Introduction
The tragedy that occurred in 1996 is known nowadays as the Everest disaster. It remains one of the most challenging events to comprehend fully. The roots of the disaster and the accounts of various participants differ severely, leading to the story being partially disjointed. In order to understand the entire weight of the situation, reviewing multiple accounts is a suitable approach that may lead to adequate response and prevention of future tragedies akin to the 1997 Everest disaster. This paper will examine the accounts of Krakauer and other climbers and analyze the decision-making processes of their teams’ leaders from the collective point of view.
Krakauer’s Point of View
Into Thin Air allows a reader to understand Krakauer’s point of view, yet it is not sufficient to realize the full extent of the disaster. First of all, this situation was an organizational catastrophe that put each individual’s decisions up for a careful assessment. Krakauer’s account of the events clearly states that people went to Hall for any decision or emergency (Krakauer 91). However, he had doubts regarding his gas tank reserves before 2:00 PM during the summit day, which he failed to deliver to his team leader (Krakauer 205). Krakauer is an experienced climber who wanted to provide excellent material for his employer, yet it appears that he overestimated his abilities just as the others did. It is much more likely that the presence of a journalist only added pressure to succeed on the guides.
One of the reasons for the unreliability behind Krakauer’s depiction of the events may lie in his lack of accountability and adverse emotions towards Hall and other guides, as his leaders provoked the disaster. Dependency on Hall’s decisions during the final stages of the summit and on Boukreev’s actions in saving other climbers’ lives might have bent Krakauer’s perception of guilt and duty. In turn, Hall and Fischer might have used an inappropriate leadership style to convey their decisions to the team. It is likely that Krakauer, knowing the composition of his team, expected the guides to provide clear instructions and failed to express his concerns in a timely fashion due to this overreliance.
Analysis of Hall and Fischer’s Actions
Alas, this confidence was put on people whose goals and desires were already misplaced due to personal conflicting plans. Later in his book, the journalist-climber reveals that he saw Fischer reporting to his employer regarding the inappropriate decisions made by Boukreev (Krakauer 231). However, this report is of questionable value to Krakauer’s conclusions due to factors that he was unable to see. Boukreev, in his book-response The Climb, explains that both Fischer and Hall were competing for the attention of a journalist, trying to excel at both showmanship, risk-taking, and leading their groups to the top before others (Boukreev and DeWalt 16). It is possible that Fischer was merely trying to appease his employer through this call in a desperate attempt to prevent this ascent from negatively reflecting on his career. This unhealthy environment decisively leads to a major failure, as shown in Hall’s group example.
Hall and Fischer, who died during the ascent, were the leaders of the two groups arriving at the summit on 10 May 1996. They led groups before with great success yet were already known to be highly competitive among themselves (Boukreev and DeWalt 14). Moreover, they did not have sufficient teamwork training and did not know how to transform their managerial approach on the fly (Tempest et al. 1050). Both leaders were more inclined to lead by example and encourage others to follow their success. However, an authoritarian leader is more suitable for a commercial expedition with underskilled climbers rather than a motivational one (Kayes 60). The addition of Boukreev, whose independency was only fueling the guides’ ambitions, made a sure recipe for disaster.
Analysis of Boukreev’s Actions
Krakauer’s point of view also differs from other climbers’ experiences. The primary issue lies in his opinion on Anatoli Boukreev, who did not use gas tanks as instructed, which made his decisions negatively affected by the lack of oxygen (Krakauer 319). With the increase in altitude, the level of oxygen plummets, especially during storms. Boukreev was already known to Krakauer as a terrible team player through his acquaintances’ accounts (Krakauer 174). Fischer was also not keen on having the Russian climber on his team, yet he did not push toward mutual agreement on behalf of safety for the entire group (Kayes 97). This initial hostility might have made explaining decisions to the team more difficult. However, Krakauer admits that Boukreev’s actions were “an incredible display of strength and courage” (234). Despite his negativity towards the Russian guide, Krakauer does not put the guilt for the deaths on Boukreev’s shoulders entirely.
