Introduction
Context of the Policy Problem
Drones are aircraft that do not require a pilot on board to fly. They are also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The use of armed drones by Middle Eastern nations has become a topic of interest over the past decade as it raises critical concerns, including the implications of drone deployment in countering insecurity (Zwijnenburg and Postma 2018). Iran, Israel, and Turkey have impressed advancement in AI technology which they presently use to manufacture armed drones (Gettinger 2020). These drones are significant in helping to monitor border surveillance and counter any forms of attacks (Maghazei, Michael, and Torbjørn 2022). However, the UAE has registered limited development in the capabilities of armed drones since it imports from China (Gettinger 2020). Thus, the UAE’s border surveillance and security information are incomparable with states such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey, which have greatly relied on armed drones to enhance their security systems. For instance, the drone gap faced by the UAE is an attributing factor to the 2022 recent attack by Houthi on the UAE’s infrastructure (Crino 2020). The attack caused a fuel tank blast at a storage facility in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
Therefore, this attack proves the need for the UAE to develop and implement policies that will help the country to achieve its own drone capabilities and independence. For example, the UAE is still struggling in the age of deploying mercenaries on the battlefield, while nearby states such as Iran manufacture drones that are cost-effective and efficient (Krieg 2022). Most often, mercenaries are not reliable because they might tend to overcharge the nation and underperform in the field strategy (Gettinger 2020). Other countries such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey have continued to advance in the deployment of AI in drones in security aspects and cushioning the human task force (Colefax et al. 2018). Therefore, responsible bodies and powers in the UAE have a duty to analyze and provide policy options that will make the country maintain the security of its infrastructure and borders like its surrounding states such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel.
Definition of the Policy Problem
The UAE has had strict regulations over the use of drones through bodies such as the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority. For instance, countries such as Dubai require drones to be registered with both the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) and the DCAA. However, another significant disadvantage is that persons cannot register a drone unless they are UAE nationals or have a UAE residency visa (Tuamah and Saja 2022). UAE has showcased a slow growth rate in the application of AI in technological applications and the use of drones due to regulations by GCAA and DCAA. This aspect by the GCAA limits the use of drones in security surveillance (Chen, Zhangchen, and Senay 2021). As a result, the UAE has become vulnerable subject to attacks on its infrastructure (Gettinger 2020). On the contrary, Israel, Turkey, and Iran have strengthened their infrastructural security by utilizing drones to monitor attacks caused by terrorists (Kırdemir and Phil 2019). The technological advance and solid security maintained on infrastructure in Israel, Iran, and Turkey reveal a drone gap in the UAE that need to be addressed through the formulation of the best policies.
Iran, Turkey, and Israel have remained on the core to better their operationalization through drones, and the advantages have surpassed the disadvantages. Israel, for instance, is a neighboring state currently using drones to carry out geographical surveillance and military monitoring (Husain 2021). Iran has become the leading nation in the advancement and production of drones which have helped the country shape its military surveillance (Rubin 2021). Unfortunately, UAE has remained less developed while other countries continue to explore AI and robotics applications in drones (Colefax et al. 2018). However, the existing drone gap between UAE and the neighboring states in the Middle East can be resolved through the selection of the best policy options by concerned authorities in the country.
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of increased technological advancement and proliferation of drones in the Middle East and analyze the best policy options that can be selected by the UAE to address the challenge of the armed drone gap between nearby states such as Israel, Turkey, and Iran.
Methodology
This research used qualitative methodology to find sources and data that have contributed information about the technological advancement and proliferation of drones and the existing drone gap in the UAE. Sources used in this research paper were sampled based on the viability, time span, geographic coverage, availability, and usability of the database. Sources that fit the subject matter of the proliferation of drones in the Middle East and regulations of drones in the UAE were selected to fit the scope of the research. Sources published within a period of fewer than five years were sampled and used to give a clear image of the current policy problem in the UAE. The availability of these sources is considered accessible and non-purchasable sources to facilitate the easy gathering of data and evidence on the drone gap in the UAE.
