The contemporary Russian political regime cannot be qualified as democratic despite the fact that the formal rules of the Russian political apparatus clearly provide the foundations for solid democratic institutional structures. Indeed, the Russian constitution is grounded on many established liberal democratic premises viz. competitive elections within a multiparty environment, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, federalism, and protection of individual civil liberties. This paradoxical mode of governance is precisely what Alan Siaroff brands “semi-liberal-autocracy.”
Most of the available literature on the post-soviet Russian state deals with traditional arguments such as the democratic transition paradigm or the impact of communism on Russia’s development. However, there is a conspicuous lack of literature addressing the power of institutions and how they can shape political decisions. This paper addresses the impact of the 1993 Russian constitution on democratic development of post-soviet Russia. More precisely, I will argue that the constitutional powers allocated to the presidency have significantly undermined the democratic consolidation as reflected under Putin’s leadership.
The primary intention of creating the Russian constitution was to allow the executive office to dominate politics; not to foster compromises. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin was elected the first president of the Russian Federation on the 12th in June 1991. For a brief period, the triumphant democrats and their nationalist politics led to a substantial unification of the Russian institutions. Regrettably, when they started to formulate their policy agenda, the political debate gradually changed from issues of statehood towards those of economic and institutional reforms.
At that point, various diverging opinions and interests started to emerged, which led to a decrease in parliamentary support for the president. In 1991, hard-liners of the Communist Party rallied behind Mikhail Gorbachev and plotted a coup against Boris Yeltsin in an attempt to seize control over the political institutions. Resisting against the maneuver, Boris Yeltsin assumed dictatorial powers and proclaimed himself as the defender of the democrats.
The opening stage in a democracy is usually characterized by intense political debates between hardliners and soft-liners. As Thomas Carothers puts it, “the opening period of democratic is ferment and political liberalization in which cracks appear in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being that between hardliners and soft-liners.”1 The April 1992 meeting of the Congress of People’s Deputies unveiled that the parliament was divided into three main groups: soft-liners committed reformists; hard-liners committed Communists, and a determined bloc without any specific ideology.
When Yeltsin began to expand his power over the institutions of the state trough personal appointments of governors in the country’s eighty-nine regions and through the accumulation of institutional devices, the executive increasingly dominated the legislative. This situation ultimately degenerated into a political crisis between the president and the parliament from early December 1992 through early October 1993. On the verge of a civil war, the two branches negotiated to hold a referendum in April 1993 in order to determine which branch would dominate Russian politics. Yeltsin obtained a majority and ordered the dissolution of the parliament as well as the creation of a new constitution.
The new constitutional arrangement gave the president considerable powers that would ensure his control over the decision-making process. The following principles from the Russian constitution particulate illustrate the supremacy of the president over the state and the consequent gagging of democracy: the president can dissolve the State Duma if it refuses to confirm the president’s choice for prime minister three times, or votes no confidence in the government twice; president has the right to issue presidential decrees with the force of law, as long as they do not conflict with existing legislation; plenary powers to the president to form and alter the composition of the government, including the prime minister and the cabinet’s structure; president’s right to veto a delay veto on laws passed by the parliament and on the publication of their own normative legal acts; the judges of the three highest courts – Constitutional, Supreme, and Arbitrage – are proposed by the president and the other federal judges are appointed by him. Furthermore, the constitution provides the president with other considerable power such as the direct command of the armed forces.
Although the executive decisions still depended on the approval of the legislature, the constitution literally created a fault line between two popularly elected political constitutions: the parliament and the president; therefore, instead of a system designed to foster political accommodation in a very polarized society, the new political elite opted for a highly personalized political regime. The president has authority over the Government, the parliament and courts. Similar as the tsars and the communist party, the president symbolized the supreme authority that would shape the central domestic and international political goals of the state.
The creation of a new institutional environment represented the first step in the democratic revolution for the reformers. Nevertheless, conscious that the state could not be stable without compromises, the new ruling elite also gave substantial power to the legislature. From a realist perspective, power and control over the institutions of post-soviet Russia state was the main goal. In the words of Guillermo O’Donnell, “on the premises that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained by only the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term in office”2 (34).
