Intelligence Operations in Afghanistan, 2001-to Present Research Paper

Introduction

Intelligence operations on security have become a core function that no security group can do without if it wants to succeed. Intelligence operations have mutated since time immemorial from a simple primitive spying to the present-day highly technological and sophisticated operations.

Intelligence is important to users of the intelligence information because it keeps them informed concerning the plans by their rivals so that the necessary steps can be taken in advance. All types of intelligence bodies operate on an underground basis since the officers involved in the process and together with their operations remain a secret that should not be revealed.

Once the cover of an intelligence officer is blown, the officer has to be withdrawn, with the operation being stopped or reorganized so that the enemy being spied does not know about it. Every country in the world has an intelligence unit for security management of its internal and regional affairs. Major world powers that have interests all over the world have set up intelligence mechanisms that work for their interests.

The United States of America and other countries of the world that have an interest in other countries have set up intelligence units to enable them accomplish their missions. The paper focuses on the war in Afghanistan since 2001 to date. This war has become protracted for so many years since it was started. This has called for an organized warfare that will guide how the war should be conducted.

The employment of intelligence activity in this war has been necessary as a way of achieving an edge against an enemy whose tactics keep on mutating. Therefore, to win this war, there has been the need to deploy intelligence operations that will feed the security forces with information that will aid in their operation.

Intelligence Players in Afghanistan

Intelligence in Afghanistan can be described as a very complex scenario that involves many players in with different interests. As Aldrich reveals, some players have common interests on one side¹. Other different players have individual interests, with the third group being the common enemy (Aldrich 128)².

The interest of western countries in Afghanistan were stoked after the September 11^th attack in United States of America when the twin towers were bombed. During that time, Afghanistan was hosting Osama bin Laden who was then the leader of al-Qaida terrorist group, which claimed responsibility.

Hitz states that the Taliban government had acknowledged hosting Osama bin Laden and had accepted to expel, but not extradite him, without evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attack³.

Therefore, through NATO, America and its allies launched an attack to find him while also removing the Taliban government from power. This war has lead to the intensified intelligence operations by different countries in Afghanistan.

Mickael states that America, which is the leading member of NATO, has an intelligence network that serves several of its interests in Afghanistan and the whole world in general⁴. The presence of American forces in Afghanistan together with the work they do there needs to be backed up by intelligence reports that can enable them conduct successful operations.

Dreyfuss reveals how the war has failed to vanquish the Taliban⁵. The Taliban group has therefore evolved into an insurgency that attacks foreign forces as a way of expelling them. The insurgency relies on guerrilla warfare tactics, which are not easy to contain.

Therefore, to save the forces from random attacks and losses, the army has had to develop an intelligence network that is effective to the warfare. Glenn and Gayton explain that several countries that have interests in Afghanistan have set up their own intelligence mechanisms, thus making Afghanistan a conglomerate of intelligence activities⁶.

When the war started, it involved America, Germany, and Britain who fought together against the Taliban. They were later on joined by other allies under the banner of NATO. This therefore meant that the allies had separate intelligence units other than having a central intelligence command unit⁷.

The American intelligence operation in Afghanistan can be described as the biggest of all due to the amount of interest the USA has in the war. Other than fighting to win the war and restoring democratic governance, Feinstein and Kaplan reveal that the United States of America has another purpose in arresting some of the Taliban leaders it wishes to prosecute⁸.

Most of the countries with intelligence operations in Afghanistan have a common interest. Therefore, they cooperate with each other. On the other hand, Russia and Pakistan who are not members of the NATO also have extensive intelligence operations in Afghanistan, which can be described as counter intelligence⁹.

Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan. On several occasions, it been accused of working in favor of the deposed Taliban because Pakistan has vast interests in Afghanistan.

Therefore, it employs different tactics to keep its stronghold on its position in the region. In most cases, the Pakistani intelligence has been accused of aiding the Taliban in different ways while at the same time working with the American government with regards to the situation in Afghanistan¹⁰.

Pakistani intelligence has been accused on several occasions of aiding the Taliban by providing them with arms, training its fighters, providing intelligence services to the Taliban group, and aiding the group escape and hide inside Pakistan. The height of intelligence operations by the Americans and their allies was to capture Osama bin Laden who was interestingly captured in a Pakistan city¹¹.

It is believed that Pakistan uses its intelligence services to influence military and political development in Afghanistan as a way of setting a foundation for future influence when the Americans leave. The Pakistani intelligence has also been used to fight the trafficking of opium from Afghanistan. Russia also has intelligence operations in Afghanistan.

