Introduction
It is worth noting that secrecy is an integral part of the work of the Intelligence Community (IC) due to the nature of the tasks it performs. The IC carries out intelligence tasks, prevents and investigates traditional and non-traditional threats to national security, monitors the activities of various organizations, and carries out the protection of certain structures and objects (Lowenthal, 2017). Secrecy gives Intelligence Community a competitive edge in dealing with complex issues, while excessive transparency puts it at risk. For this reason, executing full oversight by the US Congress is challenging. The purpose of this paper is to address several oversight issues and make recommendations for each that could assist in streamlining the Congressional oversight process.
Background
It should be mentioned that the problem of transparency and accountability of the work of the Intelligence Community is related to Congressional oversight directly. The solution to the majority of issues depends on decisions taken by Congress since it participates in the development and adoption of laws and strategies governing privacy and access to information. Thus, it plays an important role in determining the level of accessibility or closeness of Intelligence activities to public control (Lowenthal, 2017). In addition, Congress not only oversees the work of the Community but also bears the responsibility to society and is obliged to provide citizens with information about the Intelligence Community. For these reasons, the US Congress should discuss strategies and budgeting related to intelligence services in an open regime.
Congressional and IC focus on Appropriations instead of Real Oversight
One of the main problems associated with the interaction between Congress and the Intelligence Community is the focus on the audit of expenditures, budget allocations, revenues, and financial systems (Schick, 2007). The chambers of Congress carry out control and audit management, which gives them access to any information related to secret funds. Specially trained employees study classified documents and classified information considered a state secret.
The level of access of oversight authorities gives them the right to reject or approve funding for strategic intelligence programs and approve the financing of special services as well as appoint new leaders for senior positions (Lowenthal, 2017). This approach must be applied so that Congress can use people at these strategic points as a tool to influence the services they control in determining intelligence policy. Thus, this state of affairs leads to the fact that the Congress of the country becomes a body of control and oversight and allows its committees to influence the formation of the main areas of intelligence and policy through the approval of budget allocations.
To shift from the focus from appropriations to real oversight, it is necessary to reorganize the priorities set for Congress. The body executing supervision should identify those tools and methods of oversight that will enable Congress to exercise its direct oversight functions. Instead of focusing on subsidies and project financing, congressional bodies should develop methods such as inspections, hearings, and workflow analysis, which are directly related to oversight and control.
They can also resort to such methods as surveys and database checks, drawing on the experience of other countries (Richelson, 2018). For instance, some European countries regard working with databases as the main tool for oversight. Depending on the tasks set, these approaches and instruments can be utilized independently of each other, in parallel, or one after another.
In this regard, it should be noted that Congress services regularly study secret and unclassified reports, files, and other documents prepared by the Intelligence Community (Richelson, 2018). These documents may contain useful information that can provide answers to questions about the activities of the Intelligence Community, but these same documents may also provoke questions, the answers to which have to be sought using other, more advanced tools.
In addition to the recommendations discussed above, Congress should oversee various stages of Intelligence activities. It can be carried out before a decision is made regarding a new project and its financing, during the implementation of operation or strategy, or after the completion of an initiative. The interim oversight regime should be determined depending on the current needs and stage of oversight.
Congress’s Legislation and Oversight Powers Relinquished to Executive Branch
The politicization of the activities of the Intelligence Community and the executive branch is another problem that requires close attention. This phenomenon can manifest itself at different levels and not only directly in the activities of the Community. In particular, this can be observed in the close relationship between the executive branch and the leadership of Intelligence. As a result, intelligence agencies begin to act according to a certain position of the state, which is highly undesirable, given the sensitive nature of the activities of this body (Richelson, 2018).
Moreover, the Community’s engagement can jeopardize the confidence of the population in the work of this body and destroy the faith in the transparency of its activities. In addition, another consequence of the fact that the legislation and oversight powers of Congress were transferred to the executive branch is the possibility of using the Intelligence Community by the representatives of the current government to collect compromising information about their political rivals.
To avoid such phenomena, it is necessary to provide conditions for discussing the main directions of the state’s international and defense policy in Congress in an open mode. It is also crucial to develop protection mechanisms due to which the community cannot be used by the executive branch to achieve political goals (Durbin, 2017). When the executive branch requests an investigation, the supervisory authority should have the right to initiate investigations on its initiative.
