Introduction
Foreign politics have always been associated with various complexities, multiple temporal alliances, as well as successes and failures. The United Arab Emirates tries to develop effective and friendly relationships with other countries and contribute to the establishment of lasting political, social, and economic stability in the Gulf region. This paper includes a brief analysis of the Emirati intervention in the Syrian conflict based on Patrick M. Regan’s framework of foreign interventions in intrastate conflicts.
Emirati-Syrian Relationships
The relationship between the UAE and Syria was not always smooth due to different reasons associated with the political agenda in Syria. For instance, rather serious tension was apparent between the two countries in the early 2000s, but they normalized in the late 2000s (Daher, 2019). The stabilization was achieved and facilitated by the Doha Agreement of 2008, and the Emirati government, as well as businesses, were willing to cooperate with the Syrians. Ragab (2017) states that the Emirati foreign policy in Syria and other Gulf countries is characterized by the focus on direct negotiations, win-win propositions, and compromises. The UAE has relied on economic tools to develop relationships with Syria, which was also true in the 2000-2010s. The Emirati policymakers also established personal relationships with their peers in other countries to ensure the development of strong ties between nations.
After the start of uprisings in the Arab countries, including Syria, the UAE has changed its foreign policy. The UAE has reconsidered relations with some of the Gulf countries that could pose a considerable threat to Emirati national security (Hassan, 2018). For instance, the UAE took part in the international coalition and sent its military aid to Syria to fight against ISIS (Ragab, 2017). The UAE is also one of the major actors in the creation of the military Arab Coalition in 2015. The UAE opposed the regime of Bashar Assad in the early and mid-2010s. However, the Emirati perspective changed in the late 2010s, and, in 2018, the Emirati embassy in Damascus was re-opened. The country provides humanitarian aid to Syrian people trying to help in such areas as food security, healthcare, and construction (Daher, 2019). The UAE is now trying to develop relationships with the current Syrian government with a focus on construction (or rather re-construction), real estate, and tourism.
Syrian Intrastate Conflict and the Intervention of the UAE as a Third Party
As mentioned above the conflict in Syria had a profound negative effect on its relations with the UAE in the early 2010s. The ties that had been established prior to the crisis in Syria could not be maintained. The Emirati participation in the military coalition that was involved in armed operations on the territory of this Arab country contributed to the deterioration of any interstate relationships between the two nations in question. Regan (1996) notes that interventions in intrastate conflicts may often be unsuccessful and have an adverse impact on the relations between the two countries. The researcher also stresses that the success of the intervention largely depends on the characteristics of the intervention rather than the nature or peculiarities of the conflict. It is possible to apply this framework to estimate the effectiveness of the Emirati intervention in the Syrian crisis and further development of the relationship between these Gulf states.
First, it is critical to define the terms in order to evaluate the outcomes of Emirati foreign policy regarding Syria after the early 2010s. Regan (1996) defines intrastate conflict as “conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups within boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities” (p. 338). The researcher justifies the number of fatalities by the fact that although it is lower as compared to more common estimations, it tends to show the intensity of the conflict and its potential for escalation (Regan, 1996). The groups may be based on ethnic, religious, political, and economic grounds.
Based on this definition, it is possible to note that the crisis in Syria is an intrastate conflict. As for the use of armament, the governmental forces started using tanks and other heavy weapons against protesters in different protest hubs in 2011, only a few months after the start of peaceful protests (Jabbour et al., 2021). The groups involved in the conflict were largely associated with economic, political, and social aspects. After several years of droughts, the absence of meaningful reforms, ineffective governmental management, and the galloping impoverishment of the population led to uprisings. The fatalities in this conflict reached over 550 thousand deaths during ten years of the conflict (Jabbour et al., 2021). At that, the death toll related to the uprisings during the first months of 2011 reached about 500 people. Hence, all the features of an intrastate conflict are apparent, so the Syrian crisis can be referred to as an intrastate conflict.
As far as the nature of Emirati involvement in the Syrian crisis and its effectiveness is concerned, it can be referred to as third-party intervention to a limited extent. The third-party intervention encompasses the provision of support to one of the opposing groups in an intrastate conflict by a foreign country’s governmental or opposition forces (Regan, 1996). Third-party interventions can take different forms, including military, diplomatic, economic. Humanitarian aid is excluded from this kind of intervention as it does not lead to meaningful changes in or the termination of the conflict. As mentioned above, the UAE participated in the coalition of countries that conducted military campaigns against ISIS on the Syrian territory (Ragab, 2017). However, the UAE did not support either Assad’s or his opponents’ forces. Therefore, the country did not intervene in terms of the military aspect.
