The abuse of power is a prevalent phenomenon in diverse societies and systems of governance as evident by the practice of judges in the context of law and the ability of a president to pardon criminals.
Judges operate within a legal structure, which constrains their roles in the administration of retributive justice and curtails their authority regarding tasks such as pardoning of offenders or discarding the execution of penalties despite the fact that they are the guardians of the law.
On the other hand, the constitution bestows excellent power to the executive, as a branch of the legislature, in critical matters of perceived justice and justifiable violence. The functions of the judicial department conflict with the powers of the executive because of the executive’s tendency to override retributive justice and sustain the governmental decree of justice (Bull 2012, p.173).
The existence of the judicial department as an element of the state has created a loophole that allows entities within the government that violate laws and avoid the recommended penalties. For example, although law enforcement agencies have been on the limelight on numerous occasions due to acts of violence against civilians, juries often absolve the agencies of any wrongdoing.
The most common justification for the use of violence by the police against citizens concerns the discretion to use force in situations whereby the police perceive violent intervention as crucial to the undertaking of their duties. The willingness of juries to condone violence highlights ideologies and structures of the power of the state that seek accountability of civilians but absolves elements of the government from any responsibility.
The state exists as a monopoly and legitimizes violence within its various elements and branches because the power of the country entails controlling various means of violence. State agents can use violence without much condemnation by the judiciary with state officers acting as an extension of the expression of the state power and violence.
Considering that government officers act in the capacity of the state, they can advance their personal interests and gains by disregarding the law and promoting violence in the pretext of doing their job and acting in the line of duty.
The constitution defines legal exceptions for the state in matters such as protecting the sovereignty through just war or internal wars, which allow political leaders and influential individuals to undertake unpopular actions and defy international law.
For example, the invasion of Iraq by the United States defied the UN Security Council resolutions and led to widespread abuse of human rights and a significantly high number of civilian casualties (Burke 2007, p.10).
When viewed in the realm of strategies for national security, a Congressional vote for the invasion of Iraq possessed a legal legitimacy despite the fact that all the powers of the government should exist within the context of the law.
Legal structures, which grant executive powers and exceptions, promote violence against civilians by influential individuals who enjoy exemptions as provide by the constitution. All actions by the state or an individual should be subject to their consequences and cause of harm to other parties because the state does not exist in a vacuum but is a collection of individuals bestowed with power in various capacities.
The executive power allows the state to act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge so that influential individuals acting in the capacity of the country can promote impunity, violence and injustice without having to worry about being accountable for their actions.
The influence of the state over legal interpretations coerces courts to act in favour of the country and is a central aspect in the foundation and thriving of states on violence. The alignment of legal interpretations in favour of state violence provides room for the application of authoritarian violence and the sustenance of hermeneutic jurisdiction (Koskenniemi 1990, p.17).
The acceptance of violence by those in power emanates from the fact that judges will support violence by the state and encourage the subjection of civilians to state violence. The power of the state allows the prevalence of selective justice and submissiveness of civilians to avoid the consequences of conflicting with state interests.
Individuals within the judicial department promote violence through their assertion of laws and destructions of others using the court’s authority, which gives superiority to judges’ interpretation of the constitution (Selassie 1936, p.1). The acceptance of a judge’s interpretation, even when wrong, allows collaboration between the executive and the judiciary in absolving the wrongdoings of those in power.
Resistance by civilians against inappropriate legal interpretations is likely to encounter violent of administration, which is beyond the reproach of the court law. An analysis of state violence illustrates that the authority of judges cannot circumscribe the undertakings of the wielders of state violence because the constitutional structure seeks to limit the intrinsic power of the judicial department.
The need by influential individuals to retain authority overrides the importance of protecting the constitutional rights of victims of violence and introduces aspects of deference of justice by the state or administrators so that the influential people do not take responsibility.
Reference List
Bull, H 2012, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
Burke, A 2007, Beyond security, ethics and violence war against the other, Routledge: London.
Koskenniemi, M 1990, ‘The Politics of International Law’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 1, no. 1, pp 4-32.
Selassie, H 1936, Haile Selassie, Appeal to the League of Nations, June 1936. Mount Holyoke. Web.