Limitations of the Study
There are various potential limitations in this study that could be addressed in future research. First, the research was only limited to one region (the Middle East) and one particular country, which is UAE. This limitation did not give the research a broader opinion that could bring comparisons and contrasting circumstances in other regions and countries. Narrowing the research to the UAE does not give a complete overview regarding the implications of increasing technological advancement and the use of AI in armed drones by other regions and countries. Sample bias is another limitation that made it challenging to select a source that had accurate information regarding the proliferation of drones in the Middle East. Most of the sources were older than five years from the time of being published. Thus, the research had insufficient sample sizes that required statistical measurement and drawing of inferences. Further, there are inadequate previous research studies on the proliferation of drones in the Middle East and the drone gap in the UAE. Hence, there is limited access to data as some sources that contain necessary information require authentication to be accessed.
Problem Description
Technology has revolutionized the application of AI in machine-controlled activities in Middle East countries. Countries that have ventured into drone usage in their atmosphere have had greater benefits in the securitization of their borders and infrastructure. Drones are now used by Iran, Turkey, and Israel to gather security intelligence in places where security people cannot reach (Gettinger 2020). When compared to dispatching security troops, they obtain security information rapidly and at a minimal cost (Mekdad et al. 2021). According to the 2021 security report, researchers predict that by 2030, drones will have taken over security work valued at $128 billion (Yaacoub et al. 2020). Drones may capture photographs and provide comments to the main server at a low cost (Tadjdeh 2023). This efficiency demonstrates that the drone gets security details at a far cheaper cost than alternative methods of getting the same information. One intriguing aspect of using drones for security is that they can film videos and pictures from a greater distance, making the target unaware (Zwijnenburg and Postma 2018). Drones are generally employed as an essential aspect of security management in the Middle East rather than as a security stand-alone in discovering security solutions.
The UAE has had little development in drones in terms of security surveillance, unlike countries such as Israel and Iran. This aspect does not put the country on the same technological threshold as other countries in the Middle East but poses a great risk to its privacy in security matters. Further, the country would have safeguarded infrastructural developments and prevented adverse exposure to attackers in the same manner in which its nearby states have gained from using armed drones. For this reason, UAE needs to adopt suitable policy options that will help the country gather the benefits brought by technology and catch up with its neighboring countries that have advanced in the use of technology in drones to evade threats posed by armed drones.
Policy Options
The following policy options could work best for UAE to eliminate the drone gap experienced with regard to its nearby states.
Build Its Own Drone Capabilities and Rely on Itself, to an Extent Called Internal Balancing
UAE should build its own drone capabilities and rely on itself, to an extent called internal balancing. Internal balancing will entail attempts to increase the UAE’s influence by boosting its economic resources and military might. This balance will allow UAE to rely on independent capabilities in response to the drone gap and compete more effectively in the international system. Partnering with other countries will ensure that the country maintains a balance of power with other states that have advanced in technology (Patel et al. 2019). For instance, Iran’s journey towards drone capabilities began with partnering with its allies such as Syria, Venezuela, and Tajikistan, which helped in the assembling and production of drones. Iran relied on Tajikistan’s technology by building factories that built reconnaissance and attack drones (Magistretti and Claudio 2019). This approach is suitable for UAE to adopt because it has proven successful in the drone capabilities possessed by Iran in the Middle East.
This relationship will help to promote easy access to drone aids and AI technology in the security monitoring of the country’s infrastructure and boundaries. Internal balancing will further promote drone capabilities in the UAE by enabling the country to copy and implement AI technologies that are used by other countries through partnerships (Horowitz 2018). Overall, the development of drones in the country will be at a lower cost due to the low cost of production of raw materials such as mini-computers, which require enormous resources.
Purchase Drones from Strategic Allies
Another policy option that the UAE could opt for is to purchase drones from its strategic allies. Strategic allies are significant countries that partner with the UAE in the implementation of projects. Strategic allies of the UAE include states such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, which manufacture drones (Colefax et al. 2018). These states have progressed in technology and have developed quality armed drones that are used in security matters (Nouacer et al. 2020). Turkey is a perfect example that employed the policy of buying drones from Israel in the 2000s. Turkey had become Israel’s primary consumer and customer for Heron UAV. Later, Turkey developed its home ground after retreating from its purchase from Israel due to political affiliation. Thus, Turkey gained drone technology and production from Israel, which became a foundation that has helped the country to emerge as a drone manufacturer.
