Introduction
In his book, The End of History and the Last Man Francis Fukuyama (1992) expresses the view that liberal democracy is the most optimal form of government and in the future, more and more countries will adhere to its principles. This essay is aimed at discussing this hypothesis by looking at such a country as China that passes through a period of economic growth without adopting a fully democratic system of government. Overall, it is possible to argue that this particular state contradicts Fukuyama’s ideas since it shows that the leaders of a country may prefer an authoritarian regime if they believe that this regime is effective. Although Chinese markets have indeed become more liberalized, one cannot say the same thing about the political system of this country. More importantly, there is no compelling evidence showing that in the future, their political system will undergo significant changes. Fukuyama’s hypothesis is based on the premise that the course of history has a certain logic, but societies can be affected by a variety of factors, and scholars cannot accurately predict their effects. The most important issue is that a non-democratic state such as China may not change its form of government if the ruling elites do not have any internal or external incentives to do it. Authoritarian regimes may prevail if they are believed to be effective by people or governments.
The complexity of China’s development
The examples provided by Francis Fukuyama (1992) emphasize the idea that liberal democracy is the most effective form of government that has ever existed (p. 4). In his book, he stresses the point that China could achieve some progress only by liberalizing its market and reducing its intervention into economic relations (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 41). It should be noted that in the late seventies, the Chinese government began to carry out a series of reforms that could help integrate the country into the global economy (Burgio 2007, p. 181). More importantly, a great number of people came to the belief that this society would inevitably become democratic. The surveys of Chinese population indicate that many people in this country have a positive attitude toward the democratic form of government and liberal values (Wang 2007, p. 561). However, contrary to widespread expectations, this change did not take place. Such a scholar as Zhengxu Wang (2007) supports Fukuyama’s hypothesis and says that Chinese people will eventually force the government to liberalize the political system of the country (p. 576).
Nevertheless, there are several important barriers that one cannot overlook. The opponents of Fukuyama’s hypothesis argue that the change of the economic system should be confused with the political life of the country (Gat 2007, p. 59). Thus, a country can become a capitalist authoritarian order without attaching much importance to the political or civic rights of citizens (Gat 2007, p. 59). In his article Li He (2005) characterizes China as a “soft- authoritarian regime” which emphasizes the economic well-being of its people, rather their political privileges (p. 209). International organizations are more critical; for example, Freedom House (2010) emphasizes the point that the Chinese state continuously suppresses human rights activists who try to raise people’s awareness about the practices of governmental institutions. Thus, one can argue that the liberal economy and autocracy can co-exist.
Moreover, the political transformation requires certain conditions and one of them is the high bargaining power of the middle class. It is not quite clear how this country can transform itself into a liberal democracy. This process is hardly possible provided that the middle class is willing and powerful enough to affect the decisions of the government (Burgio 2007, p. 186). At this point, this middle class constitutes only a small part of the population (Burgio 2007, p. 186). The liberalization of the Chinese economy has helped many urban households to reach middle-class status, and these people are not willing to criticize the state, at least openly (Farrell, Gersch, & Stephenson 2006, p. 69). Therefore, one cannot say that the liberalization of the political system is inevitable. Fukuyama’s theory does not explain why a country should may its political regime if the majority of people cannot voice their discontent with the policies of the government. This is one of the issues that should be taken into account.
Furthermore, economic growth may actually become an obstacle for the democratization of the country. The thing is that the successes of the Chinese economy can make the government even more convinced that their strategy is correct (Burgio 2007, p. 183). Successes do not usually prompt people to change their strategy. In other words, the ruling classes do not have an incentive to democratize the political life of the country. Moreover, they can even believe that the transformation of the Chinese political landscape can result in instability or unrest that may eventually harm the economic growth of the country (Burgio 2007, p. 182). This is something that they do not want. Fukuyama’s hypothesis implies that there are certain external or internal pressures that will compel a state to become democratic.
For instance, China chose to liberalize its markets in an effort to stimulate its stagnant economy and help people (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 40). Therefore, China reformed its former economy which was based on central planning (Fukuyama 1992 p. 41). Yet, at the present moment, the government of China does not significant international or internal pressure. The ruling elites may even come to the conclusion that this strange blend of capitalism and authoritarianism may be the underlying cause of the country’s progress. Surely, such a view may not be based on facts, but this is what political leaders of the country may believe. Therefore, the liberalization of markets may not be conducive to the liberalization of the government. Fukuyama’s hypothesis cannot explain why this country remains an authoritarian state, but its economic performance does not decline. Fukuyama’s book was written in 1992, but since that time the political system of China did not transform itself into a democracy. Thus, one can cast doubt on the validity of his hypothesis.
