Introduction
The bilateral ties between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates are referred to as Pakistan–UAE relations. Pakistani and the United Arab Emirates are close associates who share ethnic similarities and a common faith (Muslim). These ties go back to 1971, when the United Arab Emirates was established, and have expanded to include wide-ranging collaboration in various fields. The United Arab Emirates was the only nation to recognize Pakistan, and it remains a significant contributor of economic and monetary aid to Pakistan. Other relationships between the two states are the military and defense relations.
Additionally, the United Arab Emirates values Pakistan’s impact on developing significant UAE establishments, and Pakistan values the UAE’s investment in Pakistani’s economy and groundwork. Further, the UAE has more than often intervened in the domestic affairs of Pakistan. According to the prudent governance of the United Arab Emirates, one of the goals of the UAE’s foreign guiding principle is to help cordial and friendly nations in periods of crisis and both domestic and natural adversities by availing open-handed and public-spirited support.
Main body
The general relationships between the UAE and Pakistan are diplomatic and mutual religious ties. For the diplomatic relations, this would be the fiftieth anniversary between the UAE and Pakistan, an indication of the special friendship. According to Bloomberg (2021), under de facto ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE, which has long had trade and political ties with India and Pakistan, has engaged a different firm universal position.
The most significant change has occurred in the Middle East, where the Gulf Arab state has participated in disputes and supported area leaders. Consequently, Pakistan was involved in the groundwork of the UAEAF. Air Cdre Ayaz Ahmed Khan was the first Chief of Air Staff of the UAE, appointed by Sheikh Zayed, and was followed by Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers Ghulam Haider, Jamal A. Khan, and Feroz.
The UAE backed the United States’ pronouncement to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan to boost its air force, claiming that the transaction would not change the balance of power between India and Pakistan. And following that, the UAEAF had close to fifty-five Pakistan flying instructors as of 2004.
An excellent example of the intervention being analyzed is the interstate conflict between Pakistan and India. Although Pakistan and India are opponents, the UAE maintains two-sided relationships with both countries. According to “UAE brokering secret India-Pakistan peace roadmap: Officials” (2021), India and Pakistan have completed numerous harmony propositions over the years, to have them speedily fail, predominantly because both parties often use the subject to inflame tensions during voting periods. All through the up-to-the-minute history of the two countries, the Emirati and Pakistani leaders have preserved close-by associations.
The United Arab Emirates is interested in Pakistan’s energy division and military because of the potential to capitalize on productive substructure and trade ventures (Bloomberg, 2021). The dispute between India and Pakistan is, first and foremost, correlated with significant monetary risks for the UAE. The Pakistani navy’s blockade of western Indian ports jeopardizes the protection and safekeeping of sea lanes and liberty, course-plotting, and trade courses.
In recent years, India and Pakistan have continued to have uncensored conflict. While the two nations have committed themselves more than once to the casual 2003 ceasefire in 2013, 2015, and 2018 (Diplomat, 2021), there have been continued conflicts transpiring amid them. However, recently, UAE has projected power in the Pakistan and India appeasement conversations.
After numerous years of escalating hostility, Pakistan and India have recently edged closer to a dĂ©tente, with an unexpected interlocutor officially urging them to put their differences aside: The UAE (Chaudry, 2021). Reportedly, the Pakistan and India ceasefire pact manifested a milestone in current dialogues brokered by the United Arab Emirates. It’s worth noting, however, that the United Arab Emirates has seemingly played a crucial part in acquiring peace between Pakistan and India on many occasions in current years.
To account for interference in ethnic conflict, one must strike a steadiness amid the two driving powers. Superseding in a dispute between two countries is a dangerous proposition for a third party, according to Carment and James (2000). Nevertheless, history shows that several times a detached government intercedes to find a resolution to a conflict such as the UAE in the Pakistan-India conflict.
