Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that the Anglo-American model of democratic capitalism is the only viable model left in the world. Scholars such as Daniel Yergin and Robert Skidelsky, who are not known as free-market enthusiasts, write books assessing the triumph of capitalism. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama speculates that democratic capitalism may constitute the “endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution” and hence the “final form of human government” occasional challenges such as Islamic fundamentalism notwithstanding. Globalization forces companies to sell their products in as many different places as possible, a practice that frequently requires other people and other organizations to help them. Strategic alliances come in a variety of forms. The joint venture discussed above, in which companies either hold a proportion of their partner’s equity or set up a joint company, is the most rigid form of strategic alliance. By bringing together different firms with unique skills and capabilities, alliances can create powerful learning opportunities. Company policy, e.g. defending its designs or know-how, may exclude countries.
Finally, a company has, or should have, a long-term strategy that can influence the channel decision; if it wishes in the long term to exploit a particular market, then it will not license its product or process in that market.
Food and beverage companies attract attention because they cater to the most elementary form of human consumption. The company responded by introducing queue monitors (young women) who channeled everyone into orderly lines. Globalization has also increased the global pool of foreign direct investment (FDI), which offers further opportunities for countries to improve productivity and expand their industrial capacity. Foreign firms can create jobs; import new technology, knowledge, and skills; and provide business to local suppliers. FDI has been important for many developing countries.
The benefits of globalization have gone disproportionately to wealthy countries. Even within rich countries, many people have reason to be unhappy. All around the world children spend precious “media literacy” time learning to use the productivity tools of Microsoft Office.
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, ideology in its most comprehensive and binary form has ceased to exist. Left and Right, class and labor, East and West, no longer define the field of politics. These ideological systems have imploded and new cultural forces have emerged in the vacuum created by the fall of ideology. Gone is the ability of ideology to define a universalistic vision of the social order. In our post-modern age, the penchant for certainty has given way to cultural relativism and the homogenizing logic of modernity has been replaced by the increasing recognition of heterogeneity and difference. The Cold War era, which effectively goes back to the October Revolution, as far as ideology and meaning were concerned, was a more globalized order than what is presently the case in the so-called global age. The world revolution of globalization differs from the world revolution of modernization in that it paradoxically has brought about more and more fragmentation and different orders of meaning. Western modernity as defined by the Enlightenment, unlike the period, which defined modernization, no longer dominates what is now a post-colonial world. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
In earlier generations information moved slowly, constrained by the primitive state of communications. Financial crises in the early 19th century, for example, particularly those associated with the Napoleonic Wars, were often related to military and other events in faraway places. An investor’s speculative position could be wiped out by a military setback, and he might not even know about it for days or even weeks, which, from the perspective of central banking today, might be considered bliss.
It is worthwhile to trace the roots of this extraordinary expansion of global finance, to assess its benefits and risks, and to suggest some avenues that can usefully be explored to contain some of its potentially adverse consequences. A global financial system, of course, is not an end in itself. It is the institutional structure that has been developed over the centuries to facilitate the production of goods and services. Accordingly, we can better understand the evolution of today’s burgeoning global financial markets by parsing the extraordinary changes that have emerged, in the past century or more, in what we conventionally call the real side of economies: the production of goods and services. The same technological forces currently driving finance were first evident in the production process and have had a profound effect on what we produce, how we produce it, and how it is financed. Technological change or, more generally, ideas have significantly altered the nature of output so that it has become increasingly conceptual and less physical. A much smaller proportion of the measured real gross domestic product constitutes physical bulk today than in past generations.
The increasing substitution of concepts for physical effort in the creation of economic value also has affected how we produce; computer-assisted design systems, machine tools, and inventory control systems provide examples. Offices are now routinely outfitted with high-speed information-processing technology. Because the accretion of knowledge is, with rare exceptions, irreversible, this trend almost surely will continue into the next century and beyond. Value creation at the turn of the 21st century will surely involve the transmission of information and ideas, generally over complex telecommunication networks. That development will create considerably greater flexibility of where services are produced and where employees do their work. A century earlier, transportation of goods to their most value-creating locations served the same purpose for an economy whose value creation still rested heavily on physical, bulky output.
