The U.S-Iran relations emerged as early as mid-nineteenth century. They had a diplomatic, cultural and economic relation. During this period, the two nations were great allies; Iran government did not trust Russian and British intentions but considered America as a trustworthy nation. Throughout the Cold War, the two governments (Iran and U.S.) supported each other since they were all against Soviet Union.
United States government went as far as supporting Iranian repressive regimes. Nevertheless, many people believe that it was the Iranians who encouraged Americans to get involved with them. The relationship between United States and Iran deteriorated during Shah Mohammad regime.
It worsened after Iranian Revolution that took place in 1979. The diplomatic relation that existed between Iran and United States does not exist anymore today. This paper traces the diplomatic, cultural and economic relation that existed between United States and Iran during 1930 to 1945.
U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations started in mid-nineteen century when Tehran became strong allies with Washington to oppose Russian and British involvement in Iranian affairs.
However, this diplomatic relation between the two states became slow after they signed economic treaty of friendship in the year 1856. U.S.-Iranian relations formally began when U.S legation was opened in Tehran during the reign of President Arthur in 1883.
In 1888, the first Iranian delegate alighted in Washington (James1978). During his first meeting with President Cleveland, Iranian ambassador asked the president to form alliance with Iran against Russians and British who were interfering with Iranian affairs. The main reason why Washington had interest in Iran during 19th century was their concern for American Presbyterian missionaries in Iran.
The group arrived in Iran in 1830s and Americans were greatly concerned about their well-being in Iran. On the other hand, Tehran was interested in America for protection. The Iranian government saw America as a nation with potential; they could help them encounter their enemies who were mainly Russians and British living in Iran.
Iranian government had set a policy of third power strategy and they believed that United States was the best candidate. Iran wanted to preserve its independence and with the help of a powerful nation like United States, they were sure they will manage to do away with Russians and British people who were residing in Iran (Benson 1981).
However, few of Iranian nationalists thought that Germany could be the best candidate. Though after World War II, Iran had a change of mind concerning America: the policies set by Washington towards Iran destroyed the image of a compassionate great power. Iranian nationalists began to oppose their autocracy and considered U.S as imperialist and intruders in their affairs.
After Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), the Americans managed to take part in Iranian politics. This Iranian Constitutional Revolution led to declaration of Iran as a constitutional monarchy. United States and Iran joined hands to oppose the Russian and British imperialism. This was after Russia and Britain decided to classify Iran as their own sphere which they can control.
They together with St. Petersburg opposed and besiege Iranian autocracy and constitution. Iranian nationalists therefore had hopes that Washington will offer diplomatic support and help curb Russian and Iranian interference in their national affairs (Mark 1987).
This is why quite a number of Iranian nationalists had a positive view of U.S. They believed that Americans were not interested in their nation and would only offer them protection. The way Iranian nationalist viewed Americans was reinforced after Howard Baskerville who was American Presbyterian missionary teacher died in a civil war. He was helping Iranian revolutionaries fight Russian forces in Iran.
The fact that Baskerville died while fighting for and protecting oppressed Iranians made Iranians nationalists consider Americans as champions. The Americans had won Iranian trust. In 1911, Iranian constitutional system employed a group of Americans as their financial advisers. William Morgan was the leader of the group and they both helped in resisting Anglo-Russian plots in Iran.
Things however did not run smooth as expected between Americans and Iranians. At the end of the year 1911, there was a great showdown between St. Petersburg and Tehran which led to military coup in Iranian nationalist camps. This led to termination of Iran’s constitutional trial and later on American advisers were dismissed of their job in Iran.
The Iranian government learnt a lesson from their constitutional trial; their attitude towards Americans changed and it is believed that the future Iranian generation will never attempt to engage Americans to act as the country’s financial adviser. Since then, U.S House of Representatives and President Taft decided to detach from Iranian development plans.
American government took the initiative of defending Shuster. Iranian reformist and nationalists intentions were impressed with Shuster’s cooperation; this expressed solidarity. This news spread all over America; all pages of American press were in support of Shuster actions and they also talked about Iranian revolutionaries in a favorable way.