Its operations can be described as mixed because it shares some information with the allied intelligence system on one hand yet it has been accused of also aiding the Taliban in their insurgency. According to Aldrich, Russia has a long history of interests in Afghanistan¹².

By extension, it can be traced back to the cold war era. The presence of America and NATO forces in the region can be one of the reasons that make Russia have intelligence operations in the area because competing military forces, which are so close to an area it describes as its sphere of influence cannot go unchecked¹³. Therefore, Russia has had to strategically conduct intelligence operations on all parties in the Afghanistan case so that it is not caught flat footed in case there is a paradigm shift.

In a nutshell, different countries with different interests in Afghanistan have made sure that they have intelligence operations on the ground. The most evident form of intelligence is military intelligence that has been deployed to fight insurgency simply for the purpose of minimizing loses when the insurgents attack¹⁴. Different situations call for different operational styles.

The situation in Afghanistan requires a dynamic approach due to the ever changing mode of operation upon which the insurgency operates as Mickael reveals¹⁵. Since the onset of the war and the ouster of the Taliban, the Taliban group has retreated to the shadows from where it still operates an effective network.

The intelligence operations have had to be dynamic in nature. They change as the Taliban changes its operational models. This strategy is the only way that will guarantee success against the Taliban.

Intelligence Gathering Techniques

The CIA is the largest intelligence group in Afghanistan. Together with other intelligence agencies operating in Afghanistan, it uses some intelligence gathering techniques. One of the intelligence techniques used is called infiltration, which involves penetrating the circles of enemies by planting agents or informers within the enemy ranks to collect information in the effort to report back on the findings.

As Hitz finds out, this mode of operation is tricky because it will require the intelligence agencies to scout for possible informers within the insurgency, which is altogether a daunting task¹⁶. The use of informers has always produced mixed results due to the need to rely and/or trust the informers.

Informers have been known to give false information depending on their levels of loyalty to the groups for which they work. They can also give false information as a way of accounting for their relevance. Afghanistan has different tribes. Within the tribes, there are clans that narrow down to an individual’s identity and loyalty as revealed by Turse¹⁷. Afghan communities tend to rival among the clans and tribes.

Thus, loyalty to one tribe and clan is very essential. Therefore, getting an individual to betray members of its clan or tribe by working for the enemy is very difficult. According to Blake and Meacham, the few that can be found and recruited cannot be entirely trusted because their intentions and motivation cannot be easily known¹⁸.

The Afghan society is a highly suspicious community that does not trust strangers at all. The prospect of planting a stranger among the community members to gather intelligence information is next to impossible. With time, the intelligence community has been able to crack this problem by giving incentives to the locals as a way of wooing them to the international community’s side.

Another form of an intelligence operation is through buying of information from locals. After suffering for a long time in the hands of the Taliban, the local communities in Afghanistan found out that they would benefit more by collaborating with the Western forces than by siding with the Taliban. One common factor about insurgencies all over the world is that they thrive by instilling fear among the locals through terror acts (124).

This makes them have enemies among the locals whose loved ones may have been killed by the insurgents during their reigns. Therefore, to avenge, many locals will prefer working with foreign forces because their own locals are enemies.

Therefore, it required the intelligence services to spend a lot of money to buy people’s loyalty so that they can work with them. Tribal leaders have also been drafted to give information to the intelligence services.

They are able to inform developments in their regions so that there are no surprises whenever an attack occurs. Some areas have been receptive in terms of cooperating intelligence wise. However, some areas have remained hostile. Thus, penetrating them using this model has been very difficult.

It has proved difficult to penetrate areas within the Kandahar region due to its loyalty as a birthplace to fugitive Mullah Omar who is one of the most wanted former leaders of the Taliban government¹⁹. The American intelligence units and their allies have employed technological approaches as part of its intelligence operations in areas and circumstances that require such operations only.

It has deployed phone surveillance whereby it eavesdrops on communications going through the communication networks. This highly technological approach will make it sift through communication as it happens. The challenge is that different tribes in Afghanistan speak in different languages. It will require a person doing the monitoring to understand the local dialects for the method to be effective²⁰.

The Afghanistan terrain is harsh and rugged, with some areas being highly mountainous. These areas cannot allow conventional warfare to take place. According to Munoz, only technology can be employed to achieve success and hence the employment of reconnaissance as a way of monitoring the ground for possible attacks²¹.

Drones have recently become the tool of choice for this activity based on the nature of their operation. Drones are unmanned aircraft that are flied and controlled from a central control unit. They are mostly electrical. They do not need to be refueled. Therefore, they can fly for many hours nonstop. Drones have cameras on them.

