Introduction
Faced with increased concerns over child labor conditions in mills and factories, Congress decided to take matters into its own hands. In 1916, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act was passed, prohibiting the sale of goods made by children under a certain age in interstate commerce (National Archives, 2021). Dagenhart owned a cotton mill and employed two of his sons in the company. He filed a constitutional challenge to the Keating-Owen Act, arguing that it was an improper exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The District Court of the Western District of North Carolina agreed with Dagenhart, holding that Congress acted unconstitutionally in attempting to regulate child labor because it was a purely local matter (Bair, 2015).
Case Overview and Supreme Court Ruling
In the case between Hammer and Dagenhart, the United States Supreme Court stuck a dagger into the heart of a law that attempted to abolish child labor. On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it upheld the District Court’s ruling that Congress may not use its Commerce Clause authority to regulate child labor. The issue was whether Congress could control the sale of items made using child labor once they entered the interstate commerce stream.
The Supreme Court argued that only the State, not the federal government, may regulate local production conditions (Bair, 2015; Sawyer, 2012). Justice Day distinguished production and commerce while writing for the majority decision (Bair, 2015). Although Congress has the authority to pass regulations of goods exchanged in interstate commerce, the court found that Congress’s power does not extend to regulating how those goods are produced (Sawyer, 2012). In the Act, Congress had attempted to use interstate commerce as a hook to control the interests of the states’ production and manufacture of products simply because it believed child labor to be immoral.
Majority Opinion: Limiting Congress Under the Commerce Clause
Nevertheless, the court argued that the ability to regulate production belongs exclusively to the States. By the time a product entered interstate commerce, the labor of production was over. Therefore, Congress was powerless to regulate the conditions of production (Sullivan, 2015).
The court distinguished prior cases that upheld Congress’s authority under the commerce clause to regulate and prohibit the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, impure foods and drugs, prostitutes, and intoxicating liquors (Sullivan, 2015; Bair, 2015). Accordingly, the court reasoned Congress had the authority to regulate the interstate transportation of these things because their shipment across State lines was an unnecessary feature of their harmful results. In other words, it was the interstate sale of those products and services, rather than their production, that Congress sought to regulate. By comparison, the court reasoned that child labor might be harmful, but the interstate products created by child labor were not. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had exceeded its authority by attempting to regulate local production through indirect restrictions on interstate trade.
Justice Holmes’ Dissent and Constitutional Arguments
However, Justice Holmes’ dissent, arguing that the Act was constitutional at the time, seemed logical. Holmes agreed that States may regulate internal affairs and domestic commerce, but when products cross State lines, they enter Congress’s domain (Sullivan, 2015). Because the Act confined itself to prohibiting only the interstate or foreign sale of products made with child labor, Holmes argued it was a perfectly constitutional use of Congress’s commerce clause authority.
Hammer vs. Dagenhart represents a notable early attempt by the Supreme Court to rein in Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The attempt proved unsuccessful because the case was later overruled in the 1941 United States v. Darby case, which vindicated Justice Holmes’ dissent. The law at the time restricted Congress from prohibiting the transportation of specific products in interstate or international commerce. Nonetheless, the law gave Congress unqualified authority to regulate such commerce. Therefore, it would be illogical to argue that the authority to regulate excludes the power to prohibit (Sullivan, 2015).
In this case, interstate commerce was the subject of regulation, implying the prohibition of something. As Justice Holmes claimed, it is contradictory to question whether the statute may limit any aspect of such commerce that Congress forbids (Sullivan, 2015). It also makes no difference whether the alleged harm occurs before or after the transit. The Supreme Court decision was analogous to saying regulation is permissible against strong drinks but not the products, such as those that ruin lives.
Implications for Interstate Commerce and Child Labor Regulation
The States can impose any restrictions on domestic trade and internal affairs. They are no longer within their rights when they attempt to ship their goods beyond state boundaries. If Congress and the Constitution had never existed, these states would have depended on regulations imposed by their neighbors to facilitate trade. Therefore, commerce across state lines or internationally falls under the jurisdiction of Congress, as per the Constitution (Bair, 2015).
According to Congress, the nation’s welfare may call for a different mindset under its purview than that of a self-seeking State (Bair, 2015). For example, forcing children to work shifts of 10 hours or more for very little pay, often in unsafe conditions, exemplifies the self-seeking attitudes in these States. Arguing that producing goods from child labor was not part of interstate commerce was flawed because they were meant to be shipped across State lines.
The Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Darby revealed some discrepancies in the Hammer v. Dagenhart case that were grossly ignored. In the U.S. vs. Darby case, Justice Stone stated that Congress could regulate actions within a state that have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce” (Coffield, 2021). Therefore, Congress had the authority to bar products made under poor working conditions from competing on the national market. Interstate commerce would be significantly impacted by this kind of competition, meaning Congress should safeguard the welfare of the workers.
The ruling overlooked one legal issue: whether “interstate commerce” includes only trade at the border and extends into the interior of a state. Since the trade runs into the interior of a State, it would be hard to see how any exercise of federal power over any local economic activity could violate the commerce clause. An interstate can include activities that penetrate the interior of the State (Bair, 2015).