Iranians ability and desire to employ reforms and also to defend their independence offset their frequent appearance in narratives written by American missionaries who reviled Iranian society their main cultural traits. They also reviled their pandemic failures as well as Iranian hatred towards them. There are however, some missionaries who recorded positive legacy in Iran.
This is based on their behaviors and actions towards the Iranian for example Baskerville who died while helping Iranian revolutionaries fight Russian forces in Iran. Dr. Samuel Jordan who started American College in Tehran (now the Alborz School) and his beloved wife Mary Park Jordan was also among American missionaries who were more celebrated by Iranians (Mark 1987).
Declaring neutrality during World War I could not prevent Russian and British army from occupying Iran. President Wilson was the one who facilitated and encouraged American entry in 1917 World War. He insisted on arranging for post war between his allies as he believed that it was the only way he could safeguard weaker nations from Allied powers (William 1984).
President Wilson wanted to restrain the allies’ imperialist desire which expressed his deal. This nurtured affirmative assessments by the Iranian nationalist. President Wilson’s intentions and plans were later put to test in Iran.
U.S.-Iranian relation was greatly affected in 1917 by the outbreak of Bolshevik Revolution which gave rise to attempts of containing communism by the Americans and British. They wanted to spread communism to neighboring territories after World War II.
Washington recognized that Iran was British sphere which raised their temper to promote communism at the end of World War I. Washington wanted to forestall Iranian sovereignty without getting entangled in their national affairs. Americans therefore formulated an irresolute policy to govern Iran. The policy was enacted for 35years in Iran.
During the Paris peace talks, Tehran sought Washington assurance that Iran will be granted its independence and its wartime grievances will be honored. Iranians were therefore excluded from taking part in the peace talks in 1919. Iran were presented by American delegations in the peace talk whereby the presented Tehran’s concerns and grievances.
The Americans refrained from supporting British involvement in Iranian affairs. Washington remained true to his words and this shows that he was not willing to take any new international responsibilities in any part of the world include Iran. It also means that Washington was not ready to challenge the British who had established interest in Iran.
Washington had the desire to offer tribute to Wilson’s wish towards nations which they considered independently weak. This is also one of the reasons why Washington refrained from all international dealings. London never gave up on Iran, its government still was determined to increase it’s seize the country.
They took advantage of Russian civil war that took place in 1918 to 1920 and Bolshevik rejection of Tsarist treaties that were imposed on Iran. In August 9, 1919, London government made attempts to enforce supremacy in Iran by organizing Anglo-Iranian Agreement. This agreement was similar to that of British protectorate when they wanted to control Iran affairs (Nasrollah1952).
However, Washington managed to intervene for the Iranians by opposing the agreement during the Paris peace talks when he granted Iranians their independence. Iranian nationalists also denounced London’s agreement. Wilson also apprehended Anglo-Iranian Agreement.
His critics concerning the agreement are a clear evidence of British and France determination to implement imperialist policies in Iran and also to legitimize Europe imperialism by taking advantage of League of Nations.
Wilson was forced to challenge Anglo-Iranian Agreement due to many factors; he got pressure from domestic critics, he was not willing to go back on war to assure weaker independent nations of their independence and protection, he was also urged by Iranian nationalist to challenge the agreement and lastly Wilson was concerned about how the agreement will affect American economy and their undertakings in Iran in the future.
Iranian parliament declined London’s request in 1921to prevent them from implementing their imperial ambition. During this period, Iranian nationalists were hoping that it will do away with British’s desire for their country through the help of America. They also desperately needed new sources of revenue and that is why Iranian authorities promoted extensive economic investments by the Americans in Iran.
The only useful economic incentive that Iran could offer America during this period was oil. However, there was a big problem; the British owned Iran’s major valuable economic resource. The British government was the major shareholder of the company that was drilling oil in Iran. The company was later renamed to Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) and today it is known as Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
The British has indulged in Iranian oil and they actually owned it; they only gave Iran 16% of the net revenues obtained from oil (Nasrollah1952). This is why Iranian nationalists wanted their independence back to be able to have control over the major natural resource which is oil.
The only way Iran could obtain back and own their oil which had been dominated by the British was by striking a deal with United States. Tehran began to engage the Americans in a discussion if they could indulge with Washington to take over the control of the oil.
