Introduction
According to Forster and Wallace, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a Cold War relic. This organization was able to survive the end of the Cold War since it went on serving several helpful purposes for the members and also because the members totally came to an agreement that they would not define the core post-Cold War objectives of the organization quite precisely. Since June 1950, at the time South Korea was invaded, the alliance has been reshaped by unforeseen crises. The 1991 “outbreak” of conflict in the former Yugoslavia offered a learning process that was quite painful and very long for the U.S as well as the European allies.
From this learning process, there has been evolving of new concepts of “joint task forces and peace-enforcement operations”. The September 11 terrorist attacks, which caused the NATO council to hold the first ever discussion under the Article 5 terms; “will spark a further process of adaptation and innovation”. However, before the September 11 incident, the growing impact of enlargement and the Balkan involvement had offered a powerful European focus to NATO, “even as the security priorities of its leading member were shifting away from Europe”. Forster and Wallace point out that NATO is turning out to be more inclined towards being a European security organization and being less inclined towards being an alliance.
It is reported that the future of NATO was up in the air when the Cold War came to an end. Being an alliance that was created with a purpose of offering collective defense against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, this organization was required to give a definition to new mission so that it could go on serving as a significant actor in the global politics. The United States of America was the main muscle behind the organization but it was not clear as to whether or not this country would go on guaranteeing security even to the alliance members that were there, “let alone whether NATO would provide a security umbrella to new members”.
Several years later, by the year 2008, the organization had growth and there were ten more members who had joined. In the year 1997, three more members had joined NATO and seven joined in 2002. It is pointed out that “Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty now bounds the United States to come to the defense of former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics”. The territory that is protected by NATO has reached the borders of Russia.
The United States has been in the lead in making NATO to enlarge from within. The question has however been that, “why the U.S extended security guarantees to new members and consistently pushed for NATO enlargement under the last three presidential administrations”. To give an answer to this question, this paper is going to consider the issue of international relations and under this, there is going to be considering the issues of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and collectivism. These theories in international relations aim to give a description to the general behavior of all nations.
International Relations
The main theories under international relations are utilized to give an explanation to and prediction of the general behavior of nations within the international systems, encompassing the behavior concerning interstate alliances. As mentioned earlier, in this paper, there is going to be a highlighting of three common theories which include neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and collectivism. The predictions made by each of these theories about the support offered by the United States of America for the expansion of NATO are also going to be looked at.
Neorealism
Realism was a theoretical tradition that dominated all through during the Cold War. It portrays the international affairs as being a struggle for power among the “self-interested” states and is, in general terms, negative about the potential for doing away with conflict and war. There was a domination of this theory in the course of the Cold War for the reason that it offered simple but strong explanations for “war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the America-Soviet rivalry”.
That theory was not a single one and there was evolution of realist thought to a considerable level in the course of the entire period of the Cold War. Some ‘classical’ realists like Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr held a belief that states, in a similar manner as human beings, possessed an inborn desire to have domination over others, which caused them to engage in fighting wars. Morgenthau as well put emphasis on the “virtues of the classical, multi-polar, balance-of-power system and saw the bi-polar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous”.
Contrary to this, Kenneth Waltz came up with the “neorealist” theory which ignored the human nature and put focus on the effects of the international system. For this theorist, the international system comprises several great powers and each of these powers is looking for ways to survive. Since the system does not have a central power that serve to protect states from each other, each individual state has to survive on its own. He presented an argument that that condition could bring about a situation where the states that are weaker seek to balance against, instead of to bandwagon with, the states that are more powerful. In addition, he also contradicted with Morgenthau by presenting claims that there was more stability in bipolarity than in multipolarity.
The structural condition of anarchy serves as the biggest constraint on the behavior of the state, “demanding a self-preservation policy”. Basing on these reasons, the neorealists have expectations of having cooperation between nations not to be uncommon and not easy to achieve. The cooperation is crowded out by the “relative power” gains. There will be a formation of alliances at a time there is a situation where the risks of cooperation are outweighed by a third party external threat. These may include the worries concerning relative gains, absence of independence and absence of trust.
