Abstract
The case study report is of the Crossrail project in London, which provides the current issues that have been faced during the development and the construction process. The Crossrail project was developed to significantly reduce commuting times. Despite this, since its inception in 2009, Crossrail has been plagued by delays and overspending. The current report looked at the strengths and weaknesses experienced during the project development and provided an argument on the Crossrail project.
Executive Summary
Crossrail is an infrastructure project aimed at increasing bandwidth in the UK. It constitutes the building of an advanced 118-kilometer railway that will connect Wokingham and Heathrow throughout the west to Shenfield and Old Oak Common along the eastern. The site’s realization will allow an additional 1.5 million people to transit throughout London’s major economic areas in 45 minutes. Trips from northern Kent to downtown London are roughly an hour, and these would be reduced by about a third, thanks to Crossrail. Crossrail was marketed by Cross London Train Lines, a strategic partnership business founded by public Transport for London (TfL) and the Systemic Rail Authorities (SRA). The initiative is estimated to generate a £20 billion lift for the UK economy. Although the approval of Crossrail has been universally applauded, some features of the project continue to spark debate.
Connectivity with lengthy UK operations is impossible because Crossrail is planned as a take operation. Preserving the Heathrow railway network as an extension instead of allowing lengthy connecting is seen as a missed chance to boost train transit, like the LGV eastern metabolic end of Paris across Charles de Gaulle airport or the plans for Berlin Brandenburg Terminal. The London City council Municipality governing body then offered to assist in closing a £400 million financing gap touting the proposal before formal confirmation in October 2007. In this case, Crossrail Act 2008 gained Royal Prerogative in July 2008, and the Committee was reorganized immediately afterward.
Terms of Reference
The case study report was written to review and analyze the current scheme of the Crossrail project in London to assist the Infrastructural Planning Committee of the Crossrail project. The report’s purpose was to oversee the strength and weaknesses of the project and develop an argumentative view.
Scale
The report did take much time as it involved studying, reviewing, and analyzing the articles on the Crossrail project progress.
Scope
The scope of this study was to look at the background information on the Crossrail project in London and give the argumentative views of this project. Also, the strengths and weaknesses of the Crossrail project were analyzed, and recommendations were given.
Background information on Crossrail project
Crossrail is a huge infrastructure development in London that links the western and eastern sides of the city. This Tunnel connects Berkshire and Heathrow in the west to Shenfield and Abbey Wood in the eastern. It has impacted the city’s most vital sectors of the economy. Fast connections have become available from Heathrow to the west end, via the city and Canary Wharf. Crossrail is well-known for its several advantages. (Williams et al., 2018) On the economic side, it has reduced commuter travel time, particularly in the east end and southeast. Crossrail has increased the number of people within 45 minutes of commuting distance of London’s major economic centers by 1.5 million (Milillo et al., 2018).
Crossrail has been noted to have agglomeration and clustering effects because it has connected London’s banks and financial sectors. Cross rail appears to be on the right track inside the complicated British infrastructure delivery system. The development has conquered numerous challenges. The crossrail project, which has been under development since 2009, is not a novel concept (Lundrigan et al., 2018). This new route was conceived in the nineteenth century, revived in the 1940s, and identified as an important project for London’s growth in numerous publications, including the Central London Rail Study (CLRS) of 1989 (Newlove-Eriksson, 2020). The final ‘go-ahead’ for the development of Crossrail took over 40 years. Crossrail was given the green light and got Royal Assent in 2008 after overcoming the numerous challenges those British megaprojects typically confront.
Building a large-scale project like this in the heart of a bustling city like London is fraught with danger. Crossrail contemplated using the layout delivery technique, which would pass the risk to the developers. However, such a suggestion was rejected since it could have resulted in huge cost increases due to uncertainty. Instead, Crossrail used the usual construction management technique, which includes detailed design for the project’s major structures and solicited production bids for specific packages (Macchiarulo et al., 2019). To control and limit risk, the corporation maintained contingency costs and paid special attention to the procurement process. The railway systems and tunneling were all handled by expert committees. On all significant contracts, the procurement process mandated a full performance review every six months. The Performance Assurance Framework, is a process that involve detailed assessment, measured performance, encouraged teamwork, and information sharing.
