Introduction
Small states have been the objects and subjects of international politics for millennia. Historical scientists and political analysts have traditionally been focusing on large countries and empires, following the premise voiced by Niccolò Machiavelli that small nations can compete with larger nations neither in economics nor in military aspects, therefore being powerless to influence their own fates, which are decided by larger and stronger outside forces (Maghroori, 2019). However, after the Second World War, the situation for small nations changed. The world became peaceful and more tolerant towards smaller nations, with soft power replacing hard power as the main instrument of politics. These tendencies gave a boost to defining and theorizing small states.
Although no precise definitions exist, many scholars attempted to provide criteria, based on which a small state could be differentiated from large states. Some of these include but are not limited to population size (typically below 15 million), geographical area, military strength, GDP, natural resources, and positioning on the map (Handel 2016). Granted, no state perfectly fits all of these criteria – a country with a very small territory may have a strong GDP, large population size, and comparable military strength (Handel 2016). The offered definition also does not take into account the relative political power the country is capable of leveraging. Examples of physically small states with significant political pull include the Vatican, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, examples of physically large states with much lesser pull include Ukraine, among other nations.
Small nations can often find themselves under soft or hard pressure by its larger neighbors in order to force compliance. One example of such events includes the Gulf Crisis of 2017, during which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and banned Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes along with Saudi Arabia blocking Qatar’s only land crossing (Naheem 2017). The purpose of this paper is to evaluate one small state of interest – Qatar, in relation to the Gulf Crisis and its ongoing diplomatic and economic blockade by the neighboring states.
The Importance of Stability, Economic Advancement, and Political Diversity for the Small States
For small powers to grow and flourish, there are several conditions to be met. The first one is the presence of internal and external political stability. Small nations tend to rely on their larger neighbors and economic partners in numerous ways, from accessing their markets to receiving economic donations, contributions, and military aid, if necessary (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016). An example of such a nation would be Israel, which maintains long-standing relations with the US and has a strong political and economic lobby in the country to ensure that the relationship remains stable and beneficial to the country. Saudi Arabia is another small state that the US considers an ally, mostly because the Saudis support the US in all matters concerning oil while remaining one of their largest customers in terms of weapons and ammunition (Fawcett 2016). Thus, the absence of internal and external destabilizers is beneficiary for small-state growth.
To maintain these relations, the internal political stage in both countries has to be stable and in agreement about the general vector of relations (Galal 2020). Should Israel suddenly change course and seek the support and protection of Iran, for example, it would immediately weaken US support. Same could be said about Saudi Arabia, as it is bound to the US and its allies through economic ties and military contracts (Fawcett 2016). There are examples where small powers tried to change their political vector despite the economic, political, and military ties (Galal 2020). Those attempts usually ended up poorly due to interference from larger states. Ukraine can be a powerful example of such tendencies – its attempt to turn away from Russia and instead become part of the EU was a complete failure, resulting in the loss of the Russian market, its territories in Crimea, militant separatism in Donetsk and Lugansk, and a collapsing economy (Baldacchinoel and Wivel 2020). Therefore, both internal and external stability is of crucial importance.
Economic advancement and positioning are the sources of political power for small states. Based on the adopted criteria of small states, they generally do not possess the instruments of hard power, that being military might and the population numbers to support it (Scheldrup 2014). Nor can they rival larger states in terms of strength. Therefore, economic advancement is the best avenue of gaining power, as the economy is not hardwired into territorial sizes and population numbers. Singapore, for example, despite being a single city-state, has a very high GDP, estimated at 364 billion USD a year (Saidy 2020).
Saudi Arabia and the countries of GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) are also good examples, having achieved significant economic prowess due to high demands for oil, as well as progressive economic policies and investments into new technologies. Making a country attractive to financial capital through competent governance, long-term investments in education and innovation, the presence of natural resources, and advantageous geographical positioning are the internal qualities a small state needs to advance its economy (Scheldrup 2014). Only through these measures it can attain a measure of soft power to start influencing regional politics.
Finally, there is the subject of political diversity in relation to prosperity of small states. In theory, a small state that keeps friends with numerous nations is less likely to become overly dependent on one, thus minimizing the chances of being manipulated or coerced by said nations (Long 2016). Existing in a state of political diversity is, thus, beneficial. In practice, however, such status is rarely achieved, due to the realist consequences of trying to play both sides.
Many small powers have historically been reliant on the largest one in the area, making diversification a risky long-term project. In many cases, such motions are perceived by the dominant power as attempts to leave their sphere of influence, with catastrophic results. The latest example would be Armenia, which tried to diversify its contacts by weakening its ties with Russia – Armenia’s biggest economic and military ally (Baldacchinoel and Wivel 2020). As a result, in the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it did not receive any support and lost the contested Karabakh region (Baldacchinoel and Wivel 2020). Thus, it could be concluded that while preferable in a vacuum, diversity of foreign policy could potentially be dangerous and lead to economic and political consequences.
