Libertarian Approach to Paternalism Dissertation

Introduction

Libertarianism is an amalgamation of political philosophies that support the concept of individual autonomy in decision-making. In a political and governance context, liberty stresses the importance of promoting individual freedoms and social justice in the management of social and political affairs. Therefore, libertarians seek to maximize people’s liberties and freedoms, such as free speech and freedom to associate.¹

Key rights enshrined in various constitutions of progressive countries uphold this principle through the freedom of association and expression, among other inalienable rights.² Relative to this view, proponents of the libertarian philosophy share a common skepticism towards the role of the state and political actors in governing societies and influencing people’s choices.³ However, they hold diverse views regarding economic and social systems that support the existence of these societies in the first place.⁴ Many schools of thought have emerged from such diverse views of social governance and influenced the relationship between the state and individuals.⁵

Stemming from this link, most libertarians advocate for the dissolution of coercive social institutions and instead support the propagation of ones that use individual prerogatives as the main decision-making basis for economic, social, and political development.⁶ Key areas of governance that have been shaped by this philosophy include private property and social governance laws.⁷

Related discussions have covered a spectrum of views that often oscillate between those who support leftist and rightist policies about politics and governance.⁸ Similarly, the divide in opinions has been observed among people who have socialist or capitalist ideologies.⁹ For example, the libertarian approach is an offshoot of leftist ideas about social, political, and economic governance. The concept also stems from their common ideas about authority and state actions.¹⁰

Additionally, libertarians hold anti-authoritarian and anti-state views on the above-mentioned areas of governance. This is why some researchers label libertarians as social anarchists.¹¹ Others deem them anti-paternalistic because of their skepticism towards public property laws and the potential to promote the “common good.”¹² Therefore, libertarians often strive to encourage the proliferation of ideas, which are centered on the common ownership of goods and services.

Libertarian views on governance are also rooted in the acceptance of collective decision-making because they deem private ownership of resources as a potential threat to people’s freedoms and liberty. Comparatively, traditional versions of libertarianism have been observed in governance systems that advocate for civil liberties and natural law justice.¹³ Modern versions of this philosophy have emerged in the “green movement” that seeks to protect the environment by highlighting the excesses of capitalism, industrialization, and the pitfalls of the profit-maximization model adopted by many individualistic countries.

Libertarianism has often been associated with the concept of paternalism because of its proposed limits in exercising people’s rights for the advancement of public interests.¹⁴ The concept stems from the idea of legitimizing a state’s ability to limit an individual’s right to choice by protecting the “greater good.”¹⁵ Stated differently, it refers to people’s ability to make decisions on behalf of others – usually for the protection of public interest.¹⁶ Some pieces of literature argue that this principle of governance does not respect an individual’s will and may promote attitudes of superiority in a society’s hierarchical structure.¹⁷

However, others deem it a “necessary evil” because it is often implemented to protect public interests. After all, they may not have the capacity to discern a situation or set of circumstances to make the right decision.¹⁸ From this reasoning, paternalism is acceptable when people cannot make good choices for themselves.¹⁹ Therefore, a paternalistic action is often executed by disregarding an individual’s autonomy to make decisions. Such actions have been implemented in different areas of social governance and industry development, such as the healthcare and business sectors.²⁰²¹

In a political context, governments have used paternalism to influence people’s behaviors.²² For example, they have been known to introduce new regulations to stop socially unacceptable behaviors, such as gambling, prostitution, and smoking. Many developed economies have formulated their welfare policies using this framework of reasoning. In this regard, governments are seen to play an active role in shaping the behaviors of their subjects. Particularly, citizens who are disabled or dependent on social welfare programs are most vulnerable. Stemming from this analogy, some libertarians abhor rules and are skeptical about paternalism.²³

Alternatively, proponents of paternalism are skeptical about people’s rights to make a choice and are considered equally uncertain about the merits of libertarianism in protecting public interests. This disparity in opinions is supported by conventional wisdom, which suggests that libertarians cannot openly embrace paternalism and those who support the latter idea cannot support libertarianism because of their fundamentally varying views on public and private rights. Therefore, these two concepts seem to contradict each other.

This paper provides depth to this debate by discussing the libertarian approach to paternalism. The works of influential scholars in this field, such as John Stuart Mill, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek will underline the main discussions in this paper. Their arguments will be reviewed based on their thoughts on the rationale people use to make decisions. The discussion will also involve a review of people’s characters and the potential ramifications of using excessive paternalistic policies to promote the “collective good.”

Additionally, the consequences of people’s decisions will be assessed relative to how they affect different aspects of economic, social, and political reasoning. Lastly, an ethical argument will be provided as a moderating factor influencing the relationship between paternalism and libertarianism. Broadly, these insights will explain the libertarian approach to paternalism. The section below explores the views of John Stuart Mill on people’s inherent goodness and quest to make autonomous decisions.

Mill’s Inherent Good and Individual Autonomy

The concept of individual autonomy is premised on the need for people to have the freedom to make personal choices and to live life how they desire. Therefore, its proponents detest the use of manipulative practices to achieve the same outcome.²⁴

John Stuart Mill advances this argument by supporting the use of free will, as opposed to social control, to make social and political decisions. From a libertarian lens, he describes limits that societies must observe when exercising social power over an individual. As one of the most influential scholars in the field of libertarianism and governance, Mill argues that paternalism is akin to treating people like children.²⁵ His views also explain the harm principle, which is premised on people’s ability to make autonomous decisions. The assumption that they can discern information and make sound judgments based on reliable knowledge is the premise for the adoption of his views on libertarianism.²⁶

The common expectation associated with the implementation of Mill’s views on political governance is that people will identify and exclude wrong or harmful ideas from public discourse. This assessment also underscores Mill’s argument on individual autonomy, which stipulates that dissident and criticism against governments should be accommodated because they reflect the will of the people that should be superior to all other concerns.²⁷

People could use these arguments to justify murder and rebellion because Mill believes that if there is a real need for such outcomes to suffice they should be permitted and accepted. However, he cautions against using methodologies that cause harm to others and instead encourages people to use speech or writings to air their grievances.²⁸ He makes these arguments with the assumption that individual choice is informed by people’s innately good attributes.

His views on the inherent good of human nature underscore one of the main tenets of the harm theory, which allows authorities to contravene other people’s rights to make autonomous decisions when they want to prevent harm to others. However, for such actions to occur there needs to be a clear and present danger justifying the intervention of authorities. For example, if a person shouts “fire!” in a room full of people and causes panic, authorities should reprimand them because such an action could cause harm to others. However, if people were given enough room to discern the situation and make independent judgments, any argument that comes from the process should be welcome.