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact as well the Soviet Union tended to many neorealists, to be NATO’s end. The absence of a major threat implied either “dissolution of NATO or, at best, maintenance of the status quo in terms of membership”. According to Zarin-Rosenfeld, putting in to consideration the big relative gains which such countries as Estonia or Poland receive at a time NATO guarantees its security, and the likelihood that enlargement could imply “more confrontation with Russia without offsetting benefits, realists would have a hard time arguing that their theory offers the most explanatory perspective on the U.S preference for NATO enlargement”.
Although, in his research, Zarin-Rosenfeld ruled out neorealism as an inadequate theory for giving an explanation of the policy, and does not test its major theoretical concepts, later in his take on the history of enlargement, he points out that there exists one specific realist response which deserves attention. The argument presented by realists sees NATO enlargement as a way that leads towards power gains relative to Russia, enlarging NATO from Western Europe to the borders of Russia in an effort to take over the old Soviet “sphere of influence”. Zarin-Rosenfeld argued that this take on NATO enlargement does not account for all the rest of security motivations driving the support of the United States of America sufficiently.
Neoliberal Institutionalism
A large number of studies which have indicated the difficulties of neorealism in accounting for NATO enlargement as well offer a more promising, but eventually an unsatisfying, answer on whether or not “neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps to explain the U.S policy to expand NATO”. Even if neoliberal institutionalism is indeed not contradicted by the persistence as well as enlargement of NATO, these studies indicate that it does little in providing an answer which is specific to a question of why it happened.
The focus of neoliberal institutionalism is on the “complex interdependence” and possibility for cooperation among nations, as a response to the dire forecast of neorealists. According to the neoliberal institutionalism theory, the fear of states lies more in the issue concerning maximizing their absolute gains instead of the relative gains, and therefore see more potential which the realists would forecast for international cooperation through institutions. It is pointed out that “rather than the realist focus on balance of power, neoliberals argue states hold a balance of interests without a specific hierarchy”.
When the states engage in the sharing of those areas of common interest, there are expectations among the neoliberal institutionalist of the states to engage in compromising and cooperating through institutions so that they can obtain gains which would not be there in the absence of cooperation.
An argument is presented by Robert Keohane in his discussion about the views of neoliberal institutionalism on relations after the Cold War coming to an end that, “the theory would expect NATO to use its organizational resources to persist, by changing its tasks”. He further goes ahead to point out that “there is no reason why the defeat of the Soviet Union would prevent western institutions from continuing to provide states with opportunities for mutual absolute gains”.
The persistence and enlargement of NATO does not bring in a contradiction with the theory to any level. However, being a systematic theory of international relations, this theory does not seek to give a description of any specific conception of the interests of the states. Where there is no prediction of these interests, we can not have a real explanation of their development and therefore, whereas the continuation of NATO fits with neoliberal institutionalism, this theory can only predict so much: “NATO will continue if its members continue to share undetermined common interests”.
Specifically looking at NATO enlargement, the issue of undefined state interests remains to be an obstruction. And as the theory serves to justify the belief held by the United States of America that an institution like NATO could have an effect on the interests of non-members in a manner to qualify them to have later membership, “the emphasis on economic interdependence and sunk costs as the major reasons for institutional continuity certainly seems to weaken neoliberalism’s explanatory power for why the U.S would advocate integrating a small country in to NATO, for what is likely to be a higher economic cost”.
Constructivism Theory
Unlike the realism and liberalism theories that emphasize on material factors like trade or power, the constructivist approaches focus on the impact of ideas. Rather than taking the state for granted and making an assumption that it just looks for ways to survive, the constructivists consider the interests as well as identities of states as “a highly malleable product of specific historical processes”. They are very attentive to the current discourse within the society because a discourse serves as a reflection of the interests and beliefs and sets up behavior norms, which are acceptable. As a result, constructivism is particularly attentive to the “sources of change and this approach has largely replaced Marxism as the preeminent radical perspective on international affairs”.
Due to the end of the Cold war, the constructivist theories became legal as they were greatly affected by the result of the war. It happened because realism and liberalism did not participate in the leading events and, what is more interesting, there are no proper explanations to it. On the other hand, it is also possible to say that constructivist had an explanation: “specifically, former president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as ‘common security’”.
