Introduction
The September 11th attack in the New York marked a turning point for the approach towards terrorism both for the terrorist organizations and the United States; and indeed the world. The terrorist organization got a mixed bag; on one hand, to have managed to inflict such a devastating blow on the US gave them a new found respect an admiration among parties that feel they stand to gain from such an attack; and made it easier for them to recruit new members and source for more funds.
On the other hand, this attack sparked the war on terror; with the full force of the US security machinery coming down on terrorist activities; resulting in the loss of training bases (for example in Afghanistan for al Qaeda; and widespread arrests and detention of their operatives. In order to survive, the organizations have had to adapt better methods of recruitment; so as to avoid detection and ultimate destruction.
One the other hand, the United States (and allies) has had to expand its priorities beyond simply destroying the capability of the organization to launch an attack; the main focus now has been preventing the regeneration of these organizations. One way of doing this is by making interventions to ensure that these groups cannot recruit more members; this would have a devastating blow to them since they depend heavily on manpower both to carry out the attacks and to run the day-today operations to support the attacks.
Understanding Terrorist Recruitment
The first step in successfully preventing the recruitment of new members in terrorist organizations is by understanding why a person would volunteer him/herself to engage in the definitely/potentially fatal activity. In the past, there have been misconceptions about who joins terrorist networks; the general belief was (and still is in some quarters) that the average recruit is poor and uneducated; or mentally ill. This assumption is grossly inaccurate; terrorist organizations have a profile from which they favor during recruitment processes; generally, the average recruit is young and dissatisfied (Borum, 2004; Carlton-Ford et al, 2008). However, these organizations are very deliberate and careful about who is brought into the organization.
For instance, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) in Turkey is very particular about the recruits personality and motivation; if it fits their desired profile, such a person is drawn into the organization (rather than volunteering).
The Structure of Recruitment
The ability to convince a youth to leave home and join a military or paramilitary organization is tricky; this becomes more complicated if such an organization is illegal and faces direct opposition from a government. In this scenario, there is very little room for error; and the consequences of failure can be fatal to the group members and the organization.
In order to remain below the government radar, these groups have to be very versatile, mutating very rapidly, while at the same time, maintaining their target audience. As such, there isn’t a standard process of recruitment; and recruiters usually have to adapt to the prevailing forum. For example, recruitment in a prison would require very clandestine operation; on the other hand, recruitment in a training camp will be overt and unrestricted. Various models of recruitment thus exist:
The Net
In this scenario, the recruitment drive targets a whole population; for example a congregation in a church/mosque. This commonly occurs in regions where there is little resistance to the terrorist activities; and where the organization feels that the population is homogenously receptive to their cause. A blanket invitation is made; some respond and others don’t.
In order to make such an invitation, the organization will have to understand the demographic and psychographic inclinations of the target populations; such that a majority of the members are not only sympathetic to the organization, but pose no risk in terms of cooperating with the government for the detriment of the group.
The Funnel
In this model, the recruiter starts with a large number of recruits; who are then put through a selection mechanism that culls out those who do not have the desired traits or skills; and total commitment to the cause of the group. By the end of the exercise, the recruits have undergone a complete transformation into radical members. Additionally, even those that are weeded out can still be of aid to the organization; but can only operate at the fringes.
The Infection
Among the models of recruitment, this is the most difficult to detect; and is used in situations where the pressure from the opposing government is big; or in populations where recruitment drives would be largely opposed, for example the police or military. An agent is inserted into the population and goes ahead to recruit single members through personal persuasion and appeals. This process takes a relatively longer time; but can give the organization much needed insiders in the government.
The Seed Crystal
In this scenario, the target population is very remote, and the recruiters cannot reach it in any form; therefore, the organization seeks to create an environment whereby they recruit themselves (just like lowering the temperature of water creates ice crystals that form the points of freezing). Such include sympathetic populations in the Diasporas.
The Recruitment Process
Recruitment of a terrorist is a process rather than an event; even without a standard recruitment regime, there are certain steps that are taken. The first step is to and social problems; including issues of economy, poverty, human rights, political disputes and foreign occupation; this they do through passive methods such as propaganda. They then offer themselves as a solution through fighting of foreign and/or domestic powers who they blame the problems on (Carlton-Ford et al, 2008).
In order to persuade potential recruits, terrorists use various methods; some which are direct for example a personal appeal to join a training camp, or attend a meeting; or indirect such as (non-personal) appeals in form of sermons or pronouncement in the media. In order to reach the target audience, the organizations have fully embraced the use of mass media; such as radio, television and the internet; but also use social persuasion techniques such as sermons, training, indoctrination and word-of-mouth. Organizations that have adequate resources can use more than one method of persuasion. The method can largely be compared in two views (Goffman, 1963).
Private versus private forums; this depends on the prevailing environment. In areas largely controlled by authorities sympathetic to the terrorist cause, recruitment will be made overtly; such include parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan controlled by the Taliban which supports the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Public situations include festivals, TV, radio, posters, graffiti and sermons; private channels include restricted websites, infection-recruitment and training.
Proximate versus mediated contact; this is also determined by the environment; and is affected by technological advancement of the group, the target audience (socioeconomy, education) and the prevailing culture.
