“Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods” Botched CIA plans to bring down Castro and the Cuban regime Research Paper

Introduction

In an effort to preserve the security of their nations, governments use various means including the use of diplomatic measures that involve signing of treaties coupled with holding talks and conferences. In cases where these measures are not applicable and in the presence of increased tension and aggression, military action is usually inevitable.

However, some scholars suggest the use of intelligence or covert operations as a third option, when diplomatic means seem too subtle and military action too aggressive (Daugherty 2006). Intelligence operations possess two main characteristics namely secrecy of operations and the deniability of such actions happening.

The issues of viability of intelligence operations and their justification are usually controversial as critics arguing from a moral point of view consider such operations immoral and thus illegal considering their characteristics (Johnson 1988).

In the past, people have questioned the necessity of intelligence operations and the benefits they serve to the citizens of the country by weighing these two aspects against the disadvantages they possess. Therefore, it is important to analyze the dynamics involved in the operations, weigh the benefits against the disadvantages, and establish the necessity of operations in governments.

This paper aims at an analysis of the operations coupled with providing answers to the issues mentioned and providing possible solutions to the shortcomings, by applying the use of ‘Operation Mongoose’ and ‘Operation Northwoods’ during the Cold War period. The focus of the discussing is the American government and its intelligence operation agencies and operations.

Intelligence operations

Intelligence operations include a myriad of aspects including the collection of information, the provision of discrete solutions to problems that arise and to the issues warranting the operation, and the secrecy of resultant actions. Such operations involve the use of methods such as espionage, counter intelligence, covert operations and information operations.

As mentioned earlier, such operations possess the characteristics of secrecy and deniability in the event that the operation becomes public knowledge or the recipient gets to know about it. In explaining this concept, it is important to look at two examples that form the focus of this paper’s discussion.

Operation Mongoose was an initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an American organization with the mandate to conduct covert actions for the American government. President John F. Kennedy, who was in leadership at the time, strongly opposed the communist ideal and in November 1961, he authorized the use of aggressive covert action against the Cuban regime.

The main aim of the operation was to aid Cuba in overthrowing the communist regime, after the failure of the invasive Bay of Pigs operation. William Harvey of the CIA and Edward Lansdale of the Department of Defense (DOD) led the operation, planning a series of independent attacks, each varying in the intended impact.

Some of the strategic methods included in the plan comprised the use of propaganda, sabotage of key economic facilities and the use of information gathering mechanisms such as espionage in order to gain advantage.

The American government hoped to discredit the communist regime as well as its leader, Fidel Castro, activating a revolution that would result in a regime that was more in tune with the American ideologies by October 1962. However, the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba made it necessary to re-evaluate the operation in order to avoid the eruption of nuclear warfare.

In 1962, “the department of defense and joint chief of staff sent a proposal to the secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, for Operation Northwood” (Johnson 1988, p.114). The involved parties planned Operation Northwood as a secondary operation, following up on operation mongoose.

The main strategy for this operation was to create a series of fake Cuban attacks in the US in order to provoke the need to attack Cuba, with support from the international community.

The proposal intended to use the fake flag operations to make it seem like Cuba was imposing on the sovereignty of the American government, warranting defense through a ‘counter attack’. Some of the methods proposed in the execution of the operation included the use of Cuban exiles to stage attacks at American military bases and on civilian targets.

The United States would then blame these attacks on the Cuban government, making the United States seem like the victim. Other methods also proposed for the operation-included propaganda and covert acts of terrorism on Cuba to destabilize and disrupt the economy. On the extreme end, the proposal included the seclusion and attack of Fidel Castro himself, neutralizing him as well as his ideals.

The president rejected the proposal and in turn, the execution of the plans, evidence of which lies in the fact that Castro is still alive. Some of the methods that the agency proposed included discrediting Castro to the Cuban people by the use of thallium to make his signature beard fall off, and using poison on his favorite cigars and food (Johnson 1988).

Failure

Intelligence operations have sparked controversy, both in matters regarding legality and morality. People have argued that such operations provide leeway for government sponsored agencies to conduct acts that would normally be illegal if done by any other person, and punishable by law.