Not unexpectedly, as goods and services have moved across borders, the necessity to finance them has increased dramatically. But what is particularly startling is how large the expansion in cross-border finance has become, relative to the trade it finances. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
Literature Review
According to Kissinger and Moynihan, the conventional wisdom is that the Anglo-American model of democratic capitalism is the only viable model left in the world. Scholars such as Daniel Yergin and Robert Skidelsky, who are not known as free-market enthusiasts, write books assessing the triumph of capitalism. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama speculates that democratic capitalism may constitute the “endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution” and hence the “final form of human government” occasional challenges such as Islamic fundamentalism notwithstanding. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
Paul Mattick writes more soberly in the New York Times, “Adam Smith is the ancestor of the free market idea itself, the system that since the fall of Communism in the East and the triumph of fiscal conservatism in the West supposedly rules the world under the name of neoliberalism.” But whoever claimed to rule “under the name of neoliberalism”?
We usually think of mercantilism as an economic doctrine: the “economic system of the major trading nations during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, based on the premise that national wealth and power were best served by increasing exports and collecting precious metals in return,” according to the Columbia Encyclopedia. But mercantilism was part of a broader idea, the idea that the sovereign must direct the entire society, with responsibility for the moral, religious, and economic life of the nation. The liberal revolution rejected that broad statistic conception, not just its narrow economic aspect. Instead of a king, the representatives of the people should govern. And the government, instead of assuming responsibility for every aspect of society, should be restricted to providing a framework in which people would pursue their ends. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
Forces that flatten the world have not stopped
Friedman identifies 10 developments or “flatteners” that have helped to level the playing field of the global economy. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the triumph of capitalism. The development of Microsoft Windows and the introduction of the Netscape browser helped fuel the high-tech bubble. Most of us looked at the dot.com collapse as a disaster, but it was a great boon to globalization because billions of dollars were spent on fiber optic telecommunications cable to connect the continents. When the initial investors went bust, other companies bought these transmission networks for pennies on the dollar, which made it possible to offer those networks to users worldwide at a minimal cost. New software created compatibility among diverse computer applications. Companies could now send jobs (outsourcing) or whole factories (off-shoring) overseas; have employees in different locations collaborate online through shared operating systems, such as Linux (open sourcing); allow other companies to take over whole sections of their operations (insourcing); or create global supply chains so that when a product is sold in the U.S., another is immediately made in China (supply-chaining). Powerful new search engines, such as Google and Yahoo, enabled people around the world to mine unlimited data sources, and new wireless technologies and Voice Over Internet Protocols are now accelerating these developments.
As a result of very rapid increases in telecommunications and computer-based technologies and products, a dramatic expansion in cross-border financial flows and within countries has emerged. The pace has become truly remarkable. These technology-based developments have so expanded the breadth and depth of markets that governments, even reluctant ones, increasingly have felt they have had little alternative but to deregulate and free up internal credit and financial markets.
In recent years global economic integration has accelerated on a multitude of fronts. While trade liberalization, which has been ongoing for a longer period, has continued, more dramatic changes have occurred in the financial sphere.
World financial markets undoubtedly are far more efficient today than ever before. Changes in communications and information technology, and the new instruments and risk-management techniques they have made possible, enable an ever-wider range of financial and no financial firms today to manage their financial risks more effectively. As a consequence, they can now concentrate on managing the economic risks associated with their primary businesses.