The Standard Oil Corporation Company (New Jersey) together with the State Department and Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company gave a positive response to the Iranian deal. The company was located far away from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). This move was however opposed by Russia and Britain who dominated Iranian oil. They placed genuine contractual and political obstacles in United States paths.
However, United States Department and American companies were not willing to do anything to obtain Iranian oil. They did not want to put or start a fight with the Britain.
Some of the factors that made American decline Iranian concession were: they had reserved substantial amount of oil during this period, many countries wanted them to form part of their oil concessions and they were many uncertainty concerning the amount of oil available in north Iranian oil fields.
Tehran did not however give up on United States; Iran was willing to engage American financial adviser’s team in managing Iranian financial affairs. This deal was endorsed by the State Department in 1917 before the year ended. The American financial advisers made it in Iran in 1922 and they were led by Arthur C. Millspaugh who was not willing to neither take part nor sides in Iranian factional politics.
This leader had his own ways and methods as compared to Shuster who led the first group of American financial advisers in Iran. This means that this was the second group of American financial advisers to arrive in Iran after the first group was dismissed of their duty. The new group arrived in Iran when the country had undergone significant political transformation.
Reza Khan a patriotic military officer and his partner Sayyid Zia Tabataba who is a political dilettante and pro-British journalist joined together and staged a military coup in 1921. They got support from the British. The coup main purpose was to establish Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan and to form regional fragmentation. They got assistances from Bolshevik forces who resided in Caspian province.
Reza Khan also had plans of making attempts to do away with British military in Iran and also stop London’s imperial influence. However, this task was going to be more challenging than the previous one. Reza Khan’s persistence and had work through consolidation of military and political powers managed to overthrow Qajar dynasty which had lasted for 125years.
He then inaugurated his own Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 which is the same year he overthrown Qajar. Despite the heavy political upheavals in Iran, U.S State Department’s Office of the Foreign Trade decided to proceed with the task they were called for. This mission lasted for three years despite the fact that they worked independently and privately with a pure capacity.
It was actually Reza Khan who terminated U.S mission. The Americans could also not accomplish their mission because of many obstacles such as internal political rivalries, Millspaugh’s abrasive conducts and graft and patronage system was highly spread among Iranian political leaders.
Reza Khan increased his domineering conducts and he never complied with any of Shah’s requests to increase the military expenditure (Rouhollah 1975). Millspaugh came up with many reforms which he implemented immediately and they include new taxation but he financed Reza Shah’s Trans-Iranian Railway project. This project was started in 1927. The poor were highly affected by the new taxation laws.
The murder of Robert W. Imbrie who was American vice consul further increased complications between Iranians and Americans. Robert was murdered in 1924 in Tehran by fanatical mob. This event damaged the good relations that American press had with Iranians.
The press did not appraise Iran anymore after the event. In 1925, a book was published concerning American assignment in Iran; it was titled The American Task in Persia. The book was official released before American financial mission’s contract in Iran was terminated and also before Millspaugh and Reza Khan’s relationship completely deteriorated.
Reza Khan was still the war minister and also the prime minister and still supported Millspaugh. In the book, Millspaugh discussed Iran’s shattered economy, the obstacles they met and dealt with, and lastly he gave himself credit for all the reforms he brought in Iran. Actually Millspaugh sympathized with the Iranians and Iran as a country in the book.
He also extremely criticized Iranian bureaucracy in the book. However, Millspaugh’s book created a big influence; it shaped American political view towards Iran. Many journalists used Millspaugh’s book as a source when addressing and giving comments on Iran. In the year 1927, Millspaugh continued with his book where he commented on developments in Iran.
In 1932-3, Reza Shah made attempts to re-negotiate back Anglo-Iranian oil concession mainly in favor of Iran. However, these attempts were futile because he failed. Millspaugh also managed to publish Foreign Affairs article where he addressed the dispute that existed in Anglo-Iranian oil. Millspaugh went ahead to blame Reza Shah and the AIOC for not granting them equitable terms for their stay in Iran.
Millspaugh’s views on AIOC mislead pertinacity and its harsh political implications. The article covered both unofficial and official circles in America beginning with national oil crisis in Iran in 1951-53. Millspaugh left Iran in the year 1927 and later on Reza Shah drew closer towards Weimar Germany.