They can also carry weapons that they can deploy to hit the enemy. Monitoring the movement of people over a large area can be challenging. However, with the use of drones, this problem has been solved²².

Air surveillance has enabled the intelligence in terms of stemming attacks from insurgents before they even happen because the insurgent’s movement can be tracked and/or obliterated before any attack²³. The use o drones has many advantages that make it very conventional. Drones can fly at very high altitudes that place them out of reach from any form of missile attack.

They are also unmanned. In case of any attack, there will be no casualties to count. The harsh Afghan terrain is not easy to maneuver due to its mountainous nature and harsh desert conditions. Therefore, aerial surveillance is the best option because it can cover a big area within a very short time with very minimal resources.

The purpose of intelligence is simply to gather information that will give the user an edge over the enemy. Thus, any form of intelligence gathering is essential if any war is to be won.

Intelligence Successes in Afghanistan

Since the war started in Afghanistan, intelligence services have recorded a mixed bag of results that are either a success or a failure in equal measure. According to Glenn and Gayton, intelligence operations are hinged on a probability that something will happen unless the operation is to unravel what has already happened²⁴.

Successful intelligence operations are those that lead to the deterrence of an act by all means by informing on the actual activity or on signs that are a cursor to the activity. One of the most successful intelligence operations that was applied in Afghanistan and one which enabled the military make progress was the counterinsurgency approach towards dealing with the Afghan situation.

This situation can be described as a psychological approach towards a population that enables the security forces buy the trust of the local population as a way integrating with the society. Munoz observes, “An insurgency that maintains popular support has great advantages in terms of mobility, invisibility and legitimacy”²⁵.

The use of counter insurgency measures enabled the allied intelligence to infiltrate the local community and/or make friendship with them as a way of gaining their trust. This enabled them penetrate an otherwise impervious society that does not trust strangers. The intelligence was able to figure out who the bad guys are in the society in the effort to deal with them decisively in the end.

In such instances, the intelligence was able to track the activities of most insurgents, thus neutralizing them before they could strike. Employing counter insurgency measures in intelligence circles is the best way to tame an otherwise hostile community. Another successful intelligence measure that has enabled the allied forces to tame resistance from insurgency has been through profiling of their targets so that only the bad parties are taken out.

This measure involves collecting information on possible members of the insurgent groups, profiling them accordingly while monitoring them as a way of collecting further information. This approach has realized successful results. On one hand, it has reduced casualties in the civilian population who are not combatants, otherwise referred to as collateral damage.

During the initial stages of the war, the military bombed populations and places indiscriminately, thus killing many innocent people. This situation made the local population become resentful towards the army, thus giving birth to insurgency. Successful intelligence operations have led to the capture or killing of insurgent leaders since the operation started in 2001.

Successful intelligence information has led to the forestalling of insurgent activities in different ways such as tracking insurgents and/or attacking them before they get to their destination. Because of intelligence information, only the dangerous persons are taken out after it has been confirmed that they are out on a mission to attack the civilian population or to attack the allied forces and their installations.

Successful intelligence operations have also been achieved in cutting off the supply of arms to the insurgents. Most of the arms used by the insurgents are imported from neighboring countries such as Pakistan through the porous borders. Therefore, it is only through credible intelligence that such arms have been intercepted before getting into wrong hands because this approach leads to a fuelled insurgency²⁶.

Cutting off weapons supply in Afghanistan has had to be a more than a one-country affair with the intelligence services spreading their operations across the borders of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Tajikistan. Failed surveillance of neighboring countries can easily provide cover to insurgents who have conducted cross border operations for a long time.

According to Brake and Meacham, cross border intelligence operations are attributed to the killing of Osama bin Laden who was believed to be living in the mountainous regions bordering Pakistani²⁷. This operation is the most successful because it scored one of the major goals of the invasion.

A military operation without intelligence services is as good as moving around blindly. Thus, the intelligence is attributed for any moves that the allied forces make in Afghanistan because they are the cursor to most of the ground operations. Since 2001, the intelligence operations have had to mutate in terms of their mode of operation as a way of keeping in touch with the ever changing insurgent attacks.

The intelligence has been successful in discovering sites of arms that are used in the war²⁸. Discovering stores for arms used by insurgents is a sure way of disarming them because it will force them to source for other sources. The sourcing is not easy as long as the allied forces are still around them.

Intelligence services have also been able to discover factories for making improvised explosive devices, which are the most dangerous weapons ever deployed by insurgents.

The success of intelligence operations in Afghanistan is attributed to cooperation between agencies from different countries who share information they have collected, thus making it easy for them to cover big ground. Intelligence success is also attributed to the proper allocation of resources for the sake of intelligence operations.