This assumption is usually because of the picture painted of such operations in the past, particularly immediately after the Second World War and during the duration of the Cold War as the two examples of operations Mongoose and Northwoods depict.

Although most intelligence operations serve the defensive purposes for which government agencies institute them, some of them do not always attain positive results. For instance, some of the operations result in death and destruction of property as was the case with the resignation of Jacodo Arbenz that led to a civil war that prevailed for years, killing thousands of people in the process (Couch 2005).

The methodology used in the operations may also appear questionable if observed from a moral and legal point of view. One of the most controversial operations in America’s history is Operation Mongoose in 1962, set after the failure of the Bay of Pigs Operation, to curtail the ascension to power of Cuba’s communist leader, Fidel Castro (Dapena 2007).

In consideration of the methods used in the operations, it is clear that these agencies went a little too far in the attainment of their objectives, negating the ideals they claimed to uphold.

Moral absolutists would argue that the plotting of an assassination of a president from another country because of the ideals he supported goes went against the principle right of freedom that the American government sought to protect, thus making the operation hypocritical and immoral.

Apart from the legal and moral failure, the operations also faced operational failures in the chain of command and the abuse of covert operations by the agencies responsible. For instance, the attempts at the assassination of Castro for his support of communism, was abuse of the essence of covert operations, by using it to attack a person in another state to preserve personal interests.

The involuntary resignation of Jacobo was an attack at the sovereignty of a state by plotting against a leader willfully elected by the people. Similarly, the incitement of demonstrations in Iran in the protection of oil assets was a selfish act and manipulative act, even though instituted by the government.

The failure of the Mongoose and the Bay of Pigs operations caused the United States international embarrassment and a loss of confidence in the governmental systems, both blows that take time to recover. The operations also severely affected foreign relations between the governments of the two states, an aspect that is evident to date.

Covert operations also place a financial burden on governments, funds for which are mainly tax-supported. This means that the citizens of the country initiating such operations feel the financial strains that the decisions of their leaders cause. The use of such funding on matters that are not crucial to the security of the state is therefore improper and, to an extent, illegal as citizens are not privy to information regarding such operations.

The mongoose and Bay of Pigs operations, for instance, cost the American citizens a lot in tax money, estimates of which are unknown, as the operations occurred secretly. The Northwood operation would have cost even more had it gone through.

For these reasons, the government of the United States gave a directive to the Church Committee investigation for investigation of illegalities in covert operations. The committee was a senate select committee, with Frank Church as the chair in 1975. The committee investigates the activities of the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

The committee’s findings included that there had been severe illegalities in some operations, including illegal experimentation of drugs on people (Scott and Jerel 2007). The committee concluded that White House was aware of the CIA’s activities with regard to the Mongoose and Northwood Operations and that Congress funded the operations but chose to stay out of the loop regarding information.

It also concluded that White House had been very lenient regarding oversight of the intelligence agencies in a bid to let them conduct their activities independently and provide deniability for the operations.

The findings of the committee led to the formation of congressional oversight committees to oversee covert operations. However, the committees extended their mandate to include financial management of operations and analysis of intelligence management.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) was particularly responsible for the vetting of the president’s choice of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is also the head of the CIA (Hunlick 2002).

The creation of congressional intelligence oversight has had various benefits, including the establishment of more balance between the legislative and executive arms of the government. Such balance is an achievement that the separation of responsibilities has warranted.

For instance, the legislature, viz. the Congress, has the mandate to vet the choices made by the president of the DCI. In addition, congress conducts budgetary overview, ensuring that it is actively involved in the intelligence operations through financial responsibility.

The essence of this aspect is that although the public is not privy to information on the government’s activities concerning intelligence operations, members of congress, who serve as the representatives of the public, can access the information.

This element ensures that decisions made on intelligence operations serve public interests and not subject to personal prejudicial decisions, as was the case in the Northwood and Mongoose operations.

Secondly, although the president has the right to make direct orders concerning intelligence operations, congress holds the cards as far as choosing which operations to finance. No department or agency of the executive branch can spend any funds before the signing of findings by congress.

Successes

Intelligence operations serve a crucial part in the protection of a nation especially with regard to the prevention of security breaches by other governments and their agents.

