During World War II, an American bomber detonated the world’s first operational atomic bomb over Hiroshima, Japan. A second bomber launched another attack on Nagasaki three days later. Generally, it is perceived that President Truman sanctioned the deployment of atomic bombs in an attempt to compel Japan’s capitulation during World War II. In turn, Leon Sigal provides a broader perspective of the events and politics that led to the dropping bombs decision. Sigal operates with a bureaucratic political approach that emphasizes internal state bargaining1. According to bureaucratic politics theory, policy results are the product of a game of negotiation among a limited, highly positioned set of governmental actors. Participants select tactics and policy objectives based on their perceptions of which best suits their organization’s and personal interests. Bargaining occurs per the game’s current rules and power dynamics among the participants. Since this process is not dominated by a single person and is unlikely to favor logical judgments, it may produce unsatisfactory results that fail to meet the aims of any of the participants involved.
Sigal’s interpretation of the reasoning behind the bombing emphasizes the role of several specific governmental organizations, one of which is the Manhattan Engineering District (MED). This information relates to the slide concerning atomic energy, which also advocates for the participation of the Manhattan Project’s researchers and policy-makers in the decision to atomic bombing during World War II. As such, the United States government supported the nuclear weapons development program of the Army Corps of Engineers, which is the Manhattan Project. The project’s leader consulted Strategic Air Forces and the Target Committee, the agency tasked with choosing targets for the bombing. Hence, MED provided bureaucratic authority to people with their own strategic goals. As a result, during the decision-making process, these agencies approved bombing. While some MED scientists objected, their opinions were not considered in the power game of bureaucratic actors.
Furthermore, Sigal’s account is somewhat supported by the film “Day After Trinity,” which contains interviews of people who were the participants in the Manhattan Project. As such, a scene with the account of a woman in charge of the office when the atomic bomb was tested in New Mexico deserves specific attention. Namely, the woman describes that the camp of the researchers was infiltrated by the presence of military officials and troops, leading to a pressuring atmosphere2. Similarly, Sigal argues that military offices intruded in decision-making per their bureaucratic power, influencing or taking over the judgment process. Hence, it is supported that agencies with no expertise in atomic energy had enough power to make decisions about its use.
Finally, the documentary helps one to understand the concept of the logic of war. As such, the video describes the meaning of technological advancements for war purposes, illustrating it with the atomic bomb development. Namely, the interviewees emphasize that they perceived the atomic weapon as a significant wartime advantage which use has been unexplored. Similarly, according to the logic of war, the strategic advantage might include novel methods which are perceived as too dangerous by the combating sides. As a result, the impact of such a weapon is viewed as efficient due to the factor of unexpectedness.
Bibliography
Sigal, Leon, “Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” Polity 10, no. 3 (1978): 326-364.
Stirner’s Retrowave, “The Day After Trinity (1981) [Full Documentary].” 1995. The Voyager Company, 1:28. Web.
Footnotes
- Leon Sigal, “Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb,” Polity 10, no. 3 (1978): 326-364.
- Stirner’s Retrowave, “The Day After Trinity (1981) [Full Documentary],” 1995, The Voyager Company, 1:28. Web.