Intelligence Failures in Afghanistan

The paper has given a thorough discussion of intelligence operations in Afghanistan. However, it is crucial to point out that it depends on what platform one stands on for the person to take a certain stand. Therefore, it can be said that success and failure are evenly distributed because none of them seems to stand above the other.

The preceding paragraph has outlined the successes of intelligence services in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is the need to outline some of the intelligence failures in Afghanistan. Intelligence failures come out in different forms as long as they are proved to have failed where they should have done better.

Many failures have been recorded during the campaign. One of them is the failure to capture some of the former Taliban leaders who have ransoms on their heads²⁹. Intelligence operations in the war are some of the departments that receive huge allocations for their operations.

It is therefore questionable on the accountability basis that the intelligence operations have failed with all the resources that they have been allocated. One of the most interesting aspects of budgetary allocations for the intelligence units is that they are usually a lot and that their spending is sparingly scrutinized.

Therefore, the intelligence chiefs have great discretion in spending the funds allocated to them without having to disclose the exact expenditure details³⁰. Many casualties have been recorded during the war because of what can be described as a timid intelligence unit that is being used. The work of intelligence is to move ahead of all operations to provide helpful information to soldiers on the ground.

There have been many casualties recorded during the war because of the failure by the intelligence bodies to do their work. Many convoys have been destroyed using improvised explosive devices. Casualties have been high. The irony of this situation is that the insurgents carrying out these attacks do not have the level of training possessed by the allied forces of intelligence³¹.

Failure to discover beforehand the mode of operation employed by insurgents is a minus for the intelligence operations because they are supposed to be ahead of the insurgents before they strike. The picture coming out of Afghanistan is one that depicts an intelligence unit that is mostly reactive than proactive because most of the attacks mounted by insurgents are not so sophisticated that they can be difficult to preempt³².

The intelligence operations failed for a long time because they underestimated the Taliban’s ability to mount a long-term resistance. Therefore, it was caught off guard whenever these attacks. Although this situation was corrected after some time, the damage inflicted was enormous. Intelligence failures have been recorded in situations such as wrong timing of impending attacks.

These situations happen when the right information is gathered, with the responsible units moving in place only to discover that the attack had already occurred or when the attack had occurred later on after the military units have dropped their guard.

This outcome is a failure on the intelligence bodies because they are supposed to fill out all loopholes that might lead to losses within the operation. Intelligence operation failures have been recorded in essence that the information given is wrong whether on purpose or by fault, thus wasting the whole operation.

Information gathered during intelligence operations can sometimes be based on misinterpretation of situations on the ground. Thus, when an action is taken afterwards, it is realized that the information is wrong. Such instances have occurred on many occasions.

Victims in this case have always been civilians who are not even combatants. Convoys have been bombed on intelligence information that belongs to insurgents on a mission to attack the allied forces’ installations or on a mission to transport weapons to be used by insurgents.

The mistake has always been discovered during and after strike stock taking upon realizing that what was described as insurgents were actually men, women, and children with no weapons on them³³. In some instances, intelligence operations have failed because of failure to take appropriate action when all signs indicate that something is looming.

This outcome can be attributed to the overloading of the intelligence system with a lot of information that has to be analyzed and recommended for action³⁴. Therefore, it becomes a failure when such information is available and not acted upon because it has been collected by the relevant arms to be submitted for action. Such are the situations that have been experienced during the war in Afghanistan.

These failures have led to losses both to the allied forces and the civilian population. Some intelligence tactics have failed to work completely because they were being used in the wrong context. The Afghani people have very strong cultural values that one needs to understand before he or she can engage them.

When a wrong approach is employed in this case, it simply fails because the rules of engagement are not coherent to the local people. Thus, it was prudent for the allied intelligence services to employ tactics that would allow the civilian population to engage with them without feeling slighted culturally.

Intelligence failures in Afghanistan can simply be described as natural because they are situations that happened because of human error. They can only be used as a lesson for future intelligence operations.

Conclusion

Intelligence operations refer to activities that give security forces an edge over their enemies by informing in advance on the enemies’ activity. They are meant to cut down on the casualties in case there is engagement on the war front. Intelligence can be used by countries not in war as a way of keeping informed on the activities within and without their borders.

Intelligence operations in Afghanistan have seen many challenges that had never been seen before in other situations. The war in Afghanistan happened during the time of information explosion. Thus, groups from all sides were adequately informed, hence making the situation complicated because the military and specifically the intelligence was more informed relative to other groups due to their technological advancement.

