Initially, the Tulip Revolution was to be named after yellow by youth activists. The Tulip Revolution was a complicated exception to the post-communist electoral revolt. The Tulip Revolution is believed to have occurred due to various reasons, including; Kyrgyzstan’s liberal political environment, the economic state of the country, the rivalry between elites on presidential succession, and incumbent President Askar Akaev ’s unpopularity.
After long years of economic difficulties and perceived corruption at the end of the 1990s, President Akaev’s popularity lessened. The country still experienced high rates of unemployment and inequality even after the economy experienced growth in 2001 (Hale, 2015, p.194). In 2002, Akaev ’s decision to crack down on protesters in the Aksy district led to five civilian deaths. During his term in office, president Akaev’s aggressive amassing of private resources for his family members had put a distance between him and his subjects. Over the first years of the 2000s, all this created an expectation among increasing numbers of elites that there was a good chance Akaev himself might not be in a position much longer to punish those who defied him. And this meant that the risks of opposition activity got lower for elites while the chance they could wind up on the winning side by going into opposition grew (Hale, 2015, p.194). After the elections in 2000, Akaev, unlike his counterparts in neighboring countries, had no intentions of changing the constitution to increase his term in office. Moreover, in mid-2004, he announced that he would leave office as soon as his time ended.
According to hale, one can observe increasingly brazen challenges to Akaev ‘s authority developing during the years leading up to when he was scheduled to leave office. When Azimbek Bek Nazarov got arrested, the parliamentarian organized a demonstration in the south district of Aksy to counter the arrest (Hale, 2015, p.194). President Akaev issued a crackdown to suppress the revolt. Unfortunately, the crackdown caused negative popularity for him due to the force used. Two months after the revolution, Akaev’s prime minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev, resigned and became an opposition figure. Kurmanbek started coordinating a South-based network that openly opposed Akaev’s leadership and wanted to replace him as the president of Kyrgyzstan (Hale, 2015, p.195). Hale writes that Akaev may have used Kurmanbek as a scapegoat to cover up the Aksy revolt, which he denies saying that he resigned voluntarily.
Hale notes that in 2005 presidential elections became the key motivation drive for the elites. The elections were supposed to choose a successor for Akaev (Hale, 2015, p.195). The first round stipulated that the regime’s popularity was not credible when Akaev ’s supporters started winning more seats. Akaev’s son and daughter had been elected for parliamentary seats, while major opposers such as Roza Otunbaeva were disqualified. Southern networks and formal counts who had lost the election rallied up a protest. Elite defections from the Akaev regime overtook much of the South and increasingly spread to the North (Hale, 2015, p.195). The increasing defections from close allies in his administration decreased his term in office. Hales pens that staff and partners started supporting the opposition in Akaev’s government to secure a place for them under the new regime. Osmonakun Ibraimov, Akaev’s State Secretary, referred to it as the “syndrome of the leaving of power.” Scrutinizing the tulip revolution, most key defectors were Akaev’s trusted allies who primarily wanted a chance at winding up in the winning coalition.
Apart from Bakiev, who led the opposition, Roza Otunbaeva, the former foreign minister, and Feliks Kulov, former Vice President all a part of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan who coordinated revolt from both the North and the South (Hale, 2015, p.196). Hales argues that Akaev presenting himself as a peaceful figure who chose to leave the country to prevent bloodshed increased the opposition’s chances of forming the new regime. Political leaders in Russia and Kazakhstan accused Akaev of being a soft leader and not affirming power. They concurred that his decision not to order his troops to fire on the revolting crowds was a mistake that made him appear weak to his subjects (Hale, 2015, p.196). In an effort to maintain his grasp on the country, Azaek appointed Keneshbek Diushebaev as the new interior minister and gave him the title of vice prime minister. Keneshbek, unlike Akaev, was challenging and warned the opposition that he would not hesitate to use force on demonstrators who attacked state buildings. Furthermore, this contributed to the Kyrgyz armed forces defecting from the regime.
According to Hales, Akaev’s closest allies confirm that in March 2005, when crowds revolted around state buildings in Bishkek, his decision not to order troops to fire on the opposing group was not based on his morality and principality (Hale, 2015, p.197). instead, he could not control the army, which had already defaulted from the government, and he could not count on them to obey his command unquestionably. According to Hales, other associates and family claimed that Azaek avoided using force on crowds to prevent causing a civil war. They argued that Azaek believed that fighting against his own civilian justified the fear he had of losing his trust in the armed services (Hale, 2015, p.198). His daughter, Bermet, confirms Kyrgyz army defecting in her account of why her father opted to flee the state.” During the night of March 23–24, a report came in that the leaders of the opposition had reached an agreement with almost everyone responsible for law enforcement that there would be no resistance to the opposition forces”.
Before he fled his country, Akaev knew that his chances of winning were low, so the army and his associates were unlikely to follow his orders. Moreover, opposition figures organized a coup for president Azaek (Hale, 2015, p.198). This made it physically impossible for him to stay in Kyrgyzstan. In his statements to a Russian newspaper, Akaev claimed that important figures in the police department collaborated with the opposition (Hale, 2015, p.199). With connections in every state department, the opposition was able to overthrow the current regime and free Kulov from jail. Moreover, the opposition established power in Kyrgyzstan, acknowledging Baviek as the acting president until election time, completing the Tulip Revolution.
The blood-red revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2010)
Kyrgyzstan became the post-Soviet republic to face a repeat of an almost similar revolution in a span of five years in patronal presidentialism policies. According to Hale, the Tulip Revolution did not alter patronal presidentialism. Instead, it only changed the person in the position. Bakiev did not change the system; he ruled over Kyrgyzstan with his own style of the power pyramid. Kyrgyzstan has been categorized as a weak state vulnerable to revolutionary attempts by opposing parties (Hale, 2015, p.230). During Bakiev’s term, the opposition constantly organized protests to end his regime after his first term in office.