Many present governments have adopted Mill’s harm principle and integrated it in their substantive laws. For example, America’s constitution respects this principle through cases where people’s freedoms have been limited when there is clear evidence of a breach of public order. The civil libertarianism movement has also been associated with the debate on individual autonomy because its proponents abhor all forms of limitations to this right.²⁹

However, it is important to understand that civil libertarians do not necessarily believe that all human actions have the need to “do good.” Instead, they believe that maintaining unfettered access to this right has more advantages than disadvantages. Modern proponents of this movement are active champions in the protection of gay rights, promotion of limited legalization of prostitution services, partial legalization of marijuana, and more recently the right to assisted dying. Additionally, another group of civil libertarians is protecting digital rights on online platforms.³⁰

The aforementioned insights suggest that libertarianism fails to provide a clear demarcation between individual and social power.³¹ In practice, the problem with Mill’s individual autonomy argument is that it does not necessarily stem from its merits but rather from the resources or knowledge available to people when making decisions.³² Hayek adds to this argument by saying that individual autonomy cannot be blindly adopted as a framework for solving some of the most mundane societal or political problems.³³ The libertarian perspective to this argument accentuates the view that any person should be allowed to make choices about any aspect of their lives.³⁴

Therefore, there is no limit to whichever means or resources used to exercise this right. However, it is difficult to imagine how such a right is exercised in a world where people have unequal access to resources. This argument explains why Mill’s views on individual autonomy are often criticized. Indeed, the characterization of capitalism with private ownership of resources makes it difficult to understand how choices can be made to promote the public’s interests. In other words, the structure of a capitalist society implies a skewed structure of resource allocation, which affects the prioritization of decisions in governance. In this regard, the libertarian approach to autonomous decision-making, as proposed by Stuart, has its limits.³⁵

Kymlicka makes a similar argument by proposing that free market forces are inherently just and governments should refrain from imposing a distributive justice system.³⁶ However, not all proponents of the model are libertarian because they may not agree with all its tenets. Therefore, libertarianism and paternalism have to be practiced within limits, as none is an absolute right.

Although the above arguments may be abstract, it is worth noting important examples where state actors have undermined the libertarian approach to individual autonomy by pursuing paternalistic policies. For example, in 1984, the editors of the Sun newspaper refused to publish a headline that indicted authorities who oppressed mineworkers because they did not want to upset authorities.³⁷ This action was followed after disregarding the rights of citizens to know the truth and make their own judgments about the treatment of workers. It also shows how the inherent good of individual autonomy was overlooked to protect the public interest.

In 2010, another incident occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) where the employees of a British media house refused to cover a press conference called by the Conservative Party because they did not support the organization’s views.³⁸ Around the same time, employees of the British Postal service also threatened to stop the delivery of printed materials, which came from a political party that had contrary views to the common ideals shared by workers regarding governance and political mobilization.³⁹

The case exposed how the rights of a client to be published could be overlooked by employees acting autonomously. These cases present tangible evidence of how state actors could curtail or suppress people’s rights to individual autonomy in both private and public institutions. However, to understand how such limitations to individual freedoms of choice could be exercised and condoned; there is a need to comprehend the flip argument, which focuses on the rights of workers to protect their freedoms from violation by other people.

By focusing on the example of the refusal of British Postal workers to deliver leaflets containing disagreeable information, it is unclear whether the postal workers were supposed to spread messages that they disagreed with because it was their duty to do so, or because they disagreed with conservative ideals. In other words, they would refuse to amplify the message because it does not augur well with their beliefs. Therefore, insisting that they should distribute materials that undermine the “common good” means that they would be overlooking their will to advance the rights of others. Consequently, while pursuing their rights to protect individual views, the workers are indirectly being authoritarian by blocking another group from airing their views, irrespective of the moral arguments that surround its implementation.⁴⁰ This paternalistic way of implementing the right to individual autonomy highlights the limits of libertarianism.

Although the above-mentioned examples may provide a clear understanding of how individual freedoms are exercised or limited, the debate often becomes murkier when people who hold controversial views use a “prestigious” platform to advance their individualistic views. For example, a lecturer at a prestigious university could use the institution to spread controversial personal views about social issues, while advancing the university’s academic agenda. If everyone were allowed to speak merely because they have a right to air their autonomous views, there would be disorder and disagreements because universities are respected institutions of higher learning. Therefore, a debate may emerge when justifying the basis for linking a university’s good reputation with controversial remarks.⁴¹

Indeed, these institutions are often built on the good work of staff and students who may not support the controversial views in the same manner as employees of a media house would refrain from publishing pieces of information that do not represent their common beliefs or views about life.

Although the aforementioned analogy explains how paternalism limits individual autonomy to make decisions, people do not necessarily take offense for being prevented from speaking in prestigious institutions because they do not have a right to be heard. If this is true for major educational institutions, it is difficult to understand why it is wrong for employees or authorities who limit people’s right to say what they want about specific political or social issues. Therefore, the main argument that emerges in this analysis is not whether people should be allowed to use public platforms or resources to advance individualistic views but rather who should be given the responsibility to make such decisions on behalf of others.

The limits of Mill’s libertarian approach to individual autonomy emerge from this analysis because they shift the focus away from whether people are inherently good, or not, to who should be allowed to make decisions on behalf of others.⁴² While there may be varied opinions on this position, most libertarians deem it fit for only a small group of people to be entrusted with this task. Proponents of paternalism would wish for the contrary argument whereby a large group of people is involved in the decision-making process because they would be encouraging more open and inclusive involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process.⁴³

This example shows how the libertarian approach to paternalism could lead to authoritarian tendencies in the management of people’s rights, while those who hold a paternalistic view would be regarded as inclusive and democratic.

Evaluating the content people put on the internet provides another basis for assessing Mill’s limitations of individual autonomy. Although the internet is an open platform of engagement for all users, it is becoming increasingly difficult to conceive a situation where people are allowed to post whatever they want, albeit the unregulated nature of the platform. Practical examples of this reasoning are evident in the type of content that users post on social media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram.⁴⁴ While these applications are openly sourced online, users are often subjected to restrictive policies to regulate the content they post on such platforms.⁴⁵

Therefore, it is common to find internet-based companies regulating users’ posts, usually without their consent.⁴⁶ For example, nudity and images that promote violence are often pulled down on some social media platforms because they do not conform to community guidelines on safety and fair-use policies. Regardless of people’s individual freedoms to make autonomous decisions, a few people formulate these rules.

Their actions may be paternalistic and undermine Mill’s argument that people are inherently good because, if this were the case, there would be no need for such an intervention in the first place. This example suggests that although the internet may seem to be free for all, in reality, it is managed as the private property of corporations that exercise the right of admission or dismissal. Consequently, these entities wield a lot of power in influencing how people use the internet.⁴⁷ From this example, the paternalistic view of individual choice appears to be widely condoned in modern society, regardless of people’s right to make autonomous decisions.

Curious to this case is the possible lack of involvement of state actors in regulating people’s autonomous decisions. For example, in the above-mentioned illustration, private corporations that may not even have a physical presence in the markets where their laws are implemented, exercise the freedom to develop internet regulations. For example, Facebook, which is an American company, may regulate the content of any user who uses their platform in any part of the world, regardless of the local laws of the host country.⁴⁸

This practice supports the view that governments are not the only ones that could enforce paternalism when regulating citizens’ autonomous rights to make choices about their lives. Although it may be prudent to exercise such rights cautiously, such wishes may be redundant in a global economy controlled by corporations wielding a lot of power over people’s lives, even more than governments can do. Therefore, Mill’s argument that people are inherently good and individual autonomy rights should be protected has its limits.

