons – an action that could have come at a huge cost to both parties. However, it is difficult to holistically rely on the nuclear theory to explain the deterrent nature of nuclear weapons in the conflict because, there were possibilities of misperceptions and accidental use of the weapons that could have completely changed the outcome of the crisis. However, in this one event, the nuclear weapons were peace-inducing deterrents to the conflict.
Decision-making
Trusting Gut Instinct
In the US, the president is usually in charge of foreign policy decisions and the commander in chief of the armed forces. The president is usually the final authority on interstate crises, such as the Cuban crisis. However, he usually has a team of advisers, drawn from the diplomatic, military, and political circles, just to mention a few. Their decisions often influence the president’s final directive on diplomatic matters and influence the course of action the government would take on foreign policy issues for the time that the regime is in power. During the Cuban Missile crisis, the executive committee was the president’s decision-making body.
In the USSR, the Presidium was the top decision-making organ of the state. It was comprised of foreign and defence ministers, plus a host of important members of the communist party (George 2013). At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, members of the Presidium often furnished the president with a lot of information about the actions of the US. Most of this information was alarming, warning the president that the US was planning to invade Cuba and destroy the military arsenal it had installed there (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2012). Khrushchev also received reports that the US was not genuine in its willingness to negotiate with the USSR and would attack Cuba, despite the ongoing negotiations (Radchenko 2012). However, he did not yield to demands to attack the US. Stated differently, he chose to ignore the views of his advisory team. Instead, he sent information that he would accept the proposal made by the UN to avoid confrontations along the blockade line (Winter 2013). He also took a personal initiative to write a letter to Kennedy saying that he would not see the need to stock nuclear arsenal in Cuba if America pledged not to attack Cuba. Although Kennedy took him up on the offer, Moscow was getting a lot of pressure from Cuba to carry out a strike on US because it was evidently clear to Castro that the US would carry out an airstrike on his country and possibly follow it with an invasion (Radchenko 2012). It was Castro’s plea that the USSR should eliminate this threat by using the nuclear weapons to attack the US.
Khrushchev did not heed to this call because he was hesitant to make the first move by attacking the US. Instead, he chose to contact Kennedy directly and offer him a deal to pledge not to attack Cuba. However, unlike the American situation where Kennedy had to manage endless debates within ExComm about several courses of action to manage the crisis, George (2013) says that the USSR did not have such a problem because most of its members often agreed with the president. In fact, when Khrushchev presented his ideas about the Cuban missile crisis to the Soviet Presidium, only one member of the team expressed his reservations, citing concerns that the proposals could lead to a nuclear war with America (George 2013). However, Khrushchev did not agree with him and said that he would not allow the fear of a nuclear war to influence his policy decisions. A few days later, after making this assertion, the Soviet Presidium approved his plan unanimously.
The modes of decision-making characterizing the Cuban missile crisis largely explain why there was no war during the conflict. As highlighted in this paper, communications between the USSR and America were largely dominated by secret communications between the ambassadors of both countries and between their presidents. For example, President Kennedy often communicated with the Soviet Union through secret communications between his brother, who was the attorney general and the ambassador to the Soviet Union (Allison 1971). Such was the case during the communication to end the Cuban missile crisis because the US president summoned his brother to communicate to the Soviet Republic that that he had conceded to some of the demands proposed by the communist nation about withdrawing US nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italy.
His brother relayed the message to the Soviet ambassador. The communication was only valid as a secret understanding between the parties involved. In other words, Kennedy did not want the public to know that the US had to withdraw its military arsenal from Turkey and Italy as part of the agreement. Some observers term his acceptance to the terms of the agreement as a concession to blackmail (Allison 1971). Others term it as a turning point in the crisis (Scott & Smith 1994). Nonetheless, there are conflicting reports about whether this term was part of the agreement because accounts by Scott and Smith (1994) reveal that the Soviet Union and America had not agreed that the withdrawal of Cuban missiles would be done quid pro quo.
Historians who support this school of thought argue that the willingness to withdraw American nuclear missiles from Europe was only an expression of intent and not necessarily a requirement for a deal (Hershberg 1995). Although researchers provide conflicting accounts of what actually transpired in the agreement, it is the first formal indication that the communication between Washington and Kremlin was private. Typically, such decisions were supposed to pass through the Executive Committee (ExComm), which was part of the National Security Council. This committee was comprised of a small clique of members of the president’s inner circle who were supposed to advise him about the best courses of action to take during the conflict. Through these accounts, we find that Kennedy bypassed this committee and made crucial decisions without their input.