Reza Shah was hoping that he could restructure Iran’s economy and military and at the same time he wanted to influence the Soviet and British back to Iran. In 1933, Hitler rose to power and he became successful; there was rapid industrialization and militarization in Germany (Fatemi1960).
This evoked Reza Shah and he began to admire Hitler’s dictatorship. To improve his relation with Berlin, Reza Shah decided to add more incentives and became ideologically hostile and aggressive towards Britain and Soviet Union. In the meantime, Washington continued to make keen observations on Iranian developments. He then managed to grasp how important Iran’s oil could have been to America.
The diplomatic relation between U.S. and Iran was temporarily suspended between 1936 and 1938 by Tehran when Iranian representative in United States was detained by American government because he violated traffic rules in late 1935. The U.S.-Iranian relations totally changed during World War II (James1989).
The British and Soviet army occupied Iran with hopes that it will steer neutral course in the war. Iran acted as an allied transit route to reach Russia since there was no other route; Moscow which used to be the shortest route had already joined the war on 1947. Reza Shah however continued to be allies with the Nazi Germany.
However, Berlin’s anti-Allied surveillance activities in Iran gave Moscow and London a plot of how they will remove Reza Shah from his throne come 1941 and put his son Mohammad Reza at the thrown. Nevertheless, Reza Shah was a smart man; he had formulated and pursued a policy earnestly after Anglo-Soviet group occupied Iran.
This is because he feared the repercussions of being allies with Germany and therefore he had prepared himself just in case something bad come out of it by making pliant signals to Washington. United States joined the war in 1941 and by 1943 they stationed all their forces in Iran with the primary aim of controlling and preventing transportation of supplies to Russia. Iran’s economy was further burdened by the war and it drastically faltered.
It was at the mercies and command of their allies who had promised substantial assistance after the war. In 1945, Britain’s financial resources were drained by the war (Gary1974). They thereby made post-war Labor government in London with an aim of conducting extensive and costly nationalization schemes back in Britain.
The labor government gave Iranians a great share of wealth obtained from the oil but they created a greater havoc which led to irreconcilable confrontation in the year 1951. Later on Iranians inaugurated new rules and directions in the U.S. policy in Iran.
With regards to depletion of Britain’s military strength and resources in Iran during World War II, United States Department had already been exploring ways and means by which it could curb Soviet influence in Iran long before the war ended.
Before 1941, Washington allowed Iranians to occupy a marginal role in foreign policy formulation. About $15million amounted from trade between Iran and United State in 1941. Despite the fact that U.S.-Iranian trade had expanded during World War II, Washington’s extra-war plans in Iran were overwhelmed by the absence of long term goals and lack of unity at State Department.
Washington thought that he could rely on British analysis of developments in Iran when the war began given that London too had a role to play in Iran. Washington assumed Louis Dreyfus’ (U.S. representative in Tehran) advice instead he followed his own thoughts on the issue. Washington did not trespass on Soviet and British interest in forming an alliance with Iran.
However, circumstances could not allow him to stay loyal to his wishes of backing off in Iranian affairs. Iranian politicians were forced to turn to America during the way and they formulated positive equilibrium policy after asking U.S. to sign Tripartite Agreement between three states which include Tehran, Moscow and London (Yeselson 1982).
The negotiations for the agreement began in late 1941 and by 1942, the deal was sealed. Washington had given the Allied powers six months to move out of Iran and provide financial support to Tehran for using Iran’s resources during the war-time.
These were some of the terms of the agreement. In December 1941, Tripartite Agreement was endorsed by The Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In 1943, Cordell also understood and accepted U.S.-Iranian relation. He accepted to take responsibility for making sure that Iran attained independence by seeing the two allies out of Iranian territory.
U.S.-Iranian relations further developed when American advisers were engaged in Iranian affairs by Tehran. Actually it was like history repeating itself: in 1920s, American advisers were hired to offer financial advice to Iranians. Tehran had hopes that hiring the American advisors will be of great importance to the nation. In 1942, Tehran assigned five different groups of American advisory in Iran.
The American’s mission was to refurbish Iranian army, to reorganize gendarmerie in Iran; they also had financial mission and smaller missions to the police department and Ministry of Food and Supply in Iran. This group of Americans was led by Arthur Millspaugh.