The world is constantly developing and there are more new rules, norms and normal technologies with the each passing day. In addition, basing on the fact that we live in an age where old norms are facing challenges, once apparent boundaries are undergoing dissolution, and issues concerning identity are turning out to be more and more salient, it is almost not shocking that researchers have been attracted to approaches which put these issues front and middle. In fact, from the constructivist point of view, the core issue in the “post-Cold War world” is the way various groups consider their interests as well as identities.
Even if power is not irrelevant, the constructivist theory put emphasis on the way the ideas as well as identities are brought about, the way they undergo evolution and the way they give shape to how the states understand and offer response to the situations in which they are. Thus, it matters whether Europeans give definition to themselves basically either in continental or national terms: “whether Germany and Japan redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles; and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as a ‘global policeman’”.
The perspective of constructivism on international relations looks at the behavior of states as well as their interactions through the” lens of subjective identities”. Alexander Wendt points out that “the focus on structural forces of anarchy, so prominent in neorealism, is flipped on its head by the constructivist view that anarchy is what states make of it”. The constructivist theory puts its focus on the shared identities as well as values and does not focus on the material interests and anarchy. The states do not just have a ‘national interest’; they had various interests and relations with other states instead which arise from the social interactions formed by the actors themselves just as Wendt points out that “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not”.
Basing on this viewpoint, the interests that are socially created offer meaning to the “anarchical relations” between states as well as power distribution among them and not vice versa as in the case of realist formulation.
For those who believe in this theory, institutions are a representation of the relatively stable sets of interests as well as identities. Although institutions may be formalized by rules, they still eventually serve to represent a ‘collective knowledge’, in a manner that when the institutions continue to be there, the constructivists have an expectation that the basic reason to be is because of the shared values. Of importance, the shared value is not supposed to be cooperative: “mutual recognition that two states are ‘enemies’ represents a shared social identity, and can form a ‘self-help’ or ‘competitive’ institutional relationship”.
The state relationships can as well be ‘cooperative’ in which the states positively identify themselves with each other so that there is perception of each other’s security, to a particular level, as the responsibility of the whole group. Basing on how well build up these cooperative and collective identities are, “security institutions can range from the limited joint action all the way to the full blow form seen in cooperative security arrangements”.
The focus put on shared meanings by the constructivism theory makes a collective action made via institutions to depend less on existence of active threats and it as well assists in restructuring of conceptions of state goals in regard to shared norms and not relative power.
The constructivist answer to the question of whether or not NATO would go on at all after the Soviet threat vanishing is vitally similar to the neoliberal answer: “perhaps it won’t, but certainly it will if allies have reasons independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another”. But through its assertion on “identities independent of power gains”, this theory provides an answer that is more specific than the other theories that have been looked at: NATO went on being there after the Cold war because of the “allies’ shared values of democracy, markets, and liberal principles of sovereignty”.
Zarin-Rosenfeld points out that the enlargement of NATO can specifically be looked at as an effort to promote “the institutionalization of these shared meaning to so-called ‘bad-apple’ states that do not share them yet – a social process that constructivism accounts for far more effectively than either the previous IR theory”. The huge amount of the ‘values-based argument’ for NATO enlargement which the policy makers in the United States presented serves as a confirmation of this perspective being viable. Basing on these reasons, this theory tends to be high in the line with the policy of the United States to enlarge NATO after the Cold War was over, and it receives a more comprehensive testing within the enlargement “empirical history” later in time. A prediction is offered by constructivism that a state is given NATO membership “if reliably shares the liberal values and multilateralist norms of the Western community… [and if] the faster it internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member”.
According to Zarin-Rosenfeld, constructivism is convincing on NATO enlargement policy to this end. In being different from other international relations theories, the argument based on this theory in regard to enlargement would face a direct contradiction from the history in which NATO decided not to encompass nations which shared this organization’s values. Considering the fact that the organization opened its doors beginning from the year 1994 and apparently presented the democratic norms as well as democratic values as an overall standard by which to judge the prospective future members of the organization is what exactly a constructivist viewpoint would predict. In addition, the “socialization process” set up in to enlargement policy is greatly in line with constructivism – “using NATO membership as an incentive to further pursue democratic reform and consolidation of the transformation of their domestic systems and to spread the norms of multilateral international law”.
