Research Question
This paper will seek to answer the primary research question: Using the Military Effectiveness method, at what Levels of War were the German army most effective in Europe during 1939-1941?
Tentative Hypothesis
Using the Military Effectiveness method as an analytical framework, the German army’s campaign in Europe in 1939-1941 was most effective at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War. At the strategic level, they were able to amass extensive resources and political power to support the effort of the German army. They relied on critical thinkers at the operational level and skilled leaders at the tactical level. The German army effectively utilized its weapons and maneuverability to take advantage of its superiority in firepower while being supported by talented commanders at the Operational Art.
Concise Description
The current research assignment addresses the German army in the setting of World War II in 1939-1941. The research assignment emphasizes the period from 1 September 1939 until the commencement of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, transparently demonstrating that the Western Front was the most successful German military campaign. The major parties included the Third Reich, with significant leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and Heinrich Himmler, and the Anglo-French association, protecting Europe from Nazi aggression. The Third Reich’s objectives were to expand German territories and the political scope of influence and introduce a new racial doctrine, suppressing Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, and other ethnic groups. There were significant risks to Germany’s military campaign, such as technological disadvantage and direct opposition to Western values, which would have certainly resulted in direct warfare. Nevertheless, Germany thoroughly prepared in 1918-1939, overcoming the financial crisis and militarizing manufacturing, which allowed for overwhelming success in 1939-1941.
Literature Review
A thorough examination of credible sources is a necessary element of historical analysis. World War II is one of the most well-documented conflicts in military history, and there is an extensive amount of academic literature depicting the military effectiveness of the German army. Almost eighty years have passed since the end of World War II, and the governments declassified a large number of secret documents, allowing experts to conduct an objective analysis of the German’s army military prowess. Furthermore, historians from various parts of the world inspected the conflict both from the perspective of the Allied forces and the Nazi troops. In turn, it revealed a complete picture of the German military campaign in 1939-1941, including its successes and failures. The current literature review investigates the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War in a narrative format to lay the foundation for consequent analysis. Lastly, the additional academic sources for future work are listed at the end of the chapter.
Strategic Level
The current sub-chapter thoroughly investigates the Political and Strategic Levels of War, which designate the organization’s overall preparedness for the military conflict. The Political Level concerns such issues as the national budget, technological progress, and necessary forces, which are further used to support warfare. Consequently, the Strategic Level encompasses the ability of the organization to secure its objectives. To gain public support, it emphasizes risk management, logistics, leadership, theater strategy, strength/weakness analysis, and propaganda instruments. The two described levels of war are interconnected by the politics and the national objectives of warfare; therefore, it is plausible to analyze them in tandem for maximum efficiency.
The primary source for the Political and Strategic Levels of War analysis is the academic work by Kroener, Müller, and Umbreit, published in 2000 by Oxford University Press. It is a fundamental 1200-page tome, compiled of scientific articles by some of the most prominent German military historians, explicitly emphasizing the Political and Strategic Levels of War (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000). The first part of the book investigates Germany’s national objective of continental dominion and its expansion in Europe via military and more peaceful instruments of political influence. While it primarily concerned the campaign in 1939-1941, Hans Umbreit also investigated the pretext of World War II and inspected the methods of propaganda, economic policies, and militarization efforts in the 1930s. Moreover, he explains the context of the German racial policy that united the country against “inferior” races, such as Slavs and Jews. This information is crucial to understanding Germany’s political objectives and leadership style, which are essential elements of the Strategic Level of War.
Consequently, Rolf-Dieter Müller inspects the logistics, mobilization campaign, and economic initiatives to provide a thorough overview of Germany’s preparedness for World War II. He explains that similar to most global wars, the country needs to ensure that it has a sufficient accumulation of reserves, the concentration of resources on military objectives, and is prepared for mass production (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 410). Moreover, Müller explains that although the beginning of the war was associated with a certain degree of improvisation and instability, Germany’s economic institution proved to be a versatile and enduring unit (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 429). After the First World War, Germany went through a series of crises, such as national poverty in 1918-1924, the consequences of the Great Depression, and the struggle of political parties.
