The Conflict of Interest Between Iran and the USA Research Paper

Introduction

Israel and America perhaps understand well the danger posed to the international peace by the Iranian decision to pursue the nuclear weapon program. American Foreign Policy Project posits, “no one would dispute that the United States must keep force on the table with Iran” (Para.1).

Any attack to Iran by Israel or the US would probably pave the way to similar repercussions especially considering the close links that exist between these two nations in endeavors to deal with terrorism. The world expects Iran to respond to any military action on its soil or its nuclear facilities by either Israel or America.

Such designed responses serve the “purposes of deterrence and intimidation” (Kam 102). It is sometimes impossible to carry out or rather execute some responses because of the Iranian military limitations. However, as the paper unveils, whether in theory or practice, Iran may respond in a number of ways incase Israel or the US attacks it.

It might consider impeding oil exports, missile attacks, closing the Hormuz channel, setting free its activists against Israel, and commencing projectile attacks amongst other options.

Possible options for Iran in case of US or Israel attacks

There are some assumptions warranted while attempting to peruse through the myriad of options available to Iran in case of any attacks by Israel or the U.S. Arguably, the American Foreign Policy Project’s high anticipation for Iran to respond in similar ways when attacked by either Israel or the US might not be the case.

This is perhaps because of the reason that Iran may not want to indulge in long-term confrontations with the U.S. However, considering the enormous concerns of both Israel and the U.S to attack Iran, Iran would treat an inversion of its territories by either of the two nations as a collaboration effort between the two.

Lastly, and more importantly, the paper assumes that, opposed to Iraq’s failure to respond to bombings of its nuclear facilities in 1981, Iran will indeed respond. With these assumptions, Iran may decide to consider the following options.

Molesting the United States forces in Afghanistan and Iraq

Most likely, Iran might consider a missile attack against the American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kam notes, one would expect “Iran to conduct terrorist attacks against American forces in Iraq through Iraqi Shiite militias that receive aid from Iran, or even Iranian groups” (104).

However, Iran needs to be careful to conceal its involvements in such attacks, in fear of harsh American responses. Additionally, the level of compliance of Iraqi Shiite militias is questionable since this group has remarkably varying interests compared to the Iranian interests.

Furthermore, Iran‘s decision to interfere with the United States forces would imperil the US’ direct retribution against Iran. In spite of the fact that the president would prefer to take out, this can escalate the hostility between the two states.

Consequently, the United States may end up lengthening the existence of its military in Iraq (Bolton Para 5). On the other hand, such an attempt would attract massive jeopardy for Iran by captivating on the United States even in a primarily partial way.

Iran is also likely to respond by attacking the allies of America in the Persian Gulf. According to Mahnaini, they are more likely to do this if the allies “cooperate in the attack and allow the United States to use their territory for attacks” (17).

Even this remains as one of the potential ways of responding to attacks by the U.S., this action is highly questionable. As Kam posits “an attack against the oil infrastructure and tankers of the Persian Gulf countries is liable to lead to a similar response by the US against Iranian oil assets, and Iran is liable to prove more vulnerable” (101).

In fact, responding by attacking the U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf would also prompt the united states to attack the Iranian fleet located in the Persian Gulf with consequences of hefty damages to Iran. It is plausible to make an assumption that Iran is likely to responds by attacking the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and Persian Gulf.

However, on the other hand, the fact that it deserves to be immensely keen on limiting its involvements in such attacks due to fear of sharp responses from the US, places a question on the likelihood of Iran to go for this option.

Engrave its oil export to hoist world prices

Iran may opt to impede its own oil exports. This action, however, would wreck Iran’s domestic financial system by divesting the country hard currency. However, If the United States happen to attack Iraq, “Oil prices could conceivably increase to $200 a barrel or more…the US dollar would also lose value as to become an extremely significant liability” (Hosein Para.10).

