Australia occupies a whole continent off the coast of Asia, which puts this country in an interesting geopolitical position. Whereas Australian history and values are closely tied to the Western legacy, the geographic proximity of influential Asian players, such as China, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia, opens a new horizon for Australian foreign policy. Therefore, one can claim that Australia has gradually embraced Southeast Asia, its “Near North”, both economically and culturally, as it drifted away from its Western roots. In this regard, the question of this essay lies in verifying to which extent such an assessment of Australian foreign relations is accurate.
The topic of this essay is related to the concept of a middle power in relation to Australia. In general, a middle power can be defined as a country that lacks the strength of a true superpower but has the capacity to influence the regional balance of power. In this regard, the central argument of this essay can be presented in a short statement — Australia established itself as a middle power in Southeast Asia through military, legal, and economic instruments. In doing so, Australia embraced the role of a champion and defender of Western values in the region. As such, Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be described as a pragmatic attempt to increase Australia’s international influence rather than a genuine goodwill gesture. While Australia had significantly increased economic and political engagement with its Asian neighbors throughout the 20th century, the nature of these efforts stemmed from national security and economic power considerations.
Consequently, the essay covers three instruments used by Australian foreign policy to transform the country into true middle power, a trusted bulwark of the West in Southeast Asia. Most importantly, Australian prime ministers did not hesitate to support the military campaigns of its closest allies — the U.S. and Great Britain. In particular, Australia joined the Americans in Korea and Vietnam and the British in Malaya (Broinowski, 2018). Secondly, Australia utilized the legal instrument in the shape of immigration policy and maritime law to increase benefits from engagement with Asia. Finally, Australian foreign policy used the economic instrument to widen financial and economic ties with Asian partners. In the end, Australia managed to construct the identity of a well-intentioned middle power while attempting to shape Southeast Asia’s political and economic landscape to its benefit.
The essay uses Island off the coast of Asia: Instruments of statecraft in Australian foreign policy by Clinton Fernandes, an Australian professor who had served in Australian military intelligence, as a primary source. Published by Lexington Books in 2018, this book offers a rather radical explanation of how the Australian government uses various instruments of statecraft to shape its foreign policy. Fernandes (2018) begins his argument with a historical perspective of Australia as a part of a global white Christian world that lacked sympathy for the colonized people. As an imperial colony, Australia largely depended on British power in order to achieve military and commercial security. After the Federation, the Australian government changed its protector from Britain to the United States. However, the goals of Australian foreign policy and the role of Australia in the region remained mostly unchanged.
Australia has become a representative of Western influence in Southeast Asia. Fernandes (2018) goes even further and states that Australian foreign policy favors only the most influential entities in Australian society. In particular, the list of beneficiaries includes the largest mining, oil, and gas companies and financial institutions (Fernandes, 2018). According to Fernandes (2018), the Australian government under different prime ministers, from Robert Menzies to Malcolm Turnbull, used a combination of military, legal, and economic instruments to promote the unfair neoliberal agenda. Some readers may question the radical message since Fernandes essentially called the Australian government a servant of corporate interests. However, the historical examples of how Australia used military, legal, and economic instruments of statecraft in Southeast Asia provide evidence of a strictly pragmatic approach to relations with Asian neighbors. Therefore, Island off the coast of Asia serves as a valuable source of information that illustrates how the Australian approach in Southeast Asia is based on considerations of security and national interests.
In addition to the primary source, the essay utilized several secondary sources on the subject of Australian foreign policy. Australian public opinion, defence and foreign policy: Attitudes and trends since 1945 by Australian political scientists Danielle Chubb and Ian McAllister serves as a more notable secondary source. Published in 2021 by Palgrave Macmillan, this book somewhat challenges Fernandes’ argument by showing that public opinion finds a reflection in Australian foreign policy. Chubb and McAllister (2021) reinforce their point by providing statistical data and sociological polls’ results on various matters related to Australian international affairs. In addition, the authors connect public opinion evaluations to particular decisions in foreign policy implemented by the Australian government. For example, the end of the discriminatory “White Australia” immigration policy coincided with the significant increase in public approval of Asian migration (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). In this regard, changes in Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be associated with socioeconomic demand rather than the manipulative influence of the private sector.