The solid profitability of new financial products in the face of their huge proliferation attests to the increasing effectiveness of financial markets in facilitating the flow of trade and direct investment, which are so patently contributing to ever-higher standards of living around the world. Complex financial instruments—derivative instruments, in one form or another—are being developed to take advantage of the gains in communications and information technology. Such instruments would not have flourished as they have without the technological advances of the past several decades. They could increasingly organizations embrace a strategy of globalization and core competence. Globalization forces companies to sell their products in as many different places as possible, a practice that frequently requires other people and other organizations to help them. The preference of firms to stick to what they do best, or their core competencies, means they must let others outside the organization, often abroad, help them with everything else. In this way, the best practice can be called upon irrespective of source in all aspects of the company’s market offering. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
Strategic alliances come in a variety of forms. The joint venture discussed above, in which companies either hold a proportion of their partner’s equity or set up a joint company, is the most rigid form of strategic alliance. The most fluid form is where there is no formal agreement to fall back on and the participants rely on a common vision and considerable trust. The latter type is characterized by McDonald’s (of the ‘Big Mac’) and Coca-Cola, although most of McDonald’s alliances are of the more formal kind, e.g. a ten-year alliance with Disney. Most strategic alliances fall somewhere between the two extremes and can be fairly vague. Their open-mindedness is part of their appeal. When they have served their purpose, which may be sooner rather than later, there is no legal requirement for them to continue until resolved by lawyers, making them self-regulating. New alliances can be a form of faster, cheaper growth than other more formal arrangements. However, while alliances can be relatively inexpensive to set up, they need to be well managed, using good communication and negotiation skills as well as the older skills of diplomacy and a high tolerance of uncertainty. The trust implicit in informal agreements comes from the parties taking slight risks in divulging information about themselves and releasing more when this is not used to exploit them. It is an incremental, and delicate, process.
By bringing together different firms with unique skills and capabilities, alliances can create powerful learning opportunities. As alliances become more common, exploiting the learning potential of alliances will become more important. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
Market size is a primary consideration, together with trends in the market like segmentation and the estimated share of the market that can be achieved given the competition. The existing distribution methods will determine whether single or multiple channels are developed. Host country policies are important since any special standards, import quotas or duties will increase the cost to the consumer and disadvantage foreign suppliers about domestic ones. If a company wants to hold on to its technology, there is little point in trying to enter a market using a foreign direct investment (FDI) where there is the insistence on its transfer. Market structure is important in that the number of competing intermediaries may contain organizations with affiliations to competitors either locally or from outside the market. The economic infrastructure becomes critical when specialized expertise is required or the services are needed for the competent financing, manufacture, and distribution of a company’s output. Production costs are critical where these constitute a high proportion of the total costs of a product.
Factors relating to the organization have a bearing on the channel decision. International experience and commitment normally will be necessary before undertaking expensive foreign investment, as will training for those entering the international market for the first time. Company policy, e.g. defending its designs or know-how, may exclude countries where there is little protection for them. The product, or the technology, maybe a deciding factor in the channel decision; a bulky product transportable across borders only at great cost may be more profitably manufactured under license in the customer country. It should go without saying that finance, including appropriate cash flows, should be available for the channel project. In many organizations, there is a dominant coalition which, for differing reasons of the individuals concerned, may decide to enter a market or revise its channel approach. Finally, a company has, or should have, a long-term strategy that can influence the channel decision; if it wishes in the long term to exploit a particular market, then it will not license its product or process in that market.
The vast majority of channel co-operation arrangements are the subject of written agreements whereby, apart from the vaguer agreements of alliances, the details and conditions of how the parties are going to work together are spelled out. The best agreements will address the possibility of conflict and the means of resolution to be adopted should that contingency occur. This could cover the law under which the agreement is to be interpreted, the language version of the agreement which is to be the definitive one, as well as the place and body which will arbitrate in the case of disputes. The duration of the agreement is critical. The shorter the period, the simpler it is to have a review of arrangements, as long as it is consistent with the confidence of the partners to invest in the arrangement, e.g. building up stocks or taking on personnel to implement the agreement. Revisions included in a new agreement should take account of changes in the relationship that arises. The self-determination of the parties that exist at the time an original agreement is made is complicated by factors of performance and commitment to the joint activity once it has been put into operation. The original objectivity is clouded by the history of the growing relationship and the subsequent negotiations that take place within the original agreement. (Findlay, Ronald, 2002).
When a small US supplier quoted a large European electrical company in euros, the Eurozone currency, but was asked in negotiations to agree to payment in dollars, he did so with alacrity. What the US supplier did not know was that the European company had currency fluctuation projections which indicated that over the period between agreement and payment there would be a considerable weakening of the dollar about the European currency. Had the US company known this, it might not have agreed to the terms when the agreement was made. Information is power and, through its collection and analysis, strengthens the negotiator’s armory.