Hayek’s Slippery Slope Argument

Friedrich Hayek argued for the respect of libertarian views in maintaining political and social order.”⁴⁹ He embraced this view by upholding respect for people’s freedoms because he believed that paternalism was a flawed construct of maintaining social order. He believes it is akin to a distributive pattern of ideas concerning people’s choices by imposing collective opinions on those who may not necessarily agree with them.⁵⁰ In this regard, the philosopher deemed it wrong to impose abstract rules on people, whether good or bad, because individuals have divergent views and one framework cannot reconcile all of them.⁵¹

Therefore, collective decisions infringe on other people’s rights. This understanding explains Hayek’s opposition to the idea of social control.⁵² His views have often been a source of debate for researchers and academicians because they promote an individual’s willingness to make individual choices without accounting for collective interests. Relative to this argument, some people associate paternalism to the loss of people’s rights to determine their own destiny, while others believe it represents a struggle for freedom.⁵³

These two opposing views of human choice also reflect the ideas of Robert Nozick in his understanding and representations of social order.⁵⁴ Nozick, through a naïve understanding of Hayek’s views, would describe paternalism as the material equality of outcomes.⁵⁵ Given that people have different abilities, striving for the creation of a common vision would inherently mean that there should be an unequal application of the law to account for people’s individualism.⁵⁶

Relative to this statement, Nozick says that, if society strives to adopt a form of paternalism characterized by the equal attainment of social and economic outcomes, it would be conflicting with deep-seated intuitive views that people hold regarding differential entitlement.⁵⁷ Alternatively, human development outcomes would have to be assessed on merit. However, it may be flawed to use this criterion as a basis for quantifying human progress because of the difficulty in understanding factors that contribute to human performance and rational thought.⁵⁸ Stated differently, there are inherent weaknesses in determining one’s merit.⁵⁹

A perfect model for understanding people’s actions and choices would be premised on evaluating their ability to acquire knowledge and estimating the role that their skills and confidence play in determining their outcomes. Additionally, an ideal model for evaluating the merits of human choice would require an in-depth understanding of a person’s state of mind and capacity to be attentive. It is practically difficult to understand how all these data play into reviewing a person’s merit in making the right decisions. However, the absence of a reliable formula to determine the effects of these uncertainties on people’s rational thought provides a basis for using the libertarian approach to reject the idea of paternalism or fascism, as proposed by Hayek.⁶⁰

In other words, libertarians are mindful of people’s ability to use available knowledge to make decisions about their lives, even if others may not understand their decisions. Alternatively, libertarians allow people to use existing knowledge to make choices that ultimately affect their lives.⁶¹ This is why they believe it is difficult to judge people’s actions. Therefore, a broader understanding of their cognitive processes would mean that their decisions are assessed based on their ability to use quality information. However, such a view may be flawed because people’s merit depends on the knowledge they are aware of, as opposed to what they do not know.

Nozick’s view on paternalism closely aligns with that of Hayek because they both recognize the limitations of collective thinking.⁶² Broadly, their understanding of paternalism suggests that even though governments were to impose a generalized set of rules and policies on people, society would be unstable because free will not be exercised. Based on these insights, Hayek believes that the need for people to feel as though they were exercising free will is central to the creation of stable democracies.⁶³

Comparatively, Nozick is an ardent supporter of natural rights and private property laws. His views are useful in understanding how the consequences of natural justice affect people and shape their lives. Therefore, both scholars (Hayeck and Nozick) support the libertarian school of thought but view it from different perspectives. Additionally, they both agree that paternalism does not offer a workable formula for governing societies because it does not allow people to exercise free will.

The limitations of paternalism, as proposed by Hayek and Nozick, highlight the concept’s potential to transform to total fascism, as deduced in the slippery slope argument, which presupposes that the idea of big government could create totalitarianism.⁶⁴ In other words, paternalism is deemed a totalitarian view of distributive justice, which fails to account for the benefits of free will, which need to be realized for societies to function well.⁶⁵

Furthermore, the concept of equality, which is practiced in common law is flawed because it is premised on a social justice distributive system that fails to account for the views of people who hold contradictory opinions.⁶⁶ The uneven distribution of knowledge across different groups of people is inherently crucial to these arguments because the quality of people’s decisions depends on how much they know.

The pursuit of people’s right to make individual choices draws similarities with Mill’s arguments on individual autonomy, which presupposes that the uneven distribution and access to resources in a capitalistic society affect how people make decisions. Such are the intricacies of modern societies, which are characterized by claims of social inequity propagated by the belief that justice can be bought. This is one criticism of paternalism because it could easily transform into fascism if people’s free will is not exercised. Therefore, the concept of paternalism brings to fore the relationship that libertarians have with paternalism and its perceived limits in creating a perfect idea of social and political order. At the core of this argument is the understanding that libertarians want minimal or no descriptions of paternalism.⁶⁷

Instead, they propose an individualistic view of social justice by supporting an individual’s rights to make autonomous decisions.⁶⁸ In this argument, people are presented as supreme actors in determining choice; otherwise, failing to respect their will is a slippery slope to fascism.⁶⁹

Friedman’s Instrumental View on Libertarianism

Friedman’s views on libertarianism also draw attention to the limits of paternalism through an economic perspective. In line with this discussion, Friedman explored how governments manage their economies, vis-à-vis the philosophical policies they adopt to safeguard public interests and promote economic and social empowerment through free trade.⁷⁰ In this analysis, he investigated the role of governments in promoting free trade through paternalism as opposed to allowing free market forces to shape economic outcomes.⁷¹ Similar to other arguments that will be espoused in this paper there have been two opposing forces underpinning economic development – public and private interests.⁷²

Friedman was one of the fiercest critics of big governments because he believed that its role should only be limited to small environmental, public and safety roles that govern public life.⁷³ Consequently, he was a strong supporter of free-market policies in economic and political governance because of the belief in people’s ability to correct anomalies in economic or political engagements.⁷⁴ Friedman proposed this type of individualistic intervention in economic management by arguing that the government’s role in maintaining public order should be limited to the protection of foreigners and citizens’ properties within known jurisdictions.⁷⁵

To this end, governments have to set up three different types of institutions that maintain social, political, and economic order. The first one is the army whose role is to protect the state from an external attack.⁷⁶ Their role in maintaining public order is usually limited to responding to acts of aggression from external enemies. Therefore, countries that use such institutions to undertake external aggression, such as causing regime change in foreign countries, are excluded from this scope of analysis, as they represent an extreme form of paternalism.

