Introduction
Geopolitics is the study that is aimed to analyze geography, history, and sociology with position to special politics and prototypes at different balances (varying from the level of the state to worldwide). It researches the political, economic, and strategic importance of geography, where geography is defined in terms of the location, size, function, and relationships of places and resources.
Issues of unification of Korea
The geopolitical imagination of South Korea includes such key factors as the unification of Korea, including the arrangement of democratic elections in North Korea. Diplomatic missions seek support within the Asian region to impact Kim Chen In to refuse from nuclear weapon testing and reject the status of North Korea as the nuclear state. The essence of the geopolitical approach taken by South Korean leaders is the empowering of the state by strengthening regional cooperation in East Asia.
One of the key moments in the issue of unification is the providing of a sufficient safety level for Jeju Island. It is located about 100 miles south of the Korean Peninsula. The volcanic island is home to some 500,000 people, who are occupied mostly with farming and offering services to domestic travelers. On July 1, 2006, Seoul guaranteed superior ability to the island’s managers, as part of an attempt to enhance the island as a key global center. The Jeju Special Autonomous region now has prolonged prudence over regions comprising schooling, taxation, economics, and political management. The innovative position, affirmed in South Korea’s National Assembly in February, is escorted by tax breaks for firms spending on the island, as well as visa-free admission to inhabitants of all but eight states.
Dr. Rhee Tong-chin looks into the geopolitics of reunifying North and South Korea. His research helps elaborate on probable situations and recognizing the thespians. Though the very clearness of the options he sees also marks their restraints. One can simply picture other and possibly more likely means for change.
Dr. Rhee is certainly right that Korea is a card in the deck of tactical world power performances. But that is only a solitary card in the deck, and perhaps not even the key one. One issue is what heaviness we give to the apparent attentions of China, Japan, Russia, the USA, and probably other states as well. Another matter is the interior dynamics of Korean policy, of which Dr. Rhee is aware closely, and of which I have only the skimpy information. The third and most difficult matter is what prospects and risks any grouping of innumerable probable occasions might create. These last substances can vary from war to trade, from magnetic heads to political fall down, from outbreaks to natural catastrophes
The New York Times, in its edition of Nov. 14 (2006), discovered a new apprehension of the US government, that the head of the Republic of Korea is clandestinely advancing to attain nuclear weapons. The purpose is that the administration of South Korea aims to reinforce its location politically together with North Korea and with the United States.
An interesting situation occurs to happen, symbolic of the geopolitics of the next decade of the century. The heads of South Korea and the United States have been very intimately unified in the world arena since 1945 and surely particularly since the Korean War.
There could be many answers to the question, why does the Korean government strive to strengthen its relations with the USA, despite already close relations. One is evident. All states always desire to empower their situations in the geopolitical sphere. But surely, to do so usually means the risk of estranging an influential ally and guardian. Such a strategy has changed. The Charges must first emerge to be worth it previous to a weaker country follows this way. Such a policy must essentially be grounded on opposing terrors that are better than that of displeasing the commanding supporter. Two horrors are making a role in the present circumstances.
The first horror is that the US might be prepared to create some type of political agreement with the administration of North Korea which the administration of South Korea would sense would harm its interests. A political agreement with North Korea would be extremely disliked within the USA and focus too much discussion in the US Congress. But it is necessary to mention, it is undeniably true that U.S.-North Korean relationships have moved in the last five years from constant aggression to careful, if still aggressive, concessions. It is not unbelievable then that they might advance additional.
Nuclear aptitude
Given the radically bad financial circumstances of North Korea and its related political separation on the world prospect (even from its erstwhile closest ally, China), what could have induced the United States to enter into these negotiations (however at arms lengths they are) with North Korea? The answer hits one in the eyes: the fear that the U.S. has of the potential nuclear capacity of the government of North Korea.
Should it then be any question that the administration of South Korea draws the clear lesson that nuclear aptitude is a critical constituent in the present world geopolitical organization and that if both North Korea and the US have it but South Korea does not, South Korea’s curiosities will turn into a resulting deliberation for the other two. And it should then be uniformly evident that, from the US point of view, an improved potentiality in nuclear armaments for South Korea is a hazard they wish to avoid.
There is though another alarm, less instantaneous, that may motivate the opinion of the South Korean administration. Lots of changes appear to be in East Asia, not just in the fiscal arena but in the armed and consequently the following stadium. North Korea is not the only state to have been mounting nuclear capability. China surely has long had it, and it has been seeking to fortify itself militarily. And now, primarily since 1945, there is a somber conversation in Japan as to whether they ought not to abandon their legitimate desertion of military power and probably obtain nuclear capability themselves. No one doubts that Japan has the monetary and scientific reserves to attain this quickly if they so choose.
What is last all of this augmented importance on the disconnect military power of each state in East Asia are two matters: the predictable refuse of U.S. military capability and association in the province; and the unbalanced political stability of the area, which has three very difficult but very imperative matters to determine: the reunification of Korea, the reunification of China, and the moving retaking of Japan of the twenty-first century. The administration of South Korea does not mean to be left out of the cooperation on these matters and may well feel that nuclear capability is what buys a place at the table. (It should be mentioned that this logic is relevant to the administration of Taiwan also, and it may be guessed that they have been regarding this opportunity also)
Conclusion
Thus in modern Korea and Japan, we have two commercial, marine trading countries, neighbors with profound connections of civilization and traditions. They form a normal alliance. Korea’s hopeless involvement with Chinese suzerainty under the Yi Dynasty for five hundred years decreased it to a rural backwater, a smiling stock even in China. That lesson might not be disregarded. Surely current Chinese administration admirations the financial power of South Korea considerably more than it admirations the impoverished, “brother socialist state” of North Korea.
So in the end the South Koreans may keep steady a brisk enhancement of Chinese trade by a firmer and more cherished agreement with the Japanese people (it is a blunder to think only in expressions of the declining Japanese biased leaders). If this is to be the case then Japan too will have an ever-growing motivation to hearten reform and expansion in North Korea to a point of marketable addition with the South.
References
Gunn, Geoffrey C. “The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 37.2 (2007): 268.
Kihl, Young Whan. “Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century of Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification.” Pacific Affairs 76.1 (2003): 132.
Park, Sung-Hoon, and Min Gyo Koo. “Forming a Cross-Regional Partnership: The South Korea-Chile FTA and Its Implications.” Pacific Affairs 80.2 (2007): 259.
Zha, Daojiong, and Mark J. Valencia. “Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and Implications.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 31.1 (2001): 86.