When a supplier has created alternative sources of action such as other candidates for a distributorship, and can subtly make this known, he/she creates a more powerful negotiating position for him/herself. In the same way, if distributors or agents can indicate competition for their services, they are performing a similar function.
The joint venture has so much power floating around in it that each party has the potential to move the other a considerable way from its initial bargaining point. Furthermore, in any joint venture negotiating situation there is the potential to harness the power of other institutions. For example, if one possible partner is a company from an industrialized country while the other is a company within a less developed country, then the latter might seek to strengthen its hand if it can create alternatives and show these alternatives to be active. The government of India has in the past invited companies interested in an oil venture to indicate their degree of interest and visibly has entered into, and continued negotiations with, more than one company.
Anti-globalization activists from Seattle to Genoa may give the impression of a mass uprising against liberal capitalism. But that would be an error. The anti-globalizers are violent because they’re frustrated, and they’re frustrated because they’re losing. Everywhere governments will allow it, people are choosing open markets and open societies—the free flow of information, commerce, trade, and investment and responsibility for their own lives. (Moore, Karl, 2005).
But the triumph of liberalism is by no means inevitable. There never was a golden age of liberty, and there never will be. Although we do seem to have left behind some of the worst forms of government, we can’t help but remember that during the past century we have endured communism, fascism, and national socialism. Armed with modern technology, those regimes proved to be the most brutal in history. And they arose at another time when liberal thinkers thought that prosperity and international trade would ensure peace and harmony.
Still, every generation should learn from those that have gone before. By now we should have learned that people can run their own lives better than distant bureaucrats can, that competition works better than monopoly and markets better than central planning, that the freedom to choose is about more than economics, that taxing enterprise makes no more sense than subsidizing irresponsibility, that war is sometimes necessary but always enormously destructive, that limited government is one of the greatest achievements of humanity because it makes possible so much else. If the world is learning those lessons, then the 21st century looks bright indeed.
How are the two companies coping with these changes?
McDonald’s
McDonald’s, KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken), and Coca-Cola are primary targets of anti-globalism demonstrators who are themselves organized into global networks via the Internet (see the discussion below). Food and beverage companies attract attention because they cater to the most elementary form of human consumption. We are what we eat, and when diet changes, notions of national and ethnic identity change accordingly. McDonald’s has become a symbol of globalism for obvious reasons: on an average day the company serves nearly fifty million customers in over thirty thousand restaurants located in 118 countries. In the mid-1990s, a new McDonald’s opened somewhere in the world every eight hours (the rate of expansion has subsequently slowed). Critics claim that the spread of American-style fast-food undermines the integrity of indigenous cuisines, thereby promoting the homogenization of world dietary preferences. Anthropological research in Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong does not support this view.
Close attention to cultural trends at the local level shows that the globalization process works both ways. Fast-food chains do indeed introduce innovations that sometimes change consumer behavior and preferences. In Japan, for example, using one’s hands to hold and simultaneously eat prepared foods was considered a gross breach of etiquette before the popularization of McDonald’s hamburgers. The company had such a dramatic impact on popular etiquette that it is now common to see Tokyo commuters eating in public, without chopsticks or spoons. In late-Soviet Russia, public rudeness had become a high art form among service personnel. Today consumers expect polite, smiling service when they visit Moscow restaurants, a social revolution initiated by McDonald’s and its employee indoctrination programs. (Moore, Karl, 2005).
The social atmosphere in 1960s colonial Hong Kong was anything but genteel. Cashing a check, boarding a bus, or buying a train ticket required brute force. The majority of residents were refugees from Maoist China, and they were not inclined to see the British colony as their home. To use a Cold War metaphor, Hong Kong was a borrowed place living on borrowed time (the ninety-nine-year lease on the colonial territory expired at midnight on June 30, 1997). Given this political environment, ordinary people did not feel compelled to participate in a civic culture that included standing in line for services. When McDonald’s opened in 1975, customers clumped around the cash registers, shouting orders and waving money over the heads of people in front of them. The company responded by introducing queue monitors (young women) who channeled everyone into orderly lines. Queuing subsequently became a hallmark of Hong Kong’s cosmopolitan, middle-class culture created by the children and grandchildren of refugees. Older residents credit McDonald’s for introducing the queue, a critical element in this social transition.
