Developments in Biotechnology, genetics and molecular biology have resulted in remarkable advancements in industry, agriculture and medicine. Nevertheless as the capacity of manipulating viral and bacterial genomes increases so does the possibility for rogue nations and terrorists to bioengineer biological weapons utilizing the same technology. Following the 2001 terrorist attack and subsequent bioterrorism attack through the spreading of the anthrax via anthrax-laden letters in the same year, the United States government and other governments across the globe have enacted legislations as well as increased funding for the development of comprehensive preventive and responsive counter-terrorism strategies. Despite the current legislations providing better mechanism for dealing bioterrorism it fails to restrict the dissemination of this knowledge hence making it possible for terrorist to access it and use it in the wrong way. In simple terms the greatest obstacle to our fight against bioterrorism is not lack of political and financial resources but lack of a comprehensive legislation to deal with this menace.
Since the 2001 terror attack in the United States, the federal government has enacted various legislations providing for enough resources to both public and private agencies as part of its wars on terror. For instance the 2002 enactment of a bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act in led to increased resources for bioterrorism-related fundamental research. According to Knobler et al (2002) the NIH funding aimed at bioterrorism increased by approximately $2billion dollars from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year. In 2003, the then US president George Bush requested Congress to allow him establish a project name BioShield, at approximately $6billion to accelerate procurement of bioterrorism countermeasures and DHHS review. The BioShield initiative gives incentives in form financial resources for pharmaceutical firms to research and develop antibiotics, vaccines and antiviral agents for eradication of pathogens. The United States government also promised that it would purchase and store any countermeasures that may be developed by these companies for any future bioterrorism attacks. In the fiscal year 2004, the US Congress appropriated about nine hundred million United States dollars in optional funding for bioterrorism research in the country’s homeland security spending bill for that year. In 2003 the DHHS gave approximately $350 million to 8 new study centres specializing in biodefense studies. This information is a clear indication that there is enough funding as well as political support on health sector in dealing with bioterrorism.
As mentioned earlier, the major weakness of our response to bioterrorism is the lack of a comprehensive legislation that takes into consideration all aspects of bioterrorism. Most of the current laws are aimed at either increasing funding for bioterrorism related research or increasing surveillance to detect any potential bioterrorism attack. For instance in 2001, some Australian researchers reported that they had developed a mousebox, a virus that resembled the small pox virus and that possessed the ability of killing a mouse that was earlier resistant to it (Knobler et al, 2002). The article gave a vivid description of the procedures for the development of a virus with the ability of overcoming natural defence against the illness. In the following year, i.e. 2002 other two papers published sensitive biological information showing the world that viruses could be created as well as mutated to make them more virulence (Sutton, 2003).Such sensitive information on the media might be used by terrorist for the wrong reasons. This calls for regulations that govern sharing of biological information.
As long there are no laws preventing free exchange of sensitive biological research information hence allowing terrorist to freely access this information and utilize it to develop bioterrorism agents we will continue using our resources for defensive purposes instead of tackling the root cause of the problem, free exchange of biological information..
References
Knobler, S. et al. (2002). Biological threats and terrorism: assessing the science and response capabilities: workshop summary. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Sutton, V. (2003). Law and Bioterrorism. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishers.