One of the most peculiar aspects of a post-industrial living is that, as of today, just about every socially prominent politician in the West considers itself an ‘expert on human rights’ and refers the concept of human rights, as such that represents an objective truth-value.
Partially, this can be explained by the fact that the classical definitions of human rights suggest the concept’s perceptual and implicational universality, which in turn implies that one’s endowment with a particular ‘human right’ should not be substantiated rationally, but rather ‘felt’ emotionally.
As Cranston (1973, p. 36) pointed out, “A human right by definition is a universal moral right… something of which no one may be deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every human being simply because he is human”.
In fact, the belief that all humans are equally entitled to certain rights, within the society, served as a discursive foundation for the introduction of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the U.N., according to which, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (UDHR 1948, Article 1).
Nevertheless, even though that nowadays the concept of ‘human rights’ is being commonly discussed, as such that applies to all people, regardless of what happened to be the specifics of their ethno-cultural affiliation and their varying ability to act as the agents of progress, this is far from being the actual case.
After all, it is not only that throughout the course of history, the concept of human rights has been referred to, as such that applies to only certain groups of individuals, but that the objective socio-political realities create dialectical prerequisites for this concept to be used by Western countries to justify their continual geopolitical domination in the world.
This is exactly the reason why, as of today, we usually get to hear of people’s ‘human rights’ being abused, within the context of how Western countries (particularly the U.S.) go about rationalizing their decisions to resort to a military intervention, as the mean of ‘defending democracy’ in the de facto sovereign states.
Therefore, there is nothing too surprising about the fact that, even though that the universality of people’s ‘human rights’ has been officially declared by the international community members, as far back as in 1948, there is very little uniformity to how this concept is being applied in practice.
The reason for this is apparent – whereas, there is indeed a good rationale in thinking that the idea of ‘human rights’ does appeal to people on an unconscious level, not all of these people can be regarded humans, in the societal sense of this word. Let us explore the validity of this statement at length.
When it comes to elaborating on what should be considered a discursively legitimate definition of ‘human rights’, it is important to understand that the concept in question cannot be referred to in terms of a ‘thing in itself’.
That is, at first people evolved to the point of being able to recognize their basic humanity, and only then they realized themselves being in a position to coin the term ‘human rights’.
What does make one human? It is the same that allowed the representatives of Homo Sapiens species to attain an undisputed dominance in their environmental niche, which now accounts for the whole planet Earth – their ability to operate with highly abstract subject matters (intellect).
Being endowed with intellect, people are able to act as the agents of civilization/progress, which in turn allows them to create societies and to ensure these societies’ effective functioning. Thus, in order for just about anyone to be considered eligible of taking a practical advantage of ‘human rights, he or she must be able to prove its humanness socially.
In its turn, this would require the concerned individual to attest his or her endowment with, “1. Capacity to reason; 2. capacity to act for normative reasons, including moral reasons; 3. capacity to act autonomously; 4. capacity to engage in complex social relationships” (Bernat 2008, p. 8).
In other words, it is specifically the individuals capable of pushing forward a socio-cultural progress, which may be considered human, in the full sense of this word.
Hence, the first discursive provision to how I think the concept of ‘human rights’ should be defined – the notion of a ‘right’ derives out of the notion of a ‘power’, rather out of the notion of a ‘morality/ethics’. This is why it is wrong to believe that one can simply be assigned with certain rights, without qualifying to possess these rights, in the first place.
Rights are not given but taken (Pagden 2003). This is the reason why it is methodologically fallacious to assume that animals or unborn human fetuses can have ‘rights’ – it is not only the above-mentioned may have no understanding, as to what the concept of a ‘right’ stands for, but they would never be able to defend any of their hypothetical ‘rights’, even in theory.
The second provision is that the notion of a ‘right’ must be discussed in conjunction with the notion of an intellectual advancement. After all, it is specifically people’s ability to indulge in abstract philosophizing, which allowed them to coin up the term ‘humanity’, in the first place.
This once again suggests that it is conceptually inappropriate advocating the universality of human rights, without taking into consideration the qualitative psychological characteristics of those individuals, to which the concept of ‘human rights’ supposedly applies.
The third provision is that, contrary to what nowadays is being commonly assumed, the earlier mentioned concept (in its contemporary sounding) did not come about because of the humanity’s ways having been turned thoroughly ethical/moral.
Rather, it emerged because the concept’s advocates, which overwhelmingly consist of Westerners (Whites), came to realize that, on order for them to be able to continue exploiting the world’s natural and human resources, they need to have a legally legitimate excuse to meddle in the internal affairs of non-Western countries.
In other words, the objective laws of history naturally predetermined the concept of ‘human rights’ to serve realist rather than constructivist purposes.
What has been said earlier allows us to formulate a discursively sound definition of human rights. Human rights are the legally enforced civil liberties, to which the members of most evolutionary advanced societies happened to be entitled by the very fact that, due to their socio-economic and technological advancement, they can enjoy the luxury of not having to participate in the tribal ‘war of everybody against everybody’, as the mean of ensuring their physical survival.
This definition, of course, implies that there is indeed a good reason in limiting the ‘universality’ of humans rights to encompass only those, which due to the genetically predetermined specifics of their ‘mental wiring’, are able to comprehend the concept, in general, and its discursive implications, in particular.
Qualifying people for the entitlement to human rights will not represent much of a challenge. Since one’s ability to function as the society’s productive member (and consequently, the extent of his or her ‘humanness’) reflects the concerned person’s rate of IQ, it will be logical to assume that it is only the individuals with the IQ rate higher than 70, to which the concept of ‘human rights’ applies.
Given the fact that, as sociologists are being well aware of, in some world’s countries the average rate of citizens’ IQ is measured to be as low as 50 (Lynn & Vanhanen 2002), people that reside in these countries cannot be considered the de facto part of humanity. Consequently, the concept of ‘human rights’ cannot apply to these people, by definition.
Even though that the earlier suggestion may be deemed ‘racist’, it nevertheless correlates perfectly well with the actual state of affairs in the arena of international politics.
For example, during the course of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the deaths of at least one million people, Western countries adopted a ‘neutral’ stance – the violation of Rwandans’ ‘human rights’ did not concern these countries at all. Had Rwanda been rich in natural resources, this would have been an entirely different matter (Kimpimaki 2011).
Thus, it would only be appropriate to conclude this paper by reinstating once again that the presumed ‘universality’ of human rights is nothing but a myth, just as it is being the case with the theoretical paradigm, out of which this myth originated – the assumption of people’s universal equality. This is the reason why, if not adjusted to the earlier mentioned provisions, the concept of ‘human rights’ will continue to emanate a strong spirit of hypocrisy.
References
Bernat, E 2008, ‘Which Beings Should Be Entitled to Human Rights?’, Medical Law International, vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 1-12.
Cranston, M 1973, What are human rights?, Bodley Head, London.
Kimpimaki, M 2011, ‘Genocide in Rwanda – is it really Finland’s concern?’, International Criminal Law Review, vol. 11 no. 1, pp. 155-176.
Lynn, R & Vanhanen, T 2002, IQ and the wealth of nations. Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group.
Pagden, A 2003, ‘Human rights, natural rights, and Europe’s imperial legacy’, Political Theory, vol. 31 no. 2, pp. 171-199.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. Web.