Management and funding to the Crossrail project
Crossrail was managed by Crossrail Limited, a joint venture in 2001 to build and promote the system. Crossrail appeared to be on schedule and within budget, and its funding structure seemed to be stable (Loo et al., 2018). Crossrail, which was initially anticipated to cost £16 billion, cost £14.8 billion, thanks to a mix of public and private financing from TfL, the government, and the private sector. The funding system was separated into three thirds, each representing £5 billion. One-third of the funding comes from users, particularly travelers who pay a surcharge on their tickets. A second third comes from the private sector, e.g., employers, proprietors, and developers, who contribute to the GLA’s financial package (Giardina et al., 2019). The remaining five million dollars comes from government subsidies. The BRS was first collected in 2010, followed by the CIL in 2012. In the first year of the BRS, about £200 million was collected, close to the aim. Some stations, such as Canary Wharf, were built with the help of developers. Crossrail will provide specific transportation benefits like time savings, congestion alleviation, and broader economic benefits (Seidu et al., 2020). Several specialists used various appraisal approaches to quantify the future impact of Crossrail on central London skills of the workforce, that is, agglomeration benefits, increase in employment (Muchatuta & Brooke-Turner, 2021). The UK’s economic status is set to expand from Crossrail to the tune of £42 billion. Twenty-four trains every hour between Paddington and Whitechapel at peak times also create new work opportunities and reduce travel times. According to estimates, Crossrail will raise the value of buildings along the Crossrail line by 15%.
Argumentative view of the Cross-rail project
To explain Crossrail’s favorable trajectory, it is contended that the project has profited from the emergence of a coalition representing many interests (Schumacher, 2018). This coalition resembles a growth coalition in many ways because a significant objective of the actors was to contribute to London’s expansion and promote the upgrade of London’s existing infrastructures. The argument of the development the London’s rail project is the Elizabeth line. The Elizabeth line would make it much simpler to get about London and the South East and operate a business. It will minimize congestion on the area’s transportation system and improve connectivity between London’s main commercial business centers, such as Heathrow, the West End, the city, and Canary Wharf, than ever (Cocconcelli & Medda, 2021). When operating at total capacity, the Elizabeth route will increase core
London’s Crossrail is an infrastructure project aimed at increasing bandwidth in the UK. The £16 billion development was supposed to open in 2017; however, due to the latest budget, it has been postponed until 2018. Trips from northern Kent to downtown London are roughly an hour, and these would be reduced by about a third, thanks to Crossrail (Fowler, 2019). The period it covers to get to Heathrow, which is now over an hour and a half, would be reduced by up to a fourth Crossrail was marketed by Cross London Train Lines, a strategic partnership business founded by public Transport for London (TfL) as well as the Systemic Rail Authorities (SRA), which is perhaps disbanded with the Department of Transportation taking up its responsibility.
Crossrail would render future projects in the Metropolitan area, Isles of Dogs / Canary Wharf, and the Thames Gateway convenient from many other locations as London’s role as an entrepreneur grows, without adding to the overburdened Tunnel and urban traffic networks. The initiative is estimated to generate a £20 billion lift for the UK economy (Chodorowski et al., 2021). Although the approval of Crossrail has been universally applauded, some features of the project continue to spark debate. Connectivity with lengthy UK operations is impossible because Crossrail is planned as a take operation (Biesenthal et al., 2018). Preserving the Heathrow railway network as an extension instead of allowing lengthy connecting is seen as a missed chance to boost train transit, like the LGV eastern metabolic end of Paris across Charles de Gaulle airport or the plans for Berlin Brandenburg Terminal. The London City council Municipality governing body offered to assist in closing a £400 million financing gap touting the proposal before formal confirmation in October 2007 (Whyte et al., 2022). The Crossrail Act 2008 gained Royal Prerogative in July 2008, and the Committee was reorganized immediately afterward.
The Crossrail scheme also helps societies along the Elizabeth line regenerate, and the new concept is intended to permit the building of roughly 90,000 new homes. Nearly half of all development choices inside a kilometer of an Elizabeth line terminus identify the anticipated rail as a motivation for pushing forward, equating to nearly 5.3 million cubic kilometers of residential, commercial, and warehouse space (Williams et al., 2018). Crossrail and its supply-chain in management are obligated to assist the approximate 55,000 job growth throughout the country during the project’s duration. Over 10,000 employees are reportedly operating more on than 41 locations across London at the height of development (Ting et al., 2021). The project’s supply chain extends the length and breadth of the United Kingdom, with businesses of various sizes competing for project tasks (Mboumoua, 2017). Three out of every five companies that supported the project are headquartered outside of London, and more than half (58 percent) are small and medium-sized enterprises.
