Introduction
The invasion of Iraq by the American US army was intended to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime. The best way to succeed in the invasion was to attack the biggest urban center in the region despite the cost associated with such a mission. Since time immemorial, the role of armies globally has been the defending or attacking of cities. The cost and level of difficulty of urban city attacks have contributed to the development of tactical strategies that emphasize on avoidance of attacks of cities. However, the army continues to attacking cities with the intention of controlling the center of operations of a targeted country.
Main body
In 2017 an updated Field Manual named operation was developed by the US Army and the National Security Strategy. This strategy emphasized the significance of defending or seizing cities to take control of regions that determine the global connectivity of countries and the regions with the greatest dominance of power, resources, and people. Attacking or defending big cities requires a huge muscle of field artillery and the impacts are usually catastrophic resulting in massive deaths and destruction of property (Coteț, 2019). This essay discusses how field artillery played a significant role in enhancing the success of seizing Baghdad during the 2003 war between the US Army and Iraq.
Baghdad is the second biggest city in the world after Cairo with a population of around 4 million people (Coteț, 2019; Wong, 2003). During the attack, the city was systematically important in enhancing the win because it controlled the global energy economy with numerous modern physical structures and well-connected interstitial systems. Additionally, the defending Iraqis were well equipped with weapons and could easily hide in the regions they were well conversant unlike the incoming American Army (Wong, 2003). To win the battle, The US Army required in-depth analysis of the city and the use of superior field artillery that ensured the defendants were outnumbered and overpowered. The execution of the battle was also critical since the intention was to reduce the number of casualties and to ensure that the war took the shortest time possible.
The defending Iraqis utilized both land and air forces and demonstrated great prowess until they started being overpowered due to the lack of superior and sufficient artillery. The battle took an overall seven days with the defendants using irregular forces that incorporated a hybrid tactic methodology. Other than the numerous infrastructures, the city of Baghdad was divided by the Tigris River into halves and the roads were of a radial pattern. To be able to win the war quickly and efficiently, the operations strategy required effective utilization of artillery to win the western region of Baghdad that had key government headquarters (Cordesman, 2003). This strategy presented with the advantage of reducing the need of the forces to get rid of every city block. Success was further facilitated by a multidimensional attack on Baghdad.
Efforts to stop the attack by Iraq defendants included the use of couriers for defense development, construction of barriers in the streets as well as demolishing bridges specifically the ones located in eastern Diyala River. All this was intended at stopping the on-land attack. However, American artillery was good enough to go beyond these defense systems. The third infantry division of the US army conducted daily attacks on the defendants making them weak and depleted in stocks of weaponry. One of the remarkable attacks was the “Thunder Run” executed by the t-64 Armor task force. This task force utilized 29 tankers, and 14 Bradley armored war automobiles to get control of the Baghdad airport (Cordesman, 2003).
Despite the huge resistance from the defendants, the task force managed to utilize the artillery they had to reach the airport and take control. The Iraq defendants continued to inflict attacks on the brigade that was guarding the airport resulting in casualties. However, the US army counter-attacked them using air bombardment resulting in severe casualties of the defendants. Another brigade of the same division took control of the palace after it did massive attacks on the defendants in the downtown Baghdad region (Tuathail, 2003). This was one of the palaces that Saddam Hussein utilized in giving orders to his army.
Seizure of the palace resulted in fleeing and conceding of majority of the government officials in support of Hussein’s rule. The marine force of the US Army was greatly attacked by the Iraqi military as they tried to cross the river bridge but the artillery, they had allowed them to counter-attack and cross the bridge. Even after taking over the palace and demanding the Iraqi defendants to surrender, the war in other regions continued. The next mission was to reduce the wars in the regions as well as capture Saddam and his top aides.
The marine corps used intelligence to acquire information of residing of Sadam and his troop in a mosque. They headed there and utilized heavy propelled grenades, rifles, and mortars to ensure that Sadam aides did not compromise the mission. Unluckily, Sadam and his top aides were not in the mosque. The war in all of Baghdad ended on 12th April 2003 with a total of 34 Americans and 2330 Iraqi fighters killed in the attack (Bailey, 2003; Pirnie and O’Connell, 2008). This is an indicator that the Iraq fighters were overpowered by the US army due to the possession and utilization of modern artillery.
Conclusion
An overall analysis of the Baghdad war is that the war was conducted by two US special forces the 3rd Infantry Division as well as the US Marine Corps 1st Marine Division. These troops were well-equipped with weaponry which include M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley fighting automobiles, and M1 Abrams tanks. The fight was also facilitated by the use of US and UK-owned aircraft like A10 Warthogs, B-52S, and Harrier GR7 attack jets. The defendants in Baghdad were also well equipped with weaponry that included Asad Babil tanks and other artillery. The initial phase involves the use of aircraft to bomb the defendant Iraqis as well as to warn civilians of the attack. Key successes in the winning of the war included the capture of the Baghdad airport and the “thunder runs” to test Iraqi forces and the capture of Tharthar Palace where Sadam Husein and his allies resided.
It is therefore evident that field artillery was quite instrumental in enhancing the winning of the battle. This was crucial considering that the city is well developed with numerous roads and other infrastructure that the defendants are well familiar with. Additionally, the defendants were also well supplemented with their own artillery but were overcome by the additional strategic planning employed by the US army and marine corps.
References
Bailey, J.B., 2003. Field artillery and fire power. Routledge.
Cordesman, A.H., 2003. The Iraq War: Strategy, tactics, and military lessons. CSIS.
Coteț, F., 2019. Aspects regarding the use of field artillery in contemporary operations. Bulletin of “Carol I” National Defence University (EN), 35–39.
Pirnie, B., O’Connell, E., 2008. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006). Rand Corporation.
Tuathail, G.Ó., 2003. “Just out looking for a fight”: American affect and the invasion of Iraq. Antipode 35, 856–870.
Wong, L., 2003. Why they fight: combat motivation in the Iraq war. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.