Background of the Case: Important Highlights
The case under analysis, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U. S., 130 S. Ct. 2971 L. Ed. 2d 838, focuses on the confrontation between Hastings College of the Law headed by dean Martinez and the Christian Legal Society (CLS). The college required the recognition of students group by student organizations irrespective of the student’s status and beliefs. However, when the CLS called for subscribing to a “Statement of Beliefs” that deviated from the established norms of behavior, Hastings admitted that CLS could not be regarded as a student organization.
Specifically, “Statement of Beliefs” introduced by the CLS did not accept the behavior and beliefs of LGBT students, as well those who support the groups. The CLS sued stating that Hastings College of the Law violated the organization’s right to protest against LGBT and non-Christian students. In response, a campus gay group called Hastings Outlaw was represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights to defend the policy.
Procedural history
In the course of trial, the petitioner found it reasonable to adhere to Hastings’s arguments. Hence, even if a student does not belief in the Bible, he/she should be allowed to study the discipline; if the CLS does not admit students to the course, the college will prevent them from participating in its forum for speech. The main arguments here is that, according to the First Amendment, a public forum should be inclusive and open; however, the participants have the right to their own choice. Justice Anthony Kennedy admitted that the presented arguments are fundamental, but reference should also be made to the Stipulations 17 and 18 at 220 of the Joint Appendix that supersede the arguments presented in the Hastings’ statement.
In response, the petitioner reasoned that both stipulations justified the Hastings’ position. Justice Scalia remarked that all-comers policy had a broader application than the nondiscrimination policy. The latter, thus, had a significant impact on religious organization whereas the former was applicable to every entity. The petitioner reasoned that both polices did not justify the CLS’s actions because they contradicted the U. S. Constitution.
Issues and Questions Raised Before the Court
Did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err when it held runs opposing the decisions made by the Seventh Circuit Court concerning the case Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F. 3d 853 (2006)?
Ruling: The Decision
The decision was written by the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld the decision made by the Ninth Circuit.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth District affirmed the case, arguing that the school’s conditions on acknowledging students groups were reasonable and up to the point. The U. S. States Supreme Court asserted that Hastings had the right to require official recognition of specific students groups according to the First Amendment.
Analysis
The CLS sued the university for declaratory and injunctive relief according to 42 U. S. C. $ 1983 arguing that Hastings’ denial to invite the group to RSO program contradicted the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of associations. In the course of cross-examinations, the Court of Appeal upheld Hastings. The Ninth District stated that the all-comers should have had an equal access to the school because they found it viewpoint neutral and reasonable.
The U. S. Supreme Court supported the decision made by the Ninth Court, arguing that college’s policy was based on reasonable and viewpoint conditions and, therefore, it did not infringe the First Amendment restrictions. Based on similar assumptions, the Court had to apply less restricted measures concerning scrutiny of speech and counseled similar results in the case. According to the Court’s view, Hastings did not require the CLS to allow any student, nor did the college banish any speech.
In fact, the opponent merely established the terms for utilizing the school’s funds and facilities. Additionally, the court denied the CLS’s argument concerning free deployment and realization of religion, arguing that the Nondiscrimination Policy did not outline religious beliefs, but was generally applied and of neutral viewpoint. Therefore, the RSO document was justified.
The Court stated that student organization’s principles violated the Constitution. The CLS contended, stating that the policy targeted solely groups disapproving of a specific sexual behavior and admitting that other association could restrict their membership to students adhered to a specific ideology. The argument contradicted the presented stipulation of facts submitted by the parties at the summary-judgment stage. The court procedures also involved the consideration of the cases Healy v. James 408 U.S. 169 (1972), Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981).
With regard to the above-analyzed cases, the Court insisted that the First Amendment generally prevented public universities from refusing student associations to access public forums due to different viewpoints. With regard to the presented analysis, particular reference should be made to the CLS’s constitutional arguments. At this point, the Nondiscrimination Policy document postulated that discrimination was prohibited as far as sexual orientation and religious affiliation were concerned.
In this respect, CLS withdrew the program’s policy because it contradicted organization’s policy and limited other associations’ free access to leadership and memberships of individuals supporting the group’s ideology. According to local rules provided by the District Court, stipulated facts were out of discussions and, therefore, if Stipulations 17 and 18 were approved, the case could rely on these regulations.
The factual stipulations can be considered “formal concessions… that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issues and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact”1. In this respect, the judicial decision is conclusive. Based on the assumptions presented in the joint stipulation, both the Ninth Circuit and the District Court attained much importance to the constitutionality concerning the all-comers requirement. The U. S. Supreme Court denied the CLS’s attempt to ignore the stipulation focusing more on its targets as to Hastings’ written policy.
