The fundamental of Subjectivism states that it is not possible to know every aspect of the universe and there is no possibility to understand any topic for certainty. The reason behind this thought process is that every individual’s perspective is different and unique and the perception of a certain event is bound to be different by the individual’s experience. (Ratner, 2009) As a result, the arguments of Subjectivism are highly dependent on perception.
Let us consider for the same of the argument that this theory is subjectivist and hence the behavior of the individual would be determined by the approach or attitude of some other individual or group of individuals who is/are similar to the subject, his/her society and some ideal being (such as God). Ordinarily this subjectivism, ideal observer theory, cultural relativism, truth relativism and the divine order/command theory all are indeed diverse types of subjectivism. Having this as a background would be an interesting dilemma.
The most important objection of Truth Relativism arises from the fact that there can never be a fixed set of rules in the context of this issue. Truth Relativism is generally presented with the perception and parameters of a definite cultural background. But it should be stated that cultural and cultural civilizations are not permanent in the context of space and time. A certain element that could be ascertained as a fundamental belief or Truth Relativism in a society may be considered to be false in the same culture if enough time is given to the society or the culture. Apart from that even if time is taken into as constant then also remain the fundamental differences of cultures and societies. Thus at no point in time or space Truth Relativism can be established as a basic elementary norm of societies or cultures.
Truth Relativism’s status as a moral theory or as an approach to making moral decisions also faces objection from different quarters and there are specific reasons for that. The basic reason behind this is the fact that there can be no absolute or moral standards as there are too many societies in the world practicing diversified moral standards. In this context, it should be stated that morality or Truth Relativism’s status as a moral theory is fundamentally applied to an individual but an individual is always influence and morally directed by the society in which the individual resides. Here the local society determines the values and variables of moral norms or moralities. Thus Truth Relativism’s status as a moral theory cannot stand on firm ground as the basic ground of the issue shifts from time to time and space to space and cannot be treated as an absolute or morally standardized law applied to all individuals at the same time all over the world (Domsky, 2004).
If these theories are not limited to include non-basic norms in the code, this very moral code would have to contain different norms for each and every activity. Based on this presumption, you would not be able to know whether it is okay to see TV on the weekend using the basic norms. Instead, you would need to find out through a vote or poll whether this is correct or not. And you would have to do so for each and every activity you want to do. Definitely this is not the way anyone would be able to live and act like a sane person (Ratner, 2009). This is where it is deducted that we would need to get the reasoning done based on some very basic principles. Only when it comes to questioning the fiber of these basic principles, it will be possible for subjective society to get the overall and collective judgment about that very principle. Some will argue that this very theory is objectionable, but it is definitely better than having to vote or take a poll for every action that you want to do to conform to the basic moral code in your society. (Habermas, 1995)
It is clearly seen why it is not plausible to confine the theory to basic moral norms. Let us assume that a few people in a society start believing certain aspects of societal subjectivism plus restrictions on basic moral norms. In other words, in a subjective society a behavior or act is considered morally right only if it is not strictly and expressly forbidden by that society’s moral norms. Suppose these new believers are able to convince the rest of their fellow members about the validity of their beliefs through discourse and assuming that they are successful, now in that society, everybody will be following that subjectivity. Now obviously all the moral obligations that would apply to their lives would have to be derivatives of that new belief (subjectivism). But what happens in the truth? Suppose that now the new belief is the basic norm and the overall view comes to the thought you should do what the society dictates you to do and in turn what the society dictates you should do. Then, when everybody accepts this view it is totally reduced to nihilism – specifically because now all the people believe in the same view (Habermas, 1990).
As a counter-argument, Kohlberg points out that the human beings are in reality capable of reason and highly communicative; they also have a deep desire to see the others’ point of view as well as the world around themselves. This theory argues clearly that the form and structure of moral arguments are definitely different and separate from the content of the arguments. This is termed in Kohlberg’s theory as formalism. In the same manner, justice is directly dependent upon the fact that there exists a sound reasoning principle. Though it is justice-centered morality theory, the Kohlberg theory is found highly compatible with the contents of deontology and eudemonia.
However, the confined or restricted subjectivism forms will result in nihilism when all the members of a society (group) come to accept that theory. However, when this exception is not instrumental in the theory, the existence of high dependence of perception becomes the norm of the theory and there can be no subjectivism without the essence on the perception dependence. This of course looks as implausible as any other consequence discussed for any theory and one that would not gain any acceptance.
References
Domsky, D. (2004). Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot’s Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics. Metaphilosophy 35(5), 675-694.
Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Massachusetts, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1995). Philosophy and Social Criticism. Massachusetts, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ratner, C. (2009). Harre’s Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy: A Social Scientific Critique. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 19(11), 225-243.