The police form the second kind of institution that should be developed under Friedman’s restrictive view of government structure. Their role is to maintain law and order by preventing theft, investigating cases, and prosecuting them in a court of law. However, libertarians would argue that their role should not extend to policing the public on victimless crimes, such as prostitution and drug use because some of them believe that the decision to participate in such actions should be left to individuals who engage in them because they have the freedom to do whatever they wish.⁷⁷

The third layer of governance that libertarians propose to be set up is the court, which should act as the ultimate arbitrator between the state and its subjects. This governance structure implies that all property within a country that is not used in the execution of any of the above-mentioned functions should be privately owned. Friedman supports this type of governance model by outlining the need for a limited understanding of the role of government in developing and maintaining political and economic order.⁷⁸

It is easy to understand how his views could be contentious in areas of security and foreign relations, but they have been widely discussed in economic circles. Broadly, Friedman’s arguments favor individual and not collective responsibility in the formulation of public policy rules and guidelines. Consequently, he supports the creation of a lean government as a governance philosophy by promoting the idea of individual autonomy as the main basis of decision-making for political, social and economic governance.⁷⁹

Friedman’s views have been contrasted with those of Lord Keynes who proposed the role of the government as a powerful arbitrator in political and economic governance.⁸⁰ Keynes suggested that authorities have a public duty to prevent market excesses, such as high inflation or severe losses, during periods of economic boom and recessions.⁸¹ Friedman advances the opposite view by objecting attempts by governments to influence market forces.⁸² Instead, he supports a free market society where people’s individual autonomy is respected. However, Friedman gives a leeway for governments to correct economic imbalances through the control of money flow.⁸³

Stated differently, he supports a minimal form of government intrusion in financial management through money supply controls. This exception highlights the limits of libertarianism in the management of economic policies by adopting a mild form of paternalism. Subject to this view, Friedman acknowledges that even though individual autonomy should be used as the main basis to freely influence markets, there could be a case for an interventionist policy from the government in the form of money supply controls. Therefore, the libertarian approach to economic management could be viewed as a continuum of decisions that either support an unregulated or protectionist market environment.

Friedman’s backing of a lean government justifies how authorities could use different levers of production to manipulate, control, or improve productivity.⁸⁴ For example, he cautioned authorities and managers against imposing rent controls in free-market systems because they limit the movement of capital as a factor of production.⁸⁵ He also maintained a similar position when discussing determinants of wages because he believes that individual autonomy should be used as the main philosophy for negotiating such matters without unnecessary government interference.⁸⁶ Again, this view is in line with Friedman’s free-market philosophies of economic governance.⁸⁷

However, the libertarian view of economics is not only limited to the movement of free-market forces but also the human element of choice. Stated differently, the field of libertarian economics also encompasses an analysis of personal freedoms and their influence on economic outcomes. Therefore, libertarianism is a multifaceted concept that provides different frameworks for making economic decisions.

An extreme form of the concept would be anarchical because it would advocate for the privatization of all organizations as they would be subject to free-market forces and not government protection.⁸⁸ This form of libertarianism would thrive through the expansion of private property rights, which would then lead people to focus on how assets can be transferred from one person to another. Comparatively, a “mild” version of capitalism would stem from the need to maintain a limited form of government intervention in a country’s economic affairs. Stated differently, this form of libertarianism would limit a government’s role in economic and political governance to the protection of human and private property rights.

Friedman’s non-interventionist approach to economic governance has also been used to develop several economic theories that discuss freedom of choice. A modern version of this system is evident in the cryptocurrency trade where free market forces determine the value of a currency. There is no government involvement in such a monetary system because decisions are based on individual autonomy. This model of governance is unlike the fiat currency framework used in many countries today where a central authority, which is usually in the form of a central bank, influences market forces for purposes of economic stability. As alluded by Friedman, this idea of economic governance is a subtle form of paternalism because governments control financial systems through central banks.

Friedman’s libertarian approach to economic management shares some semblance with the civil libertarianism movement, which proposes that personal rights are supreme to all other forms of authority.⁸⁹ Although this ideology is widely referenced in academic studies, it does not necessarily refer to a specific political ideology but rather to the content of discussion in debates about civil liberties and rights.

In the context of this review, the civil libertarianism movement is primarily concerned with the relationship between governments and the people they represent. In theory, proponents of this movement believe that there should be a minimal relationship between the state and its people, which should be confined to maintaining government functions to the provision of basic services. Friedman advances this ideology because of the need to minimize the potential of the government becoming heavily involved in the lives of its citizens. To this end, Friedman’s libertarian views support a mild form of paternalism, which, in the present study, could be viewed as the basis for public-private partnerships.

Rationality of Choice

The underlying premise of libertarianism is the assumption that people should be free to make decisions because they are “rational” creatures. However, the paternalistic view of decision-making differs from this argument by recognizing the irrationality of people’s actions. The rationality of choice theory is pivotal in understanding the relationship between these two schools of thought because it explains people’s cognitive reasoning.⁹⁰

The theory’s main assumption is that people make sound decisions to promote their interests.⁹¹ However, a paternalistic view of choice implies that this statement is tautological because people may make decisions out of non-selfish interests. In other words, the rationality of choice theory is restrictive because environmental and contextual factors also play a significant role in influencing people’s choices, regardless of whether they are aware of it, or not. For example, if an experienced chess player competes against a novice, he or she is likely to win the game, not because the beginner is weaker but because the experienced player has had more time to study the game and benefits from the knowledge gathered throughout the process.

The existence of different views regarding libertarianism and paternalism explains why there is a debate regarding the merits of the concepts. However, the libertarian school of thought considers the rationality of choice theory as proposing a framework where one person makes decisions on behalf of other people.⁹² In practice, there is no alternative to paternalism, to the extent that people’s decisions and behaviors are guided by other peoples’ actions. Therefore, collective choices are weightier than people’s individual preferences for specific outcomes. This is true for people who subject themselves to the same law.

One key misconception about paternalism that affects people’s rationality when making choices is its association with coercion. When leaders make decisions on behalf of other people, they usually do so through persuasion, regardless of whether the outcomes are beneficial to their subjects, or not. Similarly, in a democracy, the public chooses whether to support these actions because of paternalistic biases or free will. Based on this reasoning, there is an emerging school of thought, which suggests that some form of paternalism should be acceptable by even the strongest supporters of libertarianism.⁹³

A deduction of this argument means that paternalistic reasoning is descriptive, as opposed to pejorative. This view overlaps with the idea that some form of paternalism is unavoidable because leaders always have to make decisions for the “greater good” of everyone. Therefore, the main question to ask in this discussion should not be whether a choice is paternalistic or not but how best to determine the best one among alternatives. This analogy may provide a new basis for exercising the rationality of choice theory that should explain the libertarian approach to paternalism.

The common understanding in libertarian circles is that people’s choices and rights need to be respected because individuals can make independent decisions based on a thorough and objective assessment of facts.⁹⁴ This idea is based on the assumption that people’s ability to make a decision is better than a third party’s right to do the same. However, based on an assessment of extant studies, it is difficult to find empirical proof that supports such an assertion.

Evidence of this claim is in the rising rates of obesity in America, which is arguably a manifestation of people’s inability to make sound decisions about their health and welfare. If people were to make rational choices all the time it would have to be assumed that adults are making informed choices about their health and diets without the interference of third party actors. However, this is not often the case because consumers continue to make unhealthy lifestyle choices, which eventually leads them to develop health complications, such as obesity.⁹⁵ Therefore, although adults enjoy individual autonomy, they do not always make rational choices.

This example explains the basis that many researchers have used to question people’s ability to make choices for the “greater good.” This criticism of paternalism is rooted in the presumption that people make good judgments based on an assessment of available information. Most people make judgments or decisions that are inconsistent with this rule and instead use heuristics to develop their plans. This weakness in judgment leads to systematic blunders that often support decisions to infringe on individuals’ rights to promote collective interests. Paternalism fosters in such an environment.

Individually, people may recognize the limits of bounded rationality and instead delegate the power to choose third parties to exercise this right of their behalf. This is the justification for the imposition of collective decisions on people because the government is a third party that acts on behalf of all citizens.⁹⁶ It is a form of delegated authority given by citizens to public entities. While this model is practiced in most countries, it highlights some of the limitations of the libertarian approach to governance such as the lack of a common arbitrator during disputes. Instead, it gives way to a form of paternalism that is not only sanctioned and approved by the state but also one that provides a platform for citizens to learn about different issues in their environment.