Turkey’s drone production has enabled it to become superior in the game of armed drones in the Middle East. The UAE’s allies will also save the cost by reducing regulations and exercising duties and tariffs on exports due to mutual benefits and development. This option is essential in the independency of drone capabilities for the UAE because it offers wider choices through which the country can expand in addressing the drone gap.
Purchase from Whoever Has the Best Accessible Technology
The UAE should purchase drones from whoever has the best accessible technology. This option is effective due to the higher rate of technological growth and advancement across the globe. While considering this policy option, Iran and Turkey are perfect case examples that borrowed powerful drone technology from Israel and European nations such as the United States. Further, countries that are advancing in military drone warfare in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Russia, have trusted Israel’s technology in the production of armed drones (Zwijnenburg and Postma 2018). The superiority of countries such as Iraq in armed drone warfare is a significant threat to the infrastructures of countries that have not strategically developed drone knowledge to enhance security surveillance (Zwijnenburg and Postma 2018). The complex nature of world events such as warfare and security, disasters, and service delivery is proving the necessity for countries to strive and get the best gadgets that meet the needs of circumstances countries face. Therefore, the UAE should choose and purchase drones from companies and countries that have the best accessible technology to acquire efficient and superior drones. For instance, Iran and Israel are considered to have developed the most superior drones through their technological advancement in AI and machine learning (Gettinger 2020). Iran’s borrowed technology from Turkey has enabled it to successfully manufacture sufficient and powerful drones that detect terror attacks (Colefax et al. 2018). For this reason, UAE will acquire up-to-date technologically advanced drones that will enhance the infrastructural growth rate experienced by countries such as Iran to fill the drone gap in the armed drone attacks in the Middle East.
Minimize the Regulations on Drones
UAE should lessen its drone regulation policies that have been in place over the last decades. These regulations have hindered the expected pace of the growth of technology, especially in the application of drones. The country should remove the visa regulation requirement that it imposes for individuals to fly drones in the UAE’s airspace. Further, the UAE needs to diversify the bodies that are in charge of registering drones instead of limiting them to DCAA and GCAA. Lessening these regulations will propel rapid growth in the application of drones in the UAE’s agricultural sector by farmers and economic performance by business entrepreneurs. Further, the establishment of different regulation and registration bodies will enable the UAE to register with a different company with the best technologies in the production of drones. Thus, the drone gap that is being experienced in the UAE will be recovered.
Conclusion
In conclusion, UAE is a country Middle East region that has continued to lag behind in infrastructural development amidst the increased technological advancement in the use of armed drones and AI. While other nations, such as Iran, have deployed military and armed drones in territorial surveillance, the UAE has suffered attacks that have resulted in adverse threats and destruction to the infrastructure. The infrastructures by armed drones in the UAE include oil storage facilities and airports in Abu Dhabi. Nearby states have fully utilized the increased growth in technological advancement and proliferation of drones in the Middle East to foster security surveillance than the UAE. Thus there is a resultant drone gap that needs to be addressed by the UAE to counter underlying threats of armed drones in the Middle East to the infrastructure.
The best policy options that the UAE can adopt include purchasing drones from strategic allies, purchasing drones from other available sellers with accessible technology, and building drown capabilities through internal balancing. Building own drone capabilities and self-dependence to the extent of internal balancing will facilitate intense collaboration and access to drone technologies at a much-reduced cost. Buying drones from strategic allies saves on cost and is less time-consuming when compared to the time needed in production. Purchasing from available best accessible technology is a significant option that will enable UAE to acquire the best drones that are technologically viable. The UAE needs to implement these policy options to best manage and address the drone gap evident between nearby states such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel. However, the best option could be for the UAE to purchase drones from its strategic allies to balance powers in international and diplomatic relations over armed drones.
