Introduction
The Bar-Lev Line was a fortification line constructed by Israel along the eastern shore of the Suez Canal in 1969. The purpose of the line was to defend the canal from a possible attack by the Egyptian Army. The line was named after General Chaim Bar-Lev, the Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff at the time. The Bar-Lev Line consisted of a series of concrete bunkers, machine gun positions, and anti-tank emplacements.
The line was supposed to be held by the Israeli Army’s 7th Armored Brigade but later was held by reserve infantry units. The Israeli government considered the Bar-Lev Line one of Israel’s most critical strategic assets. The line played a crucial role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War when the Egyptian army attempted to cross the canal and was almost wholly run over when the outpost provided no valuable warning of the Egyptian attack.
This paper will discuss some of the reasons why the leaders made the choice they did on the Bar-Lev Line. Additionally, the paper will discuss the decision’s background, concepts, and outcomes. Lastly, the paper will provide a discussion based on the analytical observation, the story about the decision, and how it was routed.
Why Did the Leaders Make the Choice They Did on the Bar Lev Line?
The decision to protect Israel against any serious Egyptian invasion across the Suez Canal was decided by the commanders on the Bar Lev Line. Moreover, the decision was anticipated to make the line serve as a graveyard for the Egyptian troops. The decision was made by the commanders to create a series of simple defense systems along the waterway. The Israeli Chief of Staff developed the perimeter defense system on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal during the Bar Lev Line’s construction, beginning in 1968 (Samaan 273).
The Bar Lev Line was a retaliation to the Egyptian weaponry assaults during the Attrition War. The decision forced the leaders to build an elaborate defense system that spanned 150 miles along the Suez Canal (Bar 322). The sole exception was the Great Bitter Lake, where the lake’s vastness made it improbable that the canal could be crossed.
The Bar Lev Line cost approximately $300 million and was an exclusive water hindrance that bonded a vast, constant sand wall liner throughout the whole canal, reinforced by a concrete fence (Samaan 275). The height of the sand wall varied, between 20 and 25 meters, and inclined at different angles, between 45 and 65 degrees (Samaan 275). The key function of the sand fence was to shelter the Israelis against any aquatic or reinforced units from attacking the Suez Canal’s east bank with no previous engineering plans. Based on the estimation of the planners, the Egyptians were anticipated to take between 24 and 48 hours to break the fence and create a conduit over the canal.
At the time of its creation, the Bar Lev Line was to safeguard the Israelis suffering from Egyptian artillery shelling. The built fortifications provided almost complete personnel protection from the shelling and were successful, despite being almost wholly run over, in sheltering the Israelis both before and during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Bar 331). Although the Israelis never realized the design and construction of the original plan, the line became the solitary principal engineering plan to have ever been started by the Israeli administration.
How Did the Bar Lev Line Reflect the Israeli Strategic Doctrine?
The basic principles of Israel’s military doctrine are deterrence, early warning, and decisive outcome. Deterrence is meant the creation of the enemy’s conviction that it cannot start a war against Israel since its losses as a result of this war will be immeasurably greater than any of its gains. If deterrence does not work and the enemy decides to go to war, Ben-Gurion’s doctrine requires that the Israeli leadership receive an early warning of this. Finally, the third principle is that in the outbreak of war, Israel seeks to defeat the enemy, i.e. to the deprivation of his ability to resist.
The Bar Lev Line reflected the Israeli Strategic Doctrine in several ways. First, it was a physical manifestation of Israel’s strategic doctrine of deterrence through defense. The line was a physical barrier to deter potential attackers from entering Israeli territory and prevented latent invaders from looking for an easy target. For most of its history, Israel has had threats of almost total destruction by its neighboring nations. Israel has a strong military, but its defense doctrine considers warfare as a “no choice option” with a high economic and social cost. The Israeli doctrine heavily depends on deterrence projections (George 144). The “erosion” of Israeli deterrence has been a topic of discussion throughout Israel for many years based on various events; nevertheless, they are rife with misconceptions.
Next, recognizing the Israeli-based deterrence doctrine requires a deep understanding of the critical national situation levels—”Routine,” “Emergency,” and “War”—in which deterrence should be accomplished. Moreover, an understanding of the contribution of “compellence” and pre-empting enemy offensive power as a tool for triggering deterrence, which is referred to as “pre-Terrence,” is essential (Konyukhovskiy and Theocharis 910). In the end, Israel successfully maintained tactical deterrence toward Egypt. Israel’s deterrence doctrine is based on the premise that Israel cannot afford to lose a single war and, therefore, must be able to deter and defeat any adversary or coalition of adversaries. The doctrine emphasizes the need for a robust military capability, including nuclear weapons, and a willingness to use military force where necessary.