Conclusion
In this paper, the theories accounting for the continual existence and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were looked at. The theories that were considered are specifically those that deal with international relations and they include neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism theories. Each of these theories has its own strengths and weaknesses. Over time, the existing theories in particular field have been continuously improved upon in order to help deal with particular situations effectively.
In this paper, it has been established the best theory that accounts for the continual and expansion of NATO to be the constructivism theory. This conclusion has been arrived at after carefully considering each of these theories individual and carrying out a comparison. The weaknesses that can be seen in each of them were analyzed as well as the strengths that are depicted by each of the theories.
Looking at neorealism, even though some scholars in their research ruled out neorealism as an inadequate theory for giving an explanation of the policy, and did not test its key theoretical concepts, in their take on the enlargement history, they pointed out that there existed one definite realist response that required to have attention. The argument given out by the realists looks at NATO enlargement as an avenue to power gains relative to Russia, expanding NATO from Western Europe to the Russian borders in an effort to take over the old Soviet “sphere of influence”. However, this takes on NATO enlargement does not take in account all the remaining security motivations that drive the support of the U.S adequately.
The other theory that was considered is the neoliberal institutionalism theory. Many studies which have given an indication of the complexities of neorealism in accounting for NATO enlargement and also a more hopeful, but eventually an unproductive, answer on the question of whether neoliberal institutionalist standpoint assists to give an explanation to U.S policy to enlarge NATO. Even though neoliberal institutionalism is, with no a doubt, not contradicted by the continual existence and enlargement of NATO, the studies show that it does not do much in offering an answer that is precise to a question of why it happened.
Basing on the neoliberal institutionalism theory, the fear of states lies more in the issue concerning taking full advantage of their total gains rather than the relative gains, and thus see more potential which the realists would forecast for international cooperation through institutions. Instead of the realist focusing on power balance, those who believe in this theory present an argument that states to hold a balance of interests with no precise chain of command. When there is sharing of the common interest areas by the states, the neoliberal institutionalist expect the states to engage in negotiation and combining forces through institutions for them to receive gains that would not be there where cooperation is lacking.
The continual existence and enlargement of NATO does cause a disagreement with the theory to whatever degree. Yet, being an organized theory of IR, the theory does not seek to explain any definite conception of the interests of the states. Where prediction of these interests is lacking, there can be no real explanation of their advancement and thus, as on the one hand, the continual existence of NATO fits with neoliberal institutionalism, on the other hand, the theory can only predict so much: “NATO will carry on in case the members go on sharing the common interests which are undetermined.
On the other hand, the constructivism theory offers an answer to the question of whether NATO would carry on at all after the Soviet threat fading is fundamentally alike to the neoliberal answer. But through its affirmation on identities autonomous of power gains, the constructivism theory offers an answer which is more precise than the answers offered by the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories. NATO went on existing and enlarging after the Cold War because of the shared values of democracy of embraced by the allies as well as the markets, and liberal principles of power.
It has been established that NATO enlargement is specifically considered to be an endeavor to support the institutionalization of these shared significance to what is referred to as ‘bad-apple’ states which do not engage in the sharing them yet; a social process that constructivism accounts for is far more successful than either the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories. The enormous amount of the arguments based on values for NATO enlargement that the policy formulators in the United States of America gave out serves as a substantiation of this viewpoint being practical. Putting these reasons to consideration, the constructivism theory is seen to be greatly in line with the policy of the United States to expand NATO after the Cold War coming to an end, and it receives a more all-inclusive testing within the enlargement “empirical history” later in time.
A forecast is provided by this theory that a given state becomes a NATO member if it consistently shares the Western community liberal values and multilateralist norms and if it is quicker at internalizing these values and norms, in order to get membership earlier. In conclusion, the constructivism theory is the best accounting theory for the continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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