However this time around Millspaugh became loyal, his financial mission and that of other American advisory missions were in-line with State Department (Fred 1996). This contributed to smooth operation to deal with the allied groups in Iran. Millspaugh did not act based on his private capacity but followed direction from the State Department.
However, just like before, all the missions were hindered by Iranian political rivalries which were deeply rooted in their interests mainly on economic, tribal, political and military. The frequent reshuffles of the cabinet in Tehran also hindered the mission since it oscillated political orientations in the country.
Between 1941 and 1946, 11 different prime ministers ranging from independents to centrists to pro-court conservatives were assigned in Iran. This created more confusion and misunderstanding especially when a new leader is assigned.
The American advisors themselves were not organized, they also had constant staff shortage, got inadequate support from State Department and U.S. War Department refused to share their resources and military staff with the missions. There were also no coherent objectives set by the missions. The financial mission became created a great rift between Washington and Tehran which led to its termination in 1945.
Millspaugh policy not only failed because of the stated factors above but it was also caused by his overbearing insolence and demeanor in handling Iranian officials. He also had personal rifts with Reza Shah over military budget for Iranians. Washington was therefore convinced not to insist on the continuation of Iranian financial mission.
This second mission and other American advisory programs eroded Americans image of being a benevolent third power nation in Iran. Mohammad Mossadeq formed a negative equilibrium towards United States (Rouhollah 1972). The only American mission in Iran which became success was the group in charge of reorganizing gendarmerie forces.
This mission was led and supervised by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf of New Jersey police. Schwarzkopf mission was to suppress the sovereign movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946. He also played the key role in propping up Mohammad Reza Shah’s dictatorial regime and conducting coup expeditions in 1953. Schwarzkopf however moved out of Iran in the year 1948.
At the time the war ended, with rapid perfusion of temperaments of Cold War in State Department, all the policies that Washington had set in Iran were fleeting gradually. This was due to immediate differences and expediencies of opinion between U.S. representatives in State Department and in Iran. The State Department adopted the Jernegen memorandum of Near East Division in early 1943.
It acted as a guide for future American policy in Iran. The memorandum was however prepared without any form of consultation with the U.S. representative in Tehran. This shows that it was an idealistic recommendation meant for disinterested post-war policies in the U.S. of helping Iran to develop its economy and also to prevent Soviet and Britain Union from undermining Iranian independence.
However, before the year ended, Jernegen’s fundamental idealism memorandum was clearly set with realizations that the main objectives of U.S. was about to clash with Soviet and British goals in Iran particularly in light of suspicious mounting of State Department in 1944. These were Soviet’s main ambitions for post war.
However, Soviets refused to state their post-war policies towards Iran in 1943 Foreign Ministers Conference that took place in Moscow and also in Tehran Conference of the Big Three. The Soviet only gave out prosaic reaffirmation to the public in respect for sovereignty in Iran conducted by the Allies (Fred 1979). They also acknowledge Tehran’s efforts and contributions towards Allied war.
Americans had failed to come to an agreement on Washington’s directions and policy on post war towards Iran. Their disagreement can best be illustrated by Stalin and Roosevelt’s private conversation during Tehran Conference. Stalin articulated Moscow’s desire to access free port on the Persian Gulf.
They also wanted an international trusteeship to manage Iranian State Railroad. Roosevelt agreed to Moscow’s demands without consulting American Tehran or aides. His actions only encouraged Soviet ambitions and desires in Iran. Stalin’s however was at odd with Jernegen memorandum but wanted to keep Millspaugh’s future prescriptions of having a joint British, U.S. and Soviet trusteeship over Iran.
After realizing the importance of Iranian oil in the ongoing war and also in future large-scale conflicts linking U.S., the State Department near East Division was backing more resolute steps to secure American oil dispensation in Iran. This however corresponded with Tehran renewed attempts to use Iranian oil as an incitement and encouraging the U.S to get involved.
Negotiations for Iranian oil concession were made in 1943 between Tehran and Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard-Vacuum Company and Sinclair. These prolonged talks eventually reduced when stiff competition began between Moscow, American oil companies and Soviet Union since they were all granted oil concession in northern Iran (Ervand 1982).