The terror attacks against the American government that occurred on September 11 2001, where the Islamic terrorist group Al Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed them into various buildings is one example of why intelligence operations are important.

Two of the planes crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York, while a third plane crashed into the Pentagon, the fourth plane, suspected to have been aiming at the Capital, Washington, fell onto a field in Pennsylvania.

These attacks occurred on the same day, causing mass destruction of property and deaths. The group had executed similar attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. It shook the American government’s confidence in its defense system, causing high alert that the government has maintained ever since (Dilanian 2011).

One of the recent successes of the heightened alert and the improvement of intelligence operations is the extermination of the mastermind behind the bombings and the self-proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden that occurred in Pakistan on May 2 2011. The success of the operation has deterred similar attacks from occurring on American soil as well as mobilizing governments in anti-terror campaigns.

Another recent success was the capture and subsequent extermination of socialist leader and suspected Dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the then leader of Libya, on October 2011. The NTC movement, the resistance group at the time, captured Gaddafi from his hiding place and occasioned his death in the fight for liberation from dictatorship.

Loopholes in legislation

However, there are a few loopholes in the legislations. These loopholes are resultant of the fact that legislation concerning covert action has remained the same way it was since its passing as law in 1991, with most of the content dating as far back as 1988, as is the case with the president’s national security directive. The result of this move is that some of the provisions cause difficulty in interpretation.

For instance, the House Select Committee has expressed concern on language in the FY2010 Intelligence Authority Act that does not provide a distinction between clandestine acts by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA’s intelligence gathering activities.

This problem brings difficulties in the understanding the agency that has responsibility over certain activities. In addition, the president’s directive requires him to inform congress of covert operations in a timely manner. It does not state the length of time that qualifies as ‘timely’, thus leaving interpretation to the president (Cummings 2009).

It would be recommendable for congress to review legislation regarding intelligence operations to include matters that arise as time evolves, such as cybercrime.

Conclusion

Intelligence operations are undoubtedly important for any country in the protection of citizens. In the past, government agencies have discredited the usefulness of these operations, causing a lack of confidence in their viability.

Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwood, for instance, are some of the controversial operations that the American government developed in the past, that have had a long-lasting impression about the purpose and usefulness of intelligence operations. The two operations create a picture of the institution of intelligence operations for the abuse of power.

They consisted many illegalities and went against the moral foundation of the American society, while costing the taxpayers a lot of money. The failure of these operations also caused embarrassment to the nation and severed foreign ties that have traversed time. However, an objective look at the importance that intelligence operations serve highlights their importance to the security of a country.

The September 11 bombing of various locations in the United States in 2001, created a need to improve operational strategies, leading to the capture and neutralization of Osama bin Laden. Past mistakes facilitated the review of legislation, providing oversight for agencies that the government award the mandate to conduct intelligence operations.

However, given the length of time that has lapsed since the relevant authorities formulated these legislations, it is necessary for the government to review the legislation in order to enable the inclusion of important aspects that develop with time, such as cybercrime and the clarification of tasks that various agencies hold.

Reference List

Couch, Dick. 2005. Covert Action. New York: Pocket Star Books.

Cummings, Alfred. 2009. Covert Action: legislation background and possible policy questions. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service.

Dapena-Valdes, Jacinto. 2007. Operation Mongoose: Prelude to a Direct Invasion of Cuba. Havana: Editorial Capitan San Luis.

Daugherty, William. 2006. Executive Secrets: Covert action and the Presidency. Lexington: Kentucky University Press.

Dilanian, Ken. 2011. CIA led U.S Special Forces mission against Osama bin Laden. Los Angeles Times, May 2.

Hunlick, Arthur. 2002a. Catching the Enemies’ Spies: Fixing the Spy machine: preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Johnson, Loch. 1988. A Season of Inquiry, Congress, and Intelligence. Chicago: Dorsey Press

Scott, James, and Rosati Jarel. 2007. “Such other functions and duties: covert action and the American intelligence policy.” In Strategic Intelligence-3, ed. Johnson Loch, 83-106. Westport: Praeger Publishers.