Historians have long attempted to specify the Tokugawa political order. The Tokugawa political system was possibly one of the most complex feudal systems ever created. In his article “The Political Order” Philip Brown explores the peculiarities of the Tokugawa political order, arguing that the order’s structure brought great stability to Japan for two and a half centuries but failed to create a powerful national administrative organization, which led to the Shogunate’s downfall.
The author uses specific words and terms that help to understand the structure of Tokugawa better, but at the same time may be new to the reader and should be further studied. They include such terms as shogun, daimyo, baku-han, liege lord, and daikan. The main historical question Brown is attempting to answer in “The Political Order” is whether Tokugawa managed to create a centralized order at the time. In addition, Brown seeks to answer how the structure of the order provided Japan with greater stability over time and why it failed to create a solid national administrative structure. The article also explores what factors subsequently led to the shogunate’s fall.
Brown is not the first historian to explore the topic of the Tokugawa. This period of time is characterized differently in various teachings. Japanese scholars mostly describe it as a “feudal time” since the oath of allegiance between the daimyo and shogun and administrative authority were broadly dispersed among daimyo (Brown 321p). In the 1960s, American academics began to notice the level of centralized. They used the term “centralized feudalism” to describe Tokugawa political arrangements (Brown 321) and also described it as “federal,” emphasizing the relationship between states and the federal government, or as a “compound state” (Brown 322). Different views on the issue suggest that the Order of Tokugawa is indeed complex and ambiguous.
Brown answered the key question that building a centralized order was impossible. According to the author, external factors made it unattainable to build a centralized state. State power was distributed at the national level but was not powerful enough to become a nationwide administrative control. One more argument is the almost complete autonomy of the Daimos in their territories, and they were not even taxed. In “Ties that bind” section, Brown confirms his headline that ports, essential markets, and other vital areas were under the shogunate’s authority. These decisions were necessary for building a centralized country. In “Limitations Of Centralized Government” the author supports his point of view by saying that the most important limitation was that the daimyo had almost complete autonomy. The power of the daimyo and some traditions prevented to build sufficiently centralized country. The “Limited Enforcement” section also lists factors proving the impossibility of centralization due to limited power and decisions.
In the subheading “Shoguns as Liege Lord”, Brown’s argument is supported by the fact that Ieyasu had complete control over the samurai, the court aristocracy of the relay orders, and military coalitions. Daimyo or direct mercenaries were reorganized, and advantageous marriages could be concluded. “Domain Allocation” reveals that Ieyasu could divide possessions that were of strategic importance. For example, the most independent ones were as far away as possible so that they had time to report an attack. In between were the hereditary possessions of the Tokugawa. He can also reduce possessions or take them away entirely if, for example, they lose a battle. This was supposed to increase centralization and strengthen the influence. “Dispersal of Domain Lands” uncovers that officials made regular visits to administer the shogun lands because of frequent conflicts. The daimyo and the shogun sent their officials to collect taxes and other important administrative matters and there were also unexpected inspections. This was done to achieve the hierarchy and control necessary for centralized management. “Alternate Attendance and Military Duties” reveals that the lord could order a daimo to serve in one or the other castle. The daimyo could also take part in castle building, thus motivating and privileging supporters for centralization.
In “Family Ties” the author tells about the successful use of advantageous marriages and adoptions. “Nodal Controls” uncovers that the Shogunate controlled the imperial capital Kyoto, the central market, the main ports, silver and gold mines, and other strategically important places and set the rules for traders allowing the concentration of power and control. “Diversity Disputes” tells that Shogunate had to resolve conflicts. Who owns the land? And all other legal conflicts. And if the conflict cannot be resolved, for example, with land, he could take it for himself.
The subheadings in the second section reveal why centralization has not been achieved. In “Taxation”, the author mention that Tokugawa’s primary income was from the lands, which greatly limited their power. “Domainal Administrative Autonomy” reveals that
daimos had a lot of power and even pursued their policies, which were sometimes perceived as centrally recognized. In “Managing Class Separation” Brown reveals that The most critical situation was with the samurai who were suspended, and different domains varied significantly, some were freer, and others were not. In “Village-Level Innovations: Rights in Land” the author indicates that there was no centralization since some regions worked towards a fee land title system approaching modern ownership concepts. In some areas, the peasants built a system in which the rights to cultivate arable land were jointly managed.
In the last main section, Brown cites evidence such as the tax situation of the Kaga possession taking half of the annual land tax from villages in the Gokaayama district with saltpeter want, which was banned in the past. All the data on confiscation of property for failures indicate a failed attempt to introduce a nationwide application of laws on state property.