Researching the Russo-Japanese War Essay

The Russo-Japanese War was a turning point in the world’s history and a fundamental factor for the rest of the XX century. The results of this major conflict had a prolonged, sometimes delayed effect not only on the direct participants but also on the East Asian, European countries, and the United States. Various countries sent their observers to witness the confrontation between the well-known great military force of the Russian Empire and a freshly modernized and yet to be recognized Japanese military¹. Due to its publicity and global involvement, this war was also unofficially named “World War Zero” by some historians².

It was the first war in which modern weapons were fully incorporated and it has shown a glimpse of horrors to be encountered in World War I, where “barbwire, machine guns, and heavy artillery were the new rulers of the European battlefields”.³ The Russo-Japanese War was won by Japan because of the advancements in military tactics and warfare technologies, which affected the plans of many generals in the following major conflicts. This essay will discuss these advancements and what impact they had on the resolving situation.

The growing presence of the Russian Empire was looming over East Asia for fifty years by the time The Russo-Japanese War began. This influence was bothering not only Asian countries but also Western countries who were struggling to compete with Russia for control over Asian governments⁴. The recent victory over China reinforced Japan’s militaristic motivations and beliefs in its power, but the intervention by Russia, France, and Germany, who were dissatisfied with Japan’s growing strength, was aimed to negate its importance. As Russia got the biggest profit out of this intervention and continued pushing its agenda over Korean and Chinese territories, it was only a matter of time for Japan to take militaristic action.

This was not a secret to anyone that the growing conflict between these two powers was about to erupt. Diplomatic errors of the Russian Empire and the miscalculations of its own military power, partially induced by the letters from Wilhelm II to Tsar Nicholas II, denied any chances for peaceful resolve. To further undermine Russia’s chances of success, the British Empire took the Japanese side of the conflict to prevent other countries from joining the war.

Britain, along with France and Germany, also provided Japan with modern warships⁵. The diplomatic actions taken by the Russian Empire were recognized as an attempt to buy more time for preparations and Japan proceeded to attack without officially declaring war at the most convenient moment⁶. Little could have been done in the time this stalling bought for the Empire, and Russia entered the conflict without proper preparation.

The initial attack by Japanese naval forces on Port Arthur was a decisive victory for Japan, however, their plans to quickly capture the fort by suddenness did not work out. Although no ships were sunk, the damage both sides took during the battle was quickly repairable for Japanese ships, but greatly impeded the Russian navy as Port Arthur was not properly equipped for ship repair. Several major Russian battleships were separated from the rest of their army and blockaded in Port Arthur.

The distribution of Russian military forces was so uneven, that little more than ten percent of their troops were anywhere near its eastern borders at the beginning of this war. The Trans-Siberian Railway was not yet fully finished, although it was operational. During that time, its daily capacity was three-four trains due to the unfinished segment at Lake Baikal. For comparison, it took the Russian army about a month to transfer a corps (30000 troops) to the front, while it only took about a day for Japan to do the same⁷.

The importance of well-maintained transitional lines was clear for the Japanese army, and they even had “civil governors” whose mission was to improve Chinese roads in Manchuria⁸. These facts, combined with the blockade of Port Arthur, allowed the Japanese to attack with greater numbers, as well as provide faster and easier support to their frontlines.

Both armies just finished the modernization of their infantry equipment. While Russian forces were armed with Mosin-Nagant, which was considerably sturdier and more reliable, albeit bulkier, the Japanese were equipped with Type-30 rifles, which were better at long-range, more accurate and lighter than Russian rifles⁹. Later they were modified into more reliable Type-38 rifles, which had their shutters greatly improved.

The extensive use of naval mines allowed the Japanese army to prevent any attempts to escape from Port Arthur, and successfully sank several Russian battleships. This tactic was soon employed by Russians as a countermeasure, also sinking multiple Japanese ships in return. During the siege of Port Arthur, the Japanese forces used naval mines as land weapons and detonated several of them under the wall of the fortress in the last stages of the siege.