Countless people starved and froze to the death between the two global wars; however, the Reich survived and united the country in combat against a common enemy. While it is evident to modern people that Germany’s national policy of racial superiority was morally unacceptable, it significantly helped the economic recovery. By 1939, the unemployment rate was virtually non-existent due to militarized manufacturing, and Germany’s economy was sufficiently prepared for World War II (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 448). The foreign trade with the Soviets, although controversial to the racial policy, allowed Germany to maintain its advantageous economic position even after the invasion of Poland (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 453). Ultimately, Germany was still at a technological disadvantage compared to the Allied forces, but it successfully overcame the economic crisis of 1918-1939 and was well-prepared for World War II.
Lastly, Kroener discussed Germany’s military forces and manpower in 1939-1941. The mobilization efforts of various units, such as the army, navy, Luftwaffe, SS militarized formations, and national police, allowed the country to have sufficient troops for both offensive maneuvers on foreign soil and maintaining discipline within the borders (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 827). Wehrmacht significantly modified the army and replaced the former military system to implement an organizational change. Moreover, Germany tested its mobilization program in 1938 and ensured the effective ratio between the armed forces and labor manpower to maintain manufacturing productivity (Kroener, Müller and Umbreit 2000, 827). As a result, the academic literature indicates that Germany was well-prepared for the early stages of World War II and could convert its reserves into fighting power, implying superior military effectiveness.
Operational Level
Consequently, the Operational Level of War concerns more narrow military objectives, such as campaigns and major operations. Namely, it focuses on the issues of military integrity in society, the army’s flexibility, operational methods in correspondence to available warfare technology, critical thinking and intelligence of political leaders, and other instruments to achieve the campaign’s objectives. The three primary sources used for the current analysis are the books by James Holland (2015), David Williamson (2009), and Karl-Heinz Frieser (2013). The former is a thorough investigation of Germany’s military campaign throughout the whole period of 1939-1941 concerning the operations in the West, including Poland, France, Britain, and other European countries. On the other hand, Williamson provides a more detailed analysis of the Poland invasion and Germany’s non-aggression pact with the Soviets, which played an essential role in the military campaign. Lastly, Frieser examines the phenomenon of Blitzkrieg – a significant concept for the Operational and Tactical Levels of War.
Considering the major campaigns in 1939-1941, it is crucial to analyze the invasion of Poland. The tension between Poland and Germany was rising for years before 1939, while the Third Reich kept attempting to provoke Poland into retaliation (Williamson 2009, 63). A false flag is a prominent strategy to justify the invasion, and it provided Germany a convenient motive to occupy Poland. Thus, the first military campaign of the war started on 31 August/ 1 September, laying the groundwork for Germany’s consequent victories (Williamson 2009, 64). The success at the Operational Level was crucial to Wehrmacht as it allowed it to test its forces and tactics, create a functional front against the Anglo-French association, improve the relationship with the Soviets, establish the logistics chains, and prove the strength of the Third Reich to the world.
Consequently, the occupation of Poland allowed the Third Reich to advance further into Europe. Operation Weserübung was the code name for the invasion of Nordic countries, which would stabilize the logistics chains and ensure sufficient reserves of iron ore (Holland 2015, 219). The first significant challenge for the Third Reich was France, protected by the Maginot Line and supported by the British government. At this moment, Germany advanced the campaign by utilizing the strategy of Blitzkrieg, which they have been perfecting since 1935 (Frieser 2013, 24). This concept was essential to the Third Reich both on the Operational and Tactical Levels of Wars, playing a decisive role in overcoming the French defenses. As a result, France surrendered after forty days of warfare, allowing Germany to advance further west.
Most experts agree that Nazi Germany excelled in modern warfare during 1939-1940; however, Hitler’s consequent decisions are frequently criticized. While the overall campaign was going according to Germany’s vision, Hitler’s critical mistake was to underestimate his adversaries. The Third Reich failed in Britain due to inadequate distribution of resources and strategic miscalculations. As a result, Hitler confronted the Soviet Union and established the Eastern Front, which eventually led to Germany’s downfall. Ultimately, the three examined sources provide a thorough overview of Germany’s military campaign in 1939-1941 and its Operational Level of War.