Since Australia is a liberal democracy, Australian political elites had to adhere to the public will, at least to a certain extent, in order to get reelected. For instance, the so-called “forward defence” strategy of the 1950s-1960s received general public acceptance (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). As a result, the Australian government could send the troops to Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam with public approval. In regard to the modern era, the 2019 Australian Election Study (AES) showed that 31% of potential voters perceive China as a military threat (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). Consequently, prime minister Scott Morrison began urging countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate and push back against China’s aggressive diplomacy (Maude, 2021). As such, this source provides an essay with additional historical background of foreign policies implemented by the Australian government on the road to the middle power status in Southeast Asia.
Australia as a Middle Power in Southeast Asia
Middle power is a popular term used by politicians, political scientists, and analysts to identify a country that cannot be called a superpower but at the same time possesses significant power and influence in the world. For instance, former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd identified Australia as a “middle power by definition” (Teo, 2018, p. 9). However, the exact meaning of the middle power concept may differ since it depends on the selected theoretical approach. Teo (2018) provides three fundamental approaches to ranking the countries. The positional approach ranks countries by the sizes of economy, military, territory, and population. The behavioral approach characterizes a country as a middle power if it exercises leadership only in specific areas, relies on multilateral processes, and emphasizes reputational, technological, or diplomatic advantages. Finally, the impact approach requires a country to have the capacity to protect its core interests and alter the balance of power through international treaties and institutions (Teo, 2018). In the Australian case, one can claim that the country fulfilled all conditions of becoming a middle power in Southeast Asia.
In terms of positional approach, Australia managed to meet the requirements of economic and military indicators. According to Teo (2018), top-level Australian officials, such as prime ministers Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, asserted on multiple occasions that the country belongs in the top 15 economies and defense spenders worldwide. Regarding the behavioral approach, Australia under the current prime minister Morrison, opposes China’s attempts to shift attention away from political and human rights (Maude, 2021). Lastly, Australia has demonstrated the capacity to produce an impact and protect its national interests through military, legal, and economic instruments (Fernandes, 2018). However, the middle power status does not automatically mean that Australia embraced Asia in a cordial alliance. On the contrary, historical evidence shows that Australia used its status to pursue its national interests and promote Western values. From this perspective, a deeper engagement with Asia should be perceived as a pragmatic action rather than a fundamental shift in international relations.
The Military Instrument: ANZUS, Malaya, Vietnam
The military instrument had a significant influence on Australian foreign policy since security has always been an important consideration for the country. Until the end of World War II, Australia could rely on British protection. However, the era of psychological comfort for the Australian government has come to an end as British Empire declined. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka won independence from Britain; Southeast Asia saw the rise of anticolonial nationalist movements (Fernandes, 2018). Given these circumstances, Robert Menzies’ administration shifted the focus to security partnership with the United States. Australian units, including the Royal Australian Air Force Squadron No. 77, joined Korean War on the U.S. side. In return, the U.S. signed the ANZUS defense treaty with Australia, which has become a vital part of Australia’s defense strategy (Fernandes, 2018). In this regard, one can claim that Australia distanced itself from Asia since it selected the strongest power of the West as its new protector.
However, the Menzies administration did not intend to sever ties with Britain. In particular, Australia assisted Britain in suppressing the Malayan Emergency, an anticolonial rebellion that occurred in British Malaya from 1948 to 1960 (Fernandes, 2018). The British and Australian post-World War II economic recovery depended significantly on rubber and tin production in Malaya. Exports from the colonies were crucial for bridging the dollar gap in trade balance with the United States, and Malaya was the biggest dollar-earner in the Empire. For instance, in 1948, Malaya brought $170 million into the British budget; the next-largest colonial dollar-earner, the Gold Coast, brought only $47.5 million (Fernandes, 2018). As such, the British and the Australians could not allow the victory of Malayan insurgents who rose against colonial exploitation. Australia sent bomber squadrons and ground troops throughout the conflict to assist the British allies. Eventually, Britain achieved military victory against Malayan Communist Party and granted formal independence to Malaya. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of independent Malaysia, protected British and Australian commercial interests in the region (Fernandes, 2018). Once again, Australia used military instrument to demonstrate its loyalty to the West and thwart Asian nationalism in the region.