The doctrine also calls for a proactive security approach, including preemptive military action if necessary. The doctrine is based on the belief that Israel’s enemies are determined to destroy the Jewish state and that Israel cannot afford to lose a single war (Weininger 630). This belief drives the need for a robust military capability and a willingness to use that force whenever the need arises. The doctrine also calls for a proactive approach to security to protect Israel from its enemies.
Third, the Bar-Lev Line was also a concrete expression of Israel’s policy of no territorial concessions. Israel’s territorial concession policy is the official strategy of the Israeli government regarding the issue of regional concerns when negotiations with neighboring countries. The policy was first articulated by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 and has been reaffirmed by successive Israeli governments. Some have criticized the policy as inflexible and an obstacle to peace. Others have praised the policy as a necessary safeguard for Israel’s security. The policy has been a significant sticking point in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, as the Palestinians have demanded a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories as part of any peace agreement. Israel has so far refused to concede on this point, leading to a stalemate in the peace process.
The policy is based on the belief that the land belongs to the Jewish people and should not be given up. It is also centered on the belief that the Palestinians are not sincere about wanting peace and would only use any territorial concession to launch attacks against Israel. Additionally, the rule is predicated on the belief that a two-state solution is impossible and that any attempt to create a Palestinian state would only lead to more violence and conflict (Konyukhovskiy and Theocharis 914). Moreover, the policy is also based on the belief that the Palestinians cannot govern themselves and that any attempt would only lead to more chaos and violence.
Finally, per this policy, the only way to achieve peace is through military force, and any concession would only be seen as a weakness. However, the policy has been criticized by many, who argue that it is counterproductive and will only lead to more violence and conflict. However, supporters of the policy argue that protecting the Jewish people and their homeland is necessary.
Lastly, the Bar-Lev Line was a testimony to Israel’s commitment to the security of its citizens, which is absolute. Israel will do whatever is necessary to protect its people, even if that means military action. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is responsible for the safety and security of Israelis inside and outside the country. The IDF has a strong presence along the borders of Israel and maintains a high state of readiness to thwart any potential threats. The IDF also works closely with other security agencies, such as the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security service), to gather intelligence and thwart terrorist attacks. In addition to its military capabilities, Israel also has a robust homeland security system, including border control, surveillance, and public security measures.
In connection with the above, it is clear that any war unleashed by the enemy indicates that the first principle of Israeli military doctrine – deterrence – has not worked. In the case of the Yom Kippur War, it is evident that the second principle did not work either: the Israeli leadership received the warning of an imminent war too late when it was no longer possible to use it effectively. The Yom Kippur War also did not end with the defeat of the enemy, despite significant tactical and operational achievements of the IDF on both fronts and such a ratio of losses that elsewhere, with different characteristics of the conflict, could be equivalent to victory. It is possible to speculate that the defeat of the enemy by the forces of the IDF was possible in October 1973 and that it would have become a fact under a different international situation, but the value of such reasoning is not great, and their practical provability is problematic.
The Background, Concepts, and Outcomes of the Decision
Despite the design of the line, the Israeli government never finished it as per the initial plans; it nonetheless grew to be Israel’s single most enormous engineering undertaking. As many other defense systems, its function has grown hazy throughout history, and its original plan was effective. The Bar-Lev Line consisted of a series of concrete bunkers, trenches, and other fortifications, backed by artillery and air support. It was considered one of the most heavily fortified lines in the world at the time.
The Bar Lev Line was a system of fortifications constructed by Israel along its borders with Egypt and Syria after the 1967 Six-Day War to defend them from raiding and deter attacks. The Israeli built the Bar Lev Line during the War of Attrition, which lasted from July 1, 1967, to August 7, 1970 (Bar 340). The Bar-Lev Line technology was based on the construction of two lines of fortifications. The first strip was sand mounds 20–25 m high and sloped 45–65° (Cordesman and Abraham, 23).
Strongholds were erected along the entire embankment, equipped with heavy machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers and anti-tank guns. Minefields and barbed wire were set up between strong points, and critical areas of the front line always had 10–12 tanks and 5–6 anti-tank weapons per kilometre of the front (Cordesman and Abraham, 24). It was assumed that the assault on the first strip of the Bar-Lev Line could be hampered by the launching of oil products into the water of the Suez Canal and their subsequent arson. For this purpose, the Israelis created a system of underground and underwater pipes that connected the reservoirs with oil products and the Suez Canal.
The second line of fortifications was located 30–45 km from the canal and consisted of concrete shelters reinforced on the outside with five layers of steel wire containers filled with stones. These stone walls were 3.5 m high and 4 m thick (Cordesman and Abraham, 25). During the Yom Kippur War, the rugged terrain of this section determined Israel’s success on the Sinai front.