The AIOC majorly concerned about American oil deal, they believed that not only will America involvement bring stiff competition between British and Americans but it would also lead to Britain’s post-war economic survival. It will also intensify renegotiation of AIOC’s contract to favor Iran. This is because American involvement in Iranian oil concession would present more lucrative terms to the Iranians.
By the time the war came to an end, Americans were not sure of their future U.S-Iranian relations. This fact was aggravated by political realignments and cabinet changes in Tehran and continued efforts from Russia and British to enlarge their countries. Between February 1945 and July 1945, Roosevelt was replaced by Truman as the U.S. president. It was during this period when Potsdam and Yalta conferences were held.
Washington was convinced about Moscow’s uncooperative attitude towards Iran. Nevertheless, Moscow remained stiff; it refused to renew its pledges to withdraw its army from northern Iran within a period of six months after the end of the war. Moscow insisted that they had no need for restating existing terms of Tripartite Agreement that was signed in 1942.
After the termination of World War II and emergence of Cold War, Washington became more attentive to Iranian requests and questions. At the same time, Millspaugh also tried to make attempts to influence U.S policy in Iran. In 1946, he published another book on Iran titled Americans in Persia.
This book was full of metaphors as compared to the first book. He accused Iranians for litany and portrayed them as nation which is not capable of governing itself. He claimed that Persia had not made any attempts to prove that they were capable of self-government and his thoughts were that Persia was wrong for demanding their independence (Arthur 1973).
Millspaugh anticipated for recognition of Moscow’s economic desire in northern Iran and also adoption of open-door policy whereby economic resuscitation of U.S, U.S.S.R and Iran are joined together under supervision by U.N committee. However, Millspaugh recommendation was incompatible with the emergence of Cold War in Washington.
Millspaugh however never gave up, he used his abilities to influence State Department but this too was undermined by his public allegations of Washington’s alleged policy of conciliation towards the State Department and Moscow’s complicity in failure to fulfill his financial mission in Iran. Iran, Turkey and Greece became initial test-case for cold War.
The worst was however expected after Moscow refused to withdraw its army from northern Iran by the set date according to 1946 Tripartite Agreement (Fred 1979). Leaders also feared the formation of self-directed governments in northwestern provinces in Iran mainly in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The local Soviet however backed up these democratic parties.
It was also feared that Washington could implement containment policy since he had refused to take into consideration domestic grievances of the self-directed movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Washington had also refused to acknowledge any possibility of Soviet objectives being implemented in Iran and also take domain in Iran whereby they control all the activities taking place in the nation.
Tehran also never gave up on United States, it turned to them for assistance. However, despite British and American protest against Moscow, the two nations managed to have a private talk with Iranian nationalists where they persuaded them to carry out bilateral talks with Moscow rather than involving U.N Security Council to condemn Soviet actions (Mary1997).
Washington worst fears and concerns were that the 1946 crisis felt in Iran could jeopardize United States future as an effective environment for carrying out international reconciliation. The Soviet-Iranian wrangle could turn into a complete disaster if the Soviet Union is tolerated in the Security Council. This could also undermine the ability of U.N to function as a gadget of solving conflict.
After all the wrangles , Soviet army finally left Iran enabling Iranian army join Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in a mission to overthrow autonomous governments (William 1946). Soviet’s change of mind owed more to Iranian pledge to Moscow to push Soviet oil concession.
However, deal to give concession of oil to Soviet was stopped by Iranian parliament after they had ratified all the arrangements and laws passed by Iranian government in 1944. United States however continued to purse their stop-go policy; they only stopped after Iran went through national oil crisis in 1951.
Washington was however still convinced that it was London’s responsibility to examine how Moscow influence in Iran since United States had dismissed the British forces responsibility for comprehending communism in Turkey and Greece.
In conclusion, The U.S-Iran relations emerged as early as mid-nineteenth century. They had a diplomatic, cultural and economic relation. During this period, the two nations were great allies; Iran government did not trust Russian and British intentions but considered America as a trustworthy nation.
Throughout the Cold War, the two governments supported each other since they were all against Soviet Union. However, relationship between United States and Iran deteriorated during Shah Mohammad regime.
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