The issues of abortion and its legal and moral rightness have not been solved yet. It is difficult to find the right solution to this issue because different philosophers and public leaders use different perspectives and theories to defend or reject abortion. Noonan bases his vision of abortion on Christian perspective and sees the right to life as a dominant in Christianity. Thomson’s bases his arguments on pro-choice position defending a right of women to choose their life path.
In his work, An Almost Absolute Value in History John T. Noonan explains that the notion of viability hides many weaknesses and threats for morality. “Noonan points out a number of significant weaknesses to this view. First, “viability” is highly variable – depending on the state of current technology, the genetic inheritance of the fetus (apparently, fetuses among some human groups attain viability earlier than others), etc” (Noonan 1970). The concept of viability is frequently misunderstood. It requires more of an infant than being born alive and refers to its capacity to survive after birth. The subject is confused by the wording of the Abortion Act 1967, s. 5 which refers to the Infant Life Act 1929 as ‘protecting the life of the viable fetus. Viability is a function not only of the fetus itself but also of its environment (Stetson, p. 44). A thirty-week fetus born under a hedgerow may well not survive while a proportion of those of twenty-two weeks’ gestation would be expected to do so given the availability of a neonatal intensive care unit. Attaining viability thus represents a moment in time which is variable and indeterminable; it follows that it is useless as a measure of the beginning of human life (Noonan, 1970).
In contrast to Noonan, Thomson states hat demands to change the abortion laws are grounded in the claim that it is a woman’s right to choose. This contention is associated, in its most extreme form of expression, with the concept of self-defense – the mother is entitled to defend herself against an intruder who threatens her (Baumgardner, p. 11). Self-defense is clearly a reason for abortion in any case where the mother’s life is clearly threatened. The principle becomes less acceptable, however, when it is extended to include threats to an undefinable state of health (Thomson, p.15). Once such extrapolation is admitted, the road is open to trade fetal life against lesser factors such as maternal psychological inconvenience. There is evidence that this occurs in practice, Peel, for example, being quoted as saying that most abortions are totally unrelated to physical or mental health. There is, moreover, something distasteful in the suggestion of conflict between mother and fetus and one wonders if it might not, in fact, be being over-played. Medical experience is that most mothers will fight to retain babies who are clearly threatening (Thomson, p. 15).
Once the concept that humanity begins with implantation is admitted, the need for an acceptable moral justification for abortion increases. The main general argument to be used against abortion is that it reduces the number of worthwhile persons; he has also pointed out that fetuses are, in the main, easily replaceable. On this basis, contraception and abortion are equally moral (Stetson, 48). This argument has an elegant simplicity and a somewhat rugged practicality. But, as Noonan explains, it depends on confining one’s analysis to the ‘direct’ effects of abortion. In practice, different ‘side’ effects will stem from the two approaches to planned parenthood. In this respect he lists the side effects of abortion on the mother herself, on the medical staff and on society at large. Contraception and abortion cannot be equated when these are taken into consideration; moreover, a qualitative difference between early and late abortions is exposed-the later the abortion, the worse are the side effects (Noonan, 1970).
Thompson underlines that all abortions of unwanted fetuses are morally justified in themselves; fetal development is a continuum which is of significance only insofar as it affects others. No attention is paid to the fetus whose increasing rights, if any, are ill-defined (Baumgardner, p. 19). Opposing suggestions such as that which holds that human life depends upon ‘brain possession’ have the alternative merit that they simultaneously define a fetus which is without ‘life’ and one which has the attributes of humanity. The door is thus opened to distinguishing abortions to which there can be no moral objection from those which involve the taking of human life (Thomson 17). He has argued that the crucial point in fetal development lies at implantation and acceptance of this carries the implication that any abortion must involve the destruction of human life. Each operation has to be justified with this factor in one of the balance pans, for the morality of an abortion depends upon how the balance lies between the rights of one who has an unexpressed humanity and those of one who has the undeniable advantage of the obvious status of a human being (Stetson, p. 76).
A less combative justification of the right to choose lies in the principle of maternal autonomy – the right to dispose of her body as she selects – or, in transatlantic terms, on the right to personal privacy. A more disarming approach is that of Thomson who maintains that the mother’s right to control her own body overrides the right to life of the fetus unless the mother has a special responsibility to it (Stetson, p. 49). Such a responsibility would exist if the parents had in no way tried to prevent its existence; but when they have taken reasonable contraceptive precautions, they cannot be said to have assumed responsibility for an unwelcome consequence and, in these circumstances, the fetus has no right to the use of the mother’s body. This view presupposes that the decision over parenthood has been taken after due consideration (Colker, p. 76).