Some argue that the idea of politics as a mean for power is characteristic of Russian political culture. Indeed, if we analyze the historical political development of Russia, we immediately notice that strong political leadership has prevailed. From despotism during Tsarist times to totalitarianism under the communist rule, it appears that the state has always been autonomous and dominant over the society. One would find it very difficult to find any signs of democratic culture.
Furthermore, cultural features are particularly resistant to change over time. Indeed, after the fall of the imperial system, the communist period also proved to be highly centralized with strong authoritarian leaders who literally dominated every single aspect of the society. Moreover, most of the post-soviet Russian leaders had acquired their skills under an authoritarian regime and had been taught the values of authoritarianism; a regime strongly opposed to compromises but tends to favor personal rather than legal rule. Thus, the establishment of a strong executive in 1993 could be described as a confirmation of a Russian predilection for tailor-made political authority.
Continuity rather than change would perhaps be more appropriate to describe the new institutions of the Russian Federation. Consequently, we could suggest that Russians leaders perceived the concept of constitutional democracy merely as an instrument of power consolidation rather than as an institution designed to foster political accommodation and consensus. To some extent, the rise of the reformers to power was more a tactic rather than a strategy.
Reformists were more concerned with establishing a strong leadership against the growing oppositions that had been released by the collapse of Communism. As a result, not only did they fail to institute discipline through a rational political hierarchy within government institutions, but they also lacked any solid political program. Therefore, the relatively independent new autocratic executive clearly did not build solid structures over which a stable democratic state could evolve. In addition, although liberalization occurred, the constitution preserved some authoritarian characteristics inherent to Russian political tradition.
The constitutional organization of Russia compromised the efficacy of the state throughout the 1990s and subsequently undermined the democratic consolidation. I believe that post-soviet Russia’s political features underscored more of a semi-liberal autocracy rather than a liberal democracy. According to Alan Siaroff, in a semi-liberal autocracy, the authority is “constrained only somewhat (if at all) by the constitution, courts, the rule of law, and/or the bureaucracy, constrained more by socio-political pluralism, especially the independent media”3 (75). In Russia, this refers to the president, who literally incarnates the nation and holds considerable political power.
Typically, the level of accountability between the institutions is minimal as opposed to the standard domestic hierarchy that we observe in contemporary western representative democracies. Alan Siaroff even argues that there is “no true political accountability”4 (75). The constitution clearly illustrates this assumption given the absence of a formal ‘checks and balances’ procedures that would control the legislative process or that could supervise the executive power.
In addition, these autocratic regimes tend to function according to rule by decree rather than to the rule of law. Scholars often use this term to refer to states that have failed to achieve institutional progress and governmental effectiveness after transition to democracy. As a result, social and economic problems inherited from the past regimes persist, which might provoke a return to authoritarianism. In Russia, the consolidation of democracy required an entirely new political framework. The collapse of the Soviet Union along with the disintegration of the communist party had many uneven repercussions throughout the territory. During the dismantling of the USSR, local elites immediately seized the resources that were available to them to secure power to avoid marginalization under the new regime.
Since the federal system under the USSR was composed of regions and republics, the repartition of these resources turned out to be very uneven. Instead of rebuilding the foundations of the system on the basis of equality, Yeltsin fostered these differences between the federal units. With his constitutional right of personal appointments, he assigned representatives to every federal constituent.
Tactically, this was optimal because it did not require tremendous efforts and it did not go against any legal principles; consequently, his power became more fortified and its legitimacy remained intact. Nevertheless, the old regional elites demonstrated reluctance to this subordination. However, Yeltsin could not fall back upon the support of the parliament because the two constitutional branches were unable to make compromises. In the end, Yeltsin opted for informal politics, which did not present serious difficulties as the president holds considerable influence over the federal courts. Thus, Yeltsin managed to establish a series of treaties with these local units without any substantial opposition.
The agreements ensured political and economic autonomy from the government in exchange for electoral support. Therefore, the constitution enabled him to reinforce his power by presenting him with numerous opportunities to bypass formal politics without raising suspicions. But above all, it set in motion a political machine where center-periphery relations were henceforth built on a patrimonial basis. At that point, Russia engaged in a direction opposed to democratic principles and there was no going back unless a major transformation came from above.
