One of the characteristics to which a military conflict should adhere in order to be considered a just war is the ‘chances of success’ (Coady 2002). This principle implies that the possibility of succeeding and winning war should be high enough for the nation to engage in the conflict. Otherwise, if a fight is too difficult for the county to win, the war is unjustified because it can bring necessity losses and damages, while not changing the situation for the better (Fabre 2008). In this case, the limited and expansive views of the just war theory present different arguments for and against such interventions.
According to the limited view, military intervention in general results in bringing many adverse outcomes for all engaged sides of the conflict. For instance, concern for unintended consequences should be considered. While the notion that democracy promotion brings exclusively positive results due to the good intentions of the intervening side may exist, it is necessary to assess all possible damages of military conflicts. The country or a group of countries intending to bring democracy to a state uses resources both tangible and intangible and engages people in order to achieve the desired outcome (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: about n.d.). As any military conflict results in substantial losses of human life and destruction of property and land, it is unclear whether the cause of democracy promotion is a sufficient reason to endanger the country’s own resources. Therefore, an unintended consequence of severe losses undermines the legitimacy of such a cause for humanitarian intervention.
Secondly, the possible consequences for the country of intended intervention should also be investigated. While a successful change of the regime may produce such positive effects as the increased level of freedoms and a better holistic approach to the nation’s development, it can also destabilise the economy and bring problems that cross the national borders, endangering the stability of other countries, both economic and political (Lefkowitz 2006). Thus, a conflict with an intention to promote democracy may escalate the country’s condition further, if it was unstable before, or create a situation that results in changing attitudes towards democracy. Furthermore, an unsuccessful attempt at installing democracy may result in even more significant adverse outcomes. These may include a harsh military response leading to devastating damages and the worsening situation for the civilians of the affected countries.
It is also vital to note that a force initiating the intervention may not fully understand the situation of the target location. For example, the misunderstanding of the regime’s rules or traditions may result in it miscalculating the rates of success, which, in turn, may lead to some critically adverse results (Nardin 2005). Moreover, the inability to adequately grasp cultural differences may also limit the side’s perception of the problem, resulting in a conflict with unclear intentions and vague determinants of success. Thus, a limited view supports the limits for military interventions to be strict – only situations where a terrible wrong (such as genocide) will be certainly prevented as a result of interference can be considered just.
The expansive view agrees that interventions should only be justified in cases with reasonable rates for success. However, its definition of success differs from that of the limited view. Here, for instance, a quick military action that results in destroying an oppressive or authoritarian regime is considered successful (Walzer 1980). The end of the intervention is perceived as the end of such military action, and the force promoting democracy is satisfied with eliminating the threat of the old regime (Oberman 2015). This concept, while possible, undermines the fact that such a rash decision does not acknowledge the situation in the affected country after the end of the intervention.
The war in Iraq started in 2003 can be taken as an example for the arguments presented in the limited view. The move to overthrow the government led by Saddam Hussein can be viewed as a movement to promote democracy as the better regime for the country (Roth 2006). Thus, the invasion’s success can be evaluated to support the presented points of the expansive view (Fabre 2007; Tesón 2005). However, while one may argue that the ending of the war, connected to the falling of the local government, can be considered a successful outcome, the events that followed these military actions cannot be viewed as strictly positive. The country was unstable and the political power vacuum resulted in violence between the country’s nations (Roth 2006). Moreover, the insurgency developed as a response to the actions of the United States and the supporting forces also increased the amount of violent activity in the country. Thus, Iraq, while being freed from the tyrannical government, suffered from chaotic outcomes of the intervention.
Here, the limited view of the ‘chances of success’ is more reasonable to apply as it recognises both short and long-term outcomes of such interventions. While short-term results may seem as satisfactory for the war to be considered just, the long-term issues reveal the unfortunate consequence of the interference. Thus, it is possible to assume that the limited view is more reliable in its assessment of the factor of success. Consequently, the idea that democracy promotion is a just cause in itself is unsupported because of the high possibility of adverse outcomes and the lack of understanding of cultural, traditional and political differences between sides.
Reference List
Coady, CAJ 2002, Peaceworks: the ethics of armed humanitarian intervention, vol. 45. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.
Fabre, C 2007, ‘Mandatory rescue killings’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 363-384.
Fabre, C 2008, ‘Cosmopolitanism, just war theory and legitimate authority’, International Affairs, vol. 84, 5, pp. 963-976.
Lefkowitz, D 2006, ‘On moral arguments against a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention’, Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 115-134.
Nardin, T 2005, ‘Humanitarian imperialism’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 21-26.
Oberman, K 2015, ‘The myth of the optional war: why states are required to wage the wars they are permitted to wage’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 255-286.
Roth, K 2006, ‘Was the Iraq war a humanitarian intervention?’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 84-92.
Tesón, FR 2005, ‘Ending tyranny in Iraq’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 1-20.
United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: about n.d., Web.
Walzer, M 1980, ‘The moral standing of states: a response to four critics’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 209-229.