The article under discussion was written in 2002 by C. J. Brainerd and V. F. Reyna and is titled “Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory.” The aim of the paper was to present an organized summary of findings that explained false memory using the Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT). The article seeks to present FTT as an adequate and parsimonious theory that explains false memory intelligibly despite the theory’s predictions veering markedly from conventional expectations. This critique will explore the consistency of the evidence presented and evaluate the sensibility of arriving at the conclusions that the writers arrive at.
The first thing that the writers of the article embark on is showing that a theory, as a scientific tool, ought to explain as many phenomena as possible with as few assumptions as possible. The problem the writers are dealing with emanates from the phenomenon of false memory being studied using varied means, under dissimilar conditions, and using unrelated subjects for the studies. The writers set out to show the common ground for all these varied scenarios and convincingly show that false memories are a result of an interaction between memory (and forgetting) and the cognitive process of reasoning.
The entire paper is a discussion of how verbatim traces and gist traces interact under varied conditions to either increase or decrease the likelihood of false memories being reported. The writers use five principles to achieve the explanatory role of their theory: verbatim and gist traces are stored in a similar manner and are stored almost simultaneously, the occurrence of false memory depends on the difference in the retrieval of verbatim and gist traces, verbatim and gist traces can both support false memory, the effect of developmental difference on false memory, and how vivid-but false-remembering can be brought about by both verbatim and gist processing.
FTT predicts several things that deviate markedly from the norm of how false memory is thought to work in a pragmatic situation like witness testimony. An intriguing prediction the writers make is that higher development is likely to result in more false memories. However, this is consistent with the assumptions that higher development increases remembering (especially gist traces in this case) by increasing the likelihood of ascribing meaning to events. These two factors of developmental advancement point toward a grown-up having a likelihood of having more false memories than a child (Ceci and Bruck, 1993).
Another prediction made by FTT is that false memories are as persistent as true memories are (Toglia, Neuschatz, and Goodwin, 1999). This prediction challenges the commonly held notion that true memories are more likely to be remembered than are false memories (Payne et al., 1996). The writers proceed to also predict that false memories can emanate from testing, thus testing does not necessarily rid one of false memories; testing might actually strengthen false memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 1996). Experiments based on FTT theory challenge the assumption that repetition does not necessarily strengthen verbatim traces; it might actually weaken the verbatim traces, consequently leading to a higher likelihood of false memory (Seamon et al. 2002). For example, cross-examination of a witness might strengthen a false memory especially when the witness is relying more on gist traces than they are on verbatim traces.
The writers of the article challenge orthodox views on how false memories are created and perpetuated. The article provides evidence-based reasons why assumptions about false memory might be wrong, this is significant from a pragmatic as well as an academic point of view.
References
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1996). Mere memory testing creates false memories in children. Developmental Psychology, 32(3), 467–476.
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), 403–439.
Payne, D. G., Elie, C. J., Blackwell, J. M., & Neuschatz, J. S. (1996). Memory illusions: Recalling, recognizing, and recollecting events that never occurred. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 261–285.
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Schwartz, M. A., Jones, K. J., Lee, D. M., & Jones, S. J. (2002). Repetition can have similar and different effects on accurate and false recognition. Journal of Memory and Language, 46(2), 323–340.
Toglia, M. P., Neuschatz, J. S., & Goodwin, K. A. (1999). Recall accuracy and illusory memories: When more is less. Memory, 7(2), 233–256.