Introduction
Despite the numerous issues related to its existence, plea bargaining (PB) is being actively used by the modern justice system of the US. For example, it accounted for 95% of state-level cases in 2008 (Burrow & Lowery, 2014, p. 212). PB is associated with challenges and dangers, and its relationship with the law is admittedly controversial. However, it is also a most efficient and useful tool, and the incentives for its use are numerous for all the parties involved, including society. As a result, it can be argued that PB is necessary for the modern justice system, which apparently lacks a less controversial and more lawful alternative.
Plea Bargaining: Definition
PB is a specific legal practice in which the defendant “agrees to plead guilty in exchange for concessions on punishment offered by the prosecutor” (Fisher, 2008, p. 943). Depending on the definition, it may have appeared back in 1804 (Burrow & Lowery, 2014). There exists a variety of ways in which a defendant can bargain. For instance, they may provide information about other criminals or give up their right to appeal and in exchange be granted various concessions from the prosecution, including shorter jail time (Fisher, 2008). In general, Bowers (2007) insists that we can only hope to define all PB types as they are custom for every case. Nowadays, PB is one of the “integral components of the criminal justice system” that is common and universally accepted (Burrow & Lowery, 2014).
Associated Issues
The apparent issue that is related to PB is the fact that it is “outside the shadow of valid law” (Bowers, 2007, p. 86). In other words, its controversial nature remains an issue. Apart from that, there is a chance of abusing PB, especially on the prosecutor’s part, who may be interested in their career rather than justice. For example, Burrow and Lowery (2014) consider the cases of juvenile PB and point out that youngsters are generally less capable of defending themselves and can be “tricked” into PB that is harmful to them. Similarly, Mackenzie, Vincent, and Zeleznikow (2014) mention that it is not unlikely for PB success to depend on the defendant’s qualities (including wealth and race). Burrow and Lowery (2014) also mention the “trial penalty,” a case that is hard to prove but the existence of which is accepted among justice system researchers (p. 212). In this situation, a defendant who refuses to bargain is threatened with or does receive a harsher sentence during the trial. At the same time, it is apparent that innocent people may be convicted through PB since the justice system is not perfect yet (Fisher, 2008). To sum up, issues related to PB are numerous and truly critical; modern researchers work to improve PB, for example, with the help of information technologies and support for more vulnerable defendant groups (Mackenzie et al., 2014).
Incentives behind Plea Bargaining
Various groups of people are interested in PB. Defendants hope to minimize the harm that the sentence will bring them. The prosecutors and judges are influenced by several incentives or pressures including caseload and the related costs in various resources, political climate, relationship with the community, career concerns, and even personal ideas and preferences concerning the law (Bowers, 2007, p. 86). Fisher (2008) also believes that judges and prosecutors are attracted by the increased injustice system efficiency (that occurs since PB is aimed at improving the positions of both parties), the improvement of the defendant’s autonomy (they are allowed to control their fate), and the “distributive justice effect” (diversity-friendliness that makes PB capable of protecting the rights of the less wealthy) (pp. 967-968). Similarly, Bowers (2007) mentions the fact that PB is likely to level out and mitigate the “draconian” nature of law (p. 120). Society at large is likely to benefit from at least some of the incentives for PB, including resource and organizational effectiveness and improved relationships between the justice system and the community.
In the US, the 1990s were marked by a rise in arrests (Burns, 2008, p. 3). Bowers (2007) shows that at the time, the prosecution chose to dismiss less and charge more while also becoming more lenient with PB. For example, in New York, non-felony prison sentences rates fell from 41% to 29% for the defendants without criminal records, while adjournments in contemplation of dismissal rose to 30% from 11% in the boroughs “that were directly affected by public-order policing”. (Bowers, 2007, p. 105). These boroughs happened to be predominantly non-white. This example demonstrates all the mentioned incentives. Indeed, the increase in arrests presupposes a greater workload that results in resources being spent. The issue of police being more active in non-white boroughs is both political and related to reputation and relationships with the community. Finally, the fact that first-time offenders were more eligible for PB demonstrates that the personal ideas concerning the fairness of various sentences might affect PB as well, which also has the potential of legitimizing the process in the eyes of the community (Bowers, 2007, p. 113).
Plea Bargaining and the System of Law
The relationship between PB and the system of the law is controversial. Bowers (2007), for example, excludes PB from the law. Mackenzie et al. (2014) point out that the law, justice, and personal interests come to a clash during PB. However, it should be pointed out that PB cannot be based on unlawful claims (for example, on the factor of race) (Burrow & Lowery, 2014). According to Fisher (2008), the bargaining “chips” that the defense has nowadays include the Fifth and Sixth Amendments that allow the right against discrimination and for a jury trial (p. 944). The violation of these rights allows the defendant to bargain; therefore, PB can be regarded as the ultimate way of realizing one’s rights. Also, the opportunity of controlling one’s trial is admittedly in line with the respect for the free will of an individual (Burrow & Lowery, 2014; Fisher, 2008). To sum up, although PB remains controversial, it is possible to justify it from the point of view of the law.
Conclusion
PB is a valid tool that is being used to maximize the positive outcomes for society, which includes the defendant and the effectiveness of the justice system. Moreover, it has the potential of making up for some of the flaws of the system, in particular, the issue of the lack of diversity-friendly practices (including socioeconomic diversity). Like most other tools, it has drawbacks and can potentially be abused, but these factors do not change the fact that it is extremely useful. The nature of PB may be defined as controversial, but it is perfectly possible to demonstrate its alignment with the law. PB is an integral part of the modern justice system, and as long as there is no valid, lawful, and equally effective measure, it will be used, and its practice should be improved to avoid misuse and enhance effectiveness.
References
Bowers, J. (2007). Grassroots plea bargaining. Marquette Law Review, 91(1), 85–121. Web.
Burns, R. (2008). Critical issues in criminal justice. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Book.
Burrow, J. & Lowery, P. (2014). A Preliminary Assessment of the Impact of Plea Bargaining Among a Sample of Waiver-Eligible Offenders. Youth Violence And Juvenile Justice, 13(3), 211-227. Web.
Fisher, T. (2008). The boundaries of plea bargaining: Negotiating the standard of proof. The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 97(4), 943–1007. Web.
Mackenzie, G., Vincent, A., & Zeleznikow, J. (2014). Negotiating About Charges and Pleas: Balancing Interests and Justice. Group Decision And Negotiation, 24(4), 577-594. Web.