A similar situation happened during the Vietnam War when Australia assisted the U.S. in its fight against North Vietnam. The Australian military involvement in Vietnam had significant public support. For instance, in September 1965, soon after the government sent the troops to Vietnam, 56% of respondents agreed with that decision. The public support for Australian involvement reached 69% by January 1968 (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). However, the Australian society was not ready for a long, bloody, and, most importantly, unsuccessful war. The Tet Offensive at the beginning of 1968 swiftly impacted public opinion. Support for the war dwindled as the footage of street fighting in Vietnamese cities began to spread (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). In this regard, one can claim that the Australian nation rejected the colonial past and finally protested against violence aimed at Asian countries. However, the Vietnam War remains another example of Australia’s alignment with the Western world in an attempt to keep Southeast Asia under political and economic control.
Overall, Australia consistently utilized the military instrument of statecraft in support of its Western allies — Great Britain and the United States. In return, Australia received recognition and security guarantees from the friendly superpowers. As a middle power, Australia never possessed a sufficient military capacity to establish dominance in Southeast Asia single-handedly. In this regard, continuous Australian involvement in Britain- and United States-led military operations against the anticolonial nationalist governments in Asia secured Australia’s strong strategic position in the region. However, this achievement can hardly be called a result of Australia’s strategic turn toward its Asian neighbors.
The Legal Instrument: Immigration Policy and Maritime Law
The legal instrument of Australian foreign policy in Southeast Asia found its primary application in two dimensions. Firstly, the Australian government gradually reconsidered the country’s restrictive immigration policy as Britain shifted its focus to Europe. Secondly, Australia used maritime law to access oil and gas resources in Southeast Asia. As a middle power, Australia applied legal tactics to strengthen its strategic position in the region. While a noticeable shift toward Asia happened in the last several decades, this shift’s essence was in promoting Australia’s national interests. Australia turned its attention to Asia out of strategic considerations rather than the genuine intention to embrace the neighbors.
The liberalization of Australian immigration policy coincided with a steady decline in British power. In the 1950s, when Britain still possessed significant influence in Southeast Asia, the racial “White Australia” policy was in place. As the name suggests, the policy restricted all forms of non-white migration to Australia. The public support for White Australia was significant — for instance, in 1957, only 35% of Australians opposed the discriminatory policy (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). However, the situation changed as Australian society realized that Britain had shifted its attention away from Southeast Asia. By 1964, only 16% of Australians opposed non-white migration into the country (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). The decline of Anglo-Australian relations in the 1960s-1970s made the shift toward trusted Asian neighbors an only pragmatic choice. Whereas the United States could replace Britain as a powerful military ally, an active anti-Asian stance became increasingly unpopular in Australian society. As a result, all major political parties followed the change of public opinion and removed the discriminatory policy from their official positions in the mid-1960s (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). In this example, one can see how Australia adapted its immigration laws to the needs of the strategic situation.
Another example of the legal instrument’s application can be found in relations with Timor-Leste. When Indonesian forces withdrew from Timor, the Australian government immediately put pressure on a newly-independent state. In particular, Australia insisted that it had a right to extract energy resources of the Timor Sea according to the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia (Fernandes, 2018). Indonesia surrendered the territories in the Timor Sea to Timor-Leste, which made the Timor Gap Treaty void; however, the aggressive Australian diplomacy took advantage of the newly-independent country. According to Fernandes (2018), Australia’s foreign minister Alexander Downer threatened the Timor-Leste prime minister to hold the gas flow from the Timor Sea for decades unless Timor-Leste settled for a pro-Australian agreement. As a result, the poor Asian country had to sign the unfavorable Timor Sea Treaty and the International Unitization Agreement (Fernandes, 2018). These treaties prevented Timor-Leste from getting a fair share of revenues, as Australia refused to establish a permanent maritime border with Timor-Leste (Fernandes, 2018). Overall, these examples show how Australia used legal instruments in a strategic, or, in the case of Timor-Leste, opportunistic way.