Evaluating previous and current intercessions requires an indulgence of the pre-disposing dynamics that lead an external player to enter a clash (Carment and James, 2000). The prevalent ideology in universal policymaking is realism, which states that a third party only intercedes when its domestic securities are put in danger. The third party negotiates for international and domestic considerations. Conversely, the theory’s “k” critics believe that legal, public-spirited, and governmental concerns like the conditions, forces, and factors take precedence in affecting external action.
One of the major dynamics that led to the UAE intervening in the domestic affairs of Pakistan was the economic factors. According to Petricevic & Teece (2019), Pakistani makes the second most significant sum of immigrants existing in the United Arab Emirates. Further, their article indicates that foreign strategy is a task of the welfares of a performer alongside Pakistan being vital to the lucrative growth of the UAE. The foreign course of action is a part of any player’s desires, not an emotional component.
Expatriate savings and work account for a large share of the United Arab Emirate economy. With 1.6 million jobs, Pakistanis are the following leading group of immigrants in the UAE, after Indians. After Saudi Arabia, the UAE is the next utmost popular destination for Pakistanis seeking employment. These statistics demonstrate how important Pakistan is to the UAE’s lucrative growth. As a result, the UAE had every excuse to interfere in Pakistan’s domestic concerns to protect its economic securities.
The United Arab Emirates ruminate Pakistan to be a significant trade and industry partner, given the existence of enormous commercial prospective in both the UAE and Pakistan, which are to be fully exploited to realize extreme reciprocal gain for the two states’ individuals in different divisions of the economy, including ventures, corporate growth, and shared ventures.
As the UAE aspects for more commercial collaboration with Pakistan, the UAE hopes to subsidize Pakistan’s growth and its terrains over various UAE ingenuities and developments. They enable financial and societal change and ensure a thriving future for the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, who share a common preemptive visualization.
The dispute between India and Pakistan is, first and foremost, correlated with significant economic jeopardies for the UAE. Pakistan’s navy blockade of western Indian harbors jeopardizes the protection and safety of marine lanes and the liberty of navigation along vocational routes (Gabel et al. 2020). As a result, Pakistan’s invasion could obstruct the import of goods into the nation, preventing the UAE from carrying out its plot to upsurge oil quantity to the state. As a result, total oil revenues could suffer a significant drop. Furthermore, the dispute could obstruct the effective conduct of cross-border profitable and trade undertakings.
The second element leading to the UAE intervention in the domestic affairs of Pakistan are the geopolitical factors. The difficult resolutions to intervene in the interior occurrences of specified states are exacerbated by the composite geopolitical problems that confront South Asia’s nations. Even though most of the countries in the area have good bilateral relationships, there is a persistent sense of hatred in the area. For example, India poses a notable risk to Pakistan because it controls nearly 33% of its territory (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2010).
Nevertheless, for the UAE to retain its position as a successful ally, it had to hold up Pakistan while remaining wary of upsetting India. The United Arab Emirates has been arbitrating between India and Pakistan to assist the nuclear-armed opponents in establishing a safe and operational partnership. The UAE had also arbitrated in the long-running Jammu-Kashmir dispute between the two nations. Since Pakistan’s broad allies are zonally close to the UAE, the geopolitical topography of any predicament suggests that the
United Arab Emirates regime ought to help Pakistan. Consequently, this would allow the UAE to reduce state security threats.
The other dynamic that led to the UAE intervening in the domestic affairs of Pakistan was the strategic factor. Historically, the United Arab Emirates and Iran have a long-standing rivalry hence the ran nuclear power threat. According to Ahmed & Bhatnagar (2010), Iran is at the core of the UAE’s menace awareness, which stems from state clashes and a broader fright of Iran’s regional itinerary of promoting Shia securities in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.
As a result, the UAE has frequently chastised Iran’s ambitions, especially in the aftermath of the nuclear deal. Consequently, since UAE does not have nuclear power of its own and Pakistan is an Islamic nuclear state, the United Arab Emirates ought to relate with and create friendly relations with states with nuclear power and Pakistan. With that in mind, it is evident why the United Arab Emirates is focused on preventing Pakistani from falling into the arms of Iran.