As a way of reciprocation, large corporations and central banks would most likely result in a search for a currency that would ensure that value is stored with better reliability. As Hosein posits, “If the proposed Iranian oil bourse succeeds in offering an alternative to the dollar for the purchase of oil, this would have disastrous consequences for the dollar” (para.10). Consequently, the rising of oil prices will directly interfere with the economy of the United States: a factor that will hinder the administration from concentrating on other issues that concern the state.

The closure of channel of Hormuz

Around 25% of the total oil consumed in the world pass through Straits of Hormuz. The Straits of Hormuz link Indian Ocean through Persian Gulf. If Iran closes the Straits of Hormuz, then it implies that other leading oil producers such as Kuwait and united emirates would not get access to export their oil to China, India and, in fact, the rest of the world.

Although the closure of the Hormuz channel is not only practical but also not prudent for Iran, the United States will rapidly overpower any endeavor to close the passage. This is of course a risking assailant from the United States on its land-based services (Ramin 20).

It would mean that there would be oil shortages in the United States, as Iran’s supply will be inexistent and this would mean that there would be protuberance of oil charges spiking. One endeavor that would cost Iran dearly is opting to “close straits of Hormuz and disrupt the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf in response to an attack by United States” (Kam 104).

In fact, such a decision amounts to a poorly thought alternative for Iran especially bearing in mind that the American intelligence has an immense belief that Iran can only be able to interfere with the oil flow through Persian Gulf for short-lived period.

Even if Iran chooses to disrupt the oil flow through the Gulf, it will finally end up being the chief loser. Her importation of refined oil and exportation of oil crude oil efforts will automatically be negatively impaired. Ali Akbar, a former president of Iran, may have well foreseen such problems when he had lamented in 1983 that “We will block the Straits of Hormuz when we cannot export oil.

Even if they damage half of our oil, it would not be in our interest to block the Straits of Hormuz” (Kam 104). The closing of the Persian Gulf would only be possible if Iran runs out of oil. However, people don not expect such a situation in the near future.

In this context, president Akbar postulated that “When we don’t have oil, when we are unable to export oil, the Persian Gulf will be of no use to us…This is the situation in which we would enter the scene and act as we wish, even if I am convinced that such a situation is exceptionally unlikely” (Kam 104).

However, the lamentation by President Akbar my not bind the Iranian regime after 25 years. However, it may indicate one of the considerations that Iran has to put in mind before employing strategies to interrupt oil flow through the Gulf as a retaliation strategy against attacks by united states or Israel.

Additionally, even if Iran does not choose to close the Persian Gulf, her attack by the US has almost definite anticipations that it will cause escalation of oil prices even if it is for short term. People expect short-lived hikes in oil prices since the international community, including America, is with no doubt, going to campaign for the reopening of the Straits even if it calls for military action.

Additionally, the situation will halt exportation of refined oil products resulting to hefty financial challenges on the part of Iran’s economy. Irrespective of deploying military interventions to open the Straits, financial difficulties would compel Iran to open the Straits.

Iran may set free its activist against Israel

The main likely alternative for Iran is striking back through its activist organizations that include Hamas and Hezbollah. Some acts show that Iran has a possibility of hitting back. These acts comprise of military raids by Hezbollah, salvoes of arms from Gaza, as well as Lebanon, thus, amplifying uncompromising assails within Israel. Iran will also do this by considerably improving Hama’s missiles abilities to offer a larger array and payload to hit throughout Israel (Lara 16).

This choice will mostly obstruct the development in the state and as well hinder the government’s effort in maintaining the political stability. However, this option presents some dilemma. Kam laments, “Iran’s problem is to determine to what degree Hezbollah would be willing to pull out all the stops of its rockets” (103).

This is a significant problem to Iran especially by noting that the Hezbollah main task has been maintaining existing lull largely contributed by fear of likely Israeli response towards it (Clawson and Eisenstaedt 17). This has been a matter of concern for Hezbollah since the advents of second Lebanon war.

Bearing in mind, that the most amicable target of Iran is Israel, Iran may opt to deploy terrorism show case attacks to Israel with the help of Palestinian organizations. To this end, Teibel argues that “it is not only reasonable to assume that Iran would repatriate through showcase terrorism against Israel, but also it is doing all it can to encourage terrorism against Israel, primarily through Islamic jihad and Hamas” (13).