Although the Israelis constructed the line along the Syrian and Egyptian borders, the main emphasis was placed on the Egyptian side. The Line was 55km long, with 20km on the Syrian border and 35km on the Egyptian border. 800-meter-deep minefields and wiring entanglements rang at every vital point. Some locations had napalm tanks that could blanket the waterway with gasoline on the spot, creating a one-meter-high flame coating and raising the water’s temperature to the full boil (Levite 9). The only way to attack the Suez Canal and Bar-Lev Line was perhaps from the front. That went against the way fortified locations have traditionally been attacked.
The result of the Bar Lev Line’s attack by the Egyptians was that the Israeli military was primarily futile in organizing in the first two hours. Due to Israeli equipment’s inability to find the Egyptian force centers, they were attacked from all sides of the broad front using unconventional strategies. Israeli forces suffered significant losses as a result of the Egyptian encirclement strikes because they were unable to withdraw strong areas along the line as a result of the subsequent disorganization (Samaan 288).
Eventually, the Israeli recovered and managed to launch a successful counterattack against Egypt after 436 Israelis had been trapped in the stationary protective spots alongside the canal (Bar 335). The successful retaliation against Egypt and the beginning rounds of the Egyptian strikes marked the major Israeli loss in the prolonged Arab-Israeli war series of the 20th century. Israel experienced major equipment and human casualties, as well as harm to its political and armed forces officials’ career prospects, which is what led to the unexpected Israeli preparation disaster.
Further, the decisive outcomes of the Bar Lev Line are still evident in Israel to date. The IDF continues to have an early warning several days before war breaks out. In the case of the Bar Lev Line, 300 tanks sufficed to defend the Sinai Peninsula (Levite 25). Moreover, if there were surprise attacks, the regular army and the air force are responsible for blocking the attacks until the Israeli defense system mobilizes the counterattacks.
Analytical Observation, Story About the Decision, and How It Routed
Israel participated in the conflict with US support. Their primary adversary was Egypt, whose coalition included Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the USSR. Moreover, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco, Libya, North Korea, Tunisia, and Sudan supported Egypt. The participation of other countries in the conflict involved the financing and supply of weapons and troops, which predetermined the outcome of the conflict.
The concept behind the Bar Lev Line was about a strategic decision and how it was implemented. The story is about a group of Israeli soldiers guarding the Bar Lev Line. The defense force was ordered to stay at their post even though they were under attack by the Egyptian army. The soldiers were eventually able to hold their ground and protect Israel from the attack.
Commanders Israel Tal and Ariel Sharon opposed the establishment of the line during its initial proposal. They thought the entrenched fortifications were nothing more than constant sights for various Egyptians. They believed that armored movement forces alone would be responsible for maintaining the canal’s defenses, continuing the IDF’s historically successful emphasis on flexibility and quick reactions to violent action (Levite 25). The dilemma was whether the Bar Lev trench was a continuous front line of defense or a delay strategy, with the actual battle taking place in a maneuver.
Israel switched from an active-based defense that primarily relied on its superiority warplanes and the contemporary Bar Lev Line tactical bunkers constructed along the eastern banks of the Suez Canal to an operational defense. With the IAF standing by to support it, the line served as the first barrier of ground-based defenses and an alarm system against an invader’s onslaught. Before the arrival of the IAF and the start of full Israeli deployment, the line functioned as a static position. Israel’s strategy appeared to operate as tensions grew before the 1973 warfare (Weininger 634). The line was meant to thwart any significant Egyptian offensives throughout the Suez.
Due to the Israelites’ small size, the 436 Israelis constrained in the stationary fortified lines besides the Canal represented a valuable asset for Israel, necessitating rescue operations to locate those troops who might return behind Israeli-based lines throughout the Sinai. The “Yom Kippur War’s” successful Egyptian invasion constituted the most significant Israeli loss in the extensive sequence of Arab-Israeli battles in the mid-twentieth century, even though the Israelis later recovered and mounted a victorious assault within Egypt itself (Weininger 636). Massive losses in both personnel and material occurred for the Israelis, and those political and military figures who were held accountable for the unusual lack of readiness for Israel incurred severe damage to their professional futures.
Conclusion
The Bar-Lev Line was a physical and political barrier constructed by Israel along the Suez Canal after the Six-Day War in 1967. The barrier prevented Egyptian forces from crossing the canal and attacking Israeli territory. Despite its construction, the Bar Lev Line was never fully effective and was eventually invaded by the Egyptian Army during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The plan was one of the most strategic decisions made in the Israeli strategic doctrines as the leaders settled on the decision for the protection against the warring neighbors.
Works Cited
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