Although the delegation of power to governments, as primary decision-making entities, is recognized in many parts of the world, it does not guarantee that decisions made will maximize social welfare. There is also no guarantee that the choices made by third parties will be better than those individuals will. Based on this assessment of the consequences of choice, there is no common basis for practicing absolute paternalism or libertarianism. The libertarian approach to paternalism stems from these views and does not seek to block people’s ability to make choices; instead, it encourages them to embrace welfare-supportive decisions.⁹⁷ Within this framework of assessment, people’s freedom of choice is still respected.

The sentiments highlighted in this paper regarding bounded rationality and self-control provide a basis for further exploration of how libertarianism relates to paternalism. Although the freedom to make individual decisions is cherished around the world, strategies that protect the same freedom and promote a greater “social good” should also be factored in decision-making processes. Broadly, these insights are useful in improving the quality of political governance not because they present instances where paternalism may be accepted but because they acknowledge the complexity of the rationality of choice theory. In this regard, the libertarian view of cognitive rationality challenges the common-sense understanding of paternalism in the way that a realist would see it.⁹⁸

This statement implies that preference cannot be perceived as a simple matter of choice, but rather a complex framework underpinned by multiple layers of influences.⁹⁹ Therefore, the superiority of individual choice is questionable.

Pierre Bourdieu has done a deeper interrogation of the complexity of choice by investigating how people differentiated themselves from others.¹⁰⁰ He found out that people’s consumption patterns and tastes are products of their socialization and not naturalization processes.¹⁰¹ Socially, the family unit is the primary basis for which people acquire their preferences for choice, especially within their early years of development. Therefore, people’s ability to make choices requires an in-depth understanding of their history because their decisions are informed by several underlying factors influencing cognitive patterns.

Some states are increasingly adopting paternalistic policies that govern people’s lives, thereby creating a “mental colony,” which forces them to act in a predetermined way.¹⁰² Such systems have been propagated through stringent economic and social policies. In this regard, some observers may opine that the state is overstepping its boundaries in political and economic administration. In history, evidence of such sentiments emerged during the formulation and implementation of Bush’s security and privacy laws after the 11 September 2001 attacks.¹⁰³

His legislative changes allowed state agents to use people’s private data to investigate and prosecute crimes. Although some people opposed these laws because they infringed on people’s rights, they are a microcosm of how governments are increasingly assuming a dominant role in shaping people’s lives, including travel, cultural appropriation, and development of nationhood. In such a context, people act in similar ways because paternalism limits their free will. This is contrary to libertarian rationality, which suggests that leaders are also human and can make the wrong decision.¹⁰⁴

If paternalism were to be adopted as the guiding principle in the rationality of choice theory, governments would need to demonstrate to the public that they have more information about the issue in question beyond merely suggesting that it knows more than the electorate does. However, this is not always the case as collective reasoning is also flawed. Nonetheless, the adoption of paternalistic policies does not mean a government is opposing the pursuit of individual interests. Therefore, there is a need to balance libertarian and paternalistic views within the context of rational choice.

Ethics

The relationship between libertarianism and paternalism can also be explored through an analysis of the libertarian view of morality and ethics. Evidence of this analysis can be understood through the actions of libertarian political institutions that prefer to uphold virtuous living.¹⁰⁵ This statement means that most of the libertarian views of paternalism stem from moral and ethical arguments.¹⁰⁶ For example, different types of ethical arguments are applied in political reasoning and some of them can be traced to libertarianism. The main motivation of using virtue ethics to explain libertarianism is to base people’s moral reasoning, not on their actions but, on their character traits.¹⁰⁷

In this regard, this concept of human reasoning is less concerned with the consequential aspects of people’s actions and is instead preoccupied with the inherent characteristics and attributes that support such decisions in the first place. The focus on virtues stems from people’s characters.¹⁰⁸ This view presents an in-depth understanding of people’s actions, which could be evaluated through an investigation of the dichotomy of human choices, based on who people are, and what they perceive themselves to be.

Vices could also be deemed as accurate predictors of human character. However, there is a need to distinguish them from virtues because the latter refers to positive influences, while the former lends to negative portrayals of human behavior.¹⁰⁹ The primary focus of moral evaluation by libertarians stems from the use of virtue ethics for purposes of moral reasoning.¹¹⁰ Albeit this analogy could be useful in understanding people’s actions, it is equally important to conceive the actions created by these traits in the context of human characters that birthed them.¹¹¹ If this argument were extrapolated to a real-life scenario, it would mean that while people may be obsessed with catastrophes and exciting events, what matters is the consequence of their actions. The focus on outcomes brings attention to the role of human character in evaluating people’s actions.

Since many societies care about the human character in decision-making, it is only natural that there is an inherent expectation that moral theorists would have a place for it in academic discourse. For example, consequential theorists have paid a lot of attention to this area of virtuous human behavior. One of the most notable contributors to this field of assessment is Mill who believes that virtuous actions are often driven by the need to do good.¹¹²

In other words, virtuous deeds can only be created through morally valuable actions. The process should be independent of the forces or characters that caused them. Although Mill presents the theory of virtue, it is critical to understand that these elements can only be assessed through the unique metrics of assessment available for analysis.¹¹³ Kant presents a similar ideology but his views are not consequentialist.

One of the key differentiating factors of virtue ethics by adopted libertarians is role reversal whereby people’s characters are more important than the actions they are linked to.¹¹⁴ While it could be useful to analyze such an approach to evaluating human behavior, it is important to recognize that different forms of ethics exist and not all of them support the libertarian approach. The differences stem from diverse reasons, including varying levels of support for libertarianism among scholars and academicians. The eudaemonist form of virtue ethics is relevant to this discussion because it presents a common form of reviewing human behavior – the pursuit of happiness.¹¹⁵

The eudaemonist approach to ethics is not a new concept because it dates back to the teachings of Socrates and Plato.¹¹⁶ Coupled with the views of Aristotle, these philosophers helped to develop this area of moral reasoning. They agreed that human will is driven by the pursuit of happiness but cautioned that this form of happiness should be carefully reviewed because there is no common understanding of what it entails.¹¹⁷

For example, some societies may deem happiness as a representation of a current mood, while others may adopt a broader understanding of the feeling to mean the quality of life. The Greek understanding of happiness shares a lot of resemblance to the latter reasoning, which associates the feeling to a greater quality of life. For example, the Greeks would deem a person to be happy because he or she has a high quality of life, despite their economic or social situations. The use of quality of life as the main basis for making such inferences emerges as the basis for understanding the eudaemonist view of happiness. For example, when wedding congregants wish a newly married couple lots of happiness, they are referring to this idea of human emotion – high quality of life.