However, it is ardently doubtful how much such groups would be interested in pursuing the Iranian desires. If the Palestine organizations fail to honor the Iranian requests to attack Israel, perhaps Iran may result in targeting the Jewish and Israeli targets located outside Israel.

This option is perhaps stands out well in “the two attacks in Argentina in the 1990s, using intelligence and terrorist infrastructure deployed in the various Shiite communities and elsewhere in the world” (Steven 8). However, as expected, Iran will most probably hide her involvements with terror groups since it would only assuming an advantage of the existing adversary between Israel the terrors groups.

Commencing projectile attacks on Israel

Iran will most probably settle on striking back against the definite assailant Israel. Iran is prone to making considerable harm to Israel by use of its military capabilities, as well as its rockets to residential target. Before initiating any assailants, Israel should make an investigation on the cost-benefit of what Iran will do once it attains nuclear arms (Lara 16).

Israel’s own nuclear potential may be at some point be engrossed by an express Iranian forces against Israel including inciting a wider Israel counter smack. Consequently, the radical guards of Israel ought to think hard and extensively prior to setting free its potentials against its foe.

Iran expressed explicitly its intents to respond to the attacks by Israel. I t would “launch a large missile attack in response to an attack by Israel” (Haaretz Para. 7). Even though Iran posses limited Shehab missiles reserved in its arsenals, these missiles cover the ranges of Israel territory. As Kam reckons, “These missiles are inaccurate. However, people expect Iran to use it against large targets, mostly cities…it will perhaps attempt to hit the nuclear reactor in Dimmona” (103).

Unfortunately, Israel possesses cute missile responses mostly in the form of arrow systems, so designed to interrupt missiles, similar to the ones that Iran is likely to use to attack it. Arguably, if the arrow systems happens to work as anticipated, “the Iranian missiles might cause painful damages and casualties, yet their strategic impacts are expected to be relatively limited” (Kam 103).

Consequently, the Iran’s decision to launch missiles attacks against Israel faces multifold challenges. Firstly, Israel has protection capabilities of the Iranian missiles in the form of arrow systems. Secondly, bearing in mind the interest of the united states to challenge the Iran’s nuclear program, the US is likely to join in the battle in case Israel attacks Iran.

As a result, people expect the magnitude of attacks directed towards Iran by the US, in case it successfully attacks Israel, to be more aggravated compared to if the US were to attack Iran first. Kam comments, “Iran has chemical or biological warheads for its missiles and hence their use against Israel cannot be ruled out” (103). However, such a decision is not acutely predictable especially by considering the experience of such attacks; Iraq never retaliated in such a manner in 1981.

Personal opinion

In my opinion, Iran will most probably settle on striking back against the definite assailant Israel. Iran is prone to making considerable harm to Israel by use of its military capabilities, as well as its rockets to residential target. Congruent with Marcus view, before initiating any assailants, Israel should make an investigation on the cost-benefit of what Iran will do once it attains nuclear arms (16).

Israel’s own nuclear potential may be at some point be engrossed by an express Iranian forces against Israel including inciting a wider Israel counter smack. Confrontation of Israel or the United States military with Iran will lead to negative results to Israel as well as to the United States.

Among the major costs that the three states will experience include both political and economical. The most challenging cost is political, as Israel and the United States leaders will be politically reluctant to surrender Iran what it would most probably require for confirmable termination of its nuclear mischief. The mischief that the leaders would be expected to execute include:

1. safety declaration;
2. confirmation of the Iranian government’s right;
3. Elimination of approval;
4. A more famous responsibility for Iran in the political as well as defense affairs in the Middle East.

The Israeli and the United States’ armed forces will also face the cost of compromise. This refers to anything that the leaders would bestow for Iran to confirm its attempts to bring to end nuclear weapons (Pipes 18).