Useful though it is, the proposition does nothing to assist in the case of those who have been reckless as to the result of sexual intercourse. To refuse abortion in these circumstances would be punitive and the suggestion falls short of its primary purpose for that reason. It does, however, provide a clear justification for termination of a pregnancy following rape, incest or, since a minor under 16 is legally incapable of consent to sexual intercourse, of any pregnancy in a girl below the age of sixteen – categories which, unusually, are not specifically delineated in legislation (Noonan, 1970).
“Noonan rejects this – again, by examining the consequences of holding this view consistently, and finding those consequences unacceptable. Simply, this criterion would further allow the equivalent of the “social construction” of humanity – i.e., the relatively arbitrary determination of who’s in and who’s out on the basis of power and interests” (Noonan, 1970).
Both Thompson and Noonan agree that it is just possible to extend such categories of ‘unwanted’ babies to include those of uncaring parents. But to do so would be to regard abortion and contraception as comparable — which may be an arguable view but one which is unacceptable to opponents (Baumgardner, p. 13).. The fetus must be thought of as more than a mere appendage to its mother; to argue the contrary is to ignore an individual’s genetic constitution, for the mother and her fetus are genetically distinct. It would be unrealistic to deny some sympathy for the extreme view that the fetus is a parasite but, in allowing this, it must also be accepted that it is not a self-aggressive parasite — its situation results from an invitation issued, maybe grudgingly or even unwillingly, by the mother (Noonan, 1970). The woman’s choice whether or not to invite conception can be made independently of any other existing interests (Colker, p. 76). After implantation, the rights of a second party who has, at least, a potential for autonomy, have also to be considered. The issue that the so-called ‘pro-choice’ position fails to meet is whether a woman, in exercising what she regards as a right to expel an unwanted fetus, also has a right to, as opposed to a necessary acceptance of, the death of that fetus (Thomson, p. 33). The problem will be looked at later in relation to the living abortus Colke, p.r 76).
The outcome of all the variables discussed must lie in the compromise proposition that, while the mother has no inherent moral right to an abortion, there is, at the same time, no absolute right to fetal survival in a hostile maternal environment. Abortion on demand is unacceptable once humanity is accorded the implanted fetus but, in the event of maternal/fetal conflict, fetal rights increase with fetal development so that feticide is justifiable only in exceptional circumstances after the attainment of what, for want of a better term, researchers call viability (Stetson 61). At the other extreme, it may be that there is no moral turpitude in the destruction of an unimplanted embryo. Yet, here, the drafting of the Abortion Act is such that this apparently innocuous action may be illegal. A consideration of abortion and its impact on the sanctity of life doctrine would be incomplete without some discussion of these two diametrically opposed conditions (Colker, p. 76). The concept of quickening as evidence of life does carry the parallel idea of vivification and has some illustrative merit. It is also closely allied to the theories of animation of Aristotle, or of ensoulment as taught by the religious philosophers of the Middle Ages — but these are of more relevance to the later discussion of extra-uterine fertilisation. It is nevertheless clear that quickening is not a moment but part of a process and is correspondingly useless as a marker of human life. Similar criticisms apply to the test of human appearance, which is at the heart of orthodox Jewish teaching. This, however, has greater illustrative significance, particularly from the negative aspect – it is difficult to believe that anyone looking at a twelve-week fetus could not appreciate that it was of human form (Colker, p. 16).
The intentional destruction of the fetus in the womb, or any untimely delivery brought about with intent to cause the death of the fetus’ but the Act, as such, carries no indication that this is an essential element. A distinction has been made by the Infant Life Act 1929, which, firstly, introduced the offence of child destruction – that is, killing an infant capable of being born alive; secondly, established the legal presumption that a fetus of twenty-eight weeks’ gestation or more is capable of being born alive; and, thirdly, allowed for a defense to child destruction-that the operation was performed in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother. Apart from the last condition, a legal termination of pregnancy between twenty-eight weeks’ gestation and full term must be in the form of an induction of premature labor which is to be distinguished, both medically and legally, from procurement of a miscarriage (Colker, p. 51).