Tactical Level
The Tactical Level of War is the narrowest area of warfare, which concerns specific battles, engagements, and crew actions. While Germany was highly successful at the Operational Level, it was primarily possible due to its effectiveness at the Tactical Level. The battles in Poland, France, and Nordic countries were led by talented commanders, such as Erwin Rommel and Walther von Brauchitsch. The two primary sources for the analysis of the Tactical Level are the books by Julian Jackson (2004) and Adrian Gilbert (2000). Both sources reveal strategical insights of the Tactical Level and analyze their significance to the overall success of the campaign.
Adrian Gilbert provides a relatively brief overview of most battles from 1939 until 1943 in an easy-to-understand manner. He complements historical facts with an extensive number of secondary sources, photographs, maps, and drawings. The book’s visual style makes it easier to understand complicated tactical maneuvers and allows the readers to grasp the scale of warfare. Moreover, Gilbert describes the technological units, such as weaponry, vehicles, and aviation, in great detail to further emphasize the military superiority and intelligent usage of resources by the Third Reich in 1939-1940. Despite the overwhelmingly positive overview of Germany’s military prowess, the author stays objective and recognizes the multiple war crimes that the Third Reich committed during this period. Gilbert admits that the military effectiveness of the Nazi army was heightened partially due to their beliefs concerning the racial superiority and righteousness of the cause. Nevertheless, German commanders also demonstrated unique methods of warfare and impeccable tactics to achieve military success, demonstrating excellence at the Tactical Level of War.
Consequently, Julian Jackson provides a highly detailed report of one military campaign – the Fall of France in 1940. He analyzes both the Operational and Tactical Levels of War and examines all the battles of the invasion. The French campaign proved to be more challenging than the previous operations, and Germany’s commanders had to utilize all their knowledge and competencies to secure the victory. Jackson demonstrates tactical superiority by thoroughly analyzing the battles and small-scale crew operations. For instance, he explains the military talent of Erwin Rommel by describing the mission of the 7th Panzer Division and their intelligent usage of geography to obtain tactical advantage (Jackson 2004, 46). Ultimately, the two examined sources provide a thorough overview of the Third Reich’s superiority at the Tactical Level of War.
Additional Literature
Experts acknowledge that brilliance at the Operational and Tactical Levels of War cannot overcome the failures in strategy and politics. From these considerations, one of the additional sources that could be used for the current analysis is The Third Reich in Power by Richard Evans. The author thoroughly examines the pretext of Germany’s politics, culture, art, religion, education, and relevant social issues in 1933-1939 (Evans 2005). This information might be crucial to further understand the Political and Strategical Levels of War that allowed the Third Reich to achieve military superiority in 1939-1941. Furthermore, this information could be beneficial for any individual since political regimes still use some elements of the Third Reich’s propaganda to establish the national narrative and unite people against a common enemy.
Consequently, while experts generally recognized the Third Reich’s military effectiveness in 1939-1940, it might be beneficial to understand the causes of the consequent failure. The book Battle of Britain 1940: The Luftwaffe’s ‘Eagle Attack’ by Dildy (2018) examines the battle on the British Isles, which is considered Hitler’s first crucial mistake in World War II. Moreover, it further demonstrates the significance of the Strategic Level of War since the failure in risk management was one of the reasons that led to Germany’s eventual loss. From these considerations, the Battle of Britain analysis might contribute to the overall transparency of the research assignment, implying that even Germany’s military vision in 1939-1941 was not without flaws.
Bibliography
Dildy, Douglas. Battle of Britain 1940: The Luftwaffe’s ‘Eagle Attack.’ Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2018.
Evans, Richard. The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.
Gilbert, Adrian. Germany’s Lighting War: From the Invasion of Poland to El Alamein. St Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2000.
Holland, James. The Rise of Germany, 1939-1941: The War in the West, Volume 1. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2015.
Jackson, Julian. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Making of the Modern World). Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2004.
Kroener, Bernhard R., Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit. Germany and the Second World War: Volume V: Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power (Part 1: Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources, 1939-1941). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Williamson, David. Poland Betrayed: The Nazi-Soviet Invasions of 1939. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2009.