In theory, a third party mediates in the internal concerns of another self-governing state grounded on several realism-based dynamics. According to Carment and James (2000), third parties in most cases step in for the promotion of domestic interests. Even so, both universal and domestic contemplations inspire aggression as well as the reasonable prospect for accomplishment. Internal securities, which may be deliberate, commercial, safety, or civil, are the essential dynamics. The superseding country must objectively assess the expenses and welfare of the mediations.
Furthermore, a foreign actor intercedes because of a substantial populace of the elaborate state’s cultural, spiritual, or ethnic rapport, as stated by Regan (1998). In the words of the article, countries would opt out of possible mediations for various causes, including internal and universal concerns. Still, it would not be expected for a governmental leader to interfere in a dispute where the strategy was likely to flop (Regan, 1998). In such cases, it would be expected for the decision-maker to choose a different course of action. Finally, if two countries share a significant portion of their boundaries, a third party can interfere in the internal concerns of the other.
Intermediation strategies’ budgets and profits are usually divided into two categories: internal and local. Internal expenses and profits may be thought of regarding political consequences or on-looker’s expenditures (Regan, 1998). However, mediation has human and quantifiable costs, but they are frequently converted into partisan considerations by policymakers. Universal charges and profits, contrastingly, are primarily associated with nationwide safety but can include content and audience expenses.
However, practical involvements, therefore, optimize political gains while reducing political expenditures. Failure, on the other hand, tends to do the reverse. Thus, the human, material, and political costs of action are all entwined, connecting the decision-making process to the political field.
Additionally, the far-reaching constraints of these expenditures and paybacks must be understood by resolution-makers as they grapple with contradictory guidance, alienated fidelities, and governmental apathy that characterize any multifaceted resolution. Correspondingly relevant is the idea that the degree of expenditures and welfare allied with any specific mediation program will be closely related.
The empirical case supports the theory that the United Arab Emirates’ domestic benefits obliged it to act in one voice. According to Carment and James (2000), realism supports the logical and rational decision-making witnessed in the United Arab Emirates engagements. Under the de facto ruler, the UAE, which has long had trade and political ties with Pakistani and India, has followed a more self-assured universal stance.
The most significant change has occurred in the Middle East, where the Gulf Arab state has participated in disputes and supported local leaders. Further than its position as a worldwide commercial and logistics core, it has also regarded Asia to reinforce political coalitions. The UAE’s resolution to arbitrate in Pakistan was rationally focused on the UAE’s welfare, like Pakistan’s geopolitical position, trade and industry, and strategic location. Irrespective of their civil beliefs, both UAE frontrunners identify that it is irrational to make choices that damage the state’s interests, both cultural and spiritual (Regan, 1998). Consequently, they played a vital part in the resolution to interfere, hence, the UAE’s high expectations of Pakistan.
Standard configuration, cultural alignment and affiliation, and cleavage must all be included in enduring national sovereignty tactics. Although the temporary remedy for how to do this can vary dependent on the circumstances, such as conflict inhibition and intermediation (Carment and James, 1998), the durable consequences of clash controlling are apparent.
To enhance how such problems are addressed, exploration and concrete knowledge must be combined. An emphasis on countries like the UAE’s various modes of involvement demonstrates how logistics cosmoses have developed critical arenas for strategic and geo-economic intermediations, aspirations, and encounters.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems that both domestic and foreign factors affect the resolution to arbitrate, with intense clashes attracting fewer external players and public-spirited crises attracting far more. A perplexing finding indicates that the more common boundaries there are, the less possibly external interference is. In the case of the UAE and Pakistan, the dynamics leading to the interventions in domestic affairs include the economic factors, the geopolitical factors, and the strategic factor (Iran’s nuclear power threat).
Additionally, both religious and ethnic interests played a massive part in the UAEs decision to act as one voice. Theoretically, the United Arab Emirates intervened in Pakistan’s domestic affairs based on several realism-based factors alongside rationally weighing the benefits and costs of the interventions.
References
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