Although the Platonic view of value has gained much acceptance since its emergence, it has failed to address some of the underlying issues that deter the universality of things and the need for associative rules of things. In this review, I seek to argue against the Platonic realism and its view of value in the distinct form and object. I argue that though Universality of value is arguable, denying dependence between form and object licenses the abandonment of the ontological nature of universals (Novák 248).
Platonic realism asserts that universals exist as separate entities in the real sense and are independent of their respective particulars. This type of realism believes that universals must be positioned as distinct objects to enable an objective account for various phenomena. An analysis of the Platonic realism suggests that universals are needed for some objects and words to qualify to mean and that the innate differences must be eminent. This means that when describing objects in using Platonic realism, one must be able to find truths or falsehood as the underlying meaning (Novák 248).
In platonic realism, the value of things is similar to particulars, consisting of objects and properties. They argue that a “particular” is usually regarded as a copy of the original form.
In essence, proponents of Platonic realism argue that value must be distinctive in form and nature. Therefore, one can easily differentiate form from their respective particulars. Researchers have suggested that Platonic realism claims that values are not related to human “will” but are usually separate entities or consist of properties of other objects presented in the metaphysical world (Novák 248).
According to Nietzsche, values are not objective facts or properties of separate things in themselves (Novák 248). The Objection of objectivism contained in the realism perspective creates a new form of knowledge known as perspectivism. I argue that the Platonic realism fails to ascertain how an object can stand in distinct object position without having a sense of dependence on the object. The Platonic assertion necessitates a question of whether we can qualify this ill-formedness. The universality of things must be incomplete if they are to satisfy their role as applying to many things.
This means that although the Platonic realism claims that distinction must be made, the distinctive nature of objects of values should not qualify generality (Novák 248). The assertion of the universality of the value of objects that creates a difference between concepts and objects seems to approve of the abandonment of the need to comprehend the ontology of universals. My criticism of the theory of Plato relies on the inability to separate concepts without gaining from the sense-perception (Novák 248).
The major concern of objection is that has been leveled is the extent to which a concept of form can exist in a special context of a universe without lining them to space and time. According to Plato, whiteness should be examined in the form of whiteness. However, critics have argued that observing “whiteness” is a process of appreciating copies of the original form. Therefore, claiming the redness of an apple is mere should not be used to conceive applehood. The objection to the Platonic realism merits as a criticism of the Platonic thinking since one cannot begin to claim universality without avoiding the innate relationship between concreteness and abstractness (Novák 248).
Work Cited
Novák, Zsolt. Truth, Reference and Realism. New York: Central European University Press, 2011. Print.