Recommendations
Underlying the evidence and findings from extensive research, it is recommended that future research should consider research in extensive areas, not limited to one area. Future researchers need to consider the incorporation of large sample sizes in the collection of data to facilitate the presentation of enough on the subject matter to avoid sample bias. The research should be expounded on other countries outside the Middle East which have experienced the proliferation of drones and the factors contributing to the less application of technology. Even though the UAE needs to adopt the policy options above, involved stakeholders and the government need to formulate laws that will govern armed drones in the country’s airspace (Macias et al. 2019). In this regard, sensitive information about the country should be monitored and operated by the UAE but not ally countries (Macias et al. 2019). The government will need to ensure that armed drones are not being used to endanger people’s lives, such as by monitoring movements and hijacking (Winkler, Sherali, and Katrine 2018). Armed drone usage should follow regulations by the international community and should be used to reinforce the country’s security (Siddiqi et al. 2022). The UAE government needs to diversify its regulation and licensing bodies while ensuring that the sensitive information and safety of significant infrastructures remain protected (Nelson and Tim 2019). The policy option that will best suit to address the drone gap in the UAE will be purchasing drones from strategic allies. Implementation of this policy will guarantee UAE the opportunity to be at par with other countries in the Middle East in terms of protecting itself against armed drones in security surveillance.
Internal balancing will entail attempts to increase the UAE’s influence by boosting its economic resources and military might. This balance will allow UAE to rely on independent capabilities in response to the drone gap and compete more effectively in the international system. Partnering with other countries will ensure that the country maintains a balance of power with other states that have advanced in technology. Thus, this relationship will help to promote easy access to drone aids and AI technology in the security monitoring of the country’s infrastructure and boundaries.
Further, firm internal balancing between states will promote collaboration and the exchange of commodities. Therefore, internal balancing will help the UAE to build its drone capabilities and rely on itself because the country will be able to import at a favorably lower cost from countries that produce drones like Iran and Turkey. Internal balancing will further promote drone capabilities in the UAE by enabling the country to copy and implement AI technologies that are used by other countries through partnerships. Overall, the development of drones in the country will be at a lower cost due to the low cost of production of raw materials such as mini-computers, which require enormous resources.
The UAE should consider purchasing from strategic allies to save on the cost and time of production. The cost will also be low when the country purchases drones because the strategic allies to UAE will be selling surplus production at reduced tariffs. The UAE’s allies will also save the cost by reducing regulations and exercising duties and tariffs on exports due to mutual benefits and development. This option is essential in the independency of drone capabilities for the UAE because it offers wider choices through which the country can expand in addressing the drone gap. The cost of production will be minimized because the initial cost of production is high cultivated by expensive raw materials used to manufacture drones in the mother country.
The time frame of production for an advancing country like the UAE will be long. Hence, the country should consider purchasing from strategic allies to save on the cost and time of production. In this case, UAE will acquire up-to-date technologically advanced drones that will enhance the infrastructural growth rate experienced by countries such as Iran. As a result, the country will gradually fill the drone gap showcased when compared to its neighboring and nearby states in the Middle East. Generally, the curse of action for UAE will be to reduce infrastructural attacks by armed drones in the Middle East at a reduced cost and resources. Further, it will create a healthy relationship with powerful countries to prevent power suppression.
SWOT Analysis
Weighted Criteria
Costs
The UAE’s course of action in cost reduction will save the country’s infrastructure from armed drones. The exploitation of opportunities by the UAE will boost the country’s security surveillance (Yaacoub et al. 2020). Further, investing in technology and AI and importing drones will save the country’s future expenses on security and infrastructural development against armed drones.
Risks
There is a high risk of the UAE spending more resources on technological development and the implementation of policies against armed drone usage in the Middle East because the world is becoming more competitive every day. UAE will suffer destruction and security intrusion due to the increased development of armed drones if it does not invest in drone technology used by nearby states such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel in the future.
Impact/Success
The course of action for UAE’s policy option in purchasing drones from strategic allies is the acquisition of the best accessible and available technology for military drones. Purchasing drones from UAE’s allies will save it from accumulating costs related to raw materials and the installation of necessary technology. Another course of action for purchasing drones from UAE’s allies is to exploit opportunities that will help to address the challenge of the drone gap (Milan and Aniseh 2020). For instance, advancements in investment in the usage of AI and drones have enabled Iran to inspect its territorial limits and territories, furthering the surge in the use of drones to manage increased threats of armed drones. Exploiting opportunities by UAE will promote the increased application of drones that will counter the proliferation of armed drones in the Middle East and its accompanying menace to infrastructural developments.
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