Landmark court decisions in the US alter how the law is now interpreted. Due to the fact that they alter how the Constitution is understood, landmark decisions are significant. The Supreme Court’s rulings in significant cases are reviewed when new matters are filed before the courts to determine how the judge will rule in such instances. Judges and attorneys both use important instances to support their conclusions. Throughout the history of the Supreme Court, several landmark cases have influenced the future of justice, and Berghuis v. Thompkins is one of them.
In the historic US Supreme Court decision Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370 (2010), the court analyzed the situation of a suspect who comprehends their Miranda v. Arizona right to remain silent. He was aware that he has this right but does not explicitly invoke or waive it. Van Chester Tompkins was a suspect in a fatal shooting in 2000. Michigan police questioned Tompkins for about three hours, and he did not say anything at the time. Tompkins was advised of his Fifth Amendment right to silence but did not indicate that he would desire to utilize it. As the hours passed, the police decided to make one more effort to persuade Tompkins to admit to the shooting by appealing to his moral principles. Tompkins was questioned about whether he prayed to God to pardon him for killing the victim, and he answered “yes” (Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010). Tompkins claimed at trial that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence and that the police were compelled to halt all interrogations once he did.
Van Chester Tompkins sought the court to suppress the comments he made during the questioning. The court rejected this defense, and Tompkins was found guilty and given a life sentence. The approach was rejected by a Federal appeals court, which reinstated Tompkins’ innocence. The federal court’s ruling was appealed by the government all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
The decision was rather ambiguous, and the court was divided. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court on June 1, 2010, by a 5-4 margin. The majority in Berghuis v. Thompkins reasoned that there was no justification for differentiating between Miranda’s rights to remain silent and counsel because “both protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by requiring an interrogation to cease when either right is invoked” in response to Tompkins’ various arguments (Berghuis v Thompkins, 2010). It was also debated whether the defendant’s actions or unclear comments may be interpreted as a reference to Miranda’s rights. The majority in Berghuis v. Thompkins came to the conclusion that there were compelling reasons why exercising these rights needed clear action on the part of the accused, including assurance for law enforcement, defense attorneys, and defendants.
The court then gave the defendant’s alleged actions further consideration. It was observed that the defendant had read and indicated an awareness of the rights, and as a result, he was aware of his rights. As a result, he was aware that this right was unaffected by time and that, should he choose to exercise it during questioning, the police would be required to comply. The Court noted that “the police are not required to reward suspects from time to time” and that the question related to religious beliefs does not make the answer “involuntary”. The accused did not have the courage to assert his rights since he was aware of their potential for use at any time. Thus, by voluntarily giving a statement to the police, the suspect, who was informed of his rights and understood them but did not invoke them, forfeited that privilege. Tompkins did not use his right to silence to terminate the questioning. He voluntarily gave a statement to the police after fully comprehending his legal options and waiving his right to remain silent.
The dissenting justices in Berghuis v. Thompkins relied on Sotomayor’s opinion, who noted that this case marked a significant departure from the protection against being forced to testify against oneself. Miranda v. Arizona had long provided it during interrogation in custody and that suspects must now expressly invoke their right to remain silent, which, against common sense, requires them to speak. Even if they have not explicitly said so, the suspects will be legally considered to have surrendered their rights. Additionally, the government must meet a high standard of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, relying on Miranda. A valid waiver would not be assumed based solely on the defendant’s silence following the administration of warnings or based solely on the fact that the confession was actually obtained.
If I had to make a decision, I would hold out the reasoning of the dissenting. The prosecution has a large burden to prove a waiver; thus, the court must start from the fact that the defendant did not renounce his right. A waiver cannot be assumed just from the fact that a confession was finally really obtained, as the question prior to getting evidence is substantial evidence against the conclusion of a valid waiver, and simple silence in answer to a query is insufficient. Contrary to Miranda and Butler, the dissent came to the conclusion that the ordinance was superfluous given the changes it made and that Tompkins was still entitled to relief even if he chose not to use his ability to impose a waiver. This position seems to me more reasoned, well-grounded, and fair.
Reference
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). Web.