The eudaemonist approach to happiness is important to libertarian ethics because it influences the type of virtuous elements that can be evaluated to understand human actions and behaviors. Therefore, traits that contribute to the improvement of people’s quality of life are virtuous, while those that have a negative effect are vices. This analysis does not mean that virtuous traits are only implemented for the benefit of people who will enjoy an improved quality of life; instead, they may have their aims, including “finesse” and nobility, as espoused by Aristotle.¹¹⁸

Therefore, there is a need to be cautious about adopting a simplistic approach to understanding choice because ideas about happiness are contestable and do not holistically represent people’s will or outcomes in life. Relative to this discussion, Aristotle claims that people’s willingness to engage in virtuous ethics stems from their capacity to deliberate on their actions and act positively.¹¹⁹ This argument draws its inspiration from the innate attribute of human beings to be good. Additionally, Aristotle says that practical rationality drives human actions. This statement does not mean that ideas of practical rationality cannot be used to cause harm to others, but they explain how each virtue contributes to a good life. Therefore, true wisdom can only be achieved when people use virtuous ethics to make decisions that improve the quality of their lives.

Indeed, unlike animals, human beings deploy capabilities that are only understood by other humans, in the same manner, a lion in the savannah would do to stay alive, or an eagle soaring in the air would do to catch prey. Therefore, human beings deploy these resources effectively to nurture relationships with others of similar kind and to achieve higher levels of prosperity. Aristotle argues that if this is the goal, human actions can only be quantified by understanding how well people deploy their resources to improve the quality of their lives.¹²⁰ Stated differently, their decision-making processes should involve searching for evidence through practical reasoning within a larger quest to improve the quality of their lives.

The significance of this discussion to our understanding of the libertarian approach and virtue ethics stems from the collective understanding of practical wisdom and its role in influencing human actions. Particularly, the networks that human beings create for social survival provide a good basis for assessing practical wisdom and happiness. This argument suggests that human beings pursue a common end to their lives – to be positively remembered. A good outcome is often desired but undermined by limited resources. Therefore, the process of living requires a continual trade-off between what people desire and what they can get. This is the main argument pitting paternalistic and libertarian views against each other.

Usually, the process starts when people have an unclear view of their vision and pursue a set of actions that would enable them to achieve it. For example, people enter into marital unions with an idea of how it would be like. Thereafter, they take a set of actions that are guided by their perceptions of how they would like to lead these unions. It is only through experience and the process of making individual decisions that they understand what such a relationship is like. This process constitutes practical wisdom, which libertarians use as the basis for promoting virtue ethics.

Broadly, the libertarian view of ethics through the exercising of human virtues provides an abstract understanding of how paternalism is exercised in modern societies because the concept is in itself an offshoot of ethical practices. In other words, the enforcement of ethical principles is paternalistic because it outlines a set of laws that have to be followed for people to be admitted into society.¹²¹ The libertarian view of virtue ethics does not openly criticize this approach to social governance because it recognizes the trade-off that people have to make in their daily lives. Instead, it provides a guide that could be used to understand human actions by focusing on virtuous deeds, as the basis for maintaining social order.

The emphasis on character as the justification for evaluating social order is perhaps one of the most important takeaways of the libertarian approach to ethical development because it deviates from the conventional understanding of human actions, which is based on an evaluation of outcomes as opposed to character. Therefore, the libertarian approach to virtue ethics introduces a new basis for analyzing people’s decisions and actions – character. This approach to ethical governance is similar to Mill’s inherent good arguments and the rationality of choice theory because they focus on the individual as the common denominator in decision-making.¹²²

This view is consistent with others, which have opposed paternalism based on its use of majority ideologies as the basis for making collective societal choices. Broadly, the relationship between libertarianism and paternalism is moderated by the quest for people to act ethically. Thorough the arguments espoused in the citizenship theory, Kymlicka also suggests that a compromise between the two concepts can be found as is the case with citizenship, which has both individualistic and community connotations.¹²³ In other words, it confers individual rights on a person, while assigning them membership to a larger community of nationals. Therefore, libertarianism and paternalism can coexist side by side.

Summary

In this paper, Mill’s inherent good and individual autonomy arguments have been used to explain the need to respect autonomous decisions, as the main basis for making decisions. Hayek’s slippery slope argument has also highlighted the excesses of paternalism and its link to fascism. Friedman’s instrumental view on libertarianism provided a more balanced understanding of the relationship between libertarianism and paternalism by explaining that only a mild form of the latter concept is relevant to economic and political governance. Subject to these insights, the assessment of Mill, Hayek, and Friedman’s views on libertarianism and paternalism show that paternalistic choices are informed by the quest to maximize social welfare, while libertarianism supports people’s right to autonomous thinking.

Mill’s view of paternalism emerges as a mild form of non-intrusive paternalism because it recognizes its importance in maintaining order but refrains from supporting it as the primary basis for making decisions. In the context of this analysis, people’s freedom to make choices about their private and public lives is respected. However, default rules and traditional frames of references that societies have used to make judgments about social conduct still influence people’s actions. Based on this assertion, the libertarian approach to paternalism respects people’s freedoms to make autonomous decisions, while at the same time respecting the need to balance public and private interests in moderating human behavior.

These insights show that the libertarian approach to maintaining social order accommodates some form of paternalism. Bounded by rationality and self-control, this view of paternalism appears to be influencing people’s choices towards supporting social welfare programs and people’s inherent autonomous rights to make decisions. These insights make it possible to understand how the libertarian approach to paternalism allows people to choose the best alternative form of governance from a variety of options based on the impact that their choices would have on their lives.

The insights highlighted above unsettle the conventional view of paternalism and libertarianism by arguing that the two views coexist side by side but a broader assessment of their relationship has shown that they are guided by human ethics as well. In other words, libertarianism is represented as a form of paternalism and paternalism is highlighted as a form of libertarianism. Ethical balance necessitates the existence of the two concepts as considerations in decision-making. Libertarianism is appealing to people who respect the freedom of choice because it promotes social welfare and people’s autonomy to make decisions. The libertarian approach to paternalism invites people to rethink several areas of contemporary law, which explain factors that influence people’s choice. Several areas of political, social and economic governance could benefit from this analysis, including human resource management through the improvement of labor relations and political governance through the protection of social interests.

These areas of application suggest that people’s decision-making processes are not only influenced by their willingness and commitment to make informed choices but also by the existing framework and knowledge available to make such choices and decisions. Therefore, their decisions are usually a product of framing effects because they highlight the main starting points for making autonomous decisions. Therefore, their cognitive processes have a profound impact on the kind of decisions they make.