In turn, other climbers’ accounts differ slightly from Krakauer’s depiction of his role in this event. As noted before, he expressed his concerns, yet they were misunderstood due to his and his leaders’ attitude. Anatoli Boukreev describes Krakauer’s behavior as impatience mixed with frustration from having to deal with less experienced climbers (Boukreev and DeWalt 144). Hall and Fischer were trying to compete for the crowd’s attention, putting Krakauer and others into a false sense of an imminent success (Bourkeev and DeWalt 16). The journalist was as much a detrimental factor as the leaders’ incoherent organizational approach. Instead of being critical of the leaders’ actions, he could have helped them with establishing clear communication with each group member, especially due to his personal experience in mountaineering.
Boukreev’s actions have caused many controversies due to his seemingly selfish choices. Indeed, Anatoli Boukreev did not wait for the clients to descend alongside him, and he did not use his gas tank (Krakauer 320). However, Boukreev and DeWalt give an extensive and convincing explanation of his actions, stating that “[Bourkeev] foresaw problems […] and positioned himself to be rested and hydrated enough to respond to an emergency” (243). In the end, it was a deciding factor in saving several climbers who were lost, as Boukreev did predict. Moreover, the decision for an independent descent was made by the expedition leader, whose words Krakauer could not have heard firsthand (Boukreev and DeWalt 241). Undoubtedly, as a leader, Boukreev should have communicated his decisions with an entire team to avoid confusion, especially during his absence. The course of action without his temporary departure would have been worse by a large margin.
Consequences of the 1996 Everest Disaster
There have been apparent changes in hikers’ leadership and safety measures taken since the first climb on Everest. Hall and Fischer made the rules of the ascent to the summit clear and explained the rationale sufficiently, yet they did not follow their words due to the lack of persuasion skills and too much emphasis on goal achievement (Useem). Leaders are now making it absolutely clear that following their instructions is paramount, while they also listen to their groups’ needs and adapt to them (Useem). However, there are deficiencies in the team formations that are yet to be resolved. First of all, sherpas remain a cornerstone for heavy work during any ascent (Parker). Moreover, unskilled climbers are still legally allowed to join groups that go to the mount’s summit (Parker). These factors were severely detrimental to the Krakauer group and remain unsolved to this day.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is understandable that Krakauer and his team had different opinions on the 1997 Everest disaster in the context of a highly stressful situation where their leaders failed to assess the challenge adequately. The deaths of Hall and Fischer show the weight that leaders carry on their shoulders, especially when their teams fail at the organizational structure. Both guides were exceptionally skilled at climbing, yet their teams were too much of a challenge in terms of self-control and instructing others to follow one’s steps. Survivors’ accounts of the event take different views on the necessity of risks, safety measures, and planning. Moreover, there are controversial accusations of Boukreev being selfish in his decisions which do not assess his trail of thoughts in this stressful situation appropriately. Overall, it appears that the lack of leadership skills and improper management during the ascent led to the untimely deaths of eight people. This case continues to serve as a dire reminder to those who fail to see the current situation and not only their final goal.
Works Cited
Boukreev, Anatoli, and Gary Dewalt. The Climb: Tragic Ambitions on Everest. St. Martin’s Press, 2018.
Kayes, Christopher D. Destructive Goal Pursuit: The Mt. Everest Disaster. Springer, 2006.
Krakauer, Jon. Into Thin Air. Anchor, 2009.
Parker, Laura. “Will Everest’s Climbing Circus Slow Down After Disasters?” National Geographic, 2015. Web.
Tempest, Sue, et al. “In the Death Zone: A study of Limits in the 1996 Mount Everest Disaster.” Human Relations, vol. 60, no. 7, 2007, pp. 1039-1064, doi:10.1177/0018726707081157.
Useem, Michael. “The Leadership Lessons of Mount Everest.” Harvard Business Review, 2001. Web.