Instability of political regimes
There is another trend that can undermine Fukuyama’s hypothesis. In developing countries, democratic government are often accused of being inefficient especially at the time when a country passes through a period of recession (Remmer 1990, p. 315). Such accusations may not be justified, but they become very popular at the time of crisis. Thus, the efficiency of liberal democracy can be questioned if the country is not able to achieve sustainable growth. In turn, Chinese leaders may believe that their authority can be at risk if they choose to introduce democracy in the country. So, one should take into account the reasoning of the ruling elite and this issue is not fully discussed by Fukuyama. Political leaders are not willing to support the principles of democracy if coercion is the source of their power.
Secondly, the Chinese government forms its attitudes toward democratic governments by looking at Western European countries or the United States. The global economic crisis that broke out in 2008 strongly affected the majority of democratic countries (Minqi 2010, p. 298). For instance, the United States had to increase the deficit of the government (Minqi 2010, p. 298). Moreover, the economic growth of many countries slowed down. In contrast, the economy of China continued to grow even at the time when the recession was in its peak. The thing is that Chinese government and the citizens of the country may conclude that their political and economic systems are superior or at least more resistant to crisis. Fukuyama’s general premise is that liberal democracy contributes to better economic performance and eventually leads to the improvements in the lives of citizens. Yet, the economic failures of democracies may undermine this argument. Moreover, political leaders can change their attitude toward non-democratic states if they can achieve sustainable growth. Francis Fukuyama did not take this possibility into account. He admits that totalitarian regime can emerge in some countries (Fukuyama 1992, p. 4). Yet, he does not say that they can become economically successful.
Additionally, the political leaders of other countries may also look at China’s economic growth and they may come to the conclusion that its political and economic system can or should be emulated. The statistical data collected by researchers suggest that democratization is not a universal trend. According to the study done by Wolfgang Merkel (2010) indicates that the number of democratic states in the world fluctuates by several percents. (p. 22). These fluctuations can hardly be predicted and fully explained. For instance, in 2007 and 2009 the number of democracies among all states decreased by 1.7 percent, but in the previous years this percentage was growing (Merkel, 2010, p. 22). The key point is that the political system is not necessarily stable and much depends on the efficiency of the policies, rather than the form of government. Therefore, one cannot argue that countries inevitably gravitate toward a democratic form of government.
Overall, political development of a country depends upon the way in people and ruling elites perceive the successes or failures of the state. If the ruling elites have no internal incentive to change the form of government, it is unlikely that a country can become turn into a democracy.
The example of China illustrates this idea because this state has attained economic growth. The political change is normally motivated by a certain failure which affects the majority of the population. Without it authoritarian regimes are unlikely to transform. It should be taken into consideration that in countries like China, the state has the capacity to suppress the expression of public opinion and the government can conceal its failures. Therefore, the ideas of Francis Fukuyama may not be applicable to this state.
Discussion
Again, one should emphasize that the ideas of Francis Fukuyama rely on the idea that the political development of countries follows a certain pattern. In his view, liberal democracy has proved to be the most efficient form of government; therefore, developing states are more likely to adopt its principles. Nevertheless, this theory can be valid provided that liberal democracy consistently demonstrates its efficiency. If a non-democratic state is believed to have achieved some success, other countries may also choose to adopt some of its strategies. One has to emphasize the point that Chinese economic growth can hardly be explained by the fact that this country is authoritarian. More likely, one can speak about such factors as the availability of skilled workers and liberalization of their economy. Nonetheless, political leaders often tend to attribute the country’s successes to ones actions, decisions, or strategies and such behavior is typical of many people. They may believe that authoritarian capitalism is the most efficient approach. This is the main limitation of Fukuyama’s model.
Conclusion
This discussion suggests that China represents a blend of liberal economy and authoritarian state. The government of the country chose to relax its restrictions of the markets, but the political system has not yet changed. It can still be regarded as a totalitarian state in which people cannot uphold their civic rights. Francis Fukuyama may be right in arguing that democratic form of government may be the most optimal one. However, one cannot say with certainly that every state will adopt its principles. The thing is that the successes or failures of the country are often attributed to its political regime. Thus, both democratic and non-democratic regimes can prevail if they are considered to be successful. Although, Fukuyama’s conception of history is an interesting model, one should not assume that it can explain every form of political change.
References
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