Strengths and weaknesses of the Cross-rail project
The London cross rail project was costly that is it received funding from the UK government public and private sectors from TFL. Millions of funds that could have been used to finance other projects in London were channeled to support the construction of the Cross rail. Also, the project took a lengthy period to come to completion, and it has been faced with many crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Jallow et al., 2020). The construction of the cross rail brought several impacts on the surrounding environment and people living around the Tunnel. Some of the adverse effects that might be obtained due to the construction are that the vibration caused by the moving rail can negatively affect the surface tension and the structures surrounding the Tunnel.
Despite the challenges faced by the cross rail during its stages of development, the construction of the cross trail was beneficial to the government, community, and UK investors. This is evident by the job creation realized during the project’s construction economic flourishment. It provided a means of fast transport to cope with London’s forecast population and, in turn, the growth of many businesses carried out along the cross trail. In addition, there were new interchange opportunities with the services of TFL’s underground and overground services, which led to the decrease in volume in the present concentration at the terminus (Roehrich & Kivleniece, 2022). The construction of the cross trail eradicated the need of retailers and business people to use other modes of transport like ferries when carrying out their business activities.
London cross attracted many foreign investors to the country to carry out their investment activities, thus boosting the economy of London. The proposed railway will provide enterprises and residents with shorter travel times, decreased roadway and local transportation congestion, more productivity, and increased wages (Pollalis & Lappas, 2019). Minimizing energy utilization throughout Cross rail’s design and maintenance seems to have been a priority for the program. Heating, elevators, staircases, conditioning, circulation, and power use on trains have all evolved over the course of the program to help achieve project goals.
The weakness of the London cross rail project is that Crossrail, which runs through the heart of London, may have an impact on the structures above that will be felt someday, or just never at all (Inayathusein & Cooper, 2018). The persistent shaking of rails could potentially damage this underground stratum and cause instability above by tunneling in specific spots adjacent to surface soil. The other thing that disappointed me with the London cross rail project was TfL’s failure to respond to commuters’ demands for onboard toilets (Whyte, et al., 2022). When elderly and individuals with disability travel, worries about accessing usable bathrooms and toilets are a significant source of problems and tension, Crossrail revealed that the train’s building had taken longer than expected, with “reduced than intended performance in the completion stage and transmission of the tunnels and terminals.” It also admitted that it had miscalculated its time to complete and deliver from over new sites in central London. Properties values have increased by 65 percent over the same period throughout all parts of London within one kilometer of a cross rail terminal, thus contributing to cross rail failures.
Conclusion
For London and the United Kingdom, Crossrail provides enormous financial and social benefits. The costs and benefits analysis demonstrates that the project has a strong business case on a regional scale, notably in terms of congested motorways on London’s existing transportation network and helping the city to generate jobs. The new railway will cost £16 billion to construct, but the advantages to the UK economy will be worth at least £42 billion. Crossrail was not only the “right project,” but it was also “done correctly.” Megaprojects tend to stick on attempted procedures by avoiding fresh or by providing a comprehensive review, with a perspective of them being risky and costly. Crossrail, on the other hand, emphasized growth and creativity from the start, establishing a blueprint for large-scale transportation.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
- In the monthly Crossrail briefings to the Transport Committee, the Crossrail Chief Executive should explain Crossrail’s high-level project timeline, including any underpinning assumptions altering the timeline.
- The Crossrail should be analyzed if any tensions are subjected to the surrounding environment by this rail project and to assess if there is any pollution to the environment.
- Also, TFL and the transport committee should look into consideration constructing on board toilets so that the elderly and the people with disability will not have problems looking for toilets when they are commuting.
- The proposed cross rail train should offer food to the passengers while they are on board.
Specifications of the objectives
Specifications of the objectives for action required and the recommended method of approach to implementing the recommendations are:
- To determine the Crossrail high level and the underpinning assumptions.
- To investigate the levels of pollution brought about by the Crossrail, if any.
An observational approach should be used to implement the above specific objectives.
References
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