Introduction
The first year after the fall of the Taliban regime passed quietly in Afghanistan. The only notable military event was the battle in the Shahi-Kot Valley (Gardez district), where the Taliban forces retreated from Kabul and Tora Bora. In March 2002, the troops of the international coalition conducted Operation Anaconda in the valley. The Taliban resistance turned out to be much stronger than expected, and the operation became the largest battle since the beginning of the war. Thus, the Kugler case tells about the memoirs of the American soldier Tommy Franks. During Operation Anaconda, the soldiers followed the 7 principles of mission command.
Discussion
Operation Anaconda was conducted from March 2 to March 18, 2002. Soldiers must constantly develop competence through institutional education, as this is the first principle of a command mission. Due to sufficient competence in their field, American soldiers decided to use the hammer and anvil plan. (Caruso, 2019).
Serious miscalculations were made at the planning stage of the operation. Lacking adequate intelligence, the American command in Afghanistan considered that the enemy would not offer serious resistance, and the operation would be completed easily and quickly. Competence does not matter without mutual trust and shared understanding between soldiers and the commander. So, for example, when the plan was undermined during the battle, the American military had to improvise and take urgent action – this would be impossible without trusting the commander. The clear commander’s intent allows the soldiers to be inspired and follow him unconditionally.
Already on the first day of the operation, when intelligence miscalculations became apparent, the number of troops had to be increased by attracting additional units. Several hundred soldiers and officers were additionally transferred by helicopters. Consequently, the principle of the mission orders worked successfully (Kugler, 2018). Only the next day, in the northern part of the valley, where the fire was not so strong, the second wave of the landing force of 200 people was able to land. In addition to small arms, they had several 81 and 120 mm mortars (Caruso, 2019). The fighters who survived the helicopter crash and gained a foothold at the top had a critical situation. The enemy made more and more attempts to kill or capture the Americans. Consequently, the commanders took risks – which is the principle of risk acceptance and disciplined initiative. Regardless of the losses, the fanatically minded Taliban repeatedly rose up in attacks. It was possible to repel them only thanks to air support.
It is safe to say that the united forces of the “anti-terrorist coalition” have not been able to achieve any other success, apart from ousting the militants from the Shahi-Kot valley. To consider this a victory is only a stretch, especially since this “victory” came at a very high price (Greentree, 2021). Many leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda movement, who were hiding in caves in the vicinity of Shahi-Kot, managed to escape. This was confirmed by the interception of a convoy consisting of three cross-country vehicles.
Conclusion
After the completion of Operation Anaconda, the American military leadership drew the appropriate conclusions. Much attention was paid to improving the coordination of joint actions between different branches of the armed forces and communication between them. Despite some errors, Operation Anaconda was completed successfully. This operation was a test of compliance with all seven principles of command. Consequently, all the principles were followed and used.
References
Greentree, T. (2021). What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 51(4), 7-22. Web.
Caruso, D. (2019). Operation Anaconda. The Oral History Review, 39(2), 334-336. Web.
Kugler, R. L. (2018). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: a case study of adaptation in battle. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.