Additionally Israel and U.S. would also incur the cost of negotiation when it opts to consider diplomatic discourses as opposed to military interventions to shun Iran form continuing with its nuclear program. The cost of negotiation is either political or strategic (Daniel 18).

The tactical cost of concession is high in the incident of dishonesty. In case of an argument with Iran, closing the Hormuz oil channels between the United States and Iran will be a possible option. This closure of the passage will lead to the United Sates expending more to acquire oil from other state.

Consequently, this will affect its economy. The United States taxpayers will also experience an additional cost following the necessity of increasing military procedures in order to cover for the expenses of extra measures against the country.

Adding up to the direct assails on Israel, the Iranian administration is liable to commencing oblique attacks by use of a wide array of proxy set. This is possible because the Lebanese activist association created almost thirty years ago by Iran to go against Israel intrusion, still obtains support from Iran through:

• Monetary support.
• Philosophical management from Iran’s fundamental government through the radical sentinel.
• Training of the activist organization.

I believe that there is no such time when confrontation between nations has solved a problem. Therefore, it is a crucial problem that the united States are in conflict to search for a better means of securing a consensus.

As far as Iran leaders argue, that nuclear series subsist only for the reason of production, this will make other republics produce such arms to terrorize others. Political and economical stabilities are among the crucial factors that determine the development of a nation, hence worth considering (Bronner 16).

I suppose that dealing with such disagreements has unintentional consequences. However, it is only after the action itself that we come to see them.

It is obvious that no wish for any state goes through the adverse effects that come hand in hand with conflicts. In case of an attack by Israel or the United States to Iran, it would take precious time for each of the nation to recover from any incurred damages.

Therefore, I would recommend that leaders should improvise superior techniques to resolve grudges among or between nations. This will work out to reduce such instances of costs met on confrontations and at the same time improve cooperation among nations: a factor that will lead to growth and developments of the whole world at large.

Conclusion

Iran has a wide range of options to consider in case of any attacks by Israel and or the US. It is almost certain that Iran cannot follow the steps of Iraq in 1981: failing to retaliate when its nuclear facilities were bombed. However, Iran has a limited military capacity.

Therefore, despite any attempt to destroy its nuclear facilities being painful, people expect Iran’s retaliation strategies to be mild. The writer’s opinion is that, despite the need to curtail production of weapons of mass destruction, warring Iran would result to a negative repercussion especially to the civilians. Consequently, Israel and the US should seek reconsidering diplomatic discourses to resolve the problem. Only then, should Iran employ military interventions.

Works Cited

American Foreign Policy Project. Attacking or Threatening Iran Makes No Sense, 2009. Web.

Bolton, John. What If Israel Strikes Iran, 2010. Web.

Bronner, Ethan. Painful Middle East Truth: Force Trumps Diplomacy. New York Times, 2009. Print.

Clawson, Patrick, and Eisenstaedt, Michael. The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action against Iran. Policy Focus 84.7, 2008: 16-19. Print.

Haaretz, Johnson. Iran vows ‘crushing response’ if attacked by Israel or U.S., 2011. Web.

Hosein, Nazar. Will Israel attack Iran?, 2010. Web.

Kam, Ephraim. Military action: the Iranian perspective. Strategic Assessment, 2008: 97-106. Print.

Lara, Setrakian. Petraeus Accuses Iran of Aiding Afghan Taliban. ABC News, 2009. Print.

Mahnaini, Uzi. Israel Readies Forces for Strike on Nuclear Iran. Sunday Times, 2005. Print.

Marcus, Jonathan. Israel’s Military Message to Iran. BBC News, 2009. Print.

Pipes, Daniel. Arabs Still Want to Destroy Israel. Wall Street Journal, 2002: 1-25. Print.

Ramin, Mostaghim. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran, Israel on ‘Collision Course. Los Angeles Times, 2008. Print.

Steven, Simon. An Israeli strike on Iran. Contingency Planning Memorandum 5.3, 2009: 1-11.

Teibel, Amy. Intel Chief: Gaza Rockets Can Reach Tel Aviv. Associated Press, 2009. Print.