Due to his patronal personality, he defeated them by co-opting, dividing, and conquering mechanisms. In June 2005, when the Kyrgyzstan White House was seized in support of Baryktabasov, Bakiev could control the situation (Hale, 2015, p.230). On other occasions, such as a multiday protest in November 2006 aimed at forcing Bakiev to adopt a parliamentarism constitution, a multiday uprising in November 20007 by former prime minister Kulov who wanted an early presidential election, the attempt to remove him from office in 2008 by Azimbek Beknazarov were all controlled (Hale, 2015, p.230). Furthermore, Bakiev’s reign faced opposition from most of the opposing figures and associates’ elites who formed the united popular movement and attempted a massive rally in March 2009 to remove him from power.
Despite winning a chance for an election, the opposition failed in the 2009 presidential election. Bakiev won seventy-six percent of the electoral vote, while opposition candidates Almaz Atambaevand Temir Sariev were divided among the remaining votes (Hale, 2015, p.231). Efforts to mobilize street protests to counter electoral results across the country fell stunningly and were quickly put down by a show of presidential-issued orders. In agreement with Hales, Bakiev’s dominance capability placed him in a better position to dominate a power pyramid during opposition challenges than Akaev. His dominating capability was seen during his first term when the former prime minister Kulov organized an uprising that led to clashes with the police in 2007 (Hale, 2015, p.231). In 2009, Bakiev’s chief of staff, Medet Sadyrkulov, resigned and was believed to back the opposition. Medet reportedly financed a presidential candidate from the opposition before his suspicious death in a car accident.
In his second term in office, Bakiev’s regime was almost ending, challenged by his opposition between July 2009 and April 2010. During his final time in office, Bakiev’s standing in public opinion had been falling at a high rate (Hale, 2015, p.232). The increasing negative popularity was due to the decreasing economy, inherited economic issues from the old regime, and monopolization of resources. Hales pens that even though Baviek had purchased large amounts of Russian credit to cushion the effects of the 2008 to 2009 global economic crisis, it was not enough to sustain the country until reelection. The financial crisis was felt in Kyrgyzstan by early 2010.
Moreover, Baviek should have addressed the issues of corruption in the electricity sector, causing vast national power shortages already in the old regime. To attribute his power, he desperately attempted to establish authority via a small circle of associates, mainly his relatives (Hale, 2015, p.232). The increasing monopolization of the state and its resources is merely attributed to most elites defecting and defying their rule without focusing on an election.
Civilian and elite increasing dissatisfaction with Baviek leadership was primarily attributed to most of his decisions. The death of journalist Gennady Pavliuk, known for openly criticizing Baviek’s regime, who was thrown from a six-story apartment with his hand and legs tapped, was connected to Kyrgyz special forces by a Kazakh television (Hale, 2015, p.233). Later in 2010, Baviek issued a crackdown on mass media, shutting and blocking internet outlets, radio, and television stations, hence controlling civilian information. Moreover, he passed several financial policies constraining significant parts of the population by doubling electricity, water, and heating prices. In addition, he put surcharges on mobile phone connections, which majorly targeted politicians. Baviek appointed his son Maksim as the chief executive officer of an Agency for investments and Economic Developments (Hale, 2015, p.233). This new agency received foreign investments and social and pension payments from the Kyrgyz financial treasury.
Russia was displeased with Baviek’s incompliancy to obey foreign policy. Russian displeasure was essential in warning the opposition by airing a critical report in 2010 that accused Baviek and his son of corruption on their televisions accessible in Kyrgyz (Hale, 2015, p.233). The signaling of corruption in Baviek’s regime facilitated defections from critical ministries under the opposition coordination. According to Hales, the event that crumbled Baviek’s administration was coordinating an extensive protest campaign against developments under the president, which was to happen in April 2010 (Hale, 2015, p.234). A day before the significant rally, Opposition Ata-Meken Party activist Bolot Sherniiazov was arrested in the Northern Kyrgyz City of Talas, where he had gone to finalize preparations for the protest. His arrest sparked street protests from the opposition, who seized the region’s governor’s office.
The seizure of gubernatorial offices and other state buildings ignited the Tulip Revolution. The fall of Talas led Baviek to order renowned opposition leaders’ arrests which enraged his adversaries (Hale, 2015, p.234). The major protest occurred with more wrath, with protesters shouting, “Today or Never.”The protest led to a clash between the police and protesters, each attacking with weapons. The police fired on protestants around the white house, and when the masses did not disperse, the police seemed edgy and unsupervised, leading to Baviek’s regime’s crumbling. Baviek and most top authorities escaped Kyrgyzstan for safety (Hale, 2015, p.234). Roza Otunbaeva assumed power in the new revolutionary regime after Baviek. This marked the second time an opposing administration took over the government through a revolution in Kyrgyzstan.
The blood-red revolution of 2010 differed from the Tulip Revolution due to its violent nature. Moreover, in contrast to the latter, the blood revolution escalated abruptly, while the former revolution demonstrated a gradual cascade of revolts and elite defections in the government. The Tulip revolution focal point focused on performing credible elections of new leaders, while The Blood revolution did not. Akiev and Baviek had monopolized regimes for wealth, forcing many alibi elites from the government. Akaev and Bakiev have been branded as weak and incompetent leaders who crumbled when the opposition mounted a challenge. The key driving factors of the patronal presidential revolution focused more on public support. Both revolutions employ the logical importance of elite collective coordination in controlling patronal presidential systems.
References
Hale, H. E. (2015). Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.