Food, especially haute cuisine, is commonly regarded (by French and non-French alike) as the core element of French culture—the one sure way to distinguish France from its less discerning neighbors. Not surprisingly, given these views, McDonald’s has become a favorite target of European protest movements. Despite its notoriety, the corporation continues to expand in the very heartland of opposition: by the end of 2002 there were 973 McDonald’s restaurants in France, employing over thirty thousand people (an increase of 60 outlets from 2001). The Big Mac maybe a reviled symbol of cultural imperialism for French intellectuals, but the steady growth of fast-food chains demonstrates that anti-globalist attitudes do not always affect economic behavior, even in societies (such as France) in which such sentiments are nearly universal. Like their counterparts in the United States, French workers and office staff are increasingly pressed for time. The two-hour lunch is a thing of the past for most ordinary Parisians; by the mid-1990s, leisurely dining was reserved for intellectuals, politicians, and tourists. (Moore, Karl, 2005).
Globalization has also increased the global pool of foreign direct investment (FDI), which offers further opportunities for countries to improve productivity and expand their industrial capacity. Foreign firms can create jobs; import new technology, knowledge, and skills; and provide business to local suppliers. FDI has been important for many developing countries. India’s thriving software industry has been driven partly by FDI from firms like Sun Microsystems, Microsoft, and Intel, which, attracted by India’s well-educated, inexpensive labor force, have invested substantial resources in the now booming cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad.
Microsoft
Many of these concerns are legitimate. The benefits of globalization have gone disproportionately to wealthy countries. Poverty in some areas is increasing. Africa, in particular, has suffered: the region’s economic growth was negative in the 1990s; foreign debt equals about 80 percent of its GDP; and the continent’s trade accounts for just 2 percent of the world total, whereas its share of the world’s population is 10 percent (Bloom, Weston, and Steven 2002). Even within rich countries, many people have reason to be unhappy. Global trade means industries often have to compete with cheaper products produced elsewhere, which can lead to business closures and job losses. While this potentially provides benefits to workers in countries where labor is cheap, low-skilled workers in rich countries inevitably suffer. The determination of U. S. steelworkers and European farmers to keep their industries from being opened up to global competition shows that resistance to globalization is not limited to international nongovernmental organizations and developing countries.
Perceptions of the unfairness of globalization could eventually become a threat to global integration itself. Already, countries such as Zimbabwe, where liberalization of the economy in the early 1990s did not have the desired effect, have reverted to protecting some of their industries (Bloom, Weston, and Steven, 2002). And resentment over rising inequality likely is one of the factors behind the increasing turbulence in much of the Muslim world: although global barriers to the movement of goods and capital have been lowered, labor mobility has become, if anything, more difficult in recent years. With many young people forced to remain in struggling countries where job opportunities are scarce, the risk that unemployment will lead to unrest grows.
The international policy community has begun to acknowledge the concerns over globalization. The Millennium Development Goals focus on reducing poverty via the channels of education, health care, and reduced gender inequality. Debt relief is underway in many countries. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 endorsed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, drawn up by African leaders as a road map out of the continent’s troubles. However, more will be needed than international agreements. Poverty and inequality must be tackled from the grassroots, and education provides one tool for addressing these problems.
The early computers-in-schools movement had a certain political valence as well. The first school computing facilities were staffed by the members of a personal computer and “hobbyist” computer clubs across the country. Many members of those clubs shared a belief that access to the “innards” of the computer is a form of political empowerment. Universal access to programming skills seemed like a way to attack the digital divide in terms not just of who owned or used computers but also of who knew how to control them. For some people, understanding how a computer worked supported the belief that you could understand how other things worked as well—in both the social and the technical world. The transparent understanding of a computer could become a metaphor for access to power.