The Economic Instrument: Engagement with Asia
The more profound engagement with Asian countries has become a valuable factor in Australia’s transformation into a middle power in Southeast Asia. The crucial role in the process belonged to the development of bilateral trade relations with China in the 1980s. Under Bob Hawke’s administration, Australia experienced an economic reorientation to Asia (Fernandes, 2018). Both parties pursued clear economic benefits — Australia looked for new export markets, and China needed the assistance of a stable, democratic, and economically advanced country to support internal modernization (Fernandes, 2018). The mutually beneficial economic partnership led to a quick improvement of China’s public image in Australia. For instance, in the late 1960s, over 30% of Australians considered China a serious military threat. By the end of the 1980s, only 2% of respondents viewed China as a threat (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). Until the middle of the 2000s, the number of Australians advocating for closer links with Asia only grew, reaching approximately 40% (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). In this regard, the beneficial bilateral partnership with China improved the overall perception of Asia in Australians’ eyes.
However, the current public opinion of Asia and China has deteriorated. For example, in 2019, 68% of Australians considered that government allows too much Chinese investment. The decline is not so steep in terms of Asia in general, as over 50% of Australians still feel that Australia-Asian relations are well-balanced (Chubb & McCallister, 2021). The worsening disposition of Australian foreign policy toward China can be seen in Scott Morrison’s statement, who claimed that Australia seeks a “world order that favours freedom” (Maude, 2021). In this regard, one can see Australia as a middle power that tries to build a multilateral coalition for freedom and democracy in Southeast Asia, the obvious sphere of Chinese interests.
At the same time, political disagreements are underscored by the importance of bilateral trade for Australia. Nowadays, up to 40% of Australian goods are exported to China, and 20% of Australian imports come from China (Das, 2022). Consequently, Australian foreign policy faces the challenge of staying committed to Western liberal values and maintaining bilateral trade with an autocratic superpower. Given these circumstances, one can claim that the use of the economic instrument in the 1980s backfired on Australia. Australia has become a middle power in Southeast Asia at the cost of significant economic dependence on China.
Conclusion
In conclusion, one can agree that Australia’s links with Asia have become closer since the Federation in 1901. However, claiming that “Australia embraced its Near North” would not be entirely accurate. A fairer assessment of Australia’s strategic position in Southeast Asia would be classifying this country as a middle power still strongly related to the Western world and liberal values. At certain points in its history, Australia participated in British and American military operations against Asian anticolonial regimes and movements. From the legal standpoint, Australia focused on Asia only when British-Australian relations started to decline. In regard to economics, Australia benefited from bilateral trade with China but eventually fell into dependence and now took a more defensive stance toward the ambitious partner. Overall, the Australian shift toward its “Near North” can be considered a manifestation of realistic, even opportunistic, foreign policy rather than a genuine acceptance of the neighboring region.
References
Broinowski, R. (2018). Island off the coast of Asia – Instruments of statecraft in Australian foreign policy. Australian Institute of International Affairs.
Chubb, D., & McAllister, I. (2021). Australian public opinion, defence and foreign policy: Attitudes and trends since 1945. Palgrave Macmillan.
Das, S. (2022).The sheer size of the China trading relationship is why Australia has to share its feasts and famines with Beijing. The Guardian.
Fernandes, C. (2018). Island off the coast of Asia: Instruments of statecraft in Australian foreign policy. Lexington Books.
Maude, R. (2021). The transformation of Australian foreign policy. Asia Society.
Teo, S. (2018). Middle power identities of Australia and South Korea: Comparing the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard and Lee Myung-Bak administrations. The Pacific Review, 31(2), 1-19.