Since a fetus of less than twenty-eight weeks’ age is progressively less likely to be viable with decreasing maturity, feticide is usually a concomitant of abortion but it is not a primary objective (Stetson, p. 87). Advancing medical technology is, however, eroding the limits of fetal viability; fresh problems related to feticide are arising independently of the Abortion Act and will be discussed later, particularly in relation to the living abortus. The medical profession is, however, motivated by considerations of the overall ill-effects of unwanted pregnancy. It is suspected that doctors in the United States are more polarized in their attitudes to abortion than is the case in Britain and that the process of decriminalization of abortion in America has derived, in the main, from the efforts of constitutional lawyers rather than from those of the medical profession (Colker, p. 34).
Thompson argues that the tests of humanity based on segmentation and on the formation of nervous tissue are, again, of greater relevance to the morality of in vitro fertilization and we are left with the widely held and relatively useful criteria of implantation and conception times on which to base an opinion (Thomson, p. 45). To regard conception as the point of life at which genetic homo- sapiens becomes subject to the legal and moral protection afforded to a human being has the attraction of simplicity and the proposition has significant secular support. Belief in conception as the beginning of life is generally attributed to the Roman Catholic church. Even so, the Roman Catholics adopted the proposition only comparatively recently. It was not until 1869 that Pope Pius IX rejected earlier teaching on ensoulment and declared human life to be sacrosanct from the time of conception (Noonan, 1970).
It is widely assumed that this change of direction rested on twin pillars – that the development of the infant from a fertilized zygote was demonstrated at that time and that, since the status of a human being was conferred on the fetus at some time, it was safer to assume that any fetal rights applied equally to that zygote. The argument is, essentially, taking the continuum theory to its furthest limits: that life is a steady progression from embryo to cadaver. By such means, it is as possible to hold that there is no difference between night and day as to believe that embryonic and adult life are of the same quality (Colker, p. 55). The proposition can also be questioned on purely practical grounds. Huge numbers of human zygotes are lost naturally every minute of the day; it seems irrational to attribute humanity to the one which is discovered later and, at the same time, to ignore with equanimity the millions which die unnoticed and unmourned. There will be objections that implantation is, itself, a process rather than a sudden change of status. Nevertheless, the successful completion of implantation, even though it is temporary, seems to me to be that point in development at which there is least objection to the attribution of acquired humanity and this is the position which I adopt within the abortion debate (Stetson, p. 76).
Noonan underlines that there are three inevitable outcomes to his conclusion. Firstly, the word humanity is used intentionally (Noonan, 1970). The implanted embryo cannot be seen as a human being. Yet it has acquired humanity and, with that, human rights. Such rights may, in certain circumstances, be subject to those of extant human beings but the closer that embryo comes to the status of a human being – that is, live birth – the less valid is any differential assessment. It follows from this, secondly, that abortion including displantation — and contraception, are entirely separate and can be distinguished on humanitarian grounds. Abortion destroys humanity and this must be accepted as an absolute in any justification of the procedure (Stetson, p. 66). Contraception, although preventing human life, has no destructive element. It is disturbing to find doctors willing to accept such simplistic propositions as: ‘essentially any method of contraception is a matter of not wanting the fetus, so it comes down to the question of whether we want contraception. (Colker, p.36). Finally, and of major importance, the medical profession is devoted to the service of humanity. Once it is accepted that implantation confers humanity, the abortion debate can be settled by appeal to the Hippocratic conscience (Thomson, p. 57).
In sum, there is no right or wrong answer related to abortion: Thompson defends rights of women and their choice while Noonan defends rights of fetus and human life as the main value.. Even so, the effects of the unamended law can still be seen. Moreover, court decisions worldwide tend to concentrate on maternal welfare; the legality of abortion for fetal reasons is still doubtful. Religious views may have a powerful influence but they are not essential in the medical context. Note that the word ‘abortion’ only appears in the marginal note to the Act; the offence is that of procuring a miscarriage. The law leaves room for some confusion as to the definition of abortion.
Works Cited
- Baumgardner, J. Abortion & Life Akashic Books, 2008.
- Colker, Ruth. Abortion & Dialogue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and American Law. Indiana. University Press. Bloomington, IN. Publication Year: 2002.
- Noonan, John T. An Almost Absolute Value in History. 1970. Web.
- Stetson, D.M. Abortion Politics, Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State: A Comparative Study of State Feminism. Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge University Press, 2002/