Indeed, by allowing greater autonomy to these local elites, the state experienced a proliferation of autonomous local regimes nearly independent. Rapidly, the environment evolved from small marginal authorities into influential sub-national authoritarian regimes. Sub-national authoritarianism stands for the localization of politics coupled with the monopolization of resources by local elites. With no legal interaction with the central authority, the government usually faces many principal agent-problems. As these local elites became more powerful economically and politically, they subsequently increased their lobbying power towards the governmental authorities.
By the end of the 1990s, these sub-national authorities became major actors at the national level, dramatically reducing the coercive as well as the distributive capacities of the center. Since economic performances merely echo the relative capacity of the state, it is unsurprising that economic reforms have failed to deliver most of their promises. Similarly to democracy, a high level of consensus and accredited legal machinery connotes a stable economic environment.
However, to neglect a constitutionally law-based state within a polarized society presupposes the failure of reforms. As in post-soviet Russia, corruption usually stems from the institutions until the state becomes incapable to develop sound economic programs through which it would access the resources necessary to provide social welfare. Above all, the lack of local administrative capacity encouraged by the constitutional features protracted the Russian transition from a planned-economy to a market economy. General social conditions deteriorated by the end of the 1990s with a life expectancy rate for women of 59.8 years in 1999.
Some might argue that the Russian constitutional principles are not against democracy and that Russia’s democratic deficit cannot be ascribed to the constitution. By contrast, the consolidation of democracy requires a strong leadership and that an equally powerful legislature would only worsen the situation. Indeed, we could argue that Russia experimented with some sort of balanced ‘semi-presidentialism’ between the phases of the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the late 1993, when the new constitution was adopted through referendum. During this period, the legislature had reasonable powers but the upshot was unappeasable inter-branch conflict, climaxing in the violent clash of October 1993 between Yeltsin and the Parliament.
I do not reject the argument that strong leadership is necessary for the consolidation of democracy; however, I believe that a strong independent executive prevented Russia from breaking with its authoritarian past experiences because having a reasonably powerful legislature is the key to democratic consolidation and it should be pointed out that, the impact of constitutional choices can only be fully understood in the context of each country’s political experience. Indeed, the historical tendency for Russia to appeal to strong symbolic personalities in period of dramatic changes usually led the people to associate change with one person.
Consequently, once the cracks appeared within Yeltsin leadership, the corrosion of legitimacy automatically implied a decline in popular support for democratic values. Thus, the constitution has compromised the legitimacy of the post-Soviet regime in Russia by identifying democracy itself with a single person. Had Yeltsin been a very competent politician and had social and economic circumstances been more favorable, the association of president and political regime might not have undermined the legitimacy of democracy.
Semi-presidential constitutions that provide for real shared authority over the government and the centers of real power are different; the president and the Parliament usually criticize one another for their actions but they do that without damaging the political system. As Yeltsin declined in popularity, democratic values appeared to loose legitimacy.
The direct and indirect constitutional legacies inherited from the first decade of the Russian Federation caused a return towards authoritarianism under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. A democracy is a mode of government by the whole population or all the suitable members of the state typically through elected representatives. As Schumpeter puts it, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”5 (63). In other words, democracy includes competition and elections, which then provide for vertical accountability.
On the other hand, a political system in which there is no true competition and accountability is called an autocracy: a system of government by one with absolute power; talk of absolutism. According to Alan Siaroff, under the classifications of political regimes, Russia falls in the category of semi-liberal autocracies or semi-authoritarian regimes. In the words of Ottaway, “the most important characteristics of semi-authoritarian regimes is the existence and persistence of mechanisms that effectively prevent the transfer of power through elections from the hands of the incumbent leaders or party to a new political elite or organization”6 (78).
As opposed to democratic regimes, the term semi-liberal autocracies entails that elections are not the true source of the government’s power, and thus voters cannot transfer power to a new leadership. I believe that the alternation of power in Russia since 2000 has been prevented by certain mechanisms directly and indirectly inherited from the constitution of 1993.