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Footnotes

1. Ki-Hyun Bae, “Seeing ASEAN as a Platform for Spreading Liberalism,” International Journal 73, no. 1 (2018): 33.
2. Julia Urabayen and Jorge León Casero, “Politics in Levinas and Derrida: Beyond and Against Liberalism,” SAGE Open 3, no. 2 (2015): 1.
3. Piro Rexhepi, “Liberal Luxury: Decentering Snowden, Surveillance and Privilege,” Big Data & Society 3, no. 2 (2016): 1.
4. Tang Xiaobing and Mark McConaghy, “Liberalism in Contemporary China: Questions, Strategies, Directions,” China Information 32, no. 1 (2018): 121.
5. Graeme Thompson, “Reframing Canada’s Great War: Liberalism, Sovereignty, and the British Empire c. 1860s–1919,” International Journal 73, no. 1 (2018): 85.
6. Matteo Bonotti, “Book Review: Paul Weithman, Rawls, Political Liberalism and Reasonable Faith,” Political Studies Review 16, no. 1 (2018): 16.
7. Uwe Becker and Alexandra Vasileva, “Russia’s Political Economy Re-Conceptualized: A Changing Hybrid of Liberalism, Statism and Patrimonialism,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 8, no. 1 (2017): 83.
8. Rexhepi, Liberal Luxury, 1.
9. Ibid., 2.
10. Ela Ünler and Bülent Kılıç, “Paternalistic Leadership and Employee Organizational Attitudes: The Role of Positive/Negative Affectivity,” SAGE Open 1, no. 2 (2016): 1.
11. Daniel Sazhin and Matthew Morey, “How We Contradict Ourselves: The Case of John Cochrane – Gliding and Behavioral Economics,” The American Economist 63, no. 1 (2018): 31.
12. Terence Jackson, “Paternalistic Leadership: The Missing Link in Cross-Cultural Leadership Studies?,” International Journal of Cross Cultural Management 16, no. 1 (2016): 3.
13. Ho-Fung Hung, “Global Capitalism in the Age of Trump,” Contexts 17, no. 3 (2018): 40.
14. Adigun Lawal and Samson Babalola, “Moderating Roles of Leadership Effectiveness and Job Stress on Relationship between Paternalism and Leadership-Induced Stress,” International Journal of Engineering Business Management 3, no. 2 (2017): 1.
15. Caitlin Petre, Brooke Erin Duffy and Emily Hund, ” ‘Gaming the System’: Platform Paternalism and the Politics of Algorithmic Visibility,” Social Media and Society 3, no. 1 (2019): 1.
16. Jodie Ginsberg, “Global View: Debunking the Argument That Powerful Voices Should Be Silenced to Promote the Free Speech of Others,” Index on Censorship 45, no. 1 (2016): 56.
17. Kristina Stoeckl, “Political Liberalism and Religious Claims: Four Blind Spots,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 43, no. 1 (2017): 34.
18. Alan Patten, “Liberalism, Culture, and Recognition: A Reply to Critics,” Political Theory 46, no. 1 (2018): 131.
19. Jonathan Anomaly, “Public Goods and Government Action,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 14, no. 2 (2015): 109.
20. Juan Tauri, “Research Ethics, Informed Consent and the Disempowerment of First Nation Peoples,” Research Ethics 14, no. 3 (2018): 1.
21. Rossella De Bernardi, “Book Review: Peter Balint, Respecting Toleration: Traditional Liberalism and Contemporary Diversity” Political Studies Review 16, no. 1 (2018): 23.
22. Bae, Seeing ASEAN Platform, 33.
23. Sanjit Dhami, Ali al-Nowaihi and Cass Sunstein, “Heuristics and Public Policy: Decision-Making Under Bounded Rationality,” Studies in Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (2019): 45.
24. Bae, Seeing ASEAN Platform, 33.
25. Mill, On Liberty (New York: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 15.
26. Maria Marron, “A Delicate Balance: ‘Free’ Speech,” Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 70, no. 1 (2015): 3.
27. Mill, On Liberty, 16.
28. Jemimah Steinfeld, “Novel Lines: An Interview with Margaret Atwood on Current Threats to Free Speech and Why Scientists Need Defending,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 2 (2017): 73.
29. Steinfeld, Novel Lines, 74.
30. Haytham Karar, “Algorithmic Capitalism and the Digital Divide in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Developing Societies 35, no. 4 (2019): 514.
31. Jodie Ginsberg, ” ‘Far-Right Are Not in Favour of Free Speech’: We Need to Champion Free Speech for All or Risk the Far-Right Controlling the Conversation,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 4 (2017): 66.
32. Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945): 519-530.
33. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 519.
34. John Power, “Drawing the Line: Australia Is Debating Free Speech, One Cartoon at a Time. Cartoonist Bill Leak Interviewed Just before He Died,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 1 (2017): 85.
35. Duncan Tucker, “Mexico’s Unlikely Visitor: Leon Trotsky Might Have Arrived in Mexico with Blood on His Hands, but He Quickly Became a Free Speech Fighter,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 2 (2017): 12.
36. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 317.
37. Kirsten Han, “Carving out a Space for Free Speech: As Journalists in Singapore Avoid Controversial Topics, a New Site Launches to Tackle These,” Index on Censorship 47, no. 1 (2018): 96.
38. Judith Shapiro, “Lessons from McCarthyism: Looking Back at McCarthyite Accusations, as Well as Free Speech Threats in the USA Today,” Index on Censorship 44, no. 3 (2015): 43.
39. Shapiro, Lessons from McCarthyism, 43.
40. Andrew Bowyer, “Moral Philosophy after Austin and Wittgenstein: Stanley Cavell and Donald MacKinnon,” Studies in Christian Ethics 31, no. 1 (2018): 49.
41. Alison Scott-Baumann, “Ideology, Utopia and Islam on Campus: How to Free Speech a Little from Its Own Terrors,” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 12, no. 2 (2017): 159.
42. John Mill, On Liberty (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1863), 10.
43. Mill, On Liberty, 11.
44. Daniel Leisegang, “No Country for Free Speech?: An Old Libel Law and a New One Aimed at Social Media Are Two Threats to Free Expression in Germany,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 2 (2017): 76.
45. Casey Fiesler and Nicholas Proferes, ” ‘Participant’ Perceptions of Twitter Research Ethics,” Social Media and Society 3, no. 2 (2018): 1.
46. Brianna Wu, “Doxxed: Impact of Online Threats on Women Including Private Details Being Exposed and ‘Swatting’. Plus Greg Lukianoff on Balancing Offence and Free Speech,” Index on Censorship 44, no. 3 (2015): 46.
47. Jason DaPonte, “Taking Back the Web: A Look at Technology Companies Putting Free Speech First,” Index on Censorship 44, no. 3 (2015): 86.
48. Jason Shepard, “Book Review Essay: Academic Freedom and Recent Campus Free Expression Controversies,” Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 73, no. 1 (2018): 101.
49. Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 2014), 14.
50. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 14.
51. Ben Gook, “Backdating German Neoliberalism: Ordoliberalism, the German Model and Economic Experiments in Eastern Germany after 1989,” Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (2018): 33.
52. Ross Mitchell et al., “School Setting Behavior That Characterizes Social Justice: An Empirical Approach to Illustrate the Concept,” AERA Open 3, no. 2 (2016): 1.
53. Kirk Harris, “Understanding the Disposition of Urban Planning Students Toward Social Justice and Equity Themes,” SAGE Open, 1, no. 2 (2015): 1.
54. Jared Colton and Steve Holmes, “A Social Justice Theory of Active Equality for Technical Communication,” Journal of Technical Writing and Communication 48, no. 1 (2018): 4.
55. Jonathan Benson, “Knowledge and Communication in Democratic Politics: Markets, Forums and Systems,” Political Studies 67, no. 2 (2019): 422.