Moreover, the court ruling seemed to overlook the commonly used tests of the period, including substantial economic impact, direct versus indirect effects, and the stream-of-commerce analysis. These three tests represented an effort to determine whether the federal regulation pertained to interstate commerce or whether the regulated activity itself constituted a form of interstate commerce. The Hammer vs. Dagenhart case, relating to federal moral and vice legislation, yielded inconsistent results due to the lack of a straightforward application of any of the three tests. Jurists may have viewed the Keating-Owen Act as a high-stakes struggle over whether the Commerce Clause grants the federal government control over sectors traditionally regulated by state and local authorities.
It has long been a principle of American law that police powers should be responsive to local conditions and accountable to local oversight. Questions on whether the law should criminalize or penalize perceived vices such as gambling, child labor, or illegal logging were usually considered a local concern (Bair, 2015; Coffield, 2021). Nevertheless, the federal government is conceived as a central entity, exercising a higher level of coordination, which should balance and complement itself with the more immediate influence of police power in the State. Given this background, it is understandable why the Champion vs. Ames court wrestled with whether state lotteries or transporting prostitutes across state lines should become a matter of federal regulation under the commerce laws (Bair, 2015). Accordingly, if a State can forbid lotteries to protect its citizens, Congress can forbid the interstate transit of lottery tickets to protect all U.S. citizens.
From a contemporary perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision in the child labor case appears more complex to understand. In theory, the injunction in Hammer v. Dagenhart represented a significant departure from equity practice (Bray, 2017). Looking back on Hammer vs. Dagenhart, it is horrifying how hard child labor was common and legal throughout the United States, and attempts to correct inconsistent Court decisions hindered it.
Furthermore, the statute only affected the transportation of goods in interstate commerce that was made with child labor, not prices or child labor itself. Specifically, the law limited the employment of children below 14 years and demanded improved working conditions for those aged between 14 and 16 (National Archives, 2021). The decision reflected the earlier twentieth-century Supreme Court’s tendency to manipulate meaningless legal forms to protect a laissez-faire economy that privileged powerful business interests at the expense of workers and children (Bair, 2015).
That indictment has supported the generalized jurisprudential view that constitutional law is nothing more than the policy preferences of the Supreme Court’s Justices at the turn of the 20th century. The attitudinal model behavior of the Supreme Court, with its narrow focus on policy preferences, severely limited constitutional development and curtailed the interests of a narrow class of citizens. Accordingly, the court erred in declaring the statute unconstitutional since its operation prevented the harmful result of child labor to the extent that interstate transportation is economically necessary for their fruition.
Later Developments and Federal Labor Legislation
Federal labor legislation later became one of the main initiatives in the U.S., indicating that previous decisions based on the Commerce Clause were significantly flawed. The initiatives were the primary drivers of interpreting federal authority under the Commerce Clause (Bair, 2015). Parallel battles were occurring, overwhelming the federal constitution, which limited state governments from enacting labor laws. For instance, the infamous 1905 case, in which the court ruled that a statute setting maximum working hours was unconstitutional, established a precedent that proved flawed in subsequent rulings (Bair, 2015). It indicates that 20th-century court decisions often failed to consider Due Process when prosecuting cases, leading to inconsistent rulings.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Hammer v. Dagenhart is a well-known early attempt by the Supreme Court to limit Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The issue was whether Congress might regulate the sale of items produced by child labor once they entered the flow of interstate commerce. By contrast, the court reasoned that while child labor may be detrimental, the interstate products produced by child labor are not. As a result, it is irrational to argue that the ability to regulate excludes the right to ban. Forcing children to work 10-hour shifts or more for very little compensation, often in hazardous situations, reflected these states’ self-serving attitudes. The argument that commodities made with child labor were not part of interstate commerce was faulty because they were intended to be shipped over state boundaries.
Moreover, the court’s ruling failed to meet the widely accepted standards of direct versus indirect effects, substantial economic impact, and the stream-of-commerce tests. In the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, which involved federal morality and vice laws, inconsistent results were arrived at without clearly applying any of the three tests. Legal scholars might have viewed the Keating-Owen Act as a pivotal struggle over whether the Commerce Clause grants the government authority over areas traditionally governed by state and local regulations.
Looking back on Hammer v. Dagenhart, it is appalling how widespread and legal child labor was in the United States and how attempts to rectify the inconsistent ruling failed. Specifically, the law restricted the employment of minors under 14 and required better working conditions for those aged 14 to 16. Therefore, the decision implicated the earlier twentieth-century Supreme Court for manipulating meaningless legal forms to safeguard a laissez-faire economy that favored powerful business interests over workers and children. This claim has reinforced the dominant legal perspective that, around the turn of the 20th century, constitutional law largely reflected the policy preferences of Supreme Court Justices. Overall, the court’s mindset and standard practices, along with its limited attention to broader considerations, significantly constrained constitutional progress and prioritized the interests of a narrow segment of society.
References
Bair, J. (2015). “The silent man”: From Lochner to Hammer v. Dagenhart, a reevaluation of Justice William R. Day. Journal of Supreme Court History, 40(1), 38–54.
Bray, S. (2017). Multiple chancellors: Reforming the national injunction. In U.S. Courts (pp. 1–66).
Coffield, T. (2021). United States v. Darby: Commerce clause, manufacturing, and the FLSA. Coffield Law.
National Archives. (2021). Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (1916). National Archives.
Sawyer, L. (2012). Creating Hammer v. Dagenhart. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 21(1), 67–123.
Sullivan, C. (2015). Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251(1918). FindLaw.