Neutral, but Effective, Decision-Making
According to Pious (2001), ExComm proposed several options to solve the missile crisis. For example, according to Scott (2015), some joint chiefs of staff proposed that the US should undertake an airstrike that would destroy the Cuban nuclear facilities and carry out an invasion thereafter. Other members of the committee proposed that the US should issue stern warnings to its enemies, but refrain from taking aggressive military positions (Pious 2001). President Kennedy took a neutral approach in the decision-making process by opting for a solution that would meet the goals of both sets of advisers.
He opted for a naval blockade of military arsenal that was being shipped from the USSR to Cuba. This strategy met the needs of advisers who chose a military solution to the crisis because it prevented the Soviet Union and Cuba from enhancing their nuclear launch program. In this regard, the ongoing missile launch project in Cuba would be ineffective. The same goal could be achieved if the US carried out an airstrike on Cuba. President Kennedy’s naval blockade strategy also met the needs of advisers who advocated for a non-military confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba because the blockade served as a warning that the US would not tolerate further enhancements to the ongoing development of nuclear launch facilities in Cuba. It was more of “drawing the line in the sand,” whereby defiance by the Soviet Union would eventually lead to unspecified consequences. Nonetheless, the decision taken by President Kennedy was independent, in the sense that it did not take the form or shape of any proposals made by members of the ExComm. At the same time, it met their needs.
Direct Communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev
At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, several analysts point out that there were several direct communications between Khrushchev and Kennedy, which helped to quell tensions between their respective countries (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). For example, in October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy proposing a solution to the crisis, which centred on the US pledging that it would not attack Cuba, in exchange for the destruction of the Cuban missile sites. The following day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another direct letter to Kennedy, specifying that any deal would have to involve the withdrawal of America’s nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italy as well (George 2013). Although there were acts of aggression by the Soviet Union against the US in the hours following the receipt of this letter, President Kennedy chose to respond to the first message. He proposed that the US would commit not to attack Cuba if the Soviet Union agreed to destroy its nuclear sites in Cuba. Through this communication, he ignored the second letter sent by Khrushchev. Analysts term this move as risky (United States Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). The contents of the second letter were replied through a separate communication channel described below.
Dual Decision-Making System
Although Kennedy ignored Khrushchev’s demands that the US withdraw its military arsenal from Turkey and Italy, it responded to these concerns through a dual decision-making system available to him. The first decision-making channel was a direct line of communication to communicate directly with Khrushchev. The second system involved the attorney general and the president’s brother who communicated with the Soviet government through its ambassador (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). In fact, the agreement with the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Italy and Turkey was communicated through the second communication channel (Force and accommodation in world politics 2012). It is also important to note that this decision-making system was free from the influence of the ExComm. Although the flurry of indirect and direct communications between Kennedy and his counterpart in the Soviet Union led to the end of the Cuban Missile crisis and, by extension, the cold war, it is important to point out that the decision-making models chosen by the two leaders left their advisers unaware of their true intentions.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how President John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev’s advisory systems almost brought the world to the doorsteps of a full-blown nuclear war. I explored the frustrations encountered by both centres of power during the crisis period, their decision-making modalities during the intensified relations, the role of diplomacy in quelling tensions between both sides, and the part played by the nuclear theory in preventing the outbreak of war. Fuelled by a common dislike for each other’s foreign policy and motivated by several advisors who wanted both countries to go to war, the US and the USSR were about to plunge the world into another conflict that would have worse consequences than those witnessed in the First World War and the Second World War. However, the two leaders realized the gravity of their decisions and chose not to execute their threats.
Comprehensively, we find that the story of the Cuban missile crisis is one of how the world came to the brink of a nuclear war and managed to get out of the quagmire without engaging in it. More importantly, the findings of this paper show that the Cuban missile crisis was a story of diplomacy, mutual respect for each other’s destructive capability, and decision-making that eventually ended the vicious circle of warfare. Indeed, by ignoring the existing decision-making systems available to them and engaging in old-fashioned horse-trading, both leaders managed to avert the crisis and diffuse the tensions between the US and the USSR. Although the war did not happen, today’s world is not built on the ashes of the conflict that could have happened, had the two leaders disagreed. Clearly, as shown through the evidence gathered in the nuclear theory segment of this paper, compromise was the best strategy to overcome the challenges that the crisis posed.
Today, as the world experiences other tensions of similar nature between North Korea and America, there are several lessons on how to apply or manage a nuclear threat, as seen in the Cuban missile crisis. More importantly, the crisis could help the world to learn more about the concept of historical inevitability. Indeed, from the events that characterized the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath, it would not be an exaggeration to say that humankind changed the course of warfare and formulated new rules of working with one another. Although there are important lessons that could be drawn from this study and that could be useful to current and future leaders about crisis management (and more importantly about how to avoid a nuclear crisis), it is pertinent to understand that each crisis is different and requires unique solutions to solve them.
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