Another series of the courts decisions revealed the laws and regulations contradicted the freedom of associations. In the light of this, the U. S. Supreme Court imposed restrictions on freedom of speech because public interest did not suppress the generally accepted ideas. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Additionally, freedom of association “…presupposes a freedom not to associate” Roberts, 468 U. S., at 623. Provided that organization includes unwelcome participants, it can also directly affect associational rights.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens stated that the CLS denied the participation of those students engaged in impenitent homosexual conduct and those mistreating people according to gender and race. Stevens did not uphold the CLS position regarding the First Amendment stipulating that the association had the right to protect discriminatory practices. The problem is that the organization did not entail a public school to support such practices.
Justice Stevens argued that discriminative beliefs were irrelevant. Specifically, no evidence was found that certain views held by individuals might distort those ideas. The policy’s religion provisions were plainly aimed at promoting religious freedom, but not at determining it. To be more precise, the established policy could have serious outcomes for religious groups. Thus, Reliance of on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did not highlight any evidence for discrimination in relation to the CLS.
Justice Kennedy also concurred. In particular, he stated that, in order to be effective, a limited school’s forum would exclude speakers judging from their affiliation, as presented in the case. Justice also paid attention to the content of Registered Student Organization program that was aimed at fostering interaction between students and at encouraging their viewpoints. The program also supported the development of students’ interests and skills. Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls 536 U. S. 822, 831, n. 4 (2002). Finally, the document focused on encouraging students to share experience and ideas.
Rule
The Court procedures were held according to the old rules, including the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Rights of Freedom of Association and Freedom of Speech. The application of Joint Appendix, stipulations 17 and 18, were also justified by U.S. S. C. 26. These stipulations affirmed the Hastings’ accusations and approved the U. S. Const. amend. I and U. S. Const. amend. XIV.
Dissenting Opinions
It has long been recognized that litigants “[a]re entitled to have [their] case tried upon the assumption that …facts stipulated into the record, were established” H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U. S. 442, 447 (1905)2. Regarding a leading legal reference, stipulations “…are binding and conclusive … and the fact stated are not subject to subsequent variation”3. Accordingly, the Court refused to consider the party’s argument that did not correspond to a joint stipulation.
The above-considered critique was supported by Justice Alito, Justice Scalia and Thomas. They criticized the explained principles, believing that right to expression was not accepted in case it offended the established norms of political correctness in the US educational institutions. In addition, Justice Alito held that many public institutions apply to this unconstitutional stipulation for the purpose of suppressing unpopular groups.
While considering the case from the dissenting viewpoint, Hastings violated the rights of the Christian Legal society by outlawing discrimination based on religion. However, the presented decisions can undergo serious criticism. Despite the fact that the First Amendment may serve as the basis for protecting CLS’s discriminatory polices outside campus, it does not argue that a public university must validate the position or uphold it.
As it has been mentioned before, the written policy runs that the Nondiscrimination Policy is viewpoint neutral because it does not reflect arguments presented by the school’s official representatives concerning the essentials of group’s speech. It does not exclude other related groups on the basis of their convictions either. The point is that the policy is more oriented on the association’s activity, but not on its philosophical clauses. Consequently, the dissent accepts Hastings’ position to bar discrimination related to religion.
It is very useful to highlight that Hastings’ policy is strongly associated with the all-comers acceptance policy which deprives the Court of difficult task to defend the legality and rightfulness of either of policies invoked by Hastings. The evidence reveals that Hastings refused the CLS’s adherence to the Nondiscrimination Policy and, therefore, the all-comers policy was not discovered until it was presented by Martinez.
Conclusions
In whole, it should be noted that the consideration of the First Amendment with regard to public polices and the RSO program is quite contradictive and sophisticated. On the one hand, the case confirms the rightfulness of the actions imposed by Hastings college because their policies and programs bear a public character. On the other hand, the CLS rights to preserve its rights to discriminate can also be viewed through the prism of the U. S. Constitution. However, in case the college is local, it should still be subjected to public establishment in order to avoid legal problems. Nevertheless, the decision presented by the U. S. Supreme Court can be justified because it is applicable to all polices irrespective of their character. The CLS’s activities are considered unlawful.
References:
Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F. 3d 853 (2006).
Healy v. James 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995).
Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls 536 U. S. 822, 831, n. 4 (2002).
Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U. S. 442, 447 (1905).
Footnotes
- K. Broun, McCornick on Evidence § 254, p. 181 (6th ed. 2006).
- Record evidence. See JA. at 220, S. 17-18.
- 83 C. J. S. Stipulations § 93 (2000).