All around the world children spend precious “media literacy” time learning to use the productivity tools of Microsoft Office. And ironically, as I have noted, those who argued for the evocative power of computational media to carry ideas have been proved right. Technology is not invisible; it is an actor, carrying embedded ideas. But the ideas that children are learning are the ones embedded in online gaming, search engines, and productivity software such as word processing, spreadsheets, and presentation tools. They are not the ideas that the epistemologists of the Logo movement had in mind, but they do constitute a particular aesthetic in educational computing in which presentation and simulation are seen as their powerful ideas.
Conclusion
The 21st century has seen three billion new people enter the world economy, the majority from China, India, and the former Soviet Union, all societies with rich educational heritages. The little secret that no CEO wants to say publicly is that they are already outsourcing–not just because they can save money on salaries, but also because they can often find better-skilled, more productive, and more ambitious people overseas than in America. Bill Gates is investing millions of dollars to improve our nation’s high schools because he is “terrified” for the future workforce of the nation. “In the international competition to have the biggest and best supply of knowledge workers,” Gates declares, “America is falling behind.”
Education is a vital factor in determining a country’s wealth. The extent of integration into the global economy is also important. The combination of education and globalization can be extremely powerful. Companies that build on a well-educated workforce to trade successfully in global markets can act as a powerful spur to economic development.
Any system that is defending itself against alteration has no choice but to be negative. We can get to the ethical and more internally directed emphasis of Core Management, we will begin by examining what new managers will do and how the job of managing will change under the new
A Core Manager’s job will be comprised of five primary tasks. All other responsibilities making decisions, planning, day-to-day oversight, integrating technology, procurement, structuring organizations, designing assignments, giving clear instructions, motivating people, developing timetables, and measuring results—flow from these tasks. These tasks are:
- Foster real positive change.
- Work through groups.
- Promote creativity.
- Negotiate a path.
- Deliver the product.
All managers do some of these tasks some of the time. Under the new paradigm, these tasks will comprise the bulk of what a public manager does. Of these, fostering change is the most important—40 to 70 percent of a Core Manager’s job will be spent fostering change. Working through workgroups is the vehicle of Core Management and creativity is the medium. Negotiation forms the language of Core Management and delivering a product is its result. All five tasks are done collaboratively and with the goal of managing to succeed, not win.
These five tasks will not replace a public manager’s regular work. Rather, they will guide how that work is done; they will be the locus of a manager’s attention. If a manager is responsible for processing tax returns, much of his or her time will be spent designing and delivering improvements to how those forms are processed. (Moore, Karl, 2005).
Many public managers today feel like they are doing everything they can just to survive. We feel like things are in a constant state of flux. We hurry from issue to issue, from meeting to meeting—from personnel to program to fiscal to budget to political to purchasing to people and more. But change is a funny thing. While you can feel like you’re doing change all the time, more often than not, change is really “doing” you.
For the most part, the public sector today adheres to a maintenance model of management. Public managers are responsible to keep things running. I am reminded of the building manager who could not contract out for work because the public employees knew not to replace the piping, redo the electrical work, or order new fencing, but rather to refurbish and repair what we had. In other words, part of their job was to avoid the additional expense, no matter how reasonable or warranted the repair. No contractor worth his or her salt would ever do that.
The maintenance model forces public managers to make do—to manage with their heads down, to process the vouchers, to get the workout, to implement the new legislation. It fosters a certain degree of inaction—a willingness to accept things that are not quite up to par or that could be better. It can also feed an unwillingness to try anything new, or worse, an overt desire to sabotage any effort to change things.
In truth, most managers never get beyond problem-solving. We fight the fire of the moment. We argue for additional funds with the legislature, deal with the staff person who has trouble delegating, listen to the latest systems problem, report to the boss on our crumbling infrastructure, and congratulate that critical person in Finance who just found a new job. Rarely do we step back to see the total picture, to see what needs changing, let alone to integrate our own issues—personal or organizational—into the analysis.
Real positive change is a special kind of change that seeks to improve things. It does less harm than good and is done for the right reasons. It’s the kind of activity that makes everything else worth doing. Everything should be subject to real positive change.
So what is it? Real positive change is the change that gets something done, that fixes something for the better. It involves changing something—a process, a procedure, a law, a technology, an organization, a fiscal structure, a mission, or a source of frustration—anything that may or may not appear broken but that as a result of the change is noticeably improved.
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