Going to Afghanistan and fighting against an equally informed insurgency posed a disadvantage to the allied forces because of the nature of the country’s terrain, which is not friendly to foreigners. The ability of western intelligence especially the CIA has been put to test because of the belief that it is the most sophisticated agency in the world.

The public expectations have been an impediment in the proper working of the intelligence agency. The American public is known for its restlessness, which has forced intelligence agencies to try to give positive feedback to public questions.

This strategy has made intelligence services work subjectively instead of working objectively in executing their mandate by trying to come up with results and news that sound good to the public ear. Although the intelligence has had its failures, it still remains on the spotlight with regards to the way it conducts its much-questionable activities.

Bibliography

Aldrich, Richard. “US European Intelligence Cooperation on Counter Terrorism; Low Politics and Compulsion.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11.1 (2009): 122-139. Print.

Blake, Devon and Deloye Meacham. “Intelligence Support to Sustainment Operations: Lessons Learned from the Iraq Drawdown.” The Military Academy 45.2(2013): 21-3. Print.

Dreyfuss, Bob. How the US War in Afghanistan Fuelled the Taliban Insurgency, 2013. Web.

Feinstein, Edward and Jonathan Kalpan. “Counter Intelligence Operations and Terror Attacks.” Public Choice 11.1 (2011): 281-291. Print.

Glenn, Jamie and Russell Gayton. Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2008. Web.

Hitz, Frederick. “US Intelligence in the Wake of September 11: The Rise of the Spy Commando and Reorganized Operational Capabilities.” HAvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 35.1(2011): 245-260. Print.

Mickael, Aubout. “The Airbase Network Serving French and Coalition Operations in Afghanistan.” Air & Space Power Journal 23.1 (2009): 52-55. Print.

Munoz, Arturo. US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010. London: NAtional Defence Research Institute, 2012. Print.

Turse, Nick. Americas Lethal Profiling of Afghani Men, 2013. Web.

Footnotes

• ¹ Richard Aldrich. “US European Intelligence Cooperation on Counter Terrorism; Low Politics and Compulsion.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11.1 (2009): 128. Print.
• ² Ibid, 128
• ³ Frederick Hitz. “US Intelligence in the Wake of September 11: The Rise of the Spy Commando and Reorganized Operational Capabilities.” HAvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 35.1(2011): 245. Print.
• ⁴ Aubout Mickael. “The Airbase Network Serving French and Coalition Operations in Afghanistan.” Air & Space Power Journal 23.1 (2009): 53. Print.
• ⁵ Bob Dreyfuss. How the US War in Afghanistan Fuelled the Taliban Insurgency, 2013. Web. Para. 1.
• ⁶ Jamie Glenn and Russell Gayton. Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2008. Web.
• ⁷ Richard Aldrich, 124.
• ⁸ Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan. “Counter Intelligence Operations and Terror Attacks.” Public Choice 11.1 (2011): 283. Print.
• ⁹ Richard Aldrich, 123.
• ¹⁰ Jamie Glenn and Russell Gayton, 3.
• ¹¹ Richard Aldrich, 133.
• ¹² Ibid, 128
• ¹³ Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan, 286.
• ¹⁴ Bob Dreyfuss, 13.
• ¹⁵ Aubout Mickael, 52.
• ¹⁶ Frederick Hitz, 248.
• ¹⁷ Nick Turse. Americas Lethal Profiling of Afghani Men, 2013. Web.
• ¹⁸ Devon Blake and Deloye Meacham. “Intelligence Support to Sustainment Operations: Lessons Learned from the Iraq Drawdown.” The Military Academy 45.2(2013): 21. Print.
• ¹⁹ Nick Turse, 12.
• ²⁰ Ibid, 12
• ²¹ Arturo Munoz. US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010. London: NAtional Defence Research Institute, 2012. 3. Print.
• ²² Jamie Glenn and Russell Gayton, 30.
• ²³ Arturo Munoz, 3.
• ²⁴ Jamie Glenn and Russell Gayton, 30.
• ²⁵ Arturo Munoz, 3.
• 26 Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan, 286.
• ²⁷ Devon Blake and Deloye Meacham. “Intelligence Support to Sustainment Operations: Lessons Learned from the Iraq Drawdown.” The Military Academy 45.2(2013): 23. Print.
• ²⁸ Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan, 285.
• ²⁹ Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan, 285.
• ³⁰ Ibid, 287
• ³¹ Edward Feinstein and Jonathan Kalpan, 286.
• ³² Devon Blake and Deloye Meacham, 23.
• ³³ Bob Dreyfuss, 13.
• ³⁴ Devon Blake and Deloye Meacham, 25