However, in most cases, the decision on whether to open an investigation on a specific issue remains with the oversight body. The overseeing side cannot meet high standards of professionalism if the law does not fully guarantee its independence and autonomy. To ensure this level of professionalism, all parties need to function without pressure from the side of political forces.
To fix the current situation, it is essential to clearly distinguish between the conditions of interaction between the Intelligence Community and the executive branch (Gill, 2017). The legislative and supervisory powers of Congress should be defined in a special document with a strict regulatory framework. When changing the work of the Intelligence Community, alterations need to be made to the document as well as to the mandate of the body carrying out oversight.
The powers of the oversight authorities should be comparable with the powers of the Community, and the controlling body should be able to hold any type of hearing and gain access to the necessary information. For oversight to be systematic, not only planned budget discussions are needed but also a plan of oversight activities (Schick, 2007). In carrying out activities, the Intelligence oversight body should adhere to high standards of transparency, responsibility, and accountability.
In the setting of hybrid threats, America needs an effective and highly professional Intelligence Community that is respected and has public support. This cannot be achieved without the confidence and control of Congress over intelligence activities. The specifics of state security do not imply complete openness and absolute control, and a compromise is required to be able to meet the requirements of taxpayers but not to jeopardize the viability of the special services (Durbin, 2017). Oversight commissions should have extensive powers since they need to monitor compliance with the law in the activities of special services and the compliance of intra-departmental regulatory documents with the legislation.
Congress determines the amount of budget funding and agrees to the appointment of the heads of special services and their deputies. Despite so much oversight, there need to be limitations as well. Oversight commissions should not gain access to information about operational activities, the procedure for interaction with foreign special services, sources and methods of obtaining information, to any information that could reveal the identities of employees, and jeopardize the current operations. Otherwise, the disclosure of such information threatens the lives of people.
Lack of Necessary Resources to Do Adequate Oversight
Lack of necessary resources for adequate supervision is another issue due to which oversight of the activities of the Intelligence Community cannot be carried out as needed (Richelson, 2018). Because most of the oversight actions are retrospective in nature, it is impossible to assess the current component, which will make it possible to evaluate how the forces and resources available to the Intelligence Community correspond to the future needs of the government in this area. However, the structures that can carry out oversight activities do not always have the time and resources to perform full-fledged oversight of the intelligence sector on an ongoing basis (Gill, 2017). To compensate for the lack of control, lawmakers may decide to grant additional authority to the control or audit bodies or to create additional control and audit structures.
As the main recommendation, it is possible to gather a permanent, politically neutral staff that will assist legislators in the exercise of oversight functions. This will help in the formation and consolidation of institutional memory. Experience and knowledge in the intelligence field have been accumulating over the years, and the rotation of the legislative and executive branches often leads to the loss of this valuable knowledge and experience, and consequently – resources (Richelson, 2018). Therefore, the presence of a permanent, politically unbiased body will help reduce the impact of this factor on the effectiveness of oversight of the Intelligence Community and will save resources and allow for their more effective usage.
Conclusion
Thus, it can be concluded that the main task of the oversight committee is to check not only expenses and allocate the budget but also to determine the specifics of performing functional tasks, carry out consultations on military-political issues, and the like. At the same time, interference in the process of performing functional tasks is not only impractical but often harmful and risky. Admission of committee members to operational activities is unacceptable since it can affect the sensitive nature of the work of the Intelligence Community. Accurate resource allocation, an adequate degree of transparency, and effective interaction between the structures are the key factors of effective oversight.
References
Durbin, B. (2017). The CIA and the politics of US intelligence reform. Cambridge University Press.
Gill, P. (2016). Intelligence governance and democratisation: A comparative analysis of the limits of reform. Routledge.
Lowenthal, M. M. (2017). The future of Intelligence. John Wiley & Sons.
Richelson, J. T. (2018). The U.S. intelligence community (7th ed.). Routledge.
Schick, A. (2007). The federal budget: Politics, policy, process (3rd ed.). Brookings Institution Press.