Following his election to the presidency in 2000, Putin promoted an agenda that aimed at establishing the government’s supremacy over all scopes of political and civil life. Many scholars have debated on the question whether Russia can be qualified as a dominant power system. Thomas Carothers argues that Russia and South Africa fall just to the side of this syndrome: “They have a fair amount of political freedom and have held competitive elections of some legitimacy. Yet they are ruled by political forces that appear to have long-term hold on power, and it is hard to imagine any of the existing opposition parties coming to power for many years to come”7 (13).
Others consider the term “superpresidentialism” as more appropriate to describe the contemporary Russia’s parliamentary system. The suppression of many democratic principles such as the freedom of media, the ability to form or join interest groups, and the absence of civil liberties typified this environment. It guaranteed a complete control over elections while corruption gradually became normalized. Indeed, two legal initiatives were instituted in 2001 under Putin supervision, which severely reduced the number of competing parties. The executive also reinforced itself with the exclusion of regional elections and also through direct appointments of the governors by the President, centralizing the political authority.
Former KGB bureaucrats began to direct both federal and regional governments, seizing strategic political positions. National television and media as well as numerous television channels and popular newspapers were swallowed up by state-controlled organizations. Furthermore, corruption was present in many different areas ranging from medical facilities, law enforcement, schools and education.
The Disastrous reforms of the 1990s fueled the demand for a strong leadership and the constitution subsequently enabled the government under Putin to acquire an extensive control over all political institutions in the process. More specifically, it allowed for the concentration of power in the hands of the majority party United Russia, denying any potential transfer of power to a new leadership. The political development of Russia as illustrated above clearly demonstrates that Russia fails to meet the central criteria of democracy proposed by Schumpeter. Indeed, the leading political party in current Russia (United Russia) supported by the President Putin has revised the formal rules of the State Duma elections in order to guarantee for itself the ascendant role in Russia’s political apparatus. United Russia’s jurisdiction of the Parliament enables the president to control the legislature.
Furthermore, Putin’s domination of both branches strengthened his ability to appoint judges and coupled with his capacity to affect decisions; he really controlled the judiciary. However, a formalized division of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary plays a vital function in keeping checks and balances that are perceived as an essential guarantee of a democracy. It is evident that Russia has been experienced a deterioration of this mechanism, with the legislative and judicial branches of government being subordinate to the executive. By directly appointing judges, it facilitated Putin’s efforts to influence decisions.
The consequences of this development were exhibited in a report by Transparency International, in which it was observed that the Russia judicial system manifested outrageous abuse of civil liberties as well as the negligence of Russian legislation and the rule of law.
Corruption in courts is also common, which provides incentives to judges to generate decisions sentences based on financial interests. To centralize power to such an extent gave Putin’s advisers considerable authority, which made government corruption even more widespread. Only by establishing a real democratic checks and balances mechanism, including freedom of the media, can accountability emerge and corruption or ineffectiveness removed. Regarding the fairness of political competition, a competitive and adamant striving for votes would never take place without the freedom of the media and the right to run for office.
As long as the press cannot be insulated from government threats, the public cannot be assured of politically independent supplies of political information, which is considered as a necessary requirement in democratic societies. Therefore, the absence of a competitive multiparty environment, a truly independent legal system, and free media in Russia prevent us from defining Russia’s contemporary political regime as democratic.
Works Cited
Bova, Russel. “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition.” World Politics 44(1991) : 113-38. Print.
Brown, Archie. Contemporary Russian Politics: a Reader. New York: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.
Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5-21. Print.
Fish, M. Steven. Democracy Derailed in Russia: the Failure of Open Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print.
Kesselman, Mark. European Politics in Transition. 6th Ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2009. Print.
Siaroff, Alan. Comparing Political Regimes: a Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics. 2nd Ed. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2009. Print.
Footnotes
- Thomas Carothers, The End Of The Transition Paradigm. P. 7.
- Archie Brown, Contemporary Russian politics. P. 34.
- Comparing Political Regimes, Alan Siaroff P.75.
- Comparing Political Regimes, Alan Siaroff P.75.
- Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes P. 63.
- Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes P. 78.
- Thomas Carothers, The End Of The Transition Paradigm. P. 13.