56. Younghwa et al., “How Liberals and Conservatives Respond to Equality-Based and Proportionality-Based Rewards in Charity Advertising,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 37, no. 1 (2018): 108.
57. Samuel Venkatanarayanan, “Economic Liberalization in 1991 and Its Impact on Elementary Education in India,” SAGE Open 5, no. 2 (2015): 1.
58. Trevor Latimer, “Plural Voting and Political Equality: A Thought Experiment in Democratic Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 17, no. 1 (2018): 65.
59. Dave Cudworth, “Schooling, Space and Social Justice,” Power and Education 7, no. 1 (2015): 73.
60. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 519.
61. Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1st ed, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1944), 26-28.
62. Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 33.
63. Maroš Krivý, “Towards a Critique of Cybernetic Urbanism: The Smart City and the Society of Control,” Planning Theory 17, no. 1 (2018): 8.
64. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, 33.
65. Mark Olson, “Exploring Military Social Work from a Social Justice Perspective,” International Social Work 61, no. 1 (2018): 119.
66. Joan Dodgson, “The Intersection of Power, Social Justice, and Lactation,” Journal of Human Lactation 34, no. 3 (2018): 411.
67. Melanie Bertrand and Katherine Rodela, “A Framework for Rethinking Educational Leadership in the Margins: Implications for Social Justice Leadership Preparation,” Journal of Research on Leadership Education 13, no. 1 (2018): 10.
68. Lisette Farias et al., “Reclaiming the Potential of Transformative Scholarship to Enable Social Justice,” International Journal of Qualitative Methods 3, no. 2 (2017): 1.
69. Friedrich, The Road to Serfdom, 4.
70. Dubravka Zarkov, “Populism, Polarization and Social Justice Activism,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 24, no. 3 (2017): 197.
71. Luca Mavelli, “Governing the Resilience of Neoliberalism through Biopolitics,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3 (2017): 489.
72. Pradyumna Dash, “The Impact of Public Investment on Private Investment: Evidence from India,” Vikalpa 41, no. 4 (2016): 288.
73. Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), 33.
74. Milton Friedman, There is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1975), 15.
75. Anirvan Pant and Abhoy Ojha, “Managerial Values and Organizational Identities in the Developing World: An Introduction to the Special Issue,” Journal of Human Values 23, no. 1 (2017): 7.
76. Bryan Mabee and Srdjan Vucetic, “Varieties of Militarism: Towards a Typology,” Security Dialogue 49, no. 1 (2018): 96.
77. Mabee and Vucetic, Varieties of Militarism, 97.
78. Soumali Bose and Bindya Kohli, “Study of FDI Trends and Patterns in BRICS Economies during the Period 1990-2015,” Emerging Economy Studies 4, no. 1 (2018): 78.
79. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 5.
80. Milton Friedman, On Galbraith and on Curing the British Disease (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1977), 18.
81. Gareth Dale, “Justificatory Fables of Ordoliberalism: Laissez-Faire and the ‘Third Way,’” Critical Sociology 45, no. 7 (2019): 1047.
82. Richard Swedberg, “The State, the Market, and Society,” Contexts 14, no. 3 (2015): 58.
83. Milton Friedman, Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 13.
84. Milton Friedman, The Essence of Friedman (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 8.
85. Rille Raaper and Mark Olssen, “Mark Olssen on Neoliberalisation of Higher Education and Academic Lives: An Interview,” Policy Futures in Education 14, no. 2 (2015): 147.
86. Friedman, The Essence of Friedman, 9.
87. Steve Cohn, “Book Review: Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China,” Review of Radical Political Economics 50, no. 2 (2018): 441.
88. Karel Kouba and Stanislav Mysicka, “Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?,” SAGE Open 3, no. 2 (2019): 1.
89. Ian Cummins, “Book Review: Neil Thompson Social Problems and Social Justice,” Critical Social Policy 38, no. 1 (2018): 174.
90. Salhieh, Sa’Ed, “Modeling the Rationality of Customers’ Switching Mobile Services Behavior,” International Journal of Engineering Business Management 11, no. 1 (2019): 1-10.
91. Engelen, Bart, “Nudging and Rationality: What Is There to Worry,” Rationality and Society 31, no. 2 (2019): 204-32.
92. Bart, Nudging and Rationality, 206.
93. Sa’Ed, Modeling the Rationality of Customers, 3.
94. Bart, Nudging and Rationality, 207.
95. Bivins, Roberta, “Weighing on Us All? Quantification and Cultural Responses to Obesity in NHS Britain,” History of Science 1, no. 2 (2019): 1-10.
96. Shubha, Free Speech, 61.
97. Sa’Ed, Modeling the Rationality of Customers, 3.
98. Ibid., 4.
99. David Schmidtz and Pavel Carmen, The Oxford Handbook of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 6.
100. Wacquant, Loïc, “Four Transversal Principles for Putting Bourdieu to Work,” Anthropological Theory 18, no. 1 (2018): 3-17.
101. Loïc, Four Transversal Principles, 3-7.
102. Payne, James, and Luis Gil-Alana, “Data Measurement and the Change in Persistence of Tourist Arrivals to the United States in the Aftermath of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,” Tourism Economics 24, no. 1 (2018): 41-50.
103. James and Gil-Alana, Data Measurement, 41.
104. Loïc, Four Transversal Principles, 7.
105. Jay Marlowe and Martin Tolich, “Shifting from Research Governance to Research Ethics: A Novel Paradigm for Ethical Review in Community-Based Research,” Research Ethics 11, no. 4 (2015): 178.
106. Vinca Bigo, “On Silence, Creativity and Ethics in Organization Studies,” Organization Studies 39, no. 1 (2018): 121.
107. Claudia Vadeboncoeur et al., “Variation in University Research Ethics Review: Reflections Following an Inter-University Study in England,” Research Ethics 12, no. 4 (2016): 217.
108. Marilyn Morris and Jason Morris, “The Importance of Virtue Ethics in the IRB,” Research Ethics 12, no. 4 (2016): 201.
109. Ann Gallagher and David Augustin Hodge, “Gun Violence: Care Ethicists Making the Invisible Visible,” Nursing Ethics 25, no. 1 (2018): 3.
110. Bigo, On Silence and Creativity, 121.
111. Tom Lundborg, “The Ethics of Neorealism: Waltz and the Time of International Life,” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 1 (2019): 229.
112. John Mill, On Liberty (New York: Courier Corporation, 2012), 11.
113. Mill, On Liberty, 10.
114. Shlomo Back, Matthew Clarke and Anne M Phelan, “Teacher Education as the Practice of Virtue Ethics: Editorial,” Research in Education 100, no. 1 (2018): 3.
115. Mill, On Liberty, 10.
116. Raphael Sassower, “The Refuge of the Academy: Response to Socrates Tenured,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48, no. 1 (2018): 63.
117. Støre Brinchmann et al., “An Aristotelian View of Therapists’ Practice in Multifamily Therapy for Young Adults with Severe Eating Disorders,” Nursing Ethics 26, no. 4 (2019): 1149.
118. Brinchmann et al., An Aristotelian View, 1149.
119. Marke Ahonen, “Ancient Philosophers on Mental Illness,” History of Psychiatry 30, no. 1 (2019): 3.
120. Ahonen, Ancient Philosophers, 3.
121. Alex Guilherme, “Do We Have a Right to Education or a Duty to Educate Ourselves? An Enquiry Based on Fichte’s Views on Education,” Power and Education 8, no. 1 (2016): 3.
122. Natasha Joseph, “Dangerous Minds: Rather than Creating an Alliance, Fees Must Fall Is Limiting Free Speech at South Africa’s Universities, Leaving Some Early Supporters Disheartened,” Index on Censorship 46, no. 1 (2017): 18.
123. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 284.