The History of the Gulf Crisis
The Gulf Crisis started in 2017, when the UAE, KSA, Bahrain, and Egypt cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. These countries closed off their air spaces to Qatari airlines, prevented the use of docks, facilities, and access to maritime borders by Qatari ships, closing off their land borders (Naheem 2017). The official reasons for such drastic actions include the alleged support of radical Islamist groups and Iran by Qatari officials, as well as the desire of the country to challenge the existing hierarchy and status quo within the GCC (Naheem 2017). In essence, the existing crisis is the continuation of the crisis of 2014, when diplomatic tensions were also high, for similar reasons (Fawcett 2016).
The motivations of countries may vary, as there is evidence that the crisis was triggered not by Qatari support of radical Islamism groups and Iran alone, but also by ambitions of the countries involved to maintain their leading positions in the GCC and with the US allies (Fraihat 2020). With Saudi Arabia, the motivations are likely of a political, rather than religious nature, since Qatar is a major competitor for leadership in the GCC, having often been relied on as a negotiator nation between the Sunni and the Shia conflicting parties (Lynch 2017). In addition, Qatar threatened Saudi Arabia’s position as the main ally of the US in the Middle East by housing its largest military base (Quilliam 2019). UAE and Bahrain’s motivation in this conflict is to support KSA for its own economic benefit, due to closer ties to the Kingdom rather than to Qatar. Finally, Egypt’s motivation is based on its relationships with KSA as well as the political objective to weaken Turkey and Iran (Quilliam 2019). The demand to shut down a number of independent news outlets also indicate a desire to dominate the info-space in the region.
The blockade has been holding since 2017, and Qatar does not show signs of concession. Its substantial crisis fund of over 300 billion dollars is enough to sustain the country and its people for quite some time (Ulrichsen 2020). Turkey and Iran have shown support to Qatar through humanitarian aid, diplomatic assistance, and military support. The members of the blockade are unwilling to concede either due to the loss of face and fearing the strengthening of Turkey’s and Iran’s prestige in the region.
Theoretical Analysis of the Qatar Crisis
Qatar finds itself in a very complex and volatile diplomatic deadlock. Its situation demonstrates the danger of conducting a multi-vectoral political approach in a region where there are several competing powers hostile to one another (Long 2016). In this case, the fraction lines go through the political and religious aspects of diplomacy. GCC and its allies oppose Iran and Turkey not only due to religious disagreements, as Iran is championing political Islam, whereas Saudi Arabi wishes to keep it secular but also because of either country’s political ambitions to become the new dominant forces in the Middle East (Fahy 2018; Saidy 2020). As such, trying to negotiate and mingle with these countries, from GCC’s point of view, means treason, which provoked such a strong reaction. In addition, Saudi Arabia, being the strongest minor power in the GCC, feels naturally threatened by Qatar’s economic and political flexibility and fears losing its prominent position as US’s go-to ally and negotiator (Saidy 2020). Whether Qatar planned on eventually challenging KSA or not is unclear, but it remains in a difficult position.
Qatar can no longer conduct its multi-vectoral policy, as its former allies turned hostile. At the same time, changing camp and becoming close to Turkey and Iran would put the country in a vulnerable position, as they have effectively exchanged their reliable former allies on former enemies in terms of politics and religious beliefs (Fahy 2018). In order to truly be capable of diversifying its economic and political contacts, Qatar requires a powerful ally that could protect it from both sides while satisfying its economic and political needs without the region having to rely on its neighbors.
Such ally could be the US, and Qatar has all the qualities to replace Saudi Arabia as the supernation’s primary ally and base of operations in the region (Fahy 2018). Qatar’s economic fortitude, as well as its reserves, will allow withstanding a prolonged diplomatic and economic blockade (Ulrichsen 2020). Eventually, once GCC, Iran, and Turkey realize that Qatar will not budge and can maintain stable growth with the assistance of the US and the collective West, the blockade may be removed or left as a token gesture, and allow Qatar to be the hub of inter-faction politics, acting as a mediator, like it wanted to (Ulrichsen 2020). It is one of the few strategies to provide a mediating outcome without risking long-term enmity and losing national sovereignty.
Conclusion
Based on the traditional, realist view of international relations, lone small states are at a disadvantage. In order to maximize their power, they require to form blocks of interests, ensure stability and economic growth, and achieve sustainable diversification of relationships. Qatar was part of one such block and enjoyed significant economic growth as part of it. However, after the 2017 Gulf Crisis, its membership in GCC is heavily questionable, while Turkey and Iran make for poor allies of convenience. Repairing relationships in the short-term perspective is unlikely, which means Qatar needs to seek assistance from a power that can ensure its sovereignty from both the GCC and other nations.
That power could be the US, which already has good relations with Qatar and fields its largest military base in the country. Qatar economy can repurpose itself while relying on its saved funds to become less dependent on the nations surrounding it and more aimed towards the West. Once that is done, the country could serve as a viable alternative to Saudi Arabia as the US’s partner in the Middle East. In addition, maintaining neutrality towards both Sunni and Shia-backing states would support Qatar’s diplomatic standing and ensure its place as a neutral ground in any future negotiations.
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