One of the most notable stains on America’s reputation, as the ‘beacon of democracy,’ has to do with the fact that the US is the only country in the world that had used the Atomic weapons against the predominantly civilian population of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200.000 people. Therefore, it has always been crucially important for the country’s political establishment to apply a continual effort into trying to convince Americans that the nuclear bombing of Japan was unavoidable because it allowed saving the lives of thousands if not millions of American servicemen.
Henry Stimson initiated the tendency “(Without the nuclear bombing), the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties to American forces alone”.1 It is understood, of course, that America’s governmental officials never bothered to substantiate the estimated number of the would-be-saved Americans.
Neither did these individuals bother to explain why it was specifically through the summer of 1945 that they became so touchingly concerned with trying to save the lives of American soldiers – especially given the fact that the same people could not care less about the unbelievably high human cost of the famous Omaha Beach landing or the Operation Guadalcanal.
It is also commonly suggested that the nuclear bombing of Japan was supposed to take place in a much more ‘civilized’ manner, “We ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which people would be warned to leave-telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such centers2 However, the ‘Japs’ themselves made it impossible for the Americans to be giving too many thoughts to the idea of not killing innocent women and children.
After all, had the Japanese found out about the American plans to subject them to the nuclear holocaust, they would surely try to prevent it from happening. As Compton pointed out, “If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure… (it) would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made”. 3
Therefore, the Japanese should blame themselves for what had happened. During the time of war, there is no room for sentiments. President Truman himself used to endorse this point of view while publicly proclaiming that the Japanese are nothing short of ‘sub-humans’, and as such, they deserve to be treated accordingly, “When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is regrettable but nevertheless true”.4 Once an enemy proclaimed a ‘beast’, it is no longer necessary to conduct warfare in accordance with the applicable conventions of international law.
Many American scientists of the era came up with their own contribution towards legitimizing the idea that it is indeed thoroughly justified to drop a few nuclear bombs on Japan, at least in the utilitarian sense of this word. As it was noted in the Szilard Petition, “The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion, and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare”.5 It would be quite impossible to disagree with the petition’s signatories – it is indeed the epitome of effectiveness achieving the complete destruction of an entire city by the mean of dropping a nuclear bomb on it.
In fact, it is specifically the ‘scientific’ consideration in favor of subjecting Japan to the nuclear bombardment that contains a hidden answer, as to why a positive decision was made, in this respect. It is important to understand that the cost of the Manhattan Project amounted to $2 billion – a rather unimaginable sum of money by the standards of the 1940s. Therefore, it represented the matter of crucial importance for the involved parties to be able to prove to citizens that the funds were not spent in vain. And, there was only one way to do it – to drop the bombs, as the ultimate mean of adding more ‘fuel’ to the patriotic fervor among the Americans.
It is understood, of course, that while authorizing the atrocity, Truman was fully aware that the would-be undertaken action does fit the definition of a war crime. After all, this idea appears to be subtly present in many analytical reports, reviewed by the President when he was deciding whether to ‘drop or not to drop’. For example, according to the Frank Report, “The military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world”. 6
However, since the US came as a winner out of WW2, there was no way on earth at the time for the country’s top-officials to consider the possibility that they may end up facing the charges of genocide. As the popular saying goes – ‘history is written by the victors’.
Apart from the fact that the Manhattan Project needed to be proven ‘feasible’, there was another important reason for Truman to rush with subjecting Japan to the nuclear bombardment – the fact that, according to the agreement reached between Roosevelt and Stalin during the 1945 Yalta Conference, the USSR was to attack Japan on August 15 of the same year. Then, it would only be a matter of days before Japan signs an unconditional capitulation.
However, this would put the Soviets in the position to demand the presence of their occupation-administration in defeated Japan – something that would stand in a striking contradiction to America’s plans for turning the country into its own ‘unsinkable air-carrier’- the role that Japan continues to play even today. Therefore, a sign needed to be given to the Soviets that they are no longer welcome to make landfall in Japan – two nuclear bombs that were in America’s possession at the time, came in rather handy, in this respect. They were rushed to Okinawa and dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as soon as the opportunity presented itself.
The pre-bombing history of the targeted cities serves as the best proof that there was nothing ‘spontaneous’ about Truman’s decision to nuke Japan – throughout the war’s entirety, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were kept exempted from the list of legitimate targets for conventional bombing by American B-29s. This was done so that it would be easier for the US intelligence-analysts assessing the scale of destruction that was yet to be brought upon these cities by the nuclear bombing. What it means is that the atrocity in question was well premeditated, which in turn serves as an additional indication that the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be discussed in terms of a war crime.
References
Compton, Arthur. “Recollection of Interim Commetee Meeting (1945)”.
Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall (1945).
Stimson, Henry. “The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb”.
The Frank Report (1945).
The Szilard Petition (1945).
Truman, Harry. “Letter to Samuel Cavert (1945)”.
Footnotes
- Henry Stimson. “The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb,” 369.
- “Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall (1945), 366.
- Arthur Compton. “Recollection of Interim Committee Meeting (1945)”, 367.
- Harry Truman. “Letter to Samuel Cavert (1945)”, 368.
- The Szilard Petition (1945), 368.
- The Frank Report (1945), 367.