Introduction
The majority of the writings in this anthology deal with the background and consequences of the events in Iran in 1953. The government of Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddegh was ousted as a result of the coup d’Ă©tat on August 19, 1953. This incident has been discussed extensively in books and articles, yet internal dynamics in Iran have frequently been ignored. The argument that is virtually usually made is that the masters of intrigue in the United States and the United Kingdom thoroughly weakened Iran through their dubious operatives. Misconceptions existed for over fifty years and three decades after the Iranian monarchy was overthrown. This bibliography provides research and books that analyze this situation from many perspectives.
Discussion
The incidents that occurred in Iran in 1953 are discussed in this article. The collapse of Muhammad Musaddik’s regime in Iran on August 19, 1953, was a significant historical event from many angles, many of which are still being analyzed by Middle Eastern analysts. The coup d’Ă©tat, which the CIA referred to as Operation AJAX, took place during the height of the Cold War and was therefore supported by several well-known justifications. The most significant was the lack of prospects for resolving the Iranian-British oil nationalization dispute. Musaddegh remained in power while facing a communist challenge from Iran’s Tudeh party and its Soviet backer.
The twenty-eight difficult months between April 1951 and August 1953 are the focus of this book, which is based on freshly released CIA and U.S. The Iranian oil crisis, which would lead to the 1953 coup, is described in State Department records from the Mossadeq government. Ervand Abrahamian sheds new light on American engagement in Iran by showing how deeply involved Washington was in parliamentary politics, monarchy preservation in 1952, and internal Iranian politics well before the 1953 coup.
This article thoroughly critiques the book Iran and the CIA by Darioush Bayandor. In contrast to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, according to Bayandor, select Shi’a clergy were primarily responsible for the toppling of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor offers no substantial new evidence to substantiate this assertion. He places undue emphasis on certain remarks, extrapolates meaningless conclusions from others, and downplays or ignores a mountain of data that contradicts his story. He exaggerates the influence of civilian mobs in the fall of Mosaddeq while downplaying the contribution of CIA-organized Iranian armed forces. Additionally, he disregards the significance of American and British efforts to spark resistance to Mosaddeq before the coup.
The fascination with Middle Eastern oil that has existed since the early 20th century is discussed in this work. For the United States, his allure was essential. Geologists working for Standard Oil of California found commercial oil deposits on the east coast of Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, which marked the beginning of the American romance. Over time, the interest developed into an obsession. It was soon apparent that oil was more than simply a valuable economic resource following World War II. The most noteworthy and well-known historical occasion was when Franklin D. Roosevelt welcomed Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, the country’s first king, onboard the USS Quincy in Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake in February 1945.
The Cold War’s history, core concepts, and effects are covered in this text. Before the Cold War, covert operations were a mainstay of American national security strategy. Still, it was only during this struggle that they became widely acknowledged as a crucial instrument for policymaking.
The writers of this paper examine the background and significance of the events in 1953. The government of Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh was deposed as a consequence of a coup on August 19, 1953. The argument that is virtually usually made is that the masters of intrigue in the United States and the United Kingdom thoroughly weakened Iran through their dubious operatives.
One of the most contentious Cold War instances was the 1953 Iranian coup that removed the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. The 1979 Islamist revolution was made possible by U.S. interference, commonly described as the original sin that tainted ties between the two sides.
Iran’s 1953 Coup d’Ă©tat fundamentally altered the direction of that nation’s history. In addition to being an outright violation of Iran’s sovereignty and the right of its citizens to select their political course, it also set a precedent that was later used for similar overthrows of governments in third-world countries throughout the Cold War.
In this work, the author said that, Ironically, the United States had reversed course on its earlier declaration that it would resist any one power’s hegemony over the Gulf. They now have to deal with the repercussions of the USA becoming that power.
Conclusion
This book tells the parallel narrative of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the tenacity of Iraqi society by fusing the history of Arab nationalists, American diplomats, and Western oil executives. Wolfe-Hunnicutt covers the history of the twentieth century, from the pre-WWI origins of the IPC consortium and the decline of the British Empire to the beginnings of covert U.S. action in the region and, ultimately, the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry and dangers of postcolonial politics. She does this by drawing on new evidence, including the private records of the IPC, interviews with important figures in Arab oil politics, and recently declassified U.S. government documents.
Bibliography
Behrooz, Maziar. “Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 3 (2001): 363–82. Web.
Ervand Abrahamian. Oil Crisis in Iran : From Nationalism to Coup D’etat. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, Ny: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The Causes of Iran’s 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor’sIran and the CIA.” Iranian Studies 45, no. 5 (2012): 669–78. Web.
Jones, Toby Craig. “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East.” The Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012): 208–18. Web.
Mitrovich, Gregory. “What Really Happened: Solving the Cold War’s Cold Cases.” H-Diplo | ISSF Forum, 2015.
Mokhtari, Fariborz. “Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue.” Middle East Journal 62, no. 3 (2008): 457–88. Web.
Šćepanović, Janko. “Looking Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran: Structural- and Unit-Level Views.” Chinese Political Science Review 3, no. 3 (2018): 345–58. Web.
Takeyh, Ray. “The Iran Coup That Never Dies.” Orbis 65, no. 1 (2021): 172–86. Web.
Vitalis, Robert. “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy, and Hegemony in the Gulf.” Diplomatic History 26, no. 2 (2002): 185–213. Web.
Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon. The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy. Stanford University Press, 2021. Web.