The Emirati government also used diplomatic instruments to contribute to the conflict’s resolution. The Emirati embassy was closed in 2012, and the UAE condemned the reaction of Assad’s forces for the excessive violence that led to devastating outcomes (Daher, 2019). The country supported Syrians residing in the UAE and in Syria, developing ties and plans for future investments in post-Assad Syria. At the same time, the Syrian embassy still operated in Abu Dhabi, and the Emirati government let Assad’s relatives and people supporting the regime come to the country. Business as usual with pro-governmental forces was also a part of the UAE’s government’s relations with Syrians. Therefore, economic and diplomatic involvement in the conflict cannot be referred to as a conventional third-party intervention.
UAE-Syria Relations as a Case for Regan’s Model
It is often believed that the decision to intervene in an intrastate conflict is largely determined by the nature of the conflict. However, Regan (1998) argues that the decision-making process mainly depends on the internal evaluations of the third party. According to Regan (1998), three major factors that are intermingled and dependent on each other affect the decision to intervene: costs, outcomes, and the likelihood of success. A successful intervention can be defined as the intervention associated with low costs (finance, manpower, country’s internal and international image). In addition, intervention is successful if the outcomes include the termination of the conflict and the establishment of the leadership willing to collaborate effectively with the third party. These two conditions are critical for evaluating an intervention as successful.
The UAE’s position and its non-involvement as a third party is an illustration of an effective application of the model. The analysis of Emirati’s potential involvement in the conflict suggests that the likelihood of its success was very low. As for potential costs, it is necessary to note that the provision of considerable military and economic (food, construction supplies) support would have a negative impact on the Emirati economic situation. The world economic instability made many countries of the Gulf face significant challenges in the 2010s. Sending Emirati troops, taking one of the opposing Syrian forces’ parts, would be an unacceptable cost for the UAE. The UAE society was unprepared to tolerate the death of Emirati soldiers in the Syrian intrastate conflict.
One of the reasons for that is closely linked to religious and cultural aspects. The uprisings in Syria had a completely social impetus in 2011, but different internal groups (supported by such external actors as Iran, Turkey, and Russia) shifted the focus of the protest. A full-scale civil war that started in Syria was associated with the struggle of Sunni and Shia Muslims and their control over the country (Khatib, 2017). The majority of the UAE’s population are Sunni Muslims (approximately 70%), while Shia Muslims also constitute a considerable part (over 10%). Hence, the involvement in the conflict seen as a tension between Sunnis and Shias could lead to adverse outcomes for the UAE. The conflict could be imported to the UAE, or it could lead to considerable social turmoil.
As far as the outcomes of the involvement regarding the empowerment of the groups ready to collaborate with the UAE, this aspect is also rather associated with uncertainty. The development of relationships with the opposing groups the Emirati government managed to maintain shows that both opposing forces would be cooperative in the spheres the UAE would collaborate (business, investment, and humanitarian aspects) (Daher, 2019). At that, the support of one group that would eventually succumb could make the establishment with the other group more difficult.
Finally, the international image of the UAE is another important factor to consider when considering the possibility of intervening. The UAE has worked on attaining a leading position in the Gulf region, developing an image of a hub where western, Arab, and Asian countries could collaborate effectively (Ragab, 2017). These efforts have been successful in many respects as the UAE is involved in diverse international projects aimed at solving global issues. In the Middle East, the UAE is one of the leading powers trying to keep the balance and stability in the region. The Emirati government makes an effort (in coalitions with partners or alone) to prevent the empowerment of Iran in the region and minimize the effects of the involvement of such actors as Iraq, Turkey, and Russia. As to the Syrian crisis, western countries and Arab states have, in many cases, different approaches to the problem, so the Emirati government made a decision not to intervene in the conflict.
Conclusion
On balance, the UAE and Syria relations have fluctuated since 2003 due to the civil war in Syria. Although the Emirati government was involved in some military, economic, and humanitarian projects, this participation cannot be referred to as a third-party involvement in an intrastate conflict. The decision not to intervene can be justified with the use of the model offered by Regan. The estimation of costs, outcomes, and the likelihood of success suggests that the decision not to intervene was beneficial for the UAE.
References
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