Vulnerability to Recruitment
Little empirical work has been done to fully describe the vulnerability of individuals to recruitment by terrorist organizations (Moscovici, 1980). Such has resulted in the filling of the information gaps with assumptions, misconceptions and stereotypes; therefore further crippling the ability of concerned authorities to prevent or reduce the recruitment. It has been shown that some of the factors that were considered important are in fact not central to this vulnerability.
For example, demographic are not as important as the psychographic state; it is this that determines an individual attitude and reasoning; and the probability of accepting the ideas presented during the recruitment. Factors such as age, profession and sex have been shown to have a lesser ability of enabling the potential recruit to resist (Ash & Zerin, 1982).
Some of the factors that increase the vulnerability of an individual include some dependent personality characteristics for example suggestibility and low tolerance for ambiguity; weak resistance or guidance from the immediate family; frustrated idealism; and dissatisfaction with the current status of self or environment (Carlton-Ford et al, 2008).
The terrorist recruiters have learnt to recognize these characteristics in potential individuals; albeit in non-scientific processes. Such has allowed them to recruit from populations that demographics would suggest there would be difficulty in converting someone into a terrorist. The main drive for the terrorists is that they seek to fill their ranks with people who are not only willing to die fighting for the cause, but who also posses skills, education or social status that would make their activities either more devastating or perpetual (Sageman, 2009).
For example, looking at the September 11th attacks in New York, all of the 19 attackers were well educated and of mature age; and were fully aware of what they were doing and committed to it (Clayton, 2003). Additionally, one of the hijackers, Hani Hanjour, was a trained and licensed commercial pilot; and had intermittently lived in the United States for a period of 10years; he had been identified through the regular screening of recruits for special skills. This and many other incidences debunk the misconception that a potential recruit is poor, uneducated or mentally ill. Indeed, it would not be of any service to the organization to have someone who cannot take instructions, or cannot communicate in English; and that would be conspicuous in a Western set up.
Additionally, the organizations also need recruits with whom they can engage in supportive (rather than directly offensive) activities such as making of bombs; telecommunications; and managing the finances so as to evade detection (Sageman, 2008). Such would require qualifications such as engineering and accounting.
In order to reach such a population, the recruiter first makes the initial contact that sets up future (and more intense) interactions. Secondly, the recruiter seeks to transform the inclination of the recruit into full commitment- by changing his/her line of thought. The recruit will see himself as a new person, defined by his membership in the group rather than any past events. Such techniques would work on anyone; regardless of the age, socioeconomic status, gender, level of education or mental status. The only prerequisite is that such a person must fit the profile; that s/he must be receptive to the overtures of the recruiter and must replace his/her line of thinking to that determined by the organization (Borum, 2004).
Many people in different parts of the world can easily fall prey to the recruiters drive; indeed, in some parts of the world, terrorist organizations get more volunteers than they have use for. Therefore, many are very selective; taking only the ones they want and taking into consideration the skills that they want to add to their organization; and risk of getting infiltrated by government operatives.
Challenges To Reducing Or Preventing Recruitment By Terrorist Organizations
The biggest impediment to reducing recruitment is the inaccurate profiling of the high risk groups. Indeed, the poor and uneducated youth would make a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment; and this demographic group makes up a large majority of the recruits. However, the damage their can inflict is small and restricted to attacks of a small scale. They also lack technical skills that would increase the magnitude of the attacks (Gambetta & Hertog, 2009).
The most worrying group of recruits, however, is the educated middle class professionals. These have the ability to put biological and/or nuclear weapons into the hands of the terrorist; they can form part of the terrorist network infiltration of governments and security forces; they can manage vast amount of money through the global financial system; they can form sleeper cells that blend into the Western society; they can operate highly advanced communication systems; they can fly commercial planes. Indeed, the undetected recruitment of one of a terrorist of this kind can have a bigger impact than the recruitment of hundreds of youths in remote outposts of the world (Gambetta & Hertog, 2009).
Terrorist organizations are very versatile and mutate at a very high rate (Sageman, 2008); if the various authorities charged with preventing attacks cannot keep up, then there is no guarantee that the world is safe from future terrorist attacks.
References
Ash S. and Zerin M. (1982). The Pied Piper Phenomenon: Family Systems and Vulnerability to Cults. The Fielding Institute, Santa Barbara, Calif.
Borum R. (2004): Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida.
Carlton-Ford S., Morten G. Ender, Ahoo Tabatabai (2008): Iraqi adolescents: Self-regard, self-derogation, and perceived threat in war. Journal of Adolescence, Volume 31, Issue 1, Pages 53-75.
Clayton, Mark (2003). Reading into the mind of a terrorist. The Christian Science Monitor. Web.
Gambetta D. and Steffen Hertog (2009): There’s something about engineers… The New Scientist, Volume 202, Issue 2712, Pages 26-27.
Goffman E. (1963): Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe.
Moscovici S. (1980): Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 13: 209–239.
Sageman M. (2008): Portrait of a modern terrorist group. The New Scientist, Volume 197, Issue 2641, Pages 46-47.