Thesis
Haslanger’s claim that both gender and race are real and both are social categories is constructive since defining both terms depends on the political aims in analyzing the past and present and in envisioning alternatives.
Core Argument
In her argument against racial essentialism, Sally Haslanger states that both gender and race are real and basically social categories. She states that both terms are not chosen, but “the forms they take can be mutated or restricted” (Haslanger, 2016, p. 116). Third, both terms are hierarchical, but the systems that sustain this form of the hierarchy are conditional. Haslanger claims that the ideologies of gender are race and the hierarchical structures they sustain are different, but both terms are basically intertwined.
Haslanger develops a comprehensive argument based on some questions. She seeks to answer the principle questions of “what is gender” and what is a race” and related questions such as “what is to be a woman or a man” and “what is to be Latino, White, Black, or Asian” (Haslanger, 2016, p. 118). These questions require one to consider their needs and what they need to do for the person defining them. It is the responsibility of the person to define the questions based on their purpose (Beeghly, 2021a). The world tells the person what gender or race is, and it is the role of the people to decide what these terms mean in their world.
The author uses critical theory from a feminist and anti-racial perspective and the concepts of normativity and commonality. Haslanger states that races, just like gender, are racialized groups whose membership needs three specific criteria. First, members of races are those who are either imagined or observed to have features or aspects of the human body that are evidence of a given ancestry based on geographical locations (Barnes, 2017). Secondly, having or imagining to have those specific bodily features marks the members as occupying a given privileged or subordinate social position, which then justifies the position. Third, having satisfied the two previous criteria is important in the systemic subordination or privilege of the members. The author adds that many forms of racial identity “…are valuable, important, and inevitable responses to racial hierarchy” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 30). Therefore, in such contexts, racial identities do not need to focus exclusively on privilege or subordination.
The author further states that people should not be afraid to embrace the cultural groups that are marked by appearance and ancestry in the short term as they fight for equality and justice. However, she states that what is worrying is embracing these aspects on a long-term basis. In general, the possibilities of human bodies are not wholly a function of the understanding of the body itself. Rather, Haslanger states that human bodies outdo them in spite of the meanings given to them.
In her conclusion, Haslanger states that it is the responsibility of people to define what gender and race are for theoretical purposes and usage. Accordingly, the words “gender” and “race” themselves cannot tell what gender and race mean, respectively. Instead, defining these terms requires people to keep clearly in their minds the intended political aims of analyzing the past and the present while also envisioning alternative futures. In essence, people should not be worried about what gender and race really are (Lynch, 2017). Rather, they should start by asking what they want them to be, both in political and theoretical senses.
Possible Objections
From a scientific point of view, it is possible to identify some problems in the argument by Haslanger. Race and gender are distinct terms that identify specific aspects of humans based on biological differences that their existence cannot be objected. In terms of gender, one is male, female, or transgender (Beeghly, 2021b). A male individual has a body that has the specific features of the gender, all of which are evidenced by bodily features. Such features are physical, physiological, and anatomical.
A male body has such features as a distinct duct system made up of the vas deferens and epididymis, accessory glands including the prostate and seminal vesicles, the penis, and the related hormones. With these biological hormones, the male body develops to have physical features such as facial hair, a distinct form of pubic hair, a broken voice, and other aspects (Dash, 2019). In the same way, the female body has distinct biological features such as hormones, glands, the uterus, vagina, ovaries, and others. The hormones produced from these features make the body develop observable features such as breasts and others common in women.
Race can be defined from a biological point of view. Scientifically, people have different body features because of their genetic compositions, which are different based on their ancestry. Scientific evidence classifies people based on their races, which are specific due to differences in genetic compositions (Lindsey, 2020). Blacks, White, Latino, Asians, Natives, Aborigines, and other groups have specific genes that make them appear the way they are.
People with African ancestry tend to have dark skin because of a high level of melanosomes in their skin cells. Indians are second after Africans in terms of the level of melanosomes in their skin cells, followed by Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, and Europeans in that order (Keister & Southgate, 2021). The rationale is scientifically proven because the higher the number of melanosomes in the skin cells, the higher the ability of an individual to withstand hot temperatures. People of African origins have had to overcome hot temperatures common in Africa, thus the need for more melanosomes.
Rebuttal
Despite the scientific evidence showing that Haslanger’s point of view is flawed, it is clear that her claim is justified. In her argument, Haslanger (2012) argues within the context of the social and political definition of both race and gender. It is worth noting that constructivism cuts through the cultural and political dimensions (Connell, 2020). Haslanger’s views are paradigmatic of political constructivism through the understanding of the meaning of gender and race as determined by hierarchical relations of power (Jenkins, 2016). The definition given to race and gender is variable and depends on the purpose that a society or group wants to achieve.
The terms gender and race do not have to mean themselves until people define what they want them to mean or imply from a social and political context. People define race and gender based on the social context of power and politics (Díaz-León, 2018). For example, despite the fact that scientific evidence proves that someone is half racial because he has both European and African genes, he is classified as “colored” and considered a “minority,” and in that case, “less privileged” or “disadvantaged.”
Conclusion
This review supports that both gender and race are real and both are social categories is constructive since defining both terms depends on the political aims in analyzing the past and present and in envisioning alternatives. Even though there is scientific evidence that provides specific definitions of gender and race, the terms are applied for the purpose of achieving some meaning due to political and social aspects.
References
Barnes, E. (2017). Realism and social structure. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2417-2433. Web.
Beeghly, E. (2021a). Embodiment and oppression: Reflections on haslanger, gender, and race. Lexington Books.
Beeghly, E. (2021b). Reflections on Haslanger, Gender, and Race. The logic of racial practice: Explorations in the habituation of racism. Lexington Books
Connell, R. (2020). The social organization of masculinity. Routledge.
Dash, J. (2019). The melanin effect. Independently Published.
Díaz-León, E. (2018). On Haslanger’s meta-metaphysics: Social structures and metaphysical deflationism. Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy, 10(50).
Haslanger, S. (2012). Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be? In Resisting reality. Oxford University Press.
Haslanger, S. (2016). What is a (social) structural explanation? Philosophical Studies 173(1), 113-130.
Jenkins, K. (2016). Amelioration and inclusion: Gender identity and the concept of woman. Ethics, 126(2), 394-421.
Keister, L. A., & Southgate, D. E. (2021). Inequality: A contemporary approach to race, class, and gender. Cambridge University Press.
Lindsey, L. L. (2020). Gender: Sociological perspectives. Routledge.
Lynch, T. (2017). Social construction and social critique: Haslanger, race, and the study of religion. Critical Research on Religion, 5(3), 284-301. Web.