In an attempt to gain more ground closer to Port Arthur, the Japanese army soldiers were practically forced to charge the Russian positions that were equipped with barbwires, Maxim machine guns, and electric fences. This first sight into modern warfare technology has shown how destructive modern weapons could be, and that bravery alone is no longer able to turn the tide of the battle¹⁰. It took three months and tens of thousands of lost troops for Japan to take the hill near the Port to begin the bombardment of the Russian fleet. It is to be noted that the hill was taken because of the arrival of the new Armstrong 11-inch howitzers provided to Japan by the British Empire¹¹. With their help, Port Arthur has surrendered after a total of 5 months and 1 day of the siege.

During the times of peace prior to this war, some nations have already started working on radio jamming technologies. However, the first practical use of this technology was implemented by the Russian army, who used this technology to prevent Japanese sailors from transmitting data required to readjust howitzer fire¹². It was the first example of tactical usage of radio, but even prior to this war Japan and Britain used radio communication to gather and transmit intelligence about Russia.

The same wireless communication method allowed the Japanese Combined Fleet to prepare ahead of time for the arriving ships of the Baltic Fleet. The intelligence from scouting ships was a crucial point in the Battle of Tsushima and gave Japan enough time to stage a perfect battleground in their favor. During the battle, the Japanese ships were proven vastly more effective, outranging Russian gunnery by a thousand meters¹³. This incident marked the end of the Russo-Japanese War with the almost complete annihilation of the Russian fleet, with only three out of thirty-seven Russian vessels evading destruction or captivity.

The peace treaty was partially hastily signed due to the exhaustion of resources in Japan, and the uneven distribution of military forces in total by both sides. The number of Russian soldiers on land still overshadowed the Japanese army by hundreds of thousands, and Japan was unable to compete in a prolonged conflict, despite winning most battles on land. As a result, the economy of both countries suffered greatly, but the modernization that led to Japan’s victory also increased its foreign debts by four times, while Russian debts increased by approximately thirty percent. Because of these facts, the victory for Japan did not seem as big on paper, and the peace treaty barely achieved what Japan wanted to gain out of this conflict.

Being the first most observed and well-documented war of the modern era, it had the most prominent effect on World War I. Russia was no longer considered undefeatable, which led to major changes in plans of many European countries. Germany was affected the most and changed its future plans to accommodate the possibility of winning the war against both Russia and France at the same time¹⁴.

Seeing how their current tactics and weaponry were partially ineffective or could be improved, many countries took notes on the performances of Russian and Japanese forces and implemented numerous new technologies in the following years. The British Empire, watching how their battleships performed in this conflict, entered the XX century with increased self-confidence and began the construction of dreadnought battleships¹⁵.

Japan’s victory served as a model of success for other Asian nations and led to military reforms in India, China, Thailand, Indonesia, and the rest of South-Eastern countries¹⁶. Furthermore, Japan earned the respect of Western countries and was at last considered a major power in the world.

Bibliography

Busch, Noel F. The Emperor’s Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima. New York: Funk & Wagnall’s, 1969.

Connaughton, Richard M. The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. Abingdon: Routledge, 1988.

Jacob, Frank. The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century. Abington: Routledge, 2017.

Jacob, Frank. “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image”. CUNY Academic Works, 2015.

Jukes, Geoffrey. The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Essential Histories. Wellingborough: Osprey Publishing, 2002.

Kowner, Rotem. Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006.

Oldenburg, Sergiy S. Emperor Nikolay II Tsarstvovanie. St. Petersburg: Petropolis, 1991.

Rosen, Stephen P. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. New York: Cornell University Press, 2018.

Footnotes

1. Frank Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 2.
2. Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 1.
3. Frank Jacob, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image,” CUNY Academic Works. (2015), 14.
4. Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 4.
5. Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 6.
6. Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 4.
7. Sergiy S. Oldenburg, Emperor Nikolay II Tsarstvovanie (St. Petersburg: Petropolis, 1991), 213.
8. Geoffrey Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Essential Histories (Wellingborough: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 85
9. Rotem Kowner, Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 437–438.
10. Jacob, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image”, 13.
11. Richard M. Connaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1988), 230–246.
12. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (New York: Cornell University Press, 2018), 191.
13. Noel F. Busch, The Emperor’s Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima. (New York: Funk & Wagnall’s, 1969), 179.
14. Jacob, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image”